JUDGMENT : U. Durga Prasad Rao, J. The challenge in this C.R.P at the instance of appellant/respondent is to the order dated 01.06.2019 in R.C.A.No.5 of 2018 where under learned Rent Control Appellate Authority-cum-Senior Civil Judge, Pithapuram dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant/respondent under Section 20 of A.P Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short "the Act"), while confirming the decree and order dated 28.08.2018 in R.C.C.No.1 of 2016 passed by the learned Rent Controller-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Tuni directing the eviction of appellant/respondent from the petition scheduled tiled shop room. 2. The parties in this CRP are referred to as they are arrayed in R.C.C.No.1 of 2016 for the sake of convenience. 3. The petitioner is the owner of the petition schedule property, which he let out to the respondent on a monthly rent of Rs.1,000/-. While so, the Tuni Municipality issued notice under Section 231 of A.P. Municipalities Act stating that the building being old and dilapidated one has to be demolished. Respondent filed R.C.C.No.2 of 2015 in the Court of Rent Controller-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Tuni seeking a direction to the petitioner to effect repairs to the roof of the leasehold shop, which is pending enquiry. Further case of petitioner is that he is a physically handicapped person and oil manufacturer by caste and so, he wants to carry on the business in oil manufacturing and selling, for which he needed the building for demolition and reconstruction to set up his business. Thus, he required the premises for a bonafide personal occupation. His other buildings were in occupation of tenants. The respondent and her husband have already secured an alternative accommodation and they are in possession of very big godowns for storing cement bags. Hence, the petitioner filed R.C.C.No.1 of 2016 for eviction under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) (b) and Section 12 of the Act. (b) The respondent opposed the petition interalia contending that she filed R.C.C.No.2 of 2015 for effecting repairs to the leasehold premises and the same is dragged on by the petitioner purposefully. It is contended that the petition under Section 12 of the Act is not maintainable, as the petitioner did not give an undertaking affidavit that after demolition and reconstruction, he would again let out the premises to the respondent. It is contended that the petition under Section 12 of the Act is not maintainable, as the petitioner did not give an undertaking affidavit that after demolition and reconstruction, he would again let out the premises to the respondent. It is also contended that the petitioner is in possession of his own non-residential building in Tuni and enjoying those properties. In fact, after filing eviction petition, the petitioner had leased out his another non-residential building to one Karri Ramana for establishing a shop. If really, the petitioner is in bonafide need of the premises, he would not have leased out the shop to Karri Ramana, but ought to have occupied. It is further contended that securing an alternative accommodation by the husband of the respondent does not deprive respondent from continuing in the present building. It is contended that godowns are different from shops, cement will be sold in retail in shops only, but not in godowns. So also there is no possibility of selling the cement in retail in godown. The godowns will not be situated in commercial places and the purchasers of the cement will not come to the godown and they will come to the petition schedule shop alone to purchase the cement. Hence, the petition is not maintainable. (c) During trial, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Ex.A-1 was marked on behalf of petitioner. R.W.1 was examined, but no documents were exhibited on behalf of respondent. (d) It should be noted that both the Courts below ordered eviction by rendering concurrent findings on the following main observations: (i) Though the petitioner sought for eviction of respondent under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) (b) and Section 12 of the Act, the petitioner is not entitled to seek for eviction under Section 12 of the Act for the reason that he failed to give an undertaking affidavit to the effect that the building on completion of repairs or on demolition and reconstruction, would again be offered to the tenant. (ii) So far as the other ground of bonafide requirement under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) (b) of the Act is concerned, it is observed that the petitioner could establish the ground of bonafide requirement for his personal occupation i.e. for starting oil business therein after demolishing the existing structure and constructing a new building. (ii) So far as the other ground of bonafide requirement under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) (b) of the Act is concerned, it is observed that the petitioner could establish the ground of bonafide requirement for his personal occupation i.e. for starting oil business therein after demolishing the existing structure and constructing a new building. It was observed that though the respondent could elicit in the evidence that the petitioner has another shop which he let out to one Karri Ramana for doing cloth and gold business, however it was not further elicited in the cross examination whether the said shop premises would be fit for doing oil business proposed by the petitioner. In the absence of extracting the said fact as to the sufficiency or otherwise of the shop premises let out to Karri Ramana, for the personal oil business of the petitioner, the respondent cannot be permitted to contend that the petitioner owns another shop room which he let out to Karri Ramana after filing R.C.C.No.1 of 2016. (iii) So far as the availability of alternative accommodation for respondent is concerned, the Courts below observed that she is having her own shops just opposite to the petition schedule property, so that she can shift her cement shop to her own shop premises by vacating the existing building. The contention of the respondent that her godown can be used only for storing the cement, but not conducive for doing retail business as no purchaser will be willing to come to the godown to purchase the cement but they prefer only the shop, was rejected by the Courts below on the observation that it was not the case of the respondent that while she was storing the cement in the godown, doing the business in the petitioner's leasehold premises. Further, she has the shop rooms just opposite to the petition schedule property and therefore, she has every possibility to shift her cement shop to her own shop premises by vacating the petitioner's shop. The lower appellate Court apprehended that since the rent was only Rs.1,000/- per month, which is a very low amount in the present days' cost of living, probably the respondent was not vacating the premises. Thus, they observed that the petitioner could establish his bonafide requirement of the premises and the respondent had no sufficient cause to squat over the property. Hence, the C.R.P. 4. Thus, they observed that the petitioner could establish his bonafide requirement of the premises and the respondent had no sufficient cause to squat over the property. Hence, the C.R.P. 4. Heard Sri Challa Dhanamjaya, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Sri J.Prabhakar, learned counsel representing Sri M.Solomon Raju, learned counsel for the respondent. 5. While castigating the judgment of the lower appellate Court, learned counsel for the revision petitioner would strenuously argue that the Courts below failed in observing that the respondent/petitioner miserably failed to prove the bonafide requirement of the shop premises. In expatiation, he would submit that admittedly the respondent/petitioner is having a shop which he let out to one Karri Ramana after filing of R.C.C.No.1 of 2016 which indicates that he is not in serious requirement of shop premises lest he should have started his oil business in the said shop instead of leasing out to Karri Ramana. Unfortunately, the Courts below have not appreciated this aspect in a proper perspective. It is further contended that the Courts below while holding that the eviction petition is not maintainable under Section 12 of the Act, consequently ought to have held that the petition is not maintainable on the other ground of bonafide requirement also and dismissed the R.C.C. Nextly, it is argued that though revision petitioner's husband is having a godown to store the cement, the same is not conducive for conducting a retail cement shop and therefore, the Courts below were wrong in observing that the revision petitioner ought to have shifted his business to said godown, which is situated opposite to the shop room of respondent/petitioner. He thus, prayed to allow the C.R.P. 6. Per contra, while supporting the orders of the Courts below, learned counsel for respondent/petitioner would strenuously argue that both the Courts below have given concurrent findings on the facts relating to bonafide requirement of the respondent/petitioner to the shop premises to do oil business and they gave further concurrent finding as to availability of alternative premises to the revision petitioner and in that view, this Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction may not interfere with such concurrent factual findings to dislodge them. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Daya Rani & Anr. Vs. Shabbir Ahmed (Civil Appeal Nos.6594 of 2019 & 6595 of 2019, decided on 22.08.2019). In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Daya Rani & Anr. Vs. Shabbir Ahmed (Civil Appeal Nos.6594 of 2019 & 6595 of 2019, decided on 22.08.2019). He thus prayed to dismiss the CRP. 7. The point for consideration is: Whether there are merits in this CRP to allow? 8. Point: The admitted facts are that the respondent/petitioner is the owner of the shop premises, which he let out to petitioner/respondent to run retail business in cement on a monthly rent of Rs.1,000/-. Since the building became dilapidated, the Tuni Municipality issued a notice under Section 231 of A.P Municipalities Act requiring the building to be demolished. In the meanwhile, the petitioner/respondent filed R.C.C.No.2 of 2015 on the file of Rent Controller-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Tuni for a direction to the respondent/petitioner to effect repairs to the roof of the petition schedule property. Thereafter the respondent/petitioner filed R.C.C.No.1 of 2016 under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) (b) & Section 12 of the Act on two grounds viz., the petition schedule building was required to him to demolish the same pursuant to the notice of the Municipal authorities and secondly that the building was required to demolish and construct a new building to start manufacturing and selling of oil business. 9. As already stated supra, since the respondent/petitioner has not filed an undertaking affidavit in terms of Section 12 (2) of the Act, agreeing to offer the building after reconstruction to the petitioner/respondent, the Courts below have held that the petition cannot be maintained under Section 12 of the Act. I gave my anxious consideration to the said legal finding. 10. Section 12 (2) of the Act reads thus: (1) xxx (2) No order for recovery of possession under this Section shall be passed unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the building on completion of the repairs, alterations or additions or the new building on its completion will be offered to the tenant, who delivered possession in pursuance of an order under sub-section (1), for his occupation before the expiry of such period as may be specified by the Controller in this behalf. Thus, the words 'shall' and 'unless' employed in the above provision make it clear that the Court shall not pass an order for eviction unless the landlord gives an undertaking to offer the building again to the tenant either after effecting repairs or reconstruction. In this case, the respondent/petitioner has admittedly not filed such a mandatory affidavit. Therefore, the Courts below were right in holding that the eviction petition under Section 12 of the Act was not maintainable. 11. Then the eviction petition hinges on the doctrine of bonafide requirement envisaged under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) (b) of the Act. This aspect is concerned, P.W.1 who is the wife of the respondent/petitioner deposed that her husband requires the petition schedule premises for his personal occupation to carry oil business. It is stated that her husband met with an accident and he became physically handicapped and they belong to oil manufacturing community. It is elicited in the cross examination of P.W.1 that they are having another shop at Main Road, which was let out to one Karri Ramana for doing cloth and gold business on a monthly rent of Rs.8,000/- subsequent to filing of R.C.C.No.1 of 2016 and further, her husband is not doing any business at present and they are having lands and are doing cultivation. The factum of respondent/petitioner belonging to oil manufacturing community is not much disputed. Therefore, there is nothing on record to disbelieve their version that they were intending to do oil business by constructing a shop room after demolishing the existing dilapidated one. Therefore, the respondent/petitioner do require a shop to continue his family trade. So far as the availability of another shop room at Main Road and letting out the same to Karri Ramana is concerned, as rightly observed by the lower appellate Court, except eliciting in the cross examination of P.W.1 that they let out the available shop at Main Road to Karri Ramana after filing of R.C.C.No.1 of 2016, no further information was elicited as to whether or not the said shop room was conducive to manufacture oil and sell. Therefore, mere availability of another shop which was let out cannot be a ground to reject the request of the landlord. Therefore, mere availability of another shop which was let out cannot be a ground to reject the request of the landlord. Further, it is a trite law that when a landlord owns number of premises which are on rent, he cannot be directed by the Court to occupy any other premises other than the one he seeks eviction. The discretion rests with him depending upon the suitability and other facts. Therefore, in the instant case, merely because respondent/petitioner let out a shop room situated in the Main Road to one Karri Ramana instead of occupying the same to do oil business that is not a ground to reject his petition. Thus, on a consideration of facts and evidence, it is clear that the respondent/petitioner bonafide requires the petition mentioned shop room for doing his family trade of oil business. 12. So far as the petitioner/respondent is concerned, R.W.1 admitted in the evidence that herself and her husband having shops opposite to the petition schedule property and are having one godown in the market yard, apart from house properties and business properties. Therefore, it is clear that the petitioner/respondent is having shop in front of the petition schedule property. However, the petitioner/respondent contends that it was a godown which will be used only for storing cement and not for doing retail business. This argument cannot have substance because it was not her case that at present she was storing the cement in her godowns and selling the cement in retail in the petition schedule shop room. It appears she is storing the cement and selling the same in the present shop room. If that being so, the same activity can be done by her in the shop room which is situated opposite to the petition schedule shop room. It means, the petitioner/respondent has an alterative accommodation to smoothly conduct her cement business in the shop room which is situated opposite to the petition schedule shop room. 13. So, on a conspectus of the facts and evidence, it is clear that the respondent/petitioner is in bonafide requirement of his building for demolition and construction of a new one for running oil business, whereas the petitioner/respondent is having another shop room opposite to the existing one and in view of availability of alternative accommodation, she is liable to vacate the petition schedule shop room. It must be said that both the Courts below have aptly dealt with the facts and evidence and came to a correct finding, which is not vitiated by any law or perversity. Therefore, the orders impugned are impregnable. Even otherwise, when the factual findings given by the Courts below do not suffer any perversity, such concurrent findings cannot be dislodged by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. In Daya Rani's case (supra), the Apex Court held thus: 14. The law is thus well settled that while exercising revisional power, the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence on record: both oral or documentary. Further the consideration while exercising revisional jurisdiction is confined to find out whether the findings of fact rendered by the Court or Authority below were according to law and did not suffer from any error of law. 15. The assessment made by the High Court in the present matter is not in conformity with the law laid down by this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Though the judgment of the High Court discloses that the High Court was aware that it was exercising Revisional Powers, the judgment does not spell out or advert to any perversity in the findings rendered either by the Rent Controller or by the Appellate Authority. 14. Therefore, for all the above reasons, this civil revision petition is dismissed and the revision petitioner is granted one month time to vacate the petition scheduled shop room. No order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.