JUDGMENT Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, J. - This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short 'Cr.P.C.') has been preferred seeking quashing of the First Information Report giving rising to Saharsa Sadar P.S. Case No. 51 of 2008 dated 08.02.2008 registered under Sections 406, 420, 409, 120B, 504 of the Indian Penal Code. The FIR has been lodged after a written complaint filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate being Complaint Case No. 584C of 2007 was referred to the jurisdictional Police Station under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. 2. In the written complaint, the complainant/informant alleged that he being a businessman had opened a saving account in Central Bank Employees Savings and Credit Self Supported Cooperative Society Limited having its principal office at Supaul and a branch office at Saharsa. The informant was depositing a sum of Rs. 200/-per day through an agent and the amount was being entered in this pass-book which ultimately matured for payment at the end of the one year on 09.03.2006. 3. It is alleged in the written complaint that when the informant went to the Branch office for getting his maturity payment, he came to know that all the officers had closed the Branch and had fled away with the money of the investors. The informant was told by the gent that all the officers of the Bank have closed the Branch and they have fled away with the money. The informant alleged that he met the officers and requested them to make payment but the payment was not made, the informant came to know that the accused persons had engaged some persons who were misleading the customers so that the customers do not lodge any case against the accused persons. The allegation is that the accused persons have with an intention and conspiracy planned to cheat the people and after opening branch offices and collecting money from the customers they have fled away with some of Rs. 5 Crores approximately. 4. In course of argument, initially, a question arose as to whether an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may be maintained for quashing of the FIR. In this regard learned APP for the State had relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Anr. Vrs. 5 Crores approximately. 4. In course of argument, initially, a question arose as to whether an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may be maintained for quashing of the FIR. In this regard learned APP for the State had relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Anr. Vrs. Shri P.P. Sharma & Anr., (1991) AIR SC 1260 which arises out of the Hon'ble Division Bench judgment of this Hon'ble Court reported in 1990 (2) PLJR 405. Learned APP submits that in the case of P.P. Sharma (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that it is only after the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences upon consideration of the materials so placed before him, then only proceeding in a criminal case commenced and in paragraph 40 of the said judgment following observations have been made: 40. On completion of the investigation, if it appears to the investigator that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground to place the accused for trial, the investigating officer shall forward to the court a report in that regard along with the evidence and the accused, if he is in the custody to the Magistrate. If on the other hand he opines that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds connecting the accused with the commission of the offence he may forward the report to the Magistrate accordingly. The Magistrate is empowered to consider the report and on satisfying that the accused prima facie committed the offence, take cognizance of the offence and would issue process or warrant to the accused, if on bail, to appear on a date fixed for trial or to commit him for trial to the court of session. It is not incumbent upon the Magistrate to accept the report of the investigating officer that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground to connect the accused with the commission of the crime; he may direct further investigation or suo moto the investigator may himself submit supplemental chargesheet under S. 173(8) if he subsequently becomes aware of certain facts or itself or through a subordinate Magistrate to make further enquiry or to take cognizance of the offence upon consideration of the material so placed before him and take further steps as aforesaid. Then only proceedings in a criminal case stands commenced. Then only proceedings in a criminal case stands commenced. Taking cognizance of the offence is conterminous to the power of the police to investigate in the crime. Until then there is no power to the Magistrate except on a private complaint in a cognizable/non-cognizable offence to direct the police to investigate into the offence. The Magistrate is not empowered to interfere with the investigation by the police. In King Emperor v. Khawaja Nazir Ahmad, 71 Ind App 203, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that "the function of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping" and "the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then". In Jamuna Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (1974) 3 SCC 774 , this Court held: "The duty of the investigating officer is not merely to bolster up a prosecution case with such evidence as may enable the court to record a conviction, but to bring out the real unvarnished truth." 5. Learned APP further relied upon the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 42' as under.:- 42. In S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari,1970 3 SCR 945: ( AIR 1970 SC 786 ), this Court held that S. 159 primarily meant to give to the Magistrate the power to direct an investigation in cases where the police decides not to investigate the case under provision to S. 157(1) and it is in those cases that, if he thinks fit, he can choose to enquire into it by himself or direct the subordinate Magistrate to enquire into and submit a report. Section 159 intends to give a limited power to the Magistrate to ensure that the police investigate into cognizable offence and do not refuse to do so for certain limited cases of not proceeding with the investigation of the offence. The Code gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect a cognizable offence has been committed. In an appropriate case an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. If the court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, a mandamus can be issued restraining the investigator to misuse his legal powers. In an appropriate case an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. If the court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, a mandamus can be issued restraining the investigator to misuse his legal powers. The same view was reiterated in State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha, (1980) 1 SCC 554 , wherein this Court held that unless extra-ordinary cases of gross abuse of power by those incharge of the investigation is made out, the Court should be quite loath to interfere at the stage of investigation. A field of activity is reserved for police and the executive. This Court also noted that it is a clear case of usurpation of jurisdiction by the High Court, that vested in the Magistrate to take or not to take cognizance of the case on the material placed before him. The High Court committed grave error by making observations on seriously disputed questions of facts taking its clue from affidavit, which in such a situation hardly provides any reliable material. This Court also noted that the interference or direction, virtually amount to a mandamus to close the case before the investigation is complete. In State of West Bengal v. Sampat Lal, (1985) 1 SCC 317 at p. 336 para 26, this Court held that the court has residuary power to give appropriate directions to the police when the requirements of law are not being complied with and investigation is not being done properly or with due haste and promptitude." 6. Learned APP submits that in a catena of decisions the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court need not interfere with the investigation in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and that in an appropriate case where the FIR does not disclose commission of an offence, the High Court can quash the investigation and interfere with the same under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but it cannot exercise its inherent power for quashing the investigation under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 7. Learned APP has relied upon the judgment in the case of R.P.Kapur V. State of Punjab, (1960) AIR SC 866 , in the case of State of Bihar & anr. Vs. Learned APP has relied upon the judgment in the case of R.P.Kapur V. State of Punjab, (1960) AIR SC 866 , in the case of State of Bihar & anr. Vs. P.P.Sharma & anr., (1992) Supp1 SCC 222 and in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Murad Ali Khan & Ors., (1989) AIR SC 1 ( = 1989 PLJR 6 (SC) and a Full Bench judgment of the 7 Hon'ble Judges of Allahabad High Court in the case of Ramlal Vs. State of U. P., (1989) CriLJ 1013 wherein it has been observed in paragraph 22 that "the high court has no inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to interfere with the arrest of a person by a Police Officer even in violation of Section 41(1) (a) Cr.P.C. However, where no offence is disclosed in the first information report or when the investigation is mala fide as the inherent powers of the Court to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice came into play after the charge-sheet has been filed in court and not during investigation which may even be illegal or unauthorized." 8. In response to this preliminary objection raised on behalf of learned APP for the State, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that whether the first information report or a criminal proceeding is fit to be quashed in the given facts and circumstances of the case would depend upon the facts of that particular case and there cannot be a blanket proposition that no application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may be maintained for quashing of the first information report and that in no case an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may be maintained. In this connection, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., (1992) AIR SC 604 . He has further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Bureau Investigation Vs. K. M. Sharma, (2008) 4 SCC 471 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has placed reliance upon paragraph 24' of the judgment in the case of Bhajan Lal's case (supra) as under:- "24. He has further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Bureau Investigation Vs. K. M. Sharma, (2008) 4 SCC 471 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has placed reliance upon paragraph 24' of the judgment in the case of Bhajan Lal's case (supra) as under:- "24. In Bhajan Lal's case ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp1 SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 ) this Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of CrPC under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This court in the said judgment made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. According to this judgment, the High Court would be justified in exercising its power in cases of following categories: (SCC pp.378-79) para 102) "102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and /or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 9. In the case of Roy V.D. vs. State of Kerala, (2000) 8 SCC 590 the Hon'ble Court observed in paragraph 18' as under:- "18. It is well settled that the power under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where criminal proceedings are initiated based on illicit material collected on search and arrest which are per se illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and sentence based on such material but also the trial itself, the proceedings cannot be allowed to go on as it cannot but amount to abuse of the process of the court; in such a case not quashing the proceedings would perpetuate abuse of the process of the court resulting in great hardship and injustice to the accused. In our opinion, exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings in a case like the one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice." 10. In our opinion, exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings in a case like the one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice." 10. In the case of Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Md. Sharaful Haque and Ors., (2005) 1 SCC 122 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "8.... It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto." 11. In the case of Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Ravi Shankar Srivastava, IAS and Anr., (2006) 7 SCC 188 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the legal position. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. of the High Court are very wide but those are required to be exercised with great caution and the court must be very careful to ensure that the decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power, cannot be exercised to scuttle the legitimate prosecution. 12. In view of the aforesaid legal pronouncement, this Court being prima facie satisfied that this application cannot be dismissed on the ground of maintainability alone because in a case where this Court finds that initiation or continuance of a proceeding itself is an abuse of the process of the court or that in the interest of justice the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is required to be invoked and exercised, this Court may entertain an application and examine the same to find out whether the facts of the case require an interference. This Court, therefore, called upon learned counsel for the petitioner to make submissions on merit of the case. 13. This Court, therefore, called upon learned counsel for the petitioner to make submissions on merit of the case. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that all these petitioners are the members /officials of the Central Bank Employees Savings and Credit Self Supported Co-operative Societies Limited (hereinafter referred to as the 'Society'). It is his submission that members of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive officer of the Society have no role in managing of the accounts and it is the role of the local branch headed by the Branch Manager. The sheet anchor of his submission is that once the society has gone in liquidation and a liquidator has been appointed, in view of Section 50(2) of the Bihar Self Supporting Co-operative Societies Act 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1996'), no criminal proceeding could have been maintained against these petitioners. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioners has emphatically submitted before this Court that in similar circumstance a learned co-ordinate Bench of this Court has been pleased to interpret Section 50(2) of the Act of 1996 and has taken a view that the said case was covered under the words "other legal proceedings" and quashed the first information report in the said case. Learned counsel has drawn attention of this Court towards Annexure 6' which is a copy of the judgment dated 13.02.2019 passed by the learned co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Cr. Misc. No. 14884 of 2014 (The Central Bank Employees Savings and Credit Self Supported Co-operative Society Ltd. & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) and its analogous case being Cr. Misc. No. 6586 of 2017 (Md. Ehsanul Haque Vs. The State of Bihar &Ors.) It is submitted that in the said case learned coordinate Bench has taken note of Section 50(2) of the Act of 1996, noticed the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of D. K. Kapur Vs. Reserve Bank of India & Ors., (2001) 1 ILR(Del) 35 and came to the conclusion as under:- "From the aforesaid, it is clear that the terms "other legal proceedings" referred in Section 50(2) of the Act shall cover criminal proceeding also. Reserve Bank of India & Ors., (2001) 1 ILR(Del) 35 and came to the conclusion as under:- "From the aforesaid, it is clear that the terms "other legal proceedings" referred in Section 50(2) of the Act shall cover criminal proceeding also. Further while defining the power of liquidator in Section 47, sub sections (2) and (3) of the same give him the power to proceed against any person for concealing, withholding or misappropriating any property of the Society. Moreover, Section 47 (1)(b) also confers on the liquidator the power to bring, defend or take part in civil or criminal or administrative action or proceeding in the name and on behalf of the co-operative society. This clearly provides that if any criminal conduct is found attributable to any person connected with the affairs of the society, the liquidator has the power to institute criminal proceedings also. In that view of the matter also the present complaint case is not fit to continue." 15. Per contra, learned APP for the State submits that in the case of P.P. Sharma (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically observed that the proceedings in a criminal case commences only after the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences upon consideration of the materials so placed before him. Thus, only because an FIR has been lodged, it cannot be said to be initiation of a criminal proceeding. Secondly it is submitted that in order to arrive on a just and a proper conclusion as to the purport and meaning of the words "other legal proceedings" this Court would be required to look into the Act of 1996 and compare it with the provisions of Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956. It is submitted that although the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of D. K. Kapur (supra) was cited before the learned coordinate Bench of this Court but the same has been held not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case whereas on a careful glance over the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court would show that a similar question with regard to interpretation of the word "other legal proceedings" had fallen for consideration in the said case and the similar words were present in Section 446 of the Companies Act 1956 which were sought to be interpreted. 16. 16. It is submitted that under the provisions of the Act of 1996 Chapter 'X' deals with the dissolution of a co-operative society. The dissolution may be either by a special resolution, the Society may authorise its own dissolution or dissolution may take place on the order of the Tribunal, when the Tribunal takes a view that the co-operative society has no right to be or to continue to be recognized as a Cooperative society, because of the reasons provided under various clauses such as if the society (a) obtained its registration by a fraud or mistake;(b) is serving illegal purposes; (c) has willfully, after notice by the registrar; violated any of the provisions of this Act or its by- laws; (d) is no longer operating in accordance with Cooperative principles and the provision of this Act; (e) has not commenced business within two years of the date of its registration; or (f) has not carried on business for the past two consecutive years, the Tribunal shall pass an order for dissolution. 17. The order passed by the Tribunal for dissolution of the society when received by the Registrar he shall act as per order of the Tribunal and where the order is to liquidate and dissolve the Cooperative society under the supervision of the Registrar then a notice will be published in the newspaper and the same will be distributed in the district in which the registered office of the Cooperative society is situated. Section 45 under the said Chapter provides for appointment of Liquidator and to wind up the affairs of the co-operative society. Section 46 provides for duties of the Liquidator and one of his duties is to take into custody and control the property of the Cooperative Society, keep accounts of the money of the Cooperative Society received and paid out by him. Certain powers have been conferred upon the Liquidator under Section 47 of the Act of 1996 and then by following those procedures the Liquidator shall submit final account for approval and promotion to distribute the money. Where the Registrar approves the final account rendered by the Liquidator, he shall issue such directions with respect to the custody or disposal of the documents records of the co-operative society. 18. Where the Registrar approves the final account rendered by the Liquidator, he shall issue such directions with respect to the custody or disposal of the documents records of the co-operative society. 18. It is submitted that so far as Section 50 which creates Bar of Jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it specifically provides that "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no Civil or Revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any dispute required by Section 40 to be referred to the Cooperative Tribunal, or recovery proceeding under Section 41 or dissolution under Sections 43 and 44. Sub-section (2) of Section 50 provides that where a Cooperative Society is in liquidation, no suit or other legal proceedings shall be proceeded with or instituted against the liquidator or against the Cooperative society or any member thereof on any matter touching of the affairs of the co-operative society except by the leave of the Registrar and subject to such terms as he may impose. 19. It is submitted that Section 446 of the Companies Act 1956 contains a similar provision which had come for consideration by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court looked into the scheme of the Companies Act and formed a question for consideration:- "Whether the expression "suit or other legal proceedings" in Section 446 (1) and the expression "suit or proceedings" in Section 446 (2) in Chapter II in part VII of the Companies Act 1956 encompasses criminal proceedings against the companies or not ?" 20. For purpose of interpreting the aforesaid provisions of the statute, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court went into the object of the statute and the context in which expression has been used. In this regard the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Gopal Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) CriLJ 3237 has been relied upon to say "interpretation of statutes Construction of expression in statute - Text and context of entire Act must be looked into-Court must look to object which statutes seeks to achieve." 21. It was held that the object of Section 446 of the Companies Act is to protect the asset of the company during the winding up proceedings so as to avoid any wasteful expenditure. It was held that the object of Section 446 of the Companies Act is to protect the asset of the company during the winding up proceedings so as to avoid any wasteful expenditure. Again in this connection, reference was made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sudarsan Chits (I) Ltd. Vs. G. Sukumaran Pillai, (1985) 1 SCR 511 and the law summarised on the subject in the case of Central Bank of India Vs. M/s Elmot Engineering Company, (1994) 3 SCR 766 , the court then noticed various other provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and observed in paragraph 12' of the judgment as under:- "12. Mere look at the aforesaid provisions would show that on the one hand, in Section 457 of the Act, the legislature has empowered the liquidator to institute or defend any 'suit' or 'prosecution' or 'other legal proceedings' civil or criminal in the name and on the behalf of the company after permission from the court; and by Section 454 (5A) of the Act the legislature has empowered the Company Court itself to take cognizance of the offence under sub-section (5) of Section 454 of the Act and to try such offenders as per the procedures provided for trial of summons cases under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974; but on the other hand in Sections 442 and 446 of the Act the legislature has used only the expression "suit or other legal proceedings". The words "prosecution" or "criminal case" are conspicuously missing in these sections. It appears quite logical as per purpose of object of Sections 442 and 446 of the Act is to enable the Company Court to oversee the affairs of the company and to avoid wasteful expenditure. Therefore, the intention of the legislature under these sections does not appear to provide jurisdiction to the Company Court over criminal proceeding either against the company or against its directors. Wherever legislature thought it necessary to provide such jurisdiction it has used the appropriate expressions." 22. Again in paragraph 14' the Hon'ble Court observed as under:- "14. The scope and meaning of expressions "other legal proceedings" or "proceedings" under Section 446(1) came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the context of Income Tax proceedings in S.V. Kondaskar Vs. V. M. Deshpande, (1972) 83 ITR 685 (SC) . Again in paragraph 14' the Hon'ble Court observed as under:- "14. The scope and meaning of expressions "other legal proceedings" or "proceedings" under Section 446(1) came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the context of Income Tax proceedings in S.V. Kondaskar Vs. V. M. Deshpande, (1972) 83 ITR 685 (SC) . It was observed that the expression "other legal proceedings" in this Section cannot be extended to Income Tax proceedings as these cannot appropriately be dealt with by the company court. It was held:- "While holding these assessment proceedings the Income Tax Officer does not, in our view, perform the functions of a Court as contemplated by Section 446 (2) of the Act. Looking at the legislature history and the scheme of the Indian Companies Act, particularly the language of Section 446 read as a whole, it appears to us that the expression in "other legal proceeding" in sub-section (1) and the expression "legal proceeding" in sub-section (2) convey the same sense and the proceedings in both the sub-sections must be such as can appropriately be dealt with by the winding up court." It was further held: The liquidation Court, in our opinion cannot perform the functions of Income Tax Officers while assessing the amount of tax payable by the assesses even if the assesse be the company which is being wound up by the Court. The orders made by the Income Tax Officer in the course of assessment or re-assessment proceedings are subject to appeal to the higher hierarchy under the Income Tax Act. There are also provisions for reference to the High Court and for appeals from the decisions of the High Court to the Supreme Court and then there are provisions for revision by the Commissioner of Income Tax. It would lead to anomalous consequences if the winding up Court were to be held empowered to transfer the assessment proceedings to itself and assessed the company to Income Tax. "15. The reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in the above case would be fully applicable to the facts at hand. Complaints under the panel provisions of other statutes against the company or its directors, (except those provided under the Companies Act) cannot be appropriately dealt with by the company court. Orders passed by the criminal court are subject to the appeal and revision etc. under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Complaints under the panel provisions of other statutes against the company or its directors, (except those provided under the Companies Act) cannot be appropriately dealt with by the company court. Orders passed by the criminal court are subject to the appeal and revision etc. under the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the (sic) court is held to be empowered to transfer these criminal proceedings to itself it would to anomalous consequences." 23. On the strength of aforesaid submissions it is contended that the view taken by the learned co-ordinate Bench of this Court as regards the true scope and ambit of sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act of 1996 is required to be considered. CONSIDERATION 24. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned APP for the State as also on a careful perusal of the provisions of the Act of 1996 which have been referred here and the judicial pronouncements on the subject, this Court regrets its inability to agree with the interpretation given by the learned coordinate Bench of this Court to sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act of 1996. The scheme of Section 446 and various other provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 which have been referred in detail by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of D. K. Kapur (supra) is similar to the scheme of sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the various provisions falling under Chapter 'X' of the Act of 1996 which deals with the liquidation and the dissolution of the society. The plea of learned counsel for the petitioners that in view of sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act of 1996, the first information report in this case shall be covered under the meaning of the word "a criminal proceeding" is to be out rightly rejected in view of the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of P.P. Sharma (supra). Paragraph 40' of the judgment in the case of P.P. Sharma (supra) has been referred hereinabove. 25. Paragraph 40' of the judgment in the case of P.P. Sharma (supra) has been referred hereinabove. 25. The next submission that in view of the judgment of the learned co-ordinate Bench of this Court, the words "other legal proceedings" referred in Section 50(2) of the Act of 1996 shall cover "criminal proceeding" also is required to be referred to the Hon'ble Division Bench of this court because this Court regrets it's inability to agree with the view of the learned co-ordinate Bench of this Court on this issue. 26. To this Court, it appears that the bar created under subsection (2) of Section 50 of the Act of 1996 would not cover lodgment of an FIR and secondly this Court is also of the view that the words "other legal proceedings" are to be construed looking to the object, text and context of the entire Act of 1996. Under Section 47 of the Act of 1996, the Liquidator has got power to bring, defend or take part in any civil, criminal or administrative action or proceeding in the name and on behalf of the Cooperative Society. Like Sections 442 and 446 of the Companies Act 1956, the legislatures have purposely not incorporated under sub-section (1) of Section 50 the word "Criminal Court". The Legislatures used the word "Civil" or "Revenue Court" but has purposely not referred the words "Criminal Court". Similarly under sub-section(2) of Section 50 the Legislatures have not incorporated the word "Criminal Proceedings". Sub-section 2 of Section 50 of the Act of 1996 therefore, cannot be interpreted in the manner in which it has been sought to be done by pleading that this provision creates a bar of jurisdiction in lodging the first information report against the co-operative society, it's director or officers if they have committed a cognizable offence. 27. To this Court, therefore, it appears that the following question may be referred to the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court for consideration:- (1) Whether sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Bihar Self Supporting Co-operative Societies Act, 1996 may be interpreted to mean and understand that the words "other legal proceedings" occurring thereunder create a bar in lodgment of a first information report against the co-operative society registered under the said Act, its Director(s), Officer(s), Manager(s) or a member of the society and that it would also cover "the criminal proceeding" against them ? 28. 28. Let the records be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring the aforesaid questions to the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court.