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Gujarat High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 1010 (GUJ)

Aalap Chandrakant Solanki v. State of Gujarat

2020-12-24

A.C.RAO

body2020
ORDER : In the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the request and consent of the parties appearing through their learned advocates, the petition was taken up for final consideration. 1.1 Rule, returnable forthwith. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.Trupesh Kathiriya waives service of Rule. 2. Heard learned advocate Mr.N.K. Majmudar for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Trupesh Kathiriya, for the respondents. 3. The petitioner has prayed to set aside orders dated 24.10.2019 passed by Deputy Collector, Anand, whereby the services of the petitioner came to be terminated. It is prayed to reinstate the petitioner on his original post as Clerk, ClassIII at Collector Office, Criminal Branch, Anand with continuity of service and consequential benefits. 3.1 The petitioner, appointed as Clerk, joined services at Collector Office, Criminal Branch, Anand. The appointment was on contractual basis for a period of five years. It appears that F.I.R. was registered against the petitioner Anti-Corruption Bureau Police Station, Anand, Crime Register No.5/2013 and the chargesheet was also came to be filed on 26.02.2013 and criminal case (ACB) No.6 of 2013 is pending before the Sessions Judge & Special Judge, ACB. 3.2 On the basis of the above facts, the order termination came to be passed against the petitioner referring to Rule 3 of the Gujarat State Service (Conduct) Rules, 1971. It was concluded that petitioner had shown lack of commitment to duty, that he was not honest and that he had acted in a manner unbecoming of a government servant. Stated that it was not advisable to continue the petitioner in service. The condition of the appointment order was referred to that the appointee could be driven out from service after paying salary for one month. Accordingly, with such order, the services of the petitioner came to be put an end to. 3.3 Looking to the impugned order, it is clear that the said order is passed based on the factum of filing of F.I.R. The Collector who issued order, reached his conclusion on the basis of filing of F.I.R. only that the petitioner had committed misconduct. The order founded on the incident of taking bribe had taken place as described in the order and that the petitioner was dishonest and acted in the manner unbecoming of a government servant. The order founded on the incident of taking bribe had taken place as described in the order and that the petitioner was dishonest and acted in the manner unbecoming of a government servant. There is no gain saying from the bare reading of the order that the order was stigmatic and punitive in nature. 4. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the order was passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. He submitted that when the order was recorded on the conclusion of misconduct, a regular departmental inquiry ought to have been held. It could be noticed that the authority did not act in compliance of natural justice. Learned Assistant Government Pleader was entirely at his receiving end when confronted with this aspect. 4.1 Learned submitted covered that by advocate the for the case of the decision of this petitioner Court in next stands Sanjay Bhanubhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No.15773 of 2018 decided as per the judgment dated 07th May, 2019 which was confirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No.493 of 2020 dismissed on 03 rd September, 2020. 5. In Sanjay Bhanubhai Makwana (supra), the facts were similar as could be seen from the contents of paragraph Nos.3 and 3.1 which are reproduced hereunder. “3. Looking at the impugned order, it mentioned about the F.I.R. having been filed against the petitioner under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 at Crime Register No.I03 of 2014 before ACB Police Station at Valsad. It was alleged that petitioner, along with other persons, was caught while accepting the amount of bribe and that the petitioner was arrested. Thereafter mentioned were condition No.11 in the order of appointment. Condition Nos.11 and 12 of the order of appointment to state that petitioner was liable to be terminated during the fixed period if he was found to have committed serious misconduct or financial irregularity. It was thereafter mentioned that the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 would not straightway apply to the employee as he was a fixed term employee. Condition Nos.11 and 12 of the order of appointment to state that petitioner was liable to be terminated during the fixed period if he was found to have committed serious misconduct or financial irregularity. It was thereafter mentioned that the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 would not straightway apply to the employee as he was a fixed term employee. 3.1 After detailing the facts of the alleged incident wherein bribe was allegedly accepted by the petitioner, the respondent No.2 authority concluded that the petitioner had committed a misconduct in view of filing of the F.I.R. It was stated that the incident described in the complaint had taken place and that the misconduct committed by the petitioner was serious. According to the respondents, the petitioner was issued notice but he could not convince the authorities about his innocence and no documents were produced which proved innocence. Consequently, the services of the petitioner was terminated. Thus, the termination of services of the petitioner was on the footing that the petitioner had committed a misconduct.” 5.1 In the aforesaid case also, the petitioner employee was a fixed term employee. Since the order was passed terminating the services on the footing of misconduct not preceded by any inquiry in compliance with the natural justice, the Court allowed the petition and reinstated the petitioner as per the final directions. 5.2 The discussion of law and the reasoning supplied in Sanjay Bhanubhai Makwana (supra) would apply to the present case which is extracted here in below to be treated and adopted as part of the reasoning in support of the present order. “5. The question arises is whether the order was punitive and amounted to stigma which ought to have preceded by a regular inquiry against the petitioner in respect of the allegations levelled against the petitioner employee even though petitioner was appointed for a fixed term of five years. 5.1 In judging whether termination is simpliciter or punitive, a trite distinction is made between motive of the order and foundation of the order. In Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 5 SCC 152 ], the Supreme Court explained the concept of motive and foundation in respect of probationer as under: “Motive is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. In Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 5 SCC 152 ], the Supreme Court explained the concept of motive and foundation in respect of probationer as under: “Motive is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? It if was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the act would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were to be true in the preliminary inquiry.” (para 29) (emphasis supplied) 5.2 The Supreme Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [ (1980) 2 SCC 593 ] stated and observed thus, “53. Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological coverups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put it slightly differently, a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non-injurious terminology is used.” 5.3 The principle stated was that even the form of the order may be merely a camouflage for order of dismissal actually passed on the basis of misconduct. In such circumstances, the Apex Court stated, it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged, to go beyond the form and ascertain the true character of the order. The Supreme Court held, If .... .... .... the court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground where the aggrieved officer is not afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311(2). It is wrong to assume that it is only when there is a full scale departmental enquiry any termination made thereafter will attract the operation of Article 311(2).” (Paras 11 and 13) 5.4 It is the foundation of the order which really matters. The Supreme Court in Anoop aiswal (supra) stated that if from the record and the attendant circumstances of the present case it becomes clear that the real foundation for the order of discharge of the appellant-probationer was the alleged act of misconduct, the impugned order would amount to termination of service by way of punishment and in absence of any enquiry held in accordance with Article 311(2), it was liable to be struck down. The Supreme Court thereafter directed reinstatement of the appellant of the said case in service with the same rank of seniority he was entitled to before the impugned order passed as if it had not been passed at all. 5.5 In Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) also the Supreme Court considered its own various decisions on the aspect and after referring to the decision in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. 5.5 In Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) also the Supreme Court considered its own various decisions on the aspect and after referring to the decision in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. [ (1999) 2 SCC 21 ] observed that the proposition of law operating two ways. In certain cases of temporary servants and probationers if the inquiry undertaken about the very conduct forms the motive of termination order, then the termination could not be said to be punitive merely because principles of natural justice have not been followed. In such circumstances, without becoming stigmatic, the employer can exercise its right to terminate service of the employee concerned. In the other line of decisions, the Supreme Court has ruled that if the facts revealed in the inquiry or from the narration of the order itself that the inquiry into the conduct was not the motive but it was a foundation and the allegation of misconduct considered against employee becomes foundation of termination of service of temporary servant or probationer, such action would become punitive and it would make the order legally unsound. The Supreme Court in Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) thereafter referred to the above quoted observations from Gujarat Still Tubes Limited (supra) terming them as instructive. 5.6 In Manishbhai Nayanbhai Mod v. Vadodara Municipal Corporation [ 2018(2) GLR 1636 ] the petitioner was Assistant Station Officer and was appointed for a fixed term. It was alleged against him that while serving in the Fire Brigade Branch of the Vadodara Municipal Corporation on the post of Assistant Station Officer, petitioner misbehaved with the Telephone Operator and tried to injured Telephone Operator physically. In the impugned order it was mentioned that while being on the sensitive post, petitioner acted with negligency and carelessness in discharge of duties. Show-cause notice was issued against the petitioner and his reply was solicited. Thereafter his services put to an end, this Court referred all the aforesaid decisions to come to the conclusion that the order was founded on the allegations of misconduct and that it was punitive in nature casting stigma. It was held that, “Such an action could not have been taken, eventhough the petitioner was a fixed period employee, without giving the petitioner a fullfledge opportunity to defend and thus by holding a regular departmental inquiry.”. It was held that, “Such an action could not have been taken, eventhough the petitioner was a fixed period employee, without giving the petitioner a fullfledge opportunity to defend and thus by holding a regular departmental inquiry.”. 5.7 Decision in Manishbhai Nayanbhai Mod (supra) was challenged by way of Letters Patent Appeal No.189 of 2018, which came to be dismissed. The Division Bench, confirming the decision in Manishbhai Nayanbhai Mod (supra), observed as under. “4.1 ... ... … The above act on part of the competent authority of appellant – Corporation was not only stigmatic, but contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court to which reference is made by learned Single Judge and distinguishing the facts of the present case it was found that termination was punitive. As a necessary corollary, when there is a breach of procedure of instituting full-ledged departmental inquiry, particularly, when termination order referred to following of Gujarat Civil Services [Discipline & Appeal] Rules, 1971, the issuance of show cause notice, receiving reply and then to take final decision to terminate services of an employee was unjust, unreasonable, arbitrary, in breach of the Rules, 1971, violative of principles of natural justice and Article 14 of the Constitution as it would not make any difference whether the employee was appointed temporarily for a fixed term on a fixed salary incorporating various conditions.” 5.8 In another decision in Sandip Ajitsinh Vaghela v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No.12071 of 2018 decided on 26th February, 2019 the same question had arisen where also the petitioner was Junior Clerk employed on temporary basis. In Rahul Aydanbhai Vank v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No.889 of 2018 decided on 05th September, 2018, the petitioner was a contractual employee who was dismissed on the ground of insubordination. The order was found to have been passed on the allegation of misconduct. Same principles were applied and held that services could not have been terminated without undergoing the inquiry. 5.9 The aforesaid decision in Rahul Aydanbhai Vank (supra) was also confirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No.841 of 2019. In the following paragraph, the Letters Patent Bench referred to Manishbhai Nayanbhai Mod (supra) and other decisions to come to the following conclusion to clearly observe that full-scale formal inquiry was requirement of law before the services could have been terminated. “8. In the following paragraph, the Letters Patent Bench referred to Manishbhai Nayanbhai Mod (supra) and other decisions to come to the following conclusion to clearly observe that full-scale formal inquiry was requirement of law before the services could have been terminated. “8. Even decision relied by learned Assistant Government Pleader in the case of Chaitanya Prakash and Another v. H. Omlarappa reported in (2010) 2 SCC 623 quotes decision in the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences [ (2002) 1 SCC 520 ] where three tests are enumerated to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive or not. We find in the present case all above tests namely a full scale formal inquiry, allegation involving moral turpitude or misconduct and culminating into guilt stands satisfied and therefore we have no hesitation to hold that the learned Single Judge committed no error of fact or law or jurisdiction warranting interference in this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.” 5.3 When the impugned order is considered in light of the above principles and the position of law, it could be well discerned that the event of filing of F.I.R. against the petitioner was treated as the base and it was concluded readily by the respondent authority that the petitioner had committed misconduct for accepting the bribe. It was upon this foundation, the termination was effected. The order was rested on the ground of misconduct and therefore it was stigmatic order, which could not have been passed without a full scale inquiry. 5.4 Decision in Sanjay Bhanubhai Makwana (supra) was confirmed by the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No.493 September, of 2020. 2020 The as per Division order Bench dated noted 03 rd that Letters Patent Appeal No.1596 of 2019 and Letters Patent Appeal No.1597 of 2019 decided on 24th July, 2019 squarely covered the point. It may be noted that decision in Sandip Ajitsinh Vaghela v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No.12071 of 2018 decided on 26th February, 2019 had similar facts so also the decision in Imranbhai Anwarbhai Majothi v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No.17872 of 2017. Those petitions were also allowed by this Court. 6. It may be noted that decision in Sandip Ajitsinh Vaghela v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No.12071 of 2018 decided on 26th February, 2019 had similar facts so also the decision in Imranbhai Anwarbhai Majothi v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No.17872 of 2017. Those petitions were also allowed by this Court. 6. In view of the above reasons and discussion and the position of law obtained, the impugned order being stigmatic and having been passed without compliance of natural justice and without holding of any inquiry, is liable to be set aside. The petition deserves to be allowed. 6.1 The petitioner was fixed term employee who joined duties on 19.04.2010. His five years term had already expired on 19.04.2015. Therefore, while the impugned order will be liable to be set aside and the petitioner is not entitled for reinstatement and therefore, the order of reinstatement cannot be passed. 7. As a consequence of above discussion and reasons, the impugned order dated 24.10.20180 passed by Deputy Collector, Anand is hereby set aside. 7.1 The resultant monetary benefits to be paid to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the present order. 7.2 At the same time, it is provided that the reinstatement of the petitioner directed as above shall be for the period upto making of the total original period fixed for his employment as per order of appointment. 8. It is observed and clarified that the respondents are not precluded from proceeding against the petitioner in accordance with law. 9. The petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Direct service is permitted.