JUDGMENT : 1. The plaintiff is in second appeal. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit seeking for specific performance of the agreement of sale, dated 22.10.2008 in respect of the house measuring about 15 1/9 square yards by which she sought to be purchase from defendant No.1, namely Smt. Zaheedabegum and her minor son Kumar Saifatali Rajesab Tandur (defendant No.2). The agreement of sale was a registered agreement under which the defendants had agreed to sell the house for a sum of Rs.60,000/-and had received a sum of Rs.50,000/-as part of the sale consideration. 3. The Trial Court on consideration of the evidence adduced before it, came to the conclusion that the agreement of sale had been proved. However, Trial Court exercised its discretionary powers conferred under Section 20 of the Specific Performance Act and refused specific performance. The Trial Court took the view that the defendant No.1 as a joint owner, had only 1/3rd share plus fixed 1/6th share out of 1/3rd share of her deceased husband’s share and in all she had less than ½ of share in the house property which was a small dwelling house. The Trial Court took the view that it was compelled to refuse as the decree for specific performance as it was not feasible to divide the house and it would be inequitable to allow a stranger to the family as to purchase a part of the dwelling house. It accordingly ordered for refund of the part of the sale consideration paid by the plaintiff. 4. The matter was carried in appeal. 5. The Appellate Court on re-appreciation of the evidence, concurred with the view taken by the Trial Court. The Appellate Court took note of the fact that the defendant No.1 only possessed a small share in the property and found that the Trial Court had exercised the discretion conferred on it judiciously and reasonably. The Appellate Court accordingly dismissed the appeal. 6. It is against this dismissal of the suit, insofar as it relates to denial of the specific performance, this second appeal is filed. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant contended before me that the Trial Court has not exercised discretionary power judiciously and therefore the decree could not be sustained. It was his contention that the Appellate Court ought to have granted specific performance, since the exercise of discretion was not guided by any judiciary principles. 8. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant contended before me that the Trial Court has not exercised discretionary power judiciously and therefore the decree could not be sustained. It was his contention that the Appellate Court ought to have granted specific performance, since the exercise of discretion was not guided by any judiciary principles. 8. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the defendants supported the findings of the Trial Court as well as Appellate Court. 9. I have heard the learned counsels on both sides and perused the materials on records. 10. It is not in dispute that the subject matter of the suit was a small house property measuring 15 1/9 square yards, in which the defendant No.1, her minor son and also her daughters had a share. Despite having only a share, the defendant No.1 had sought to sell not only her share but the share of her minor son also. The Courts have taken note of the fact that the mother, (under the Mohammedan Law) cannot be the natural guardian of the property and of her minor son and cannot possess the right to deal with the property and therefore the attempt of the mother to sell share of her minor’s son was not sustainable. 11. The Courts have taken note of the nature of the suit property and hardship that would be caused to the children of the deceased and has refused to grant specific performance. The Trial Court as well as Appellate Court have given cogent reasons for invoking their discretionary jurisdiction, which is neither arbitrary or unreasonable. 12. In my view, there is no illegality or infirmity in the judgments of Trial Court as well as Appellate Court. 13. In my view, there is no question of law, much less, a substantial question of law arises for consideration in this second appeal. Consequently, the second appeal is dismissed.