JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by Union of India through the Secretary of Revenue, Government of India, Department of Revenue, North Block, New Delhi and the Chief Commissioner, Goods and Service Tax and Customs, Guwahati Zone, Guwahati challenging the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, Guwahati (for short 'the Tribunal') dated 24.01.2020. Vide the aforesaid judgment, the Tribunal allowed the Original Application filed by the respondent and set aside the order dated 14.08.2019 whereby, he was transferred from Shillong to Itanagar. 2. The case set up by the respondent before the Tribunal in the Original Application was that he is presently working as Superintendent of Customs, posted under jurisdiction of the North Eastern Region Customs Preventive Commissionerate in the office of the Assistant Commissioner of Customs, Shillong Division at Shillong. The North Eastern Region of Customs and CGST is headed by the Chief Commissioner, Guwahati comprising of eight Commissionerates including one at Itanagar and Shillong. The Chief Commissioner has the power and authority to transfer the subordinate officers including thereof cadre of Group B gazetted officers, from one Commissionerate to another, following the transparent transfer policy, formulated and practiced over the years in the official web page of the Department. The said policy is contained in the New Transfer Policy dated 05.03.2015 and the Old Transfer Policy dated 18.12.2007. The Transfer Policy dated 05.03.2015 in para 4 provides for exercise transfer to be completed by 31st October every year and issuing posting order by the 15th December every year. It was contended that transfer of 94 Superintendents could have been issued only in the beginning of the year as per the Transfer Policy and not in the middle of the year. Unlike any other Zone in India, due to peculiarity of the North Eastern Region, which comprises seven different states, transfer in this Zone always deserves special consideration. The impugned order of transfer has been issued in clear breach of the declared Transfer Policy and is mala fide. The respondent also submitted that he was nearly 58 years old and as per circular issued by the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT), an officer due for superannuation deserves special consideration in the matter of transfer and should not to be transferred to an odd place. The respondent also submitted that he was nearly 58 years old and as per circular issued by the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT), an officer due for superannuation deserves special consideration in the matter of transfer and should not to be transferred to an odd place. Transfer of the respondent in the middle of the year from Shillong to a faraway place like Itanagar, has caused serious setback as the respondent is ailing from grave eye problem and his whole body is afflicted by a serious skin condition known as psoriasis and also that his father is about 90 years old. The respondent submitted representation to the Chief Commissioner to retain him at Shillong either in Customs Preventive Commissionerate in Shillong CGST Commissionerate. 3. The Department contested the Original Application filed by the respondent by contending that transfer has been made in the administrative exigencies of service in the routine, along with 93 other officers and further that date of birth of the respondent being 30.05.1962, his age is 57 years 8 months. Therefore, DoPT guidelines that officers with 2 years or less service from superannuation should be given their desired place of posting, is not attracted to the present case. 4. The Tribunal set aside the order of transfer dated 14.08.2019 by the impugned judgment while allowing the Original Application by holding that "the power of judicial review could very well be excised by a court of law if such transfer indicated hardship factor in compliance with such a transfer order. Moreover, it is the policy of the Govt. of India that in case of an officer due to superannuation, posting to station of choice shall be given due weightage. There is an objective based on consideration of welfare behind such provision in the transfer policy as it would enable a person about to retire after a long and devoted service to make arrangements for settling down thereafter with her family, acquire a house if not already done and to make necessary arrangement for her superannuated life". 5. The Tribunal however, while setting aside the impugned order of transfer dated 14.08.2019, also directed the Department to accommodate the respondent by adjusting him either in Shillong or in any place nearer to his home town, subject to availability of vacancy. 6. We have heard Dr. N. Mozika, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. 5. The Tribunal however, while setting aside the impugned order of transfer dated 14.08.2019, also directed the Department to accommodate the respondent by adjusting him either in Shillong or in any place nearer to his home town, subject to availability of vacancy. 6. We have heard Dr. N. Mozika, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. N. Dasgupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 7. Dr. N. Mozika, learned Senior counsel submitted that the order of transfer dated 14.08.2019 has been issued by the Department is an Annual General Transfer order, which was overdue for quite some time. The exercise could not be undertaken earlier due to pendency of WP(C) No. 58 of 2019 before this Court wherein the notification No. 13/2017 Central Excise (N.T.) : dated 09.06.2017 and the Circular No. C No. II (39)04/ET/CCO/SH/2019 dated 20.02.2019, shifting the office of the Chief Commissioner from Shillong to Guwahati, were challenged. The shifting of the office could be completed only after dismissal of the above writ petition by this Court in the month of July 2019. The Annual General Transfers were long overdue as many officers had already retired. The respondent has been enjoying home posting in Shillong or nearby Shillong areas for about 30 years for the entire period of service from 1989 till date. It is argued that the transfer of exigency of service. An employee has no right to insist on his posting at a particular place of his choice. Learned counsel in support of his arguments has relied on the following judgments of the Apex Court:- (i) State of U.P. and Ors. vs. Gobardha Lal on 23rd March, 2004. (ii) Major General J.K. Bansal vs Union of India and Ors. on 23rd August, 2005. (iii) Rajendra Singh vs. State of U.P. & Ors. on 31st July, 2009. (iv) National Hydroelectric Power... vs. Shri Bhagwan on 11th September, 2001. (v) N.K. Singh vs. Union of India on 25th August, 1994. (vi) Mrs. Shilpi Bose and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. on 19th November, 1990. (vii) Gujarat Electricity Board & Anr. vs. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani on 31st March, 1989. (viii) The State of Assam vs. Shri Dilip Kumar Sarma & Ors. on 1st September, 2011. (ix) Donger Singh Thakur vs. State of Chhattisgarh on 9th October, 2018. (x) M. Sankaranarayan-IAS vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. on 11th November, 1992. 8. Mr. (vii) Gujarat Electricity Board & Anr. vs. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani on 31st March, 1989. (viii) The State of Assam vs. Shri Dilip Kumar Sarma & Ors. on 1st September, 2011. (ix) Donger Singh Thakur vs. State of Chhattisgarh on 9th October, 2018. (x) M. Sankaranarayan-IAS vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. on 11th November, 1992. 8. Mr. N. Dasgupta, learned counsel for the respondent opposed this writ petition and submitted that the learned Tribunal was fully justified in setting aside the order of the transfer. In doing so, the Tribunal has relied on the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in Union of India v. Dr. Umesh Kumar Mishra: WA No. (SH) 17/12 wherein, it was held that when a policy has been laid down, the same may be deviated from only if there is any reason to do so. Reliance was also placed on another judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Narayan Choudhury v. State of Tripura & Ors. : WP(C) No. 239/1999 reported in (2000) 1 GLR 519. It was argued that since in the present case, the respondent will retire on May 2022, a period of about only 2 years is left. Therefore, the Tribunal has rightly directed the Chief Commissioner to consider the petitioner by adjusting him at Shillong or nearer to his home town i.e., Shillong, subject to availability of vacancy. It is argued that the petitioner-Department has distorted the facts in saying that the respondent has all along remained posted in and around Shillong whereas, he was posted at Umkiang from 11.03.2013 to 03.08.2013 and Dawki from 08.02.2016 to 09.09.2017, which are faraway places from Shillong. 9. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. (2008) 14 SCC 171, learned counsel argued that a writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting only errors of jurisdiction committed by the inferior tribunals. The Supreme Court in Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. S.B. Bhatt and Ors. AIR 1961 SC 970 and many other judgments held that the error that can be corrected by a writ of certiorari, must be self-evident and not need an elaborated examination of record. The Supreme Court in Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. S.B. Bhatt and Ors. AIR 1961 SC 970 and many other judgments held that the error that can be corrected by a writ of certiorari, must be self-evident and not need an elaborated examination of record. It is further argued that the Tribunal is a creature of a Statute under Article 323-A of the Constitution of India and therefore, would have the same jurisdiction which a civil court possesses. Learned counsel relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam & Anr. vs. Chhabi Nath & Ors in Civil Appeal No. 2548 of 2009, Laws (SC) 2015 (2) 87, argued that judicial orders of civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the present writ petition is not maintainable. 10. Learned counsel invited attention of the Court towards 18 other officers listed in para 6 of the affidavit dated 25.02.2020, who according to him, have been adjusted within the State or transferred to the place of their choice. The order of transfer qua the respondent, passed by the Department, according to him, besides being discriminatory, suffers from violation of the principles of natural justice. 11. We are at the outset inclined to reject the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent about the maintainability of the writ petition which has been sought to be built by relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam & Anr. The Supreme Court in that case was dealing with a reference upon doubt being raised about the correctness of the law laid down in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors: (2003) 6 SCC 675 . The Central Administrative Tribunal being a Tribunal set up under Article 22(3) (f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 cannot be in that sense construed to be a civil court. Judgments of the Tribunal as per law enunciated by Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. (1997) SC 1125 are amenable directly before Division Bench of the High Court. 12. The respondent has in the additional affidavit directly filed before this Court has sought to expand the scope of the case. (1997) SC 1125 are amenable directly before Division Bench of the High Court. 12. The respondent has in the additional affidavit directly filed before this Court has sought to expand the scope of the case. No such pleadings with reference to those 18 persons were made before the Tribunal, with regard to whom now it is alleged by him that they have been given favourable treatment and therefore he has been discriminated against. Transfer or posting of an employee is an incident of service. He cannot insist on his transfer at a place of his choice by raising the argument of discrimination by citing the example of others. Moreover, in the present case, the respondent has throughout his service career of 30 years remained in Shillong or nearby areas. Therefore, such argument of discrimination, even otherwise has no force. The Tribunal has quashed the order of transfer singularly on consideration of the fact that the petitioner was due to retire after a period of about 2 years. However, as per record, date of birth of the petitioner being 30.05.1962, he was due to retire on 30.05.2022. Counting from the date of the order of transfer dated 14.08.2019, the respondent was left with over 2 years and 9 months before retirement. The stipulation of the policy that employees who were left with 2 years or less service should normally be considered for being given a choice posting, would therefore not be attracted to the case of the respondent. 13. It may be significant to note here that the exercise of transfer in the present matter was undertaken with somewhat delay due to pendency of WP(C) No. 58 of 2019 before this Court in which the notification dated 09.06.2017 and circular dated 20.02.2019, shifting the office of the Chief Commissioner from Shillong to Guwahati, was under challenge. That matter was decided by this Court in the month of July 2019. The transfer was made in the administrative exigency of service is evident from that fact that transfer order was not passed in respect of the respondent alone but as many as 94 officers were transferred by this common order. 14. In view of the law enunciated by the Supreme Court by catena of judicial pronouncements, the power of judicial review even in the matter of transfer, can be exercised by the High Court or the Tribunal within the defined parameters. 14. In view of the law enunciated by the Supreme Court by catena of judicial pronouncements, the power of judicial review even in the matter of transfer, can be exercised by the High Court or the Tribunal within the defined parameters. We may in this connection cite the decided case law of the Supreme Court as to what are the limitations on the scope of interference of the Supreme Court in the matters of transfer of a Government employee. 15. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. & Anr. v. Siya Ram & Anr.: (2004) 7 SCC 405 . "5. The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India had gone into the question as to whether the transfer was in the interest of public service. That would essentially require factual adjudication and invariably depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of the case concerned. No government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or the tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. This position was highlighted by this Court in National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan: (2001) 8 SCC 574 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 21." 16. In the case of Bank of India v. Jagjit Singh Mehta (1992) 1 SCC 306 , the Supreme Court held that the guidelines for posting husband and wife at one station, even if their employers be different, has to be followed as far as practicable, but no right thereby was conferred on an employee to remain posted at the same place even if administrative exigency and transfer policy do not permit. 17. 17. What would be the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal in respect of such matters has been decided by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. S.L. Abbas (1993) 4 SCC 357 . Incidentally, S.L. Abbas, the respondent in that case, who was a Garden Curator in the office of Scientist-SE-Botanical Survey of India, was also transferred from Shillong to Pauri, Uttar Pradesh. The argument that he raised before the Gauhati Bench of the Tribunal was that his wife was also an employee of the Central Government and posted in Shillong, and that as per the guidelines issued by the Government of India, husband and wife should be kept both in the same place. Repelling the argument, the Supreme Court in para 6 to 8 of the said judgment is held as under:- "6. An order of transfer is an incident of Government service. Fundamental Rule 11 says that "the whole time of a Government servant is at the disposal of the Government which pays him and he may be employed in any manner required by proper authority". Fundamental Rule 15 says that "the President may transfer a Government servant from one post to another." That the respondent is liable to transfer anywhere in India is not in dispute. It is not the case of the respondent that the order of his transfer is vitiated by mala fides on the part of the authority making the order, - though the Tribunal does say so merely because certain guidelines issued by the Central Government are not followed, with which finding we shall deal later. The respondent attributed "mischief" to his immediate superior who had nothing to do with his transfer. All he says is that he should not be transferred because his wife is working at Shillong, his children are studying there and also because his health and suffered a setback some time ago. He relies upon certain executive instructions issued by the Government in that behalf. Those instructions are in the nature of guidelines. They do not have statutory force. 7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. Those instructions are in the nature of guidelines. They do not have statutory force. 7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration. The guidelines say that as far as possible, husband and wife must be posted at the same place. The said guideline however does not confer upon the Government employee a legally enforceable right. 8. The jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal is akin to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in service matters. This is evident from a perusal of Article 323-A of the Constitution. The constraints and norms which the High Court observes while exercising the said jurisdiction apply equally to the Tribunal created under Article 323-A. (We find it all the more surprising that the learned Single Member who passed the impugned order is a former Judge of the High Court and is thus aware of the norms and constraints of the writ jurisdiction.) The Administrative Tribunal is not an appellate authority sitting in judgment over the orders of transfer. It cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the authority competent to transfer. In this case the Tribunal has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the order of transfer. The order of the Tribunal reads as if it were sitting in appeal over the order of transfer made by the Senior Administrative Officer (competent authority)." It would therefore, be evident from above referred to judgments of the Supreme Court that the guidelines issued by the Government of India, do not confer upon an employee to have a legally enforceable right. 18. In the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Kashmir Singh & Anr. : (2010)13 SCC 306 , the Supreme Court has held as under:- "12. Transfer ordinarily is an incidence of service, and the courts should be very reluctant to interfere in transfer orders as long as they are not clearly illegal. 18. In the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Kashmir Singh & Anr. : (2010)13 SCC 306 , the Supreme Court has held as under:- "12. Transfer ordinarily is an incidence of service, and the courts should be very reluctant to interfere in transfer orders as long as they are not clearly illegal. In particular, we are of the opinion that transfer and postings of policemen must be left in the discretion of the State authorities concerned which are in the best position to assess the necessities of the administrative requirements of the situation. The administrative authorities concerned may be of the opinion that more policemen are required in any particular district and/or other another range than in another, depending upon their assessment of the law and order situation and/or considerations. These are purely administrative matters, and it is well settled that courts must not ordinarily interfere in administrative matters and should maintain judicial restraint, vide Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 : AIR 1996 SC 11 ." 19. In the case of State of U.P. & Ors. v. Gobardhan Lal, (2004) 11 SCC 402 , the Supreme Court held that transfer is prerogative of the authorities concerned and the court should not normally interfere therewith, except when (i) transfer order shown to be vitiated by mala fides, or (ii) in violation of any statutory provision, or (iii) having been passed by an authority not competent to pass such an order. It was further held that allegations of mala fides, if any, based on concrete material and must inspire confidence of the court. Such being the position of law, hardship alone does not afford jurisdiction for setting aside the order of transfer. 20. In view of the above discussion, we are inclined to hold that the Central Administrative Tribunal, while interfering with the order of transfer in the present case, has exceeded its jurisdiction, and erred in law in quashing the order of transfer. 21. Writ petition is therefore hereby, allowed and impugned judgment of the Tribunal dated 24.01.2020 is set aside. Consequently, Original Application filed by the respondent before the Tribunal is dismissed.