JUDGMENT : Ravikumar, J This Intra-court appeal is directed against the judgment dated 12.12.2019 in WP(C)No.32371/2019. The first respondent therein has come up with this appeal on being aggrieved by the judgment passed thereon by the learned single Judge. The writ petition was moved by the first respondent herein who is an employee of the appellant-Vaikom Taluk Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank. He was placed under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. In the disciplinary proceedings initiated subsequently as per Ext.P4 memo of charges the appellant appointed Advocate Harikumar as the Enquiry Officer. He is a practicing lawyer. True that, the Presenting Officer is not legally trained and he is only an Assistant Secretary under the appellant. The first respondent herein/the writ petitioner submitted Ext.P6 requesting permission to get assistance of an Advocate for presenting his case in the enquiry proceedings. The writ petition was moved when the said request was declined. A perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the learned single Judge disposed of the writ petition relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Professor Ramesh Chandra v. University of Delhi and Others reported in [ (2015) 5 SCC 549 ]. The learned single Judge ordered that the writ petitioner should be permitted to appear in the disciplinary enquiry through a legal practitioner. That apart, the learned single Judge held that it would be open to the appellant too, to engage a lawyer as its Presenting Officer. It is on being aggrieved by the said judgment that this appeal has been preferred. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent and also the learned Government Pleader appearing for respondents 2, 3 and 5. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied on various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in support of his challenge against the judgment. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent and also the learned Government Pleader appearing for respondents 2, 3 and 5. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied on various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in support of his challenge against the judgment. Firstly, he relied on the decision in N.Kalindi v. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Limited reported in AIR 1960 SC 914 .The question posed for consideration of the Apex Court in that case is available in the very opening sentence of the said decision and it reads thus:- “When the management of an industry holds an enquiry into the charges against a workman for the purpose of deciding what action if any, should be taken against him, has the workman a right to be represented by a representative of his Union at the enquiry?” (underline supplied) In the context of the contention advanced by the learned counsel relying on the said decision it is only appropriate to refer to paragraphs 4 and 5 therein of the said decision and they read thus:- “4. It is helpful to consider in this connection the fact that ordinarily in enquiries before domestic tribunals the person accused of any misconduct conducts his own case. Rules have been framed by Government as regards the procedure to be followed in enquiries against their own employees. No provision is made in these rules that the person against whom an enquiry is held may be represented by anybody else. When the general practice adopted by domestic tribunal is that the person accused conducts his own case, we are unable to accept an argument that natural justice demands that in the case of enquiries into a charge-sheet of misconduct against a workman he should be represented by a member of his Union. Besides, it is necessary to remember that if any enquiry is not otherwise fair, the workman concerned can challenge its validity in an industrial dispute. 5. Our conclusion therefore is that a workman against whom an enquiry is being held by the management has no right to be represented at such enquiry by a representative of his Union; though of course an employer in his discretion can and may allow his employee to avail himself of such assistance.” 4. 5. Our conclusion therefore is that a workman against whom an enquiry is being held by the management has no right to be represented at such enquiry by a representative of his Union; though of course an employer in his discretion can and may allow his employee to avail himself of such assistance.” 4. Thus it is evident that the Hon'ble Apex Court held therein that in the absence of any provision enabling a workman against whom an enquiry is conducted to be represented by anyone else and he himself has to defend his own case. The disinclination shown by the management in that case to grant permission to the delinquent employee concerned to be represented by a member of his own Union was upheld by the Apex Court. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant further relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dunlop Rubber Company India Limited v. Their Workmen reported in AIR 1965 (SC) 1392 . In the said case the workman was facing a domestic enquiry. The Apex Court held in holding domestic enquiries, reasonable opportunity should be given to the delinquent employees to meet the charge framed against them. Furthermore, it was held therein that in such an enquiry the delinquent employee should be given liberty to represent his case by persons of his choice, if there is no standing order against such a course. Next, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision in CIPLA Ltd. and others v. Ripu Daman Bhanot and another reported in AIR 1999 (SC) 1635 . That was a case where the relevant Service Rules admittedly carry provision for availing assistance of a co-representative of the choice of the workman concerned. Paragraph 13, relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant reads thus:- "In Kalindi and Ors. vs. Tata Locomotive & Engineering Company Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 914 : (1960) 3 SCR 407 , it was held that a workman against whom a departmental enquiry is held by the Management has no right to be represented at such enquiry by an outsider, not even by a representative of his Union though the Management may in its discretion allow the employee to avail of such assistance. So also in ,Dunlop Rubber Company vs. Workmen (1965) 2 SCR 139 : AIR 1965 SC 1392 : (1965) 1 Lab LJ 426, it was laid down that an employee has no right to be represented in the disciplinary proceedings by another person unless the Service Rules specifically provided for the same. A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. vs. Ram Naresh Tripathi, (1993) 2 SCC 115 : 1992 Suppl. (3) SCR 559: 1993 AIR SCW 1106), laid down that the right to be represented in the departmental proceedings initiated against a delinquent employee can be regulated or restricted by the Management or by the Service Rules. It was held that the right to be represented by an advocate in the departmental proceedings can be restricted and regulated by statutes or by the Service Rules including the Standing Orders, applicable to the employee concerned. The whole case law was reviewed by this Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Maharashtra Genl. Kamgar Union (1999) 1 SCC 626 : (1999 AIR SCW 64), and it was held that a delinquent employee has no right to be represented by an advocate in the departmental proceedings and that if a right to be represented by a co-workman is given to him, the departmental proceedings would not be bad only for the reason that the assistance of an advocate was not provided to him.” 6. The decision of the Apex Court in State of Rajastan v. S.K.Dutt Sharma reported in 1993 (Supp.4) SCC 61 was also relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant. The question considered by the Apex Court was whether refusal of permission to engage a lawyer would amount to violation of the rules of natural justice. The Apex Court found that the departmental nominee was not a legal practitioner nor a prosecuting Inspector. Furthermore, it was held that the charges involved in that case, were not of such nature that delinquent employee could not defend himself or through the departmental representative, whose assistance was offered to him. Ultimately, the Apex Court held refusal of permission to engage a lawyer in departmental inquiry would not amount to violation of rules of natural justice in the said circumstances. Ultimately, the Apex Court held refusal of permission to engage a lawyer in departmental inquiry would not amount to violation of rules of natural justice in the said circumstances. The learned counsel for the first respondent intervened and submitted that the corollary of the aforesaid reasoning of the Apex Court is that while deciding that question, the question whether the charges levelled against the delinquent are of such nature that he could not defend them by himself or through the departmental representative is a matter to be taken into account. We will, now, refer to the decision relied on by the learned single Judge in the impugned judgment. Obviously, the impugned judgment was rendered by the learned single Judge in favour of the first respondent relying on the decision in Professor Ramesh Chandra's case (supra). In view of the question posed it is only apropos to refer to paragraphs 27 to 30 of the said decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court. “27. The Inquiry Officer herein being a retired Judge of the High Court is a person of vast legal acumen and experience. The Presenting Officer also would be a person who had sufficient experience in presenting case before Inquiry Officer. In this background, it is also required to consider whether an application of a delinquent employee seeking permission to be represented through a legally trained and qualified lawyer should be allowed or not. 28. In Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay vs. Dilipkumar Raghvendranath Nandkarni and others, 1983 (1) SCC 124 , this Court observed: "10.......Now if the rules prescribed for such an enquiry did not place an embargo on the right of the delinquent employee to be represented by a legal practitioner, the matter would be in the discretion of the Enquiry Officer whether looking to the nature of charges, the type of evidence and complex or simple issues that may arise in the course of enquiry, the delinquent employee in order to afford a reasonable opportunity to defend himself should be permitted to appear through a legal practitioner....... 12.........In our view we have reached a stage in our onward march to fair play in action that where in an enquiry before a domestic tribunal the delinquent officer is pitted against a legally trained mind, if he seeks permission to appear through a legal practitioner the refusal to grant this request would amount to denial of a reasonable request to defend himself and the essential principles of natural justice would be violated......" 29. In J.K. Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation, 1991 (2) SCC 283 , this Court held that the denial of the assistance of a legal practitioner in inquiry proceedings would be unfair. This Court held as follows: "8. It would appear that in the inquiry, the respondent-Corporation was represented by its Personnel and Administration Manager who is stated to be a man of law. The rule itself recognises that where the charges are so serious as to entail a dismissal from service the inquiry authority may permit the services of a lawyer. This rule vests a discretion. In the matter of exercise of this discretion one of the relevant factors is whether there is likelihood of the combat being unequal entailing a miscarriage or failure of justice and a denial of a real and reasonable opportunity for defence by reasons of the appellant being pitted against a presenting officer who is trained in law. Legal Adviser and a lawyer are for this purpose somewhat liberally construed and must include "whoever assists or advises on facts and in law must be deemed to be in the position of a legal adviser". In the last analysis, a decision has to be reached on a case to case basis on the situational particularities and the special requirements of justice of the case. It is unnecessary, therefore, to go into the larger question "whether as a sequel to an adverse verdict in a domestic enquiry serious civil and pecuniary consequences are likely to ensue, in order to enable the person so likely to suffer such consequences with a view to giving him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, on his request, should be permitted to appear through a legal practitioner" which was kept open in Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar. However, it was held in that case (SCC p. 132, para 12) “... However, it was held in that case (SCC p. 132, para 12) “... In our view we have reached a stage in our onward march to fair play in action that where in an enquiry before a domestic tribunal the delinquent officer is pitted against a legally trained mind, if he seeks permission to appear through a legal practitioner the refusal to grant this request would amount to denial of a reasonable request to defend himself and the essential principles of natural justice would be violated....” 30. In view of the law laid down by this Court, we are of the view that if any person who is a legal practitioner, including a retired Hon'ble Judge is appointed as Inquiry Officer in an inquiry initiated against an employee, the denial of assistance of legal practitioner to the charged employee would be unfair.” Thus, it is evident after referring to its earlier decisions in Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavenranath Nadkarni and others reported in (1983) 1 SCC 124 and in J.K.Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Ltd., and others reported in (1991) 2 SCC 283 the Apex Court held that if any person who is or was a legal practitioner, including a retired High Court Judge is appointed as an Enquiry Officer in an enquiry initiated against an employee denial of assistance of legal practitioner to the charged employee would be unfair. When that be the exposition law by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 30 the view taken and the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge taking note of the fact that the Inquiry Officer is a legal practitioner cannot be upturned by accepting the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant based on the decision relied on by him, referred hereinbefore. Here, the first respondent is pitted against a trained mind inasmuch as the Inquiry Officer is a practicing lawyer. When the Inquiry Officer is a person having legal acumen and experience the conduct of the enquiry proceedings and appreciation of evidence will also be of a high level. In such circumstances, the delinquent also must have an opportunity to present his defence in the same qualitative level to satisfy the rules of natural justice. When the Inquiry Officer is a person having legal acumen and experience the conduct of the enquiry proceedings and appreciation of evidence will also be of a high level. In such circumstances, the delinquent also must have an opportunity to present his defence in the same qualitative level to satisfy the rules of natural justice. Therefore, the rejection of the application filed by the writ petitioner to permit him to have the assistance of a lawyer in the disciplinary proceedings is unfair. In short, the impugned judgment cannot be said to be a decision which is illegal or perverse warranting interference in invocation of the power under Section 5 of the High Court Act. According to us, the writ court arrived at the rightful conclusion bearing in mind the factual position and the law declared in paragraph 30 of the decision in Professor Ramesh Chandra's case (supra). This appeal must fail in the said circumstances and consequently, it is dismissed.