JUDGMENT : Jaspreet Singh, J. 1. This is an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, whereby the appellant insurance company has assailed the judgment and award dated 13.07.2005 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No.6, Sitapur in MAC Petition No.33/2003 (Smt. Usha Devi and others vs. Ram Das and others) awarding a sum of Rs.3,08,000/- as compensation alongwith interest @ 6% per annum from the date of judgment to the date of payment against the appellant. 2. Briefly, the facts are that on 18.12.2001 at around 04:30 PM on Sitapur-Lucknow G.T. Road Near New Krishna Hall adjacent to Kamalpur Police Station, District Sitapur, the deceased Dukhi Ram was travelling in a Tempo of a Mahendra Economy Jeep No.UP-32-Z-9360. The aforesaid vehicle met with an accident wherein a Truck bearing registration No.JK-02-F-9281 coming from the wrong direction collided with Mahendra Economy Jeep as a result of which the driver namely Dukhi Ram sustained injuries and died. His wife and two minor daughters, who are the respondents No.1 to 3 before this Court instituted a claim petition, which was registered as C.P. No.33/2003. The respondent No.7 was the owner of the Jeep which was being driven by the deceased Dukhi Ram. The respondent No.5 is the owner of the offending Truck No.JK-02-F-9281 while its driver Ramesh Kumar is the respondent No.6. The offending truck was insured with the appellant, while the jeep was insured with the respondent No.8 i.e. New India Assurance Company Ltd. 3. It was specifically pleaded by the claimants before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal that on 18.12.2001 at around 04:30 PM, Shri Dukhi Ram, who was driver of Mahendra Economy Jeep No.UP-32-Z-9360 was driving the vehicle on its own side while the offending Truck No.JK-02-F-9281 came from the opposite direction and was being driven on the right side of the road which led to the accident in question in which Shri Dukhi Ram sustained injuries and ultimately succumbed to his injuries. The first information report was lodged in respect of the accident on 18.12.2001 at 06:30 PM, which was registered as Case Crime No.256/2001 under Sections 279, 338, 304-A IPC. 4. The first information report was lodged in respect of the accident on 18.12.2001 at 06:30 PM, which was registered as Case Crime No.256/2001 under Sections 279, 338, 304-A IPC. 4. It was also alleged that the driver Dukhi Ram was able to earn Rs.5,000/- per month and his wife and his two minor daughters were fully dependent on the deceased and on account of accident they not only lost the income, but have also lost the consortium, love and affection from Dukhi Ram. 5. The dependents i.e. wife Smt. Usha Devi and two minor daughters initially instituted a claim petition, however, one Smt. Phulwasa made an application for impleadment being the mother of the deceased (though significant to note that she had remarried), the Tribunal permitted her to be impleaded as one of the claimants and she came to be impleaded as claimant No.4. 6. The claim petition was contested by the owner of the jeep wherein it stated that the offending truck in question was solely responsible for the accident and it was being driven on the wrong side rashly and negligently. It was also brought to record that the deceased Dukhi Ram had a valid driver's licence and the Jeep was duly insured with the New India Assurance Company Ltd. The owner and the driver of the truck filed their respective written statements denying the accident. However, in the alternate took plea that in case if the accident was proved then as the truck was duly insured with Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., and the driver had an effective driver's licence. Thus, the liability would be of the insurance company. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed five issues. The Tribunal considered issues No.1 and 5 together to the effect that whether on 18.12.2001, the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving of truck bearing No.JK-02-F-9281 and issue No.5 was whether the deceased caused the accident on account of his own negligence. 8. The Tribunal while considering the aforesaid two issues after consideration of the evidence held that Dukhi Ram was driving the vehicle on his own side cautiously and safely rather it was the truck bearing No.JK-02-F-9281, who was responsible for the accident as its driver Shri Ramesh Kumar was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently. 8. The Tribunal while considering the aforesaid two issues after consideration of the evidence held that Dukhi Ram was driving the vehicle on his own side cautiously and safely rather it was the truck bearing No.JK-02-F-9281, who was responsible for the accident as its driver Shri Ramesh Kumar was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently. It also returned a finding that the truck in question was duly insured with Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. However, as far as the issue No.3 is concerned, it held that though the driver of the truck did not have a valid licence but while concluding his finding it has laid the liability on the insurance company on the premise that the driver had a valid and effective driver's licence. 9. The main issue which is contested was regarding the issue No.4 which related to the quantum of compensation and who was entitled to receive. 10. Smt. Phulwasa, who was the claimant No.4, examined herself and in her cross-examination, she stated that Smt.Usha was the wife of Dukhi Ram and two minor daughters were also residing with Smt. Usha alongwith Dukhi Ram. Dukhi Ram was 25 years of age, however, she went on to state that her son Dukhi Ram was earlier married twice and both the earlier wives had left him as per customary divorce from the Panchayat. She further went on to state that Usha Devi was her third daughter-in-law, who has been residing with her son and Kumari Rishu and Kumari Kajal were daughters of Dukhi Ram. She stated that though Smt.Usha Devi and Dukhi Ram were residing as husband and wife however their marriage was not performed by taking "Feras" 11. The Tribunal after considering the aforesaid facts and evidence on record found that since Smt. Phulwasa had already remarried, therefore, though she was a heir of deceased Dukhi Ram, but was not entitled to any compensation as she was not a dependent. The Tribunal considering the age of the deceased to be 25 years and taking a notional income of Rs.3,000/- after making a statutory deduction of 1/3rd, applied a multiplier of 17 and awarded a sum of Rs.3,06,000/- + Rs.2,000/- towards funeral expenses, a total sum of Rs.3,08,000/- + 6% interest out of which half was apportioned in favour of Smt. Usha Devi (wife) and other half was equally apportioned between two minor daughters Kumari Rishu and Kumari Kajal. 12. 12. It is this award, which has been assailed by the appellant insurance company primarily raising 3 submissions. (1) That as per the statement of Smt. Phulwasa, Smt. Usha Devi was not vaidly married as there was no "Feras". Consequently, she could not be treated as a valid wife. Coupled with the fact that the earlier two ladies with whom Dukhi Ram was married though were living elsewhere and there is an allegation of customary divorce by Panchayat, yet in any situation, Usha Devi could not be treated as the wife and, therefore, she was not entitled to claim compensation. (2) The next limb of argument emanating from the first was that since the marriage between Dukhi Ram and Usha Devi was not valid, consequently, the children i.e. Kumari Rishu and Kumari Kajal born from the wedlock were also not legitimate children, accordingly, they were also not entitled and thus, the Tribunal has grossly erred in granting award in their favour. (3) The third submission raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that while dealing with the Issue No.3, the Tribunal categorically noted the admitted fact that the driver of the truck namely Ramesh Kumar did not possess an effective driver's licence inasmuch as his driving licence was valid only up till 25.06.1999 and was not valid on 18.12.2001 i.e. on the date of accident and yet while giving his finding on the aforesaid issue, the Tribunal held that the driver of the truck had a valid driver's licence and in view of the contradictory findings especially when the record established that the driver of the truck did not possess an effective driver's licence on the date of accident. Thus, the liability could not have been fastened on the insurance company. 13. The Court has heard Shri U.P.S. Kushwaha, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri K.K. Singh Rathore, learned counsel for the claimants-respondents and has gone through the record carefully. None appeared for the respondents No.4 to 8. 14. Thus, the liability could not have been fastened on the insurance company. 13. The Court has heard Shri U.P.S. Kushwaha, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri K.K. Singh Rathore, learned counsel for the claimants-respondents and has gone through the record carefully. None appeared for the respondents No.4 to 8. 14. The question that requires determination in this appeal are formulated as under:- (i) Whether in a motor accident claim matter even if a lady not strictly proved to be married yet was residing with the deceased and being a dependent is she entitled to receive compensation?; (ii) Whether the children born from such relationship which is more in the nature of marriage could be treated as illegitimate and such children whether can be granted compensation? (iii) Whether the driving licence of the driver of the offending vehicle was valid and effective? 15. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgments, reported in 1994 AIR Page 135 (SC) = 1994 SCC (1) Page 407 - Surjet Kaur vs. Garja Singh, AIR 2010 SC Page 2685 - Bharatha Matha & Anr. vs. R. Vijaya Renganathan & Ors., and C.M.A. No.491 of 2005 - Manonmani vs. R. Ranjitham, decided on 27.03.2006 by the Hon'ble Madras High Court. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant has mainly built his arguments on the provisions contained in Sections 5 and 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act and on the strength of the aforesaid provisions it was urged that since in presence of the earlier wives though they were separated or even a customary divorce was stated yet in absence of any evidence thereto it could not be taken to mean that there was a valid divorce and, therefore, the third marriage was not valid marriage and Smt. Usha Devi was not entitled to compensation and stretching the arguments Shri U.P.S. Kushwaha went on to urge that the children born from the aforesaid wedlock were also not legitimate and no compensation could have been granted. 17. In order to answer the first question, it would be appropriate to note the Scheme of the Act of 1988. At the very outset, section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 may be noted, which is being reproduced hereinafter: "166. 17. In order to answer the first question, it would be appropriate to note the Scheme of the Act of 1988. At the very outset, section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 may be noted, which is being reproduced hereinafter: "166. Application for compensation.--(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made-- (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be: Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed: Provided that where no claim for compensation under section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant. (3) * * * (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act." 18. From the perusal of the aforesaid, it clearly indicates that where a death has resulted from an accident, an application for compensation can be made by, or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. 19. The word 'legal representative' has not been defined under the Motor Vehicles Act and thus the definition of the word 'legal representative' contained under the Code of Civil Procedure can be referred and relied upon. 19. The word 'legal representative' has not been defined under the Motor Vehicles Act and thus the definition of the word 'legal representative' contained under the Code of Civil Procedure can be referred and relied upon. Section 2(11) CPC reads as under:- "2(11) "legal representative" means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued." 20. Thus, from the perusal of the aforesaid, it would be abundantly clear that (a) the word legal representatives means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person; (b) any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and (c) where a party sues or is sued in a representative character, the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the parties so suing or sued. The rights of heirship is not involved in determining as to who is or is not the legal representatives though ordinarily all legal heirs are also legal representatives but the converse is not true. Thus, the expression legal representative is inclusive in character and its scope is very wide. 21. At this stage, the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahemdabad vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and another, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1690 , shall be useful and is reproduced as under:- "While the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 provides that such suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased, Section 110-A(1) of the Act says that the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of the legal representatives of the de- ceased. A legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. It is further seen from Section 110-B of the Act that the Claims Tribunal is authorised to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. It is further seen from Section 110-B of the Act that the Claims Tribunal is authorised to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was "new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new" the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers. sisters and brothers' children and some times foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents." (Emphasis supplied) 22. From the above, it would indicate that the view taken is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscious having regard to the conditions prevailing in the society. Earlier in terms of Fatal Accidents Act, 1885, the provisions therein allowed benefit of filing a suit only to the wife, husband, parents and child of the deceased. Now upon comparing the language of Section 166 of the Act of 1988 with the provisions of Fatal Accident Act, it would reveal that there is a marked change in the language used in the two Acts. 23. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Montford Brothers of St. Gabriel and Another vs. United India Insurance and Another, reported in (2014) 3 SCC 394 , dealing with the provisions of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 held as under:- "9. 23. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Montford Brothers of St. Gabriel and Another vs. United India Insurance and Another, reported in (2014) 3 SCC 394 , dealing with the provisions of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 held as under:- "9. The Act does not define the term "legal representative" but the Tribunal has noted in its judgment and order that clause (C) of Rule 2 of the Mizoram Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1988, defines the term 'legal representative' as having the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (11) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which is as follows: "Section 2(11) 'legal representative' means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves On the death of the party so suing or sued". 10. From the aforesaid provisions it is clear that in case of death of a person in a motor vehicle accident, right is available to a legal representative of the deceased or the agent of the legal representative to lodge a claim for compensation under the provisions of the Act. The issue as to who is a legal representative or its agent is basically an issue of fact and may be decided one way or the other dependent upon the facts of a particular case. But as a legal proposition it is undeniable that a person claming to be a legal representative has the locus to maintain an application for compensation under Section 166 of the Act, either directly or through any agent, subject to result of a dispute raised by the other side on this issue. 11. ... It was specifically held that Motor Vehicles Act creates new and enlarged right for filing an application for compensation and such right cannot be hedged in by the limitations on an action under the Fatal Accident Act." 24. Thus the law so elucidated is, the word 'legal representative' as defined in Section 2(11) CPC in context of the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has to be construed liberally keeping in mind that it is a beneficial piece of legislation as well as social legislation. Thus the law so elucidated is, the word 'legal representative' as defined in Section 2(11) CPC in context of the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has to be construed liberally keeping in mind that it is a beneficial piece of legislation as well as social legislation. The whole object of the said legislation and particularly the provisions regarding the compensation is that every legal representative, who suffers on account of death of a person due to motor vehicle accident must have a remedy for realization of compensation. These provisions are in consonance with the first principles of law i.e. every injury must have a remedy. Accordingly, a bread-winner of the family if killed on account of motor vehicle accident, all persons who are dependent upon the bread-winner are entitled to compensation. 25. The manner in which Section 166 of the Act has been enacted, indicates that the Parliament while enacting the said provisions consciously did not borrow the provisions contained in the Fatal Accident Act, 1885, rather it went ahead to enlarge the scope and included even a person, who as dependent on the earning member of a family, who dies in a motor accident to be entitled to compensation which is in consonance with the principles of the law of tort. Keeping in mind the object behind the Motor Vehicles Act, the principles of tort, it is clear that the dependent upon the earning member, who dies in a motor accident, is within the ambit of the definition of legal representative and is entitled to claim compensation. 26. Apparently, it is for the aforesaid reasons that Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has made a provision for filing an application for compensation by all or any of the legal representative of the deceased. 26. Apparently, it is for the aforesaid reasons that Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has made a provision for filing an application for compensation by all or any of the legal representative of the deceased. Further, it will be gainful to visit Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is being reproduced hereinafter:- "Section 168 Award of the Claims Tribunal.--On receipt of an application for compensation made under section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be: Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award. (3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct. 27. (3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct. 27. From the conjoint reading of the provisions of Section 166 and Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it will indicate that on filing of an application for compensation, the claim Tribunal is required to give notice of the application to the parties, including the insurer and after affording an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claims and award such compensation as it appears to be fair and just. 28. The Tribunal is required to apply its own mind and specify the person or persons to whom the compensation should be paid. In deciding the person to whom the compensation is payable certainly the Tribunal has to take into consideration the aspect of the loss of dependency. It is in this context that the definition of the word 'legal representative', which is inclusive, assumes importance. A person who is not a legal heir but a person who has been dependent on the deceased at the time of accident, is the person, who bears the loss on account of the accident and consequential death and, therefore, would be the person entitled to compensation and such person may or may not be a legal heir. 29. That with the changing trend in the society, the Parliament has taken note of new situations and new dangers and to meet the same new strategies and new remedies have been provided. It is keeping in consonance with the discussion hereinabove considering that even a wife whose marriage is void but if she is living with her husband and his family members and was 'dependent' on his earnings for her living, she is still entitled to compensation as a legal representative under the Act of 1988. She may not be entitled to compensation as a legal heirs as the second marriage is void but she definitely will be entitled as a dependent to the compensation. 30. It is from this angle that the issue has to be seen by the Tribunal. She may not be entitled to compensation as a legal heirs as the second marriage is void but she definitely will be entitled as a dependent to the compensation. 30. It is from this angle that the issue has to be seen by the Tribunal. In the present case at hand, it is not disputed that Smt. Usha Devi has been residing with the deceased Dukhi Ram and she has borne two daughters, who have been living with the family. Even the statement of Smt. Phulwasa cannot be taken as gospel truth to deny the compensation inasmuch as a statement of one co-party to the proceedings cannot bind another co-party unless such statement is confronted (in this case to Smt. Usha Devi), which admittedly has not been done accordingly the statement or alleged admission of Smt. Phulawasa was not binding on Smt. Usha Devi. 31. Moreover this aspect needs to be seen from another angle and as been held by this Court in a case reported in AIR 1981 Alld Page 42 Smt. Sheel Wati vs. Smt. Ram Nandani and the relevant portion of the judgment is being reproduced for ready reference:- "9. I have, therefore, no hesitation in reiterating the view expressed by me in the referring order dated 27th September, 1979, for the reasons given therein and the further reasons given hereinabove, that a marriage though null and void for contravening any of the conditions prescribed by Clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5 of the Act, has yet to be regarded a subsisting fact, and in that sense it cannot be said to be wholly non est in law, or a nullity, so long as it is is not declared to be null and void by a decree of Nullity of the District Court on a petition presented by either party thereto against the other party to the marriage. No third person can treat the marriage to be void or have it adjudged to be null and void in any other suit or proceeding unless it already been declared to be so by a decree of Nullity of a District Court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by and under the Act; the only exceptions being the case where the aggrived spouse of the first marriage on account of whose being living the second marriage is void, prosecutes the other spouse for being punished for bigamy under Section 406 or 495 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act; or the ease where the aggrieved spouse prosecutes the guilty spouse for a contravention of Clauses (iv) and (v) of Section 5 under Section 18(b) of the Act." 32. From the above, it would be clear that neither the insurance company nor Smt. Phulwasa had any right to question or to treat the marriage of Smt. Usha Devi and Dukhi Ram as void. Even otherwise, there was no question regarding this issue to be tried since there was no pleadings to the aforesaid effect. Even the insurance company who has raised this issue before this Court has derived the idea of its argument only from the cross-examination of Smt. Phulwasa from which the aforesaid argument has been developed but significantly there was not a whisper in its written statement filed before the Tribunal. In absence of any pleadings the Tribunal was justified in not framing any issue. In absence of the relevant issue there was no requirement to lead any evidence on the same and even if at all, any evidence was led, the same would be wholly irrelevant and cannot be taken note of nor it could have been made the basis of the judgment/award. 33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gokul Chand vs. Praveen Kumar, reported in AIR 1952 SC Page 231 clearly had laid down decades ago Act that if continuous cohabitation of a man and women as husband and wife raised presumption on marriage, but the presumption which may be drawn from long cohabitation is only rebutable and if there are circumstances which weakened and destroy the presumption the Court must take note of the same. However, at the same time, it cannot be considered that merely upon raising a question or by raising a plea by a party such presumption is rebuted. The cardinal rule of pleadings governs every proceedings and it is to the effect that the parties to a suit are always bound by their pleadings and any amount of evidence or proved, adduced without proper pleadings are inconsequential and cannot come to the rescue of such party. 34. It is also equally settled that in case if a plea has been taken regarding the subsistence of an earlier marriage then cogent and proper evidence has to be adduced by the person raising such plea and only once the same is satisfactorily proved by tendering evidence only then it can be stated that such plea stands proved. The nature of proof of marriage is not of such high and strong degree in a MACT case as would be in regular trial where the issue of matrimony and the status of the parties is concerned. 35. The object of the motor accident claims is to accord a swift remedy to the claimant, who have already suffered on account of death/injury of their relative or dear one. In motor accident matters, the Tribunal is required to arrive at a finding only prima-facie and if at all any person is aggrieved would have a right to ventilate their grievance and seek a declaration of their status on the regular side but it is not open for a party to be denied compensation which in terms of Sections 166 and 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, if such a person is entitled to it. 36. The law leans in favour of legitimacy hence the presumption in favour of wedlock is strong. Heavy burden lies on the person who seeks to deprive the relationship of its legal origin. 37. Moreover in a dispute relating to relationship of the parties as husband and wife and also paternity of children, having regarding to social relevance of the matter, it requires careful and in depth evidence. Heavy burden lies on the person who seeks to deprive the relationship of its legal origin. 37. Moreover in a dispute relating to relationship of the parties as husband and wife and also paternity of children, having regarding to social relevance of the matter, it requires careful and in depth evidence. A Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a forum, which in law is equipped to deal and give a binding finding on the issue, as it is a Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act to assess and award compensation and it adopts a summary procedure and to that extent it is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction. 38. In view of the detailed discussion hereinabove, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in considering the totality of the circumstances and holding that Smt. Usha Devi was the wife and the daughters Kumari Rishu and Kumari Kajal were the heirs and dependents of Dukhi Ram and have rightly been awarded the compensation. 39. None of the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant arise or takes into consideration the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act inasmuch as the Scheme of the Act is different to other statues consequently the learned counsel for the appellant cannot draw any benefit from the aforesaid judgments. 40. Thus, in view of above, no fault can be found in the award passed by the Tribunal regarding this fact of the matter and the first submission of the learned counsel for the appellant fails. 41. Before parting with this issue, this Court feels that it is just and proper to take note of the changing circumstances which are prevailing in the society and the manner in which the society is progressing and it is always the courts of law which have risen to the occasion by taking note of such changed circumstances. With the passage of time and progression in the society now a live-in relationship is neither a crime nor a sin though it may socially be unacceptable in our country. Giving recognition to the aforesaid aspect, the Parliament has already introduced the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 with its primary object to provide a remedy in civil law for the protection of women from becoming victims of domestic violence which not only means physical but also includes economic violence and provides for monetary reliefs including residence orders. 42. 42. The Hon'ble Supreme Court noticing the progressive change in the society, had the occasion to consider the aforesaid issue in the case of Indra Sarma vs. V.K.V. Sarma, reported in (2013) 15 SCC 755 , from where the relevant extracts is being reproduced:- "... A Live-in or marriage like relationship is neither a crime nor a sin though socially unacceptable in this country. The decision to marry or not to marry or to have a heterosexual relationship is intensely personal. 2. We are, in this case, concerned with the question whether a "live-in relationship" would amount to a "relationship in the nature of marriage" falling within the definition of "domestic relationship" under Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short "the DV Act") and the disruption of such a relationship by failure to maintain a women involved in such a relationship amounts to "domestic violence" within the meaning of Section 3 of the DV Act." 43. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the concept of marriage and marital relationship and obligations also went on to consider and examine the meaning and scope of the expression 'relationship in the nature of marriage' and after discussing the concept of 'relationship in nature of marriage' in detail certain guidelines were laid down which are reproduced hereinafter:- "24. Marriage is often described as one of the basic civil rights of man/woman, which is voluntarily undertaken by the parties in public in a formal way, and once concluded, recognizes the parties as husband and wife. Three elements of common law marriage are (1) agreement to be married (2) living together as husband and wife, (3) holding out to the public that they are married. Sharing a common household and duty to live together form part of the ''Consortium Omnis Vitae" which obliges spouses to live together, afford each other reasonable marital privileges and rights and be honest and faithful to each other. One of the most important invariable consequences of marriage is the reciprocal support and the responsibility of maintenance of the common household, jointly and severally. Marriage as an institution has great legal significance and various obligations and duties flow out of marital relationship, as per law, in the matter of inheritance of property, successionship, etc. Marriage, therefore, involves legal requirements of formality, publicity, exclusivity and all the legal consequences flow out of that relationship. 25. Marriage as an institution has great legal significance and various obligations and duties flow out of marital relationship, as per law, in the matter of inheritance of property, successionship, etc. Marriage, therefore, involves legal requirements of formality, publicity, exclusivity and all the legal consequences flow out of that relationship. 25. Marriages in India take place either following the personal Law of the Religion to which a party is belonged or following the provisions of the Special Marriage Act. Marriage, as per the Common Law, constitutes a contract between a man and a woman, in which the parties undertake to live together and support each other." 44. Thus, in view of the above, it is quite clear that it is always open for the courts to rise to the occasion and to ensure that the provisions of an Act have to be construed in a manner which advances the object and the legislative intent and for the aforesaid purposes would have to adopt the purposive interpretation. 45. Now reverting to the second submission of the learned counsel for the appellant whereby he has sought to raise the question of illegitimacy, is also frivolous and deserves outright rejection and the reasons being Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 46. Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act is absolutely clear and a complete answer to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in (2011) 11 SCC Page 1 - Revanasiddappa and another vs. Mallikarjun and others, considering Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act alongwith all its facets has clearly held as under:- "14. Thus, the abovementioned section makes it very clear that a child of a void or voidable marriage can only claim rights to the property of his parents, and no one else. However, we find it interesting to note that the legislature has advisedly used the word "property" and has not qualified it with either self-acquired property or ancestral property. It has been kept broad and general. 22. The amendment to Section 16 has been introduced and was brought about with the obvious purpose of removing the stigma of illegitimacy on children born in void or voidable marriage (hereinafter, "such children"). 28. The legislature has used the word "property" in Section 16(3) and is silent on whether such property is meant to be ancestral or self-acquired. 22. The amendment to Section 16 has been introduced and was brought about with the obvious purpose of removing the stigma of illegitimacy on children born in void or voidable marriage (hereinafter, "such children"). 28. The legislature has used the word "property" in Section 16(3) and is silent on whether such property is meant to be ancestral or self-acquired. Section 16(3) contains an express mandate that such children are only entitled to the property of their parents, and not of any other relation. 29. On a careful reading of Section 16(3) of the Act we are of the view that the amended Section postulates that such children would not be entitled to any rights in the property of any person who is not his parent if he was not entitled to them, by virtue of his illegitimacy, before the passing of the amendment. However, the said prohibition does not apply to the property of his parents. Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 16 expressly declare that such children shall be legitimate. If they have been declared legitimate, then they cannot be discriminated against and they will be at par with other legitimate children, and be entitled to all the rights in the property of their parents, both self-acquired and ancestral. The prohibition contained in Section 16(3) will apply to such children with respect to property of any person other than their parents." 47. Thus this Court is of the considered view that in light of Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act and of the pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is clear that the question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the illegitimacy of the children of Dukhi Ram is vexatious and is accordingly rejected. Thus, the minor children of Dukhi Ram namely Kumari Rishu and Kumari Kajal are legally entitled and are held to be legal representatives as well as dependents and the grant of part of compensation in their favour by the Tribunal is absolutely justified and cannot be faulted. 48. Now coming to the last submission regarding the driver's licence being valid and effective. 49. 48. Now coming to the last submission regarding the driver's licence being valid and effective. 49. From the perusal of the record, it is clear that the licence of the driver of the truck was not valid on the date of accident i.e. 18.12.2001 and to that extent the findings returned by the Tribunal appears to be incongruous since in the earlier part of its discussions, it has already noted that the driver did not have a valid licence. Thus, while returning the finding the Tribunal erred in holding that the driver had a valid licence hence this finding being bad is accordingly set aside and it is held that the driver did not possess an effective driver's licence on the date of accident. 50. In view of the above, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the award passed by the Tribunal on the quantum and other issues is absolutely just and proper and requires no interference. There is no error in the award passed by the Tribunal except that the appellant insurance company shall pay and satisfy the award first to the claimants and shall have the right to recover the same from the owner. 51. Any amount deposited by the appellant before this Court shall be remitted to the Tribunal concerned for its release to the claimants, who are respondents No.1 to 3 in consonance with the directions given in the award of the Tribunal. The record of the lower court before this Court shall also be remitted back to the Tribunal concerned within three weeks. 52. In the result, the first appeal from order is partially allowed only to the extent of grant of liberty to the appellants to satisfy the award first and recover the same from the insured/owner of the vehicle concerned. 53. There shall be no order as to cost.