JUDGMENT : 1. This petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner, who is detained under the law of detention with the following prayer: “(A) Your Lordships be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or writ of certiorari or any other appropriate, writ, order or direction to quash and set aside the order of the detention dated 18.07.2020 passed by the Detaining authority under the Provision of Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 being No. PCB/DTN/PASA/494/2020 as being illegal, invalid, null and void, arbitrary, suffers from total non application of mind and violative of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India; (B) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to pass such other and further order/s as may be deemed necessary by this Hon’ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. The petitioner is a “detenue” under Section 3(1) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as, “the PASA Act”) by order PCB/DTN/PASA/494/2020 dated 18.07.2020 with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of “public order”. The order impugned is passed and is treated as class 2 - detenue and is presently at Surat Jail. 3. According to the petitioner, none of his activities would in any manner be prejudicial to the maintenance of “public order”. There are six offences which have been referred to in the order impugned however, none of them is capable to jeopardize the “public order”. He therefore has urged the Court to quash and set aside the order impugned. 4. The notice for final disposal was issued by this Court on 25.09.2020 (Coram: S.H.VORA, J.) 5. Learned advocate Mr.Rajesh Chauhan appearing with Mr.Hasmukh Parmar for the petitioner have been heard at length. He has drawn attention of this Court to the fact that though there are six offences, they all are of private nature and in no manner, he can be deemed to be a “dangerous person”, as none of his activities has affected the “public order”. He has relied upon decision of Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors vs. The State Of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1970 SC 852 . He has relied upon decision of Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors vs. The State Of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1970 SC 852 . He also further has urged that there are other decisions which would go to establish that to call a person a “dangerous person”, his activities are bound to affect the public tranquility and a larger number of people. It may also affect the tempo of the society, which is missing in the instant case. 6. Learned AGP has seriously challenged these submissions on the ground that the activities are repetitive and it is not in the personal dispute that he has acted contrary to the law. It is further argued by the learned AGP that it is not necessary for his activities to affect the entire society, but the affect is localized and yet seriously jeopardizes the public order, the Court need not interfere with the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned. 7. Upon hearing learned advocates for the parties and on careful examination of the order impugned as well as the material which has been placed on the record, the Court deems it appropriate, firstly, to look at the law on the subject, as the petitioner has been termed as a “dangerous person” under the PASA Act, instead of independently examining the provisions of the law. The decision on the subject in Special Civil Application No.9514 of 2020 for “dangerous person” is as under: “7.1 At the outset, definition of the word, “dangerous persons” is required to be considered from the provisions of the PASA Act, which is provided under Section 2(C) of the PASA Act. A person, who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang; during the period of three successive years, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under the IPC, is termed as a dangerous person under the Act, as provided under this Act or under any other Act. Thus, what is required of the person, who is termed as a “dangerous person” is of his commission of offences, as provided in this definition and his habit of committing such offences. Thus, what is required of the person, who is termed as a “dangerous person” is of his commission of offences, as provided in this definition and his habit of committing such offences. 7.2 Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the Act empowers the State Government that, if it is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. Therefore, the same shall need to be regarded by this Court. Further, Sub-Section (4) of Section 3 also shall need to be regarded by this Court, which provides, for the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order", when such a person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities, whether as a bootlegger or common gambling house or dangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or property grabber, which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. The explanation for the purpose of this sub-section provides that public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in this sub-section directly or indirectly is causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to fife, property or public health. 7.3 In this background, the Court shall also need to regard the decision of the Apex Court in the case of ‘Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan vs. State of Gujarat', AIR 1999 SC 2197 , where, the Apex Court was considering as to who can be termed as the “dangerous person” or “a habitual offender”. 7.3 In this background, the Court shall also need to regard the decision of the Apex Court in the case of ‘Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan vs. State of Gujarat', AIR 1999 SC 2197 , where, the Apex Court was considering as to who can be termed as the “dangerous person” or “a habitual offender”. In the matter before the Apex Court, the detaining authority, on being satisfied from the activities of the detenu that he belongs to a notorious gang and the members of the gang hatched conspiracy to extort money from the people, by putting them under threat of fear of death, was satisfied that the detenu is a “dangerous person” within the meaning of Section 2[c] of the Act and the activities of the detenu and his gang members were such that for maintenance of public order, it was necessary to detain the detenu and accordingly, the order of detention against the detenu was passed. The Apex Court, on hearing both the sides, held that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the respondent authority is just and thereby, it refused to interfere with the order of detention. The relevant observations, read thus: “3. The detaining authority on being satisfied from the activities of the detenu that he belongs to a notorious gang and the members of the gang hatched conspiracy to extort money from the people who are engaged in building construction business in the city by putting the people under threat of fear of death, was satisfied that the detenu is a dangerous person within the meaning of Section 2[c] of the Act and the activities of the detenu and his gang members were such that for maintenance of public order it was necessary to detain the detenu and accordingly the order of detention against the detenu was passed. Immediately after the order of detention was passed, the detenu approached the Gujarat High Court as already stated inter alia on the ground that the single activity of the detenu for which CR No. 36/97 under Sections 120-B, 387 and 506(2) IPC had been registered is not sufficient to hold him to be a dangerous person within the meaning of Section 2[c] of the Act and as such the order of detention is vitiated. By the impugned Judgment, the High Court came to the conclusion that the satisfaction of the detaining authority was not based solely on the incident culminating in registration of the criminal case under Sections 120-B, 387 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code but also the incidents that happened on 26.7.98 and 2.8.98 about which the two witnesses have stated before the detaining authority and therefore, the satisfaction of the detaining authority, holding the detenu to be a dangerous person cannot be said to be vitiated. 4. Mr. Anil Kumar Nauriya, the learned counsel appearing for the detenu in this court reiterated the same contention namely that a single incident in which the detenu is alleged to be involved and for which the criminal case had been registered will not be sufficient to hold the detenu to be a dangerous person under Section 2[c] of the Act inasmuch as the expression dangerous person has been defined to be a person who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, during a period of three successive years, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959. In other words according to the learned counsel unless the activities of the detenu considered by the detaining authority indicate that he has either habitually committed or attempted to commit or abet the commission of offence, cannot be held to be a dangerous person under Section 2[c] of the Act. The expression habitually would obviously mean repeatedly or persistently. It supplies the threat of continuity of the activities and, therefore, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner an isolated act would not justify an inference of habitually commission of the activity. In this view of the matter the question that requires adjudication is whether the satisfaction of the detaining authority in the present case is based upon the isolated incident for which the criminal case was registered or there are incidents more than one which indicate a repeated and persistent activity of the detenu. In this view of the matter the question that requires adjudication is whether the satisfaction of the detaining authority in the present case is based upon the isolated incident for which the criminal case was registered or there are incidents more than one which indicate a repeated and persistent activity of the detenu. If the grounds of detention is examined from the aforesaid stand point, it is crystal clear that apart from the criminal case which had been registered against the detenu for having formed a gang and hatched a conspiracy to extort money from the innocent citizens by threatening them and keeping them under constant fear of death, the two witnesses examined by the detaining authority narrated the incident that happened on 26.7.98 and 2.8.98 in which the detenu was involved and on the first occasion a sum of Rs. 1 lac was demanded and when the person concerned refused, he was dragged and assaulted and on the second occasion a sum of Rs. 50 thousand was demanded and on refusal, the persons were dragged on the road and were beaten on the public road. It is not the grievance of the detenu that the statements of the aforesaid two witnesses had not been appended to the grounds of detention or had not been mentioned in the grounds of detention. In fact the grounds of detention clearly mention the aforesaid state of affairs and there is no bar for taking these incidents into consideration for the satisfaction of the detaining authority that whether the person is a dangerous person within the ambit of Section 2[c] of the Act. We, therefore, fail to appreciate the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is a dangerous person is based upon the solitary incidence in respect of which a criminal case has already been registered. In our considered opinion the detaining authority has considered the three different incidents happened on three different dates and not a solitary incidence and, therefore, the test of repeatedness or continuity of the activity is fully satisfied and the satisfaction of the detaining authority holding the detenu to be a dangerous person is not vitiated in any manner. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner therefore stands rejected. 5. Mr. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner therefore stands rejected. 5. Mr. Anil Kumar, the learned counsel then urged that even if the activities of the detenu were sufficient to hold him to be a dangerous person yet an order of detention can be passed under the Gujarat Act only with a view to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. By virtue of provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act a person shall be deemed to be acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order when such person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities, whether as a bootlegger or dangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or property grabber, which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Thus maintenance of public order is sine qua non for passing an order of detention under Section 3 of the Gujarat Act. But in the case in hand the alleged activities of the detenu are all in relation to violation of the normal criminal law and it has got no connection with the maintenance of public order and, therefore, the order of detention is vitiated. We are unable to appreciate this contention of the learned counsel for the detenu inasmuch as even an activity violating an ordinary legal provision may in a given case be a matter of public order. It is the magnitude of the activities and its effect on the even tempo of life of the society at large or with a section of society that determines whether the activities can be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or not. In Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh vs. M.M. Mehta, Commisioner of Police and Ors. 1995(3) SCC 237 , it has been held by this court that in order to bring the activities of a person within the expression of acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the fall out and the extent and reach of the alleged activities must be of such a nature that they travel beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to deal with him or to prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large or a large section of society. It is the degree of disturbance and its impact upon the even tempo of life of the society or the people of a locality which determines whether the disturbance caused by such activity amounts only to a breach of law and order or it amounts to breach of public order. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid decision to the facts of the present case we find that the activities of the detenu by trying to extort money from ordinary citizens by putting them to fear of death and on their refusal to part with the money to drag them and torture them on public road undoubtedly affected the even tempo of life of the society and, therefore such activities cannot be said to be a mere disturbance of law and order. In our considered opinion the activities of the detenu are such that the detaining authority was satisfied that such activities amount to disturbance of public order and to prevent such disturbance the order of detention was passed. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the second contention of the learned counsel for the detenu. Mr. Anil Kumar then urged that the Advisory Board having not indicated that the detenu is to be detained for more than three months, has failed to discharge its constitutional obligation and there has been an infringement of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and in support of the same reliance has been placed on the decision of this court in A.K. Gopalan vs. The State of Madras, 1950 SCR 88 and the decision of this Court in John Martin vs. The State of West Bengal, 1975(3) SCR 211 . At the outset it may be stated that the detenu had not made any such grievance in the writ petition that had been filed in the Gujarat High Court. That apart, the opinion of the Advisory Board to the State Government, rejecting the representation of the detenu and expressing its opinion with regard to the existence of sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu is not a part of the record and what is pressed into service by the learned counsel in support of his argument is the mere communication from the Section Officer of the Home Department dated 27th August, 1998, intimating the factum of the rejection of representation by the Advisory Board. Section 11 of the Act is the procedure for making reference to the Advisory Board and Section 12 provides the duties and obligation of the Advisory Board on the basis of materials placed before it. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 12 it is the requirement of law that the report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu and this opinion of the Advisory Board has been furnished in the present case. We really fail to understand how a contention could be raised that the Advisory Board has failed to discharge its obligation and how the court would be entitled to examine the same without even the copy of the report of the Advisory Board being formed a part of the records of the present proceedings. In view of the counter affidavit filed in the present case that all the provisions have been duly complied with and in the absence of any material to support the arguments advanced by the learned counsel, we do not find any force in the contention raised alleging any infraction of provision of law in the opinion given by the Advisory Board and the said Board in rejecting the representation of the detenu. This contention therefore, is devoid of force.” 7.4 In case of ‘SUBRAMANIAN VS. STATE OF TN & ANOTHER’, (2012) 4 SCC 699 ; the Apex Court was considering as to when would be “the public order” can be said to be disturbed. It denotes the tempo of the community, the use of weapons and damage caused to the public and private property, threatening public tempo and creating panic amongst the people in a locality and this was held sufficient to disturb “the public order”. The relevant observations are as under: “9) With regard to the first submission that no case is made out for preventive detention by invoking the provisions of T.N. Act 14 of 1982, though the ground case incident arose out of a land dispute between the detenu and the de facto complainant, however, the argument that it is only a law and order problem and that public order was not disturbed is contrary to the facts and equally untenable. As rightly pointed out by Mr. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Guru Krishnakumar, the Detaining Authority, on consideration of materials placed has found that the accused caused damage to both public and private properties, threatened the public and also created a situation of panic among the public. In this regard, it is useful to refer the materials narrated in the grounds of detention which are as follows: "On 18.07.2011, at about 10:00 hours, while Kaliyamoorthy was available in the STD booth, Kajamalai Kadaiveethi, Kajamalai, Tiruchirapalli city, the accused Kajamalai Viji @ Vijay armed with aruval, his associates Manikandan, Uthayan, Sathiya, Sivakumar armed with Kattas came there. The accused Kajamalai Viji @ Vijay abused Kaliyamoorthy in a filthy language, threatened to murder him with aruval by saying "Have you become such a big person to give complaints against me. You bastard, try giving a complaint, I will chop you down right here." His associates threatened him with their respective kattas. Thereafter, the accused Kajamalai Viji @ Vijay caused damage to the glasses, chair and stool available in the shop. While Kaliyamoorthy questioned them, the accused Kajamalai Viji @ Vijay slapped him on the face. Kaliyamoorthy raised alarm for rescue. The general public came there and they were threatened by the accused Kajamalai Viji @ Vijay and his associates by saying "if anyone turns up as witness, I will kill them." The nearby shop-keepers closed their shops out of fear. Auto drivers took their autos from the stand and left the place. The situation created panic among the public. On the complaint of Kaliyamoorthy, a case in K.K. Nagar P.S. Cr. No. 361/2011 u/s 147, 148, 447, 448, 427, 294(b), 323, 506(ii) IPC and 3 P.P.D. Act was registered." (10) From the above materials, the Detaining Authority was satisfied that the detenu is habitually committing crimes and also acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and as such he is a `goonda' as contemplated under Section 2(f) of the T.N. Act 14 of 1982. The order further shows that the Detaining Authority found that there is a compelling necessity to detain him in order to prevent him from indul- ging in such activities in future which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The order further shows that the Detaining Authority found that there is a compelling necessity to detain him in order to prevent him from indul- ging in such activities in future which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. After narrating the details of the ground case and after adverting to earlier instances commencing from the years 2008 and 2010, the Detaining Authority has concluded as under:- "Hence, I am satisfied that the accused Kajamalai Viji @ Vijay is habitually committing crimes and also acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of Public order and as such he is a Goonda as contemplated under Section 2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Act No. 14 of 1982. By committing the above described grave crime in a busy locality cum business area, he has created a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the people of the area in which the occurrence took place and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order." (11) It is well settled that the court does not interfere with the subjective satisfaction reached by the Detaining Authority except in exceptional and extremely limited grounds. The court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the Detaining Authority when the grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant, that sufficiency of grounds is not for the Court but for the Detaining Authority for the formation of subjective satisfaction that the detention of a person with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order is required and that such satisfaction is subjective and not objective. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive and further that the action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, normally, the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authority. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct in an exhaustive manner. The satisfaction of the Detaining Authority, therefore, is considered to be of primary importance with certain latitude in the exercise of its discretion.” 7.5 Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 6414 of 2020 passed on 12.06.2020, where, the Court was considering the question of detaining authority having termed the petitioner as a dangerous person under Section 2(C) of the PASA Act. Relying on the decision of Apex Court in ‘Pushker Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal’, AIR 1970 SC 852 , ‘Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors.’, (1966) 1 SCR 709 and ‘Darpan Kumar Sharma alias Dharban Kumar Sharma v. State of T.N. & Ors.’, AIR 2003 SC 971 and other decisions, the Court held that the detaining authority failed to substantiate the aspect that the alleged anti-social acts of the petitioner-detenu adversely affected or likely to adversely affect the maintenance of public order. Profitable it would be, to reproduce the relevant observations, which read thus: 4. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law, inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR/s cannot have any bearing on the breach of public order as required under the Act and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detenue within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act. Unless and until, the material is there to make out a case that the person has become a threat and menace to the Society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that all social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person, it cannot be said that the detenue is a person within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act. Except general statements (two FIRs), there is no material on record which shows that the detenue is acting in such a manner, which is dangerous to the public order. In this connection, it will be fruitful to refer to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 852 , where the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been classically laid down, which is as under: “Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof ? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.” 5. The distinction between "public order" and "law and order" has been carefully defined in a Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Others, (1966) 1 SCR 709 . In this judgment, His Lordship Hidayatullah, J. by giving various illustrations clearly defined the "public order" and "law and order". Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: "....Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of disorder or only some? The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(l)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances. It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order". One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State.…" 6. In Darpan Kumar Sharma alias Dharban Kumar Sharma v. State of T.N. and others, reported in AIR 2003 SC 971 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations: “The basis upon which the petitioner has been detained in the instant case is that he robbed one Kumar at the point of knife a sum of Rs.1000/-. In Darpan Kumar Sharma alias Dharban Kumar Sharma v. State of T.N. and others, reported in AIR 2003 SC 971 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations: “The basis upon which the petitioner has been detained in the instant case is that he robbed one Kumar at the point of knife a sum of Rs.1000/-. Any disorderly behaviour of a person in the public or commission of a criminal offence is bound, to some extent, affect the peace prevailing in the locality and it may also affect law and order but the same need not affect maintenance of 'Goonda' the acts prejudicial to public order are 'when he is engaged, or is making preparations for engaging, in any of his activities as a goonda which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order'. The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society; that a solitary assault on one individual can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place public order in jeopardy so as to bring the case within the purview of the Act providing for preventive detention.” 7. In Siddharth @ Sindhu Laxmanbhai Thorat v. District Magistrate, Navsari, in Letters Patent Appeal No.1020 of 2019 dated 08.05.2019, this Court has made following observations: “8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, We find that though there are powers available under section 3(1) of the Act, ordinary law of Indian Penal Code under which FIRs are registered in four offences for which punishment is prescribed in the Indian Penal Code, is sufficient and order of detention cannot be passed as a short cut to exhaust such remedy. Ordinarily, this Court will be loath in interfering with subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. While arriving at subjective satisfaction, the detaining authority is supposed to undertake objective assessment of the material available. Ordinarily, this Court will be loath in interfering with subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. While arriving at subjective satisfaction, the detaining authority is supposed to undertake objective assessment of the material available. In this connection, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Letters Patent appeal No.2732 of 2010, dated 28.3.2011 in the case of Aartiben W/o Nandubhai Jayantibhai Sujnani vs. Commissioner of Police & 2 others, wherein, this Court has quoted the observations made by Apex Court in the case of Pushker Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1970 SC 852 , wherein distinction is drawn between public order and law and order. The Supreme Court observed in the said judgment as under: “Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof ? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.” 8. It is also fruitful to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (1970) 1 SCC 98 , wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “... Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. It is also fruitful to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (1970) 1 SCC 98 , wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “... Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act....” 9. Further in the case of Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M. M. Mehta, Commissioner of Police and Others, 1995 (2) GLR 1268 observed as under: “8. The Act has defined "Dangerous Person" in clause (c) of section 2 to mean a person who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act. The expression 'habit' or 'habitual' has, however, not been defined under the Act. According to The Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Reprint Edn. (1987), p. 499, 'habitually' means constant, customary and addicted to specified habit and the term habitual criminal may be applied to anyone who has been previously convicted of a crime to the sentences and committed to prison more than twice. The word 'habitually' means 'usually' and 'generally'. Almost similar meaning is assigned to the words 'habit' in Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary, 10th Edn., p. 485. It does not refer to the frequency of the occasions but to the invariability of practice and the habit has to be proved by totality of facts. The word 'habitually' means 'usually' and 'generally'. Almost similar meaning is assigned to the words 'habit' in Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary, 10th Edn., p. 485. It does not refer to the frequency of the occasions but to the invariability of practice and the habit has to be proved by totality of facts. It, therefore, follows that the complicity of a person in an isolated offence is neither evidence nor a material of any help to conclude that a particular person is a "dangerous person" unless there is material suggesting his complicity in such cases which lead to a reasonable conclusion that the person is a habitual criminal. In Gopalanchari v. State of Kerala, AIR 1981 SC 674 , this Court had an occasion to deal with expressions like "bad habit", 'habitual', 'desperate', 'dangerous', and 'hazardous'.” 7.6 In ‘Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh’ (Supra), the Court examined the expression ‘habit’ or ‘habitual’ offender to held that ‘habitually’ means constant, customary and addicted to specified habit and the term, “habitual criminal” may be applied to anyone who has been previously convicted of a crime to the sentences and committed to prison more than twice. However, it does not refer to frequency of the occurrence and invariably the practice and the habit. 7.7 This Court in Special Civil Application No. 8592 of 2020 also was considering the case of the petitioner, who was detained under Section 2(C) of the PASA Act as “a dangerous person”, on the basis of the criminal case registered against him for an offence under the Disaster Management Act on the ground that the activities of the petitioner were affecting maintenance of the “public order” and the order under challenge was not upheld. While so doing, the Court relied on the decision of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia (Supra). 7.8 In Commissioner of Police V. C.Anita(Smt.) (2004) 7 SCC 467 , the Apex Court examined the issue of ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ to hold and observe thus: .... “the crucial test is whether the activities of the detenue were prejudicial to public order. While the expression ’law and order’ is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, ‘public order’ has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. “the crucial test is whether the activities of the detenue were prejudicial to public order. While the expression ’law and order’ is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, ‘public order’ has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of law and order and public order is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of the public, it would raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of terror waves unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order. The question to ask is: ‘Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed? This question has to be faced in every case on its facts.” 7.9 As can be noticed from the decision of the Apex Court in ‘Pushker Mukherjee’ (Supra), it is not a case of two people quarreling and fighting with each other, either in their house or in the streets, and therefore, there was disorder, but, not “public disorder”. Such cases are dealt with by ordinary criminal laws and obviously, no person could have been detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Such contravention of the law would always vitiate the order, as is held by the Apex Court. But, before it is said to have affected the public order, it must affect the public at large. Such contravention of the law would always vitiate the order, as is held by the Apex Court. But, before it is said to have affected the public order, it must affect the public at large. Therefore, the Court has drawn a line, demarcating between serious and grave danger and injury to the public interest and relatively minor breach of peace of purely local, which is primarily of local and is not likely to affect the public order. It would be vital for this Court to consider, as to whether it can be said to be mere disturbance of “law and order” leading to disorder, as provided under the PASA Act. 7.10 The “public order”, as held in case of ‘Arun Ghosh' (Supra), is said to embrace more of the community than law and order. The Court even went to an extent to state that “public order” is an even tempo of the life of community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. 8. Reverting to the facts of the instant case, the impugned order refers to six offences of the present petitioner, which are as follows : Sr. No. Police Station C.R. No. Date Section Seized Muddamal Date of arrest/bail order Disposal 1 Vadaj Police Stn. II C.R. No. 3189/19 Dt. 10.09.2019 Under section 323, 294(b), 506(1), 114 of IPC --- 13.09.19 13.09.19 Pending in court 2 Vadaj Police Stn. II C.R. No. 3194/19 Dt. 16.09.2019 Under section 427, 294(b), 506(1), 114 of IPC and 135(1) of the GP Act Axe valued Rs.00/- 16.09.19 17.09.19 Pending in court 3 Vadaj Police Stn. II C.R. No. 3267/19 Dt. 10.12.2019 Under section 323, 294(b), 506(2), 114 of IPC ------ 08.01.2020 08.01.2020 Pending in court 4 Vadaj Police Stn. II C.R. No. 3272/19 Dt. 19.12.2019 Under section 294(b), 506(2) of IPC and 135(1) of the GP Act Sword value d Rs.0 0/- 07.01.2020 08.01.2020 Pending in court 5 Vadaj Police Stn. I C.R. No. 1119102320001 6/2020 Dt. 05.01.2020 Under section 143, 148, 149, 392, 427, 323, 294(b), 506(2) of IPC and 135(1) of the GP Act Knife value d Rs.0 0/- 08.01.2020 18.01.2020 Pending in court 6 Vadaj Police Stn. I C.R. No. 1119102320026 4/2020 Dt. I C.R. No. 1119102320001 6/2020 Dt. 05.01.2020 Under section 143, 148, 149, 392, 427, 323, 294(b), 506(2) of IPC and 135(1) of the GP Act Knife value d Rs.0 0/- 08.01.2020 18.01.2020 Pending in court 6 Vadaj Police Stn. I C.R. No. 1119102320026 4/2020 Dt. 19.03.2020 Under section 354(a), 354(b), 323, 294(b), 506(2), 114 of IPC Wooden Log valued Rs.0 0/- 24.06.2020 24.06.2020 Investigation is underway 9. The first FIR, being CR.NO.II-3189 of 2019 is registered with Vadaj Police Station on 10.09.2019 for an offence punishable under Sections 323, 294(B), 506(1) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The complaint is by one Kantaben Makwana, where, the present petitioner and his friend are being alleged of having given kick and fist blows on account of some enmity with the son of her sister-in-law Savita, Mehul had threatened them of serious consequences. 10. The Second FIR, being CR.NO.II-3194 of 2019 is registered with Vadaj Police Station on 16.09.2019 for an offence punishable under Sections 427, 323, 294(B), 506(1) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 135(1) of the Gujarat Police Act. Complaint is by one Bharat Parikh where he was intimated that some unknown boys had broken the glasses of vehicles and the complaint had been given against Mehul, the present petitioner and one Manoj. They not only had broken the glasses but also had abused the complainant. The co-accused Mehul has stated that he was upset by the overtake of his autorikshaw by the owner of the Car and when he realized that the same was parked near pawapuri flat, in anger, he had broken the glasses. 11. Again the third FIR, being CR.NO.II-3267 of 2019 is registered with Vadaj Police Station on 10.12.2019 for an offence punishable under Sections 323, 294(B), 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, where the complaint is by one Ashokbhai Parmar. He has alleged against Naresh, Mehul and Manoj, his niece had complained against these three persons and therefore, they were pressurizing the complainant not to press the complaint. These persons were shouting and had also attempted to scuffle with the complainant. The complaint is given essentially against Mehul, by his niece. 12. He has alleged against Naresh, Mehul and Manoj, his niece had complained against these three persons and therefore, they were pressurizing the complainant not to press the complaint. These persons were shouting and had also attempted to scuffle with the complainant. The complaint is given essentially against Mehul, by his niece. 12. In yet another complaint, being the FIR being CR.NO.II-3272 of 2019 which is registered with Vadaj Police Station on 19.12.2019 for an offence under Sections 294(B) and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 135(1) of the Gujarat Police Act. The complainant is Maltiben, who has alleged that the present petitioner had used very abusive language and when he was taunted, he went to his residence to bring a sword and when the police was called on 100 number, he ran away. 13. In yet another FIR, being CR.NO.I-11191023200016 of 2020 which is registered with Vadaj Police Station on 05.01.2020 for an offence punishable under Sections 143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 392, 427, 323, 294(B), 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 135(1) of the Gujarat Police Act, the complainant is Ramilaben, who has alleged that when she had gone for earning her livelihood through a lari of panipuri, the present petitioners and others, who are found to be ransacking the properties around, they also approached her and the amount of her livelihood had been looted. Thereafter, Amit and Harshad had threatened that they would be taking revenge, as she has complained against the brother of Amit, who had thereafter died in an accident. His son, in the meantime, had called the police control room therefore some of these accused had given a kick and fist blows. She and others had spoken about the role of the present petitioner and also of co-accused Amit Patadiya, Harshad Patadiya, Sawan Patadiya, Montu @ Harshal Solanki, Parth Solanki and Rakesh Hirabhai Patadiya. All had approached the complainant. According to the report of interrogation which is also forming part of the record, the present petitioner is said to have abetted the crime with rest of the accused and it reveals that he had no weapon in his hands. 14. All had approached the complainant. According to the report of interrogation which is also forming part of the record, the present petitioner is said to have abetted the crime with rest of the accused and it reveals that he had no weapon in his hands. 14. In yet another FIR, being CR.NO.I-11191023200264 of 2020 is registered with Vadaj Police Station on 19.03.2020 for an offence under Sections 354(A), 354(B), 323, 294(B), 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, which is given by one Maltiben, she had a verbal acrimonious exchange with her earlier, because of which, the present petitioner was stopped, yet he not only had come on 18.03.2020 with wooden baton, but also had given a blow to her on her knee and also had torn her dress. He was intervened by his wife and it is only when the crowd had gathered, that he had gone away. There are witnesses stating that the disputes had aggravated and this man had used abusive language. There are witnesses who have in-camera stated as of how high handedly, the present petitioner has been acting. Both of them have spoken of incident of five months earlier. One of them is carrying out his business as a shopkeeper. From his shop also, when the purchase was made by the petitioner, he chose not to pay the amount and had also threatened him with the life and he was also threatened with knife which he had with him. He since was pacified, he had to run out his shop and this had caused fear in the area. Likewise, there is yet another statement of 15.07.2020 by an autorikshaw driver who earns his livelihood by driving the autorikshaw when he had asked the amount of fare, after taking them to the place of their choice, the petitioner had taken out a knife and had threatened him with life. This also had caused panic and fear in the area. 15. As noted hereinabove, in case of Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors. (Supra) there is a fine line of distinction between the law and order situation and the disturbance of the public order, where the public tranquility and the tempo in the society is affected for a person to be a “dangerous person”. As mentioned hereinabove, there would be a requirement for the public order to be jeopardized. (Supra) there is a fine line of distinction between the law and order situation and the disturbance of the public order, where the public tranquility and the tempo in the society is affected for a person to be a “dangerous person”. As mentioned hereinabove, there would be a requirement for the public order to be jeopardized. This Court is conscious that every act of assault or injury to the specific person does not lead to the public disorder, as referred to in Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors. (Supra) when two people fight, quarrel and assault each other outside the house or in a street, there is a disorder but not “public disorder”. Such cases are to be dealt with under the provisions of ordinary criminal law and the culprits are not to be detained on the ground that they are disturbing the “public order”. The contravention must affect the order and before it is said to have affected the “public order”, it should have affected the community and even when serious and aggravated form of disorder is considered, it needs to affect the community or injure the public interest. The Court needs also take into account the order of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.1020 of 2019. Noticing that in barring one matter, in all other matters, there is a personal dispute with the individuals which have lead to a situation of law and order and the alleged anti social activities of the petitioner-detenue, though has affected adversely the law and order, adversely affecting of the maintenance of “public order” is not substantiated by the authority concerned. Resultantly, this petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 18.07.2020 passed by the detaining authority by Order no.PCB/DTN/PASA/494/2020 under the PASA Act is quashed and set aside. The petitioner is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in custody in connection with any other case. While so doing, the petitioner is cautioned to comply with the conditions imposed by the trial Court, while releasing him on regular bail, scrupulously and any breach of the same shall entail the respondent-authority to take stringent action against the petitioner. The petitioner shall not enter into Ahmedabad City for a period of Six (6) months. While so doing, the petitioner is cautioned to comply with the conditions imposed by the trial Court, while releasing him on regular bail, scrupulously and any breach of the same shall entail the respondent-authority to take stringent action against the petitioner. The petitioner shall not enter into Ahmedabad City for a period of Six (6) months. His permanent address as well as his temporary address for these months with the mobile number shall be given to the jail authority as well as to the respondent no.2 for necessary follow-up action; if needed. He shall mark his presence before the police authority, as will be decided by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad. Office to send a copy of this order to the concerned authority through e-mail or Fax, forthwith. Rule is made absolute, accordingly.