JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. In Sessions Trial No. 217 of 2011 the appellant has been convicted and sentenced to R.I for life and a fine of Rs. 20,000/- under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (in Short, IPC) with a default stipulation to undergo S.I for six months in default of payment of fine. 2. Jagannathpur P.S. Case No. 21 of 2011 has been registered under section 302 IPC against the appellant for committing murder of Subhash Chandra Sinku. On 12.04.2011 at about 23:00 hrs. the fardbeyan of Sumitra Sinku was recorded by Udai Pratap Singh, S.I of Jagannathpur police station at her village. After the investigation a charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant and he has faced the trial on the charge under section 302 IPC. During the trial the prosecution has examined twelve witnesses amongst whom Sumitra Sinku PW-6 and Budhram Sinku PW-7 are intimately related to Subhash Chandra Sinku, the deceased. The appellant has taken a plea or alibi and in his defence he has examined two witnesses who have come to the Court to depose that in the fateful night he was at the house of DW-I for celebrating the birthday party of his child. 3. The case of the prosecution is that a quarrel between the son of the appellant and the deceased instigated the deceased to complain about his son to the appellant whereupon the appellant became so furious that in the night of 12.04.2011 he sneaked inside the house of Subhash Chandra Sinku and committed his murder. The wife of Subhash Chandra Sinku and his son are the eye-witnesses and several villagers have seen the dead body of Subhash Chandra Sinku drenched in blood in his house. 4. PW-6, the informant of this case has stated that in the night of 12.04.2011 she was at home with her husband and son. At about 07:45 PM they were taking dinner together in the newly constructed house at Kolasai. In the meantime the appellant entered her house through the window and started assaulting her husband with Dauli. She was crying for help but nobody came there so she ran to her other house. After some time the villagers came there and an information was sent to the police station. Her fardbeyan was recorded in the night and she has identified her signature on the fardbeyan which was marked as Ext. 1/4. She was crying for help but nobody came there so she ran to her other house. After some time the villagers came there and an information was sent to the police station. Her fardbeyan was recorded in the night and she has identified her signature on the fardbeyan which was marked as Ext. 1/4. She has given a detailed description of the incidents in the past few days and stated that her husband has been killed due to animosity which primarily arose on account or a quarrel between the children. She has stood firmly to her grounds in the cross-examination. 5. PW-7, son of the informant is a child witness. At the time when his testimony was recorded in the Court he was aged about nine years. The learned trial Judge has put questions to him and after having satisfied with his maturity to understand the question and able to give rational answers has recorded his evidence. A well settled rule of law is that a child by the reason of his tender age is not incapable of giving evidence in the Court. In "Wheeler v. United States" reported in 1959 (US) 523 (1895), Brewer J. has held that a boy five years of age is not as a matter of law absolutely disqualified as a witness and his testimony on oath can be accepted in the Court. In India the law relating to competence of a witness is contained in section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act. It says that a witness shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that he is prevented from understanding the questions put to him, or from giving rational answers by reason of tender years, extreme old age, and disease whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. From section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act it is more than clear that by reason of tender age a witness is not rendered incompetent to give evidence in the court. It is for the Court to form an opinion whether to act on his testimony and the issue then necessarily would be one of reliability and trustworthiness of the evidence of the witness and not competence of the witness. PW-7 has deposed in the Court that in the fateful evening he was at home taking dinner with his parents. It is for the Court to form an opinion whether to act on his testimony and the issue then necessarily would be one of reliability and trustworthiness of the evidence of the witness and not competence of the witness. PW-7 has deposed in the Court that in the fateful evening he was at home taking dinner with his parents. He has seen the appellant assaulting his father and in his cross-examination he has reaffirmed that he has seen assault on his father. His testimony has been challenged primarily on the grounds that he has deposed in the Court that he cannot say with which weapon the appellant has assaulted his father and while so identification of the appellant by him as the assailant of his father is not trustworthy. It is also submitted that he has admitted that he was staying in hostel and he had not taken leave from the school on the day of the occurrence. On these issues, we need to keep one thing in mind that due to their tender age the children imagine things. They mix up what they have seen with what they like to imagine to have seen and a little tutoring of a child witness is also inevitable. Therefore, what is required to be seen is whether the testimony of a child witness spells ring of truth and whether there is consistency in his evidence and ultimately credibility of a child witness would depend upon the circumstances of each case. In the cross-examination PW-7 was put to questions which could have been as vague as those were and attempt of the defence was to confuse him. Therefore, on a stray statement of PW-7 in the cross-examination his claim to have seen the appellant assaulting his father cannot be challenged. In "Raja Ram Yadav & Others v. State of Bihar" reported in (1996) 9 SCC 287 , the sole eye-witness was a nine years old child and even though he was not able to name four accused persons in the Court all of them were convicted for murder. The law relating to child witness has been lucidly explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate v. State of Maharashtra" reported in (2008) 12 SCC 565 thus: "10. "6.... The law relating to child witness has been lucidly explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate v. State of Maharashtra" reported in (2008) 12 SCC 565 thus: "10. "6.... The Evidence Act, 1872 (in short' the Evidence Act') does not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one. On the contrary Section 118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old age, disease - whether of mind or any other cause of the same kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. 6. PW-7 has not raised cries or called others and on the ground of his conduct his evidence has been challenged. This is also one of the contentions that the appellant has tried to assault PW-6 but surprisingly he has not harmed PW- 7. 7. The conduct of a witness is examined in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, primarily for the reason that it is almost impossible and even unrealistic to predict behavioral pattern of a person. It is a settled proposition in law that different persons may react differently in a similar situation. In Rana Pratap & Others v. State of Haryana, reported in (1983) 3 SCC 327 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that there is no set rule of natural reaction and therefore to discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic manner. In Lahu Kamlakar Patil & Another v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2013) 6 SCC 417 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "26. ………... it is vivid that witnesses to certain crimes may run away from the scene and may also leave the place due to fear and if there is any delay in their examination, the testimony should not be discarded. That apart, a court has to keep in mind that different witnesses react differently under different situations. ………... it is vivid that witnesses to certain crimes may run away from the scene and may also leave the place due to fear and if there is any delay in their examination, the testimony should not be discarded. That apart, a court has to keep in mind that different witnesses react differently under different situations. Some witnesses get a shock some become perplexed some start wailing and some run away from the scene and yet some who have the courage and conviction come forward either to lodge an FIR or get themselves examined immediately. Thus, it differs from individuals to individuals. There cannot be uniformity in human reaction. While the said principle has to be kept in mind, it is also to be borne in mind that if the conduct of the witness is so unnatural and is not in accord with acceptable human behavior allowing variations, then his testimony becomes questionable and is likely to be discarded." 8. PW-6 and PW-7 are intimately related to the deceased and therefore we have carefully examined their testimony keeping also in mind that the place of murder is a village and PW-6 and PW-7 are rustic witnesses and therefore their evidence cannot be judged in a too sophisticated manner and with unreal assumptions as compared to urban witnesses. We are also alive to the position in law that testimony of an interested and related witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground of relation. In Sarwan Singh & Others v. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 4 SCC 369 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus: "10. ….it is not the law that the evidence of an interested witness should be equated with that of a tainted evidence or that of an approver so as to require corroboration as a to matter of necessity. The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the courts require as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses have a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses have a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration. Indeed there may be circumstances where only interested evidence may be available and no other, e.g. when an occurrence takes place at midnight in the house when the only witnesses who could see the occurrence may be the family members. In such cases it would not be proper to insist that the evidence of the family members should be disbelieved merely because of their interestedness….". 9. PW-6 and PW-7 are reliable witnesses. Their presence in the fateful evening in their house was natural and they are competent witnesses to tell the Court what had happened in the evening of 12.04.2011. According to the prosecution the incident has occurred at about 08:00 PM-08:30 PM and information was sent to the police station, at 10:00 PM. A Sanha Entry No. 235 was made in the station diary and fardbeyan of the informant has been recorded at 11:00 PM. The records would reveal that an inquest was conducted at 01 :00 AM and the First Information Report was lodged on the same night at about 03:00 am. The appellant has been named as the assailant and dead body of Subhash Chandra Sinku was found lying in a pool of blood in his house. In the aforesaid state of affairs it cannot be said that the appellant has been implicated falsely after due deliberations. The contemporaneous documents prepared by the police and name of the appellant as the assailant being revealed at the first instance would rule out any possibility of his false implication in the case. 10. The prosecution has laid sufficient materials to corroborate evidence of PW-6 and PW-7. The other witnesses are mainly hearsay witnesses on the point of assault by the appellant on Subhash Chandra Sinku, except PW-9 and PW-10. However they have supported the prosecution on other material aspects of the case. PW-2 and PW-3 are the seizure witnesses and PW-4 and PW-12 are the witnesses to the inquest. PW-1, PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5 have deposed in the Court that they were informed by PW-6 that the appellant has committed murder of her husband. However they have supported the prosecution on other material aspects of the case. PW-2 and PW-3 are the seizure witnesses and PW-4 and PW-12 are the witnesses to the inquest. PW-1, PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5 have deposed in the Court that they were informed by PW-6 that the appellant has committed murder of her husband. PW-I and PW-2 have gone to her house immediately after the occurrence and they have seen the dead body of Subhash Chandra Sinku in his house. PW-1 is residing just adjacent to the house of the informant and PW-1 and PW-4 both have stated that the house of the appellant is near the house of Subhash Chandra Sinku. The Investigating Officer has deposed in the Court that the village is sparsely populated and PW-6 has also stated that other houses in the village are at a distance from her house. The aforesaid evidence supports the prosecution story as told by PW-6 why villagers could not see the appellant entering the house of the informant or running away from the place of occurrence. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that quarrel between the children is too weak a motive to commit a crime like murder, but then, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court this has to be remembered that a crime may take place without pre-meditation, or with planning and it may happen at the spur of the moment and many a times motive may remain closeted in the chest of accused. Even though motive to teach a lesson to Subhash Chandra Sinku who had gone to the house of the appellant to complain about quarrel between the boys may appear weak, it can be seen from the First Information Report that he had gone twice to his house to object to the behavior of the son of the appellant and it is a relevant fact. In view of the evidence of PW-6 and PW-7 which is sufficiently corroborated by other independent evidences assuming for a moment that the prosecution has not been able to produce materials to establish strong motive for the crime, the prosecution has successfully proved that it was the appellant who has committed murder of Subhash Chandra Sinku. 12. The prosecution story is corroborated by the medical evidence. PW-8 Dr. Vinod Kumar Pandit has conducted the post-mortem examination at 12:30 PM on 13.04.2011. 12. The prosecution story is corroborated by the medical evidence. PW-8 Dr. Vinod Kumar Pandit has conducted the post-mortem examination at 12:30 PM on 13.04.2011. He has found ante-mortem injuries on the person of Subhash Chandra Sinku, the injuries were caused by sharp object and at the time of post-mortem rigor mortis was present in all the limbs. PW-8 has found one sharp cut injury of the size of "4" x ½" x ½” on the left side of the face covering the left ear and another injury on the neck which had penetrated 3/4th of soft tissue including the wind pipe and food pipe. These observations by PW-8 corroborates the eye-witness account of the occurrence rendered by PW-6 that the appellant has inflicted two Dauli blows on the neck of her husband. There may seem to be some discrepancy in the ocular evidence and the medical evidence inasmuch as both injuries are not on the neck of Subhash Chandra Sinku but then a prosecution witness is not expected to give a mathematical account of the incident, blow by blow. It is no longer a debatable point that in the evidence of prosecution witnesses some inconsistency, exaggeration, omission etc. are bound to happen on account of lapse of time, forgetfulness or other reason of similar kind but on that ground the whole prosecution case cannot be discarded. In Leela Ram v. State of Haryana and another reported in (1999) 9 SCC 525 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "9. ….. There are bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason therefor should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence……..". 13. In the end, we find that the prosecution has established the place of occurrence, the time of occurrence and the manner of occurrence. The appellant is the assailant who has committed murder of Subhash Chandra Sinku is established by the prosecution. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence……..". 13. In the end, we find that the prosecution has established the place of occurrence, the time of occurrence and the manner of occurrence. The appellant is the assailant who has committed murder of Subhash Chandra Sinku is established by the prosecution. The incident was pre-meditated, the appellant has sneaked in the house of Subhash Chandra Sinku in the night and assaulted him with Dauli on the vital part of his body. Even assuming for a moment that the appellant had no requisite intention as envisaged under clause firstly of section 300 IPC, the requisite knowledge that his act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability would cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death falling under clause Fourthly of section 300 IPC must be imputed to him. His acts do not fall under any of the exceptions particularly Exception 2 and Exception 4 of section 300 IPC. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment of conviction dated 17.12.2012 and the order of sentence dated 18.12.2012 passed by the learned Sessions Judge West Singhbhum, Chaibasa in Sessions Trial Case no. 217 of 2011 and, accordingly, Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 133 of 2013 is dismissed. 15. Let lower Court records be transmitted to the Court concerned, forthwith. 16. Let a copy of the judgment be transmitted to the Court concerned through IF AX'. Appeal dismissed.