ORDER : In view of outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, these cases have been taken up through Video Conferencing. Concerned lawyers have no objection with regard to the proceeding, which has been held through Video Conferencing today at 10:30 a.m. onwards. They have no complaint in respect to the audio and video clarity and quality. 2. The petitioner (Bharat Coking Coal Limited in both the cases) has approached this Court for quashing of the judgment dated 31.08.2018, passed by the learned Labour Court, Dhanbad in M.J.Case No.34 of 2010 & M.J. Case No. 36 of 2010 respectively whereby and whereuner learned Labour Court has been pleased to allow the applications filed by respondent No.1 (in both the cases) under Section 33.C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act directing the petitioner and Respondent No.2 to pay the difference to the tune of Rs.24,035.40 and Rs.66,012.30 respectively within a period of 60 days from the date of passing of order failing which the same shall bear simple interest @ 9% per annum. 3. As per factual matrix, applicants, namely, Shri Gopeshwar Rajak & Shri Habu Rajak, respondent No.1 herein in both the cases were initially appointed on 17.10.1971 and their date of birth are 04.11.1940 & 24.05.1944 respectively. They retired from service under VRS, BPES w.e.f. 08.11.1999 and 20.11.1999 respectively from Maheshpur Colliery under Govindpur Area No. III of M/s BCCL. They continuously rendered their services for 28 years and 21 days i.e. 28 years and 28 years 01 month and 03 days respectively. They retired from the service 11 months and 26 days and 4 years 06 months and 04 days respectively prior to their actual date of superannuation. The applicants have claimed last wages i.e. Rs. 245.51 per day as per NCWA-VI drawn at the time of taking VRS, however, the company has paid Ex-gratia payment/Monetary Terminal Benefit as provided under VRS on the basis of last pay drawn under NCWA-VI which has been enforced with retrospective effect i.e. w.e.f. 01.07.1996, which covers the date of retirement of the applicants and therefore, company is liable to pay Ex-gratia payment on the basis of last pay drawn under NCWA VI. The applicants have also claimed the amount deducted towards PF under NCWA-VI. The applicants have also claimed the amount deducted towards PF under NCWA-VI. Against non-payment of the said amount, the applicants had moved before the Labour Court, Dhanbad by filing M.J. Case No.34 of 2010 & M.J.Case No.36 of 2010 against one of the Coal Unit of BCCL namely Maheshpur Colliery under Govindpur Area No.III at Dhanbad and the Office of Coal Mines Provident Fund Dhanbad for computation of dues/wages and other benefits including the Provident Fund in the light of National Coal Wages Agreement (NCWA) V & VI read with Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS). 4. Upon notice the respondent No.2 appeared by filing written statement stating therein that so far non-payment of arrear of CMPF amount deducted, if any (by the ex-employer) is concerned, the applicants may be directed to apply for the payment of the same through their last employer i.e. M/s B.C.C.L. by giving their full detail including their CMPF A/C number, detail of serial number of their VV statement of concerned year and their current bank saving account. There is no laches on the part of respondent No.2. 5. The issues before learned Court below were as under: i. Whether, the instant case is maintainable U/s 33.C (2) of the Act ? ii. Whether, the claim of the applicant to get benefit of pay revision as envisaged under NCWA-VI after getting benefit of VRS is genuine and correct ? iii. Whether, the calculation of one month means & includes 30 days or 26 days ? iv. Whether claim of the applicant regarding PF and leave Encashment amount are genuine ? 6. After hearing both the parties, the Labour Court, Dhanbad has allowed both the applications filed by applicants under Section 33.C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act holding therein that: M.J. Case No.34 of 2020 In the result, it is therefore ordered that the instant claim petition is hereby allowed in favour of applicant and against O.P. on contest. Consequently, O.P. is directed to pay the difference amount to the tune Rs.24,035.40 in round off Rs.24,035/- (Twenty four thousand & thirty five) only within 60 days from passing of this order failing which O.P. will also liable to pay arrear amount along with simple interest @ 9% per annum from the expiry of said 60 days till the date of actual payment. Hence, the instant case is hereby disposed off accordingly.” M.J. Case No.36 of 2010 In the result, it is therefore ordered that the instant claim petition is hereby allowed in favour of applicant and against O.P. on contest. Consequently, O.P. is directed to pay the difference amount to the tune Rs.66,012.30 in round off Rs.66,012/- (Sixty six thousand & twelve only) within 60 days from passing of this order failing which O.P. will also be liable to pay arrear amount along with simple interest @ 9% per annum from the expiry of said 60 days till the date of actual payment. Hence, the instant case is hereby disposed off accordingly.” 7. Being aggrieved by the said judgments, the petitioner-B.C.C.L. has approached this Court for quashment of the same. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner vociferously argued that the instant cases are not maintainable Under Section 33C (2) of the Act because the claim has not been adjudicated as yet. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen’s entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis and exercise of its power U/s 33 C (2) of the Act. The applicants themselves have submitted an application to retire under VRS which was accepted by the Management and thereafter the Management had paid the ex-gratia amount as per term of VRS. The scheme of voluntary retirement speaks about a package. One may either take it or reject it. The option has to be made by the employee not by the employer. Once employees opt to retire under VRS and accept the benefits thereunder, their right as employee come to an end and thereafter employees cannot again assert their rights and re-agitate their claim for pay revision for pre-retirement period. So far MGB is concerned, in the circular of VRS term “wages” was defined and it includes basic pay, VDA & FDA and SDA. In case of piece rated workers group SPRA was also added. All these items have already been calculated at the time of computation of dues under VRS. 9. Learned Counsel further submits that by mistake last pay drawn as per NCWA-VI was admitted in the first W.S. but it was rectified subsequently in the supplementary W.S. It is well settled principle now that nobody can go beyond the statute/regulation. 10. All these items have already been calculated at the time of computation of dues under VRS. 9. Learned Counsel further submits that by mistake last pay drawn as per NCWA-VI was admitted in the first W.S. but it was rectified subsequently in the supplementary W.S. It is well settled principle now that nobody can go beyond the statute/regulation. 10. To strengthen his argument, learned Counsel places heavy reliance on the following judgments:- i. 2006 (3) SCC 708 . ii. 2015 (4) SCC 482 11. On the other hand, no counter-affidavit has been filed. However, learned Counsel for the respondents submits that there is recognized agreement known as NCWA which gives the authority and express the adjudication itself for the pay revision or say pay schedule including all other benefits. Applicants are claiming their dues as per provision of NCWA-VI. The difference of Ex-gratia claimed by the applicant as per NCWA-VI has been admitted by the Management in their written statement. Subsequently, Management has filed a supplementary written statement wherein the entire admission made in earlier written statement has been denied. It is well settled principle of law that the admitted fact cannot be denied. There is no provision for filing of such a supplementary written statement reversing the statement made earlier on record even without filing any amendment petition. The admission made by the Management in their W.S. cannot be denied without petition for permission of withdrawal of said petition. 12. To buttress his argument, learned Counsel has relied upon the following judgments:- i. AIR 1998 SC 618 ii. 2017 (155) FLR 865 13. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submission of the parties, this Court is of the considered view that admittedly the order passed by the Labour Court is perverse and de hors the Rules for the following reasons:- i. it is a settled principles of law that voluntary retirement scheme speaks of a package. One either takes it or rejects it. While opting for the same, presumably the employee takes into consideration the future implication also. The employees who opted for voluntary retirement, make a planning for the future. ii. At the time of giving option, they know where they stand. One either takes it or rejects it. While opting for the same, presumably the employee takes into consideration the future implication also. The employees who opted for voluntary retirement, make a planning for the future. ii. At the time of giving option, they know where they stand. At that point of time they did not anticipate that they would get any benefit of revision of scales of pay and therefore cannot claim the subsequent benefits of pay revision, which has been given a retrospective effect. iii. There is no dispute with respect to the facts whether an employee opting for voluntary retirement can subsequently claim the benefits of pay revision in lieu of implementation of NCWA-VI. An employee retiring under voluntary retirement scheme cannot claim benefits of revision of pay scale implemented subsequent to his separation. iv. The respondents after weighing all pros and cons accepted offer of voluntary retirement and superannuated from service on being satisfied with package, cannot subsequently be permitted to claim the benefits of pay revision after almost 10 years of superannuation. v. The Labour Court de hors the Rules and illegally and arbitrarily entertained the application under Section 33(C) (2) of the Industrial Dispute Act which was filed more than 10 years after superannuation of respondents. vi. The factual aspects have not been appreciated properly and decided by the Labour Court and are not based on cogent evidence. 14. The issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of “Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ganesh Razak & Anr.” reported in (1995) 1 SCC 235 wherein the Hon’ble Court has observed as under:- “4. It is clear that there has been no earlier adjudication by any forum of the claim of these workmen of their entitlement to paid wages at the same rate at which the regular workmen of the establishment are being paid and there is no award or settlement to that effect. In short, this claim of the workmen has neither been adjudicated nor recognized by the employer in any award or settlement. The real question therefore is “Whether in these circumstances, without a prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workmen to be paid at the same rate as the regular employees, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages claimed by them on that basis are maintainable under Section 33-C (2) of the Act.” “11. The real question therefore is “Whether in these circumstances, without a prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workmen to be paid at the same rate as the regular employees, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages claimed by them on that basis are maintainable under Section 33-C (2) of the Act.” “11. In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. vs. Workmen it was held with reference to the earlier decisions that a proceeding under Section 33-C (2) being in the nature of an execution proceeding, it would appear that an investigation of the alleged right of re-employment is outside its scope and the Labour Court exercising power under Section 33-C (2) of the Act cannot arrogate to itself the functions of adjudication of the dispute relating to the claim of re-employment. Distinction between proceedings in a suit and execution proceedings thereafter was pointed out. It was indicated that the plaintiff’s right to relief against the defendant involves an investigation which can be done only in a suit and once the defendant’s liability had been adjudicated in the suit, the working out of such liability with a view to give relief is the function of an execution proceeding.” 15. Further in case of “State of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Brijpal Singh”, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 58 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “Labour Court cannot first decide workman’s entitlement and then compute the benefit so adjudicated- It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognized by the employer, and thereafter for purpose of implementation thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that power of interpretation is treated as incidental to Labour Court’s power under S. 33-C (2), like that of executing court’s power to interpret the decree for purposes of its execution.” “10. It is well settled that the workman can proceed under Section 33-C(2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under Section 33-A or on a reference under Section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. It is well settled that the workman can proceed under Section 33-C(2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under Section 33-A or on a reference under Section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. This Court in the case of Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. vs. Suresh Chand held that a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceeding in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from the employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. Proceeding further, this Court held that the right to the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between the industrial workman, and his employer. This Court further as follows: (SCC p. 150, para 4) “It is not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 33-C (2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an Industrial Tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but dispute in a reference under Section 10 of the Act. 16. Further in case of “H.E.C. Voluntary Retd. Employees Welfare Society & Anr. Vs. Heavy Engineering Corpn. Ltd. & Others”, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 708 it has been held as under: “The parties are bound by the terms of the contract of voluntary retirement- Once an employee opts to retire voluntarily, in terms of the contract he cannot raise a claim for a higher salary, unless a statute or policy formulated in that behalf by the employer provides otherwise” “18. The Voluntary Retirement Scheme speaks of a package. One either takes it or rejects its. While offering to opt for the same, presumably the employee takes into consideration the future implication also. 19. It is not in dispute that the effect of such Voluntary Retirement Scheme is cessation of jural relationship between the employer and the employee. The Voluntary Retirement Scheme speaks of a package. One either takes it or rejects its. While offering to opt for the same, presumably the employee takes into consideration the future implication also. 19. It is not in dispute that the effect of such Voluntary Retirement Scheme is cessation of jural relationship between the employer and the employee. Once an employee opts to retire voluntarily, in terms of the contract he cannot raise a claim for a higher salary unless by reason of a statute he becomes entitled thereto. He may also become entitled thereto even if a policy in that behalf is formulated by the Company. 17. Further in case of “Manojbhai N. Shah & Others vs. Union of India & Others”, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 482 it has been held as under: “31. In the instant case, it is crystal clear that the employees had already opted under the Scheme- under a specially made scheme, which was framed only with an intention to reduce future expenditure of the employers. If all these benefits are given to the persons who had already opted under the Scheme and had retired, the real purpose with which the Scheme had been framed would be frustrated.” 32. We do not agree with the submission made on behalf of the employees that action of the employers in not giving pay rise to the employees in pursuance of the notification is discriminatory in nature. The employees who retired under the Scheme form a separate class of employees who were given many benefits, which are not given to the employees retiring in normal course. If they all form a separate class, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that all those who retired under the Scheme and those who retired in normal course, are similarly situated. Thus, in our opinion, there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in the instant case.” 33. Similarly, there is no violation of the principle of equal pay for equal work. True, that those who retired under the Scheme did not same work which was being done by those who retired in normal course, but one cannot forget the fact that those who retired under the Scheme got substantially higher retirement benefits. In the circumstances, we do not accept the said submission also. 18. True, that those who retired under the Scheme did not same work which was being done by those who retired in normal course, but one cannot forget the fact that those who retired under the Scheme got substantially higher retirement benefits. In the circumstances, we do not accept the said submission also. 18. Further in case of “Rai Bahadur Narain Singh Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Mangey Ram”, reported in (2019) 9 SCC 365 it has been held as under: “Where very basis of claim for entitlement of workmen to certain benefit is disputed and there was no earlier adjudication or recognition of such claim by employer, and dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to benefit claimed, such claim clearly outside scope of proceedings under S. 33-C(2)- In exercise of its power under S. 33-C (2), Labour Court has no jurisdiction to decide workmen’s entitlement and then proceed to compute benefit so adjudicated on that basis.” 19. Going through the aforesaid decisions of the Ho’ble Apex Court and the observations made therein it appears that the Labour Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Tribunal Act and has passed order de hors the Rules. The judgment relied upon by the respondent-workmen is not applicable neither attracted in the instant case. 20. As a sequel to the aforesaid Rules, Guidelines and judicial pronouncements, I hereby quash and set aside the order dated 31.08.2018, passed by the learned Labour Court, Dhanbad in M.J. Case No.34 of 2010 & M.J. Case No. 36 of 2010. 21. Accordingly, these writ petitions stand allowed.