JUDGMENT : The matter has been heard through video conferencing with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. They have raised no complaint regarding audio and visual quality. 2. The intra-court appeal is directed against the order/judgment dated 16.11.2017 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 4385 of 2015, whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge, has refused to interfere with the order dated 02.07.2015 passed by Project Officer, Amlabad Colliery, BCCL, by which the representation of the writ petitioner for employment of his two sons and one daughter in lieu of the acquisition of his land of area 7.63 acres has been rejected, as also refused to issue any direction upon the respondents to rehabilitate his family in lieu of his acquired land by dismissing the writ petition. 3. The brief facts of the case, which are required to be referred herein for proper adjudication of the lis, are as under: It is the case of the writ petitioner-appellant that the land appertaining to Khata No. 75, Plot Nos. 51, 62 to 72, 74, 76, 78 to 83 and 90 measuring an area of 7.63 acres in Mouza Amlabad belonging to the father of the writ petitioner-appellant was acquired in the year 1989-90 for being utilized by Bharat Coking Coal Limited for its Amlabad Project, Bokaro. At the time of acquisition, Pucca and Kachha houses were standing upon the said land, as such same were also acquired by the respondents. In lieu of acquisition of land, the respondents paid compensation to the tune of Rs. 13,379.98 to the father of the writ petitioner-appellant and Rs. 34,302.79 for one house but failed to pay Rs. 27,959.95 for the second house. It is stated that at the time of acquisition of the land, a policy was floated by the respondents-BCCL, as per which the benefit of one employment in lieu of acquisition of two acres of land was assured to be given to the land losers. It is claimed by the writ petitioner-appellant that despite acquisition of land of 7.63 acres, no employment was provided to the writ petitioner’s family though his family members were entitled to get at least three employments. Aggrieved thereof, the writ petitioner-appellant approached the respondents-BCCL for employment of his wife several times and lastly in the year 2012. It is claimed by the writ petitioner-appellant that despite acquisition of land of 7.63 acres, no employment was provided to the writ petitioner’s family though his family members were entitled to get at least three employments. Aggrieved thereof, the writ petitioner-appellant approached the respondents-BCCL for employment of his wife several times and lastly in the year 2012. But, when his grievance was not redressed, the writ petitioner-appellant approached the writ Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 2181 of 2013, which was disposed of vide order dated 27.01.2015 giving liberty to the writ petitioner to approach the respondents-BCCL by filing a representation for grant of benefit under R & R Policy. Pursuant thereto, the writ petitioner filed representation before the Project Officer, Amlabad Project, Bokaro which was rejected vide order dated 02.07.2015, which was the subject matter of W.P. (C) No. 4385 of 2015. In the writ petition, the writ petitioner had mainly taken the plea that R & R Policy stipulates to provide one employment against acquisition of two acres of land but even after acquisition of 7.63 acres of land no employment was provided and, therefore, the order dated 02.07.2015 passed by the respondents-BCCL sought to be quashed. The respondents-BCCL had entered their appearance and made opposition to the aforesaid prayer made by the writ petitioner and submitted that the impugned order dated 02.07.2015 may not be interfered with, inter alia, on the ground that the employment has already been provided for acquisition of land to the dependent of Buniyadi Rajwar, who is the grandfather of the writ petitioner. Since at the time of acquisition of land, no one except the writ petitioner was entitled for the employment and further at the relevant time since the writ petitioner was already an employee of respondents-BCCL, hence now after waiting for 20 years i.e. after attaining the age of majority by his sons and daughter, the writ petitioner has approached this Court, which is not permissible in law. Further it has been stated that the ground of discrimination, which was agitated by the writ petitioner-appellant of land loser of Tetulmari Nagarikala Mouza, has neither been stated in the writ petition nor specific argument has been made by counsel for the writ petitioner that case of the writ petitioner is similar to that of land-losers of Tetulmari Nagarikala Mouza. Further it has been stated that the ground of discrimination, which was agitated by the writ petitioner-appellant of land loser of Tetulmari Nagarikala Mouza, has neither been stated in the writ petition nor specific argument has been made by counsel for the writ petitioner that case of the writ petitioner is similar to that of land-losers of Tetulmari Nagarikala Mouza. The writ Court after hearing the parties has declined to interfere with the impugned decision and to pass any positive order in favour of the writ petitioner and dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 16.11.2017, on the ground that the acquisition is of the year 1989-90 but the writ petitioner has approached this Court after lapse of about 20 years and further at the time of acquisition, the writ petitioner was already in the service of BCCL and his dependents, i.e., his two sons and one daughter, being minors, were not eligible to get employment during the relevant time when the acquisition took place, which is the subject matter of present intra-court appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner-appellant has reiterated the ground, which was agitated before the writ Court, by making a submission that since the land of area 7.63 acres has been acquired, as such as per the R & R Policy three employments were to be given but no such employment has been given which has not been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge which suffers from infirmity hence the same is required to be quashed and set aside by issuing a direction upon the respondents-BCCL to forthwith provide employment in favour of two sons and daughter of the writ petitioner-appellant. 5. The aforesaid submission has seriously been disputed by learned counsel appearing for the respondents-BCCL, inter alia, on the ground that since the writ petitioner has approached this Court after inordinate delay of about 20 years, therefore, the writ Court has rightly not interfered with the impugned order and further during the relevant time, the writ petitioner-appellant was in service of respondents-BCCL and his dependents being minor and after attaining the majority the writ petitioner cannot be allowed to agitate the aforesaid issue that too after lapse of twenty years. 6. The admitted fact herein is that the land having area 7.63 acres was acquired. 6. The admitted fact herein is that the land having area 7.63 acres was acquired. According to the writ petitioners-appellant, as per R & R Policy of the respondents-BCCL there is provision of one employment for dependents of land losers against every two acres of land acquired. It is very surprising that this Court time and again asked the writ petitioner-appellant to place the said R & R Policy which stipulates about employment to the dependents of land losers against acquisition of every two acres of land but neither before the writ Court nor before this Court said R & R Policy has been appended to, however, upon query it has been submitted by learned counsel for the writ petitioner-appellant that he does not have copy of said R & R Policy. 7. Be that as it may, it is admitted fact that the writ petitioner-appellant was in service of respondents-BCCL at the time of acquisition of land as such he cannot seek appointment even accepting that R & R policy stipulates about employment to the dependents of the land losers for acquisition of land. 8. It is also admitted fact that at the time of acquisition of land, the children of the writ petitioner-appellant were minor, which fact is obvious from the conduct of the writ petitioner-appellant that even though the land was acquired in the year 1989-90 but no such claim for employment has been made at that point of time but it is claimed by the writ petitioner-appellant that several representation have been filed but save and except a representation said to have been submitted in the year 2012 no other representation has been annexed. Even accepting that writ petitioner-appellant had submitted several representations but it is settled position of law that filing of representation will not be a sufficient cause in approaching the Court after such an inordinate delay. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttaranchal & Anr. Vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari & Ors. reported in 2013 (6) SLR 629 , wherein the Hon’ble Court while considering the issue regarding delay and laches opined that repeated representations made will not keep the issues alive. Vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari & Ors. reported in 2013 (6) SLR 629 , wherein the Hon’ble Court while considering the issue regarding delay and laches opined that repeated representations made will not keep the issues alive. A state or a dead issue/dispute cannot be got revived even if such a representation has either been decided by the authority or got decided by getting a direction from the Court as the issue regarding delay and laches is to be decided with reference to original cause of action and not with reference to any such order passed. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Pyarimohan Samantaray & Ors reported in (1977) 3 SCC 396 , has laid down that making of repeated representation is not a satisfactory explanation of delay. Such principle was also held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Shri Arun Kumar Patnaik & Ors reported in (1976) 3 SCC 579 . Further in the case of Shiv Dass v. Union of India & Ors reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 , in particular paragraph 9, which is quoted hereunder as: 9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore [ AIR 1967 SC 993 ]. There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray [ (1977) 3 SCC 396 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 424 : AIR 1976 SC 2617 ] making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. Further, reference in this regard be made to the case of New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh & Ors reported in (2007) 9 SCC 278 in particular paragraph 17, which is quoted hereunder as: 17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India). Pan Singh & Ors reported in (2007) 9 SCC 278 in particular paragraph 17, which is quoted hereunder as: 17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India). In State of M.P. & Ors Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors reported in AIR 1987 SC 251 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to interfere and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid down on the principle of delay and laches stating that the High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and inconvenience in bringing the justice. In this context, further reference is made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. And Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1004 [S.L.P. (C) Nos. 30404-30442/2017] wherein the land losers had approached the Court of law after inordinate delay seeking enhanced compensation which the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to condone. In the aforesaid case, in para 7, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held which reads hereunder as:- “7. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz., laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient -9 cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent.” Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional Court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 9. Admittedly, the writ petitioner has approached this Court for the first time in the year 2013 for a direction upon the respondents to offer employment to his sons and daughter in lieu of acquisition of land. It is also admitted fact that on the date of acquisition of the land the writ petitioner was already in service of the respondents-BCCL and his children were minor, for whom direction has been sought for to provide employment, as such they were not eligible for employment, therefore, the writ petitioner has filed the writ petition after delay of almost 23 years that too without any reasonable explanation for such delay in approaching the Court. 10. This Court considering the settled position of law as held by Hon’ble Apex Court, referred herein above, is of the view that in absence of sufficient explanation for delay and laches, the writ Court being a Court of equity has rightly dismissed the writ petition declining to interfere with the order passed by the respondents-BCCL. 11. In view thereof, the order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be faulted with. 12. Accordingly, the instant appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.