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2020 DIGILAW 1026 (ALL)

Roop Singh v. Vinay Kumar Jauhari

2020-07-13

PANKAJ MITHAL, YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

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JUDGMENT : YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Heard Sri Ravindra Narayan Singh alongwith Sri Ashok Kumar Lal, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Kshitij Shailendra, learned counsel for respondent no.1 and Sri Uday Pratap Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent nos.2 to 5. 2. The present special appeal has been filed seeking to challenge an order dated 04.03.2020 passed in Contempt Application (Civil) No.6748 of 2018. 3. The respondent no.2 in the contempt application is the appellant before us. 4. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent applicant with regard to the maintainability of the special appeal. It has been contended that the order under appeal does not decide the rights of the parties and as such the same cannot be held to be a judgment for the purposes of filing of an intracourt appeal. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has supported the maintainability of the appeal by referring to the merits of the case and trying to contend that the order under appeal was legally unjustifiable. In support of his contention learned counsel for the appellant has sought to place reliance upon the judgments in the case of Anil Kumar Gupta and another Vs. Pawan Kumar Singh and others, 2015 (8) ADJ 724 , Subhash Chandra Tiwari and 2 others Vs. Kishore and 4 others, Special Appeal No.314 of 2019, decided on 05.03.2019 and Vinod Kumar Sharma, District Inspector of Schools, Azamgarh and another Vs. Shiv Mohan Dwivedi, Assistant Teacher, Inter College, Sarai Brindabad, District Azamgarh, 2020 (4) ADJ 48. 6. In order to appreciate the rival contentions we deem it necessary to set out the order dated 04.03.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge, against which the present appeal has been preferred. The order reads as under: “On 10.12.2019, charges were required to be framed. However, when on 10.12.2019 certain submissions were made by the opposite parties explaining their conduct charges were not framed on that date. On 9.1.2020, the respondents were required to take further instructions. No further instructions have been brought on record. List this case peremptorily on 1.4.2020. On that date, the respondent no. 2 shall be personally present for the framing of charges.” 7. On 9.1.2020, the respondents were required to take further instructions. No further instructions have been brought on record. List this case peremptorily on 1.4.2020. On that date, the respondent no. 2 shall be personally present for the framing of charges.” 7. The ambit and scope of maintainability of an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971(the Act, 1971) and also an intracourt appeal under the relevant rules of the High Court, in case of an order passed in contempt proceedings was considered in the case of Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others, (2006) 5 SCC 399 and it was held that any direction issued or decision made by the High Court, in contempt proceedings, on the merits of a dispute between the parties, unless the same is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, would not be in the exercise of "jurisdiction to punish for contempt" and, therefore, would not be appealable under Section 19 of the Act, 1971. Such an order, passed by the Contempt Court, was held, amenable to a challenge in an intracourt appeal under the relevant rules of the High Court. The position with regard to filing of appeals against orders in contempt proceedings was summarised thus: "11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of "jurisdiction to punish for contempt" and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intracourt appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intracourt appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases)." 8. The question as to whether an intracourt appeal would be available against an interlocutory order containing directions on merits of the dispute was answered by referring to the decision in Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and another, (1981) 4 SCC 8 , and it was held that interlocutory orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case or which finally decide a collateral issue or a question which is not the subject matter of the main case, are "judgments" for the purpose of filing appeals under the relevant rules of the High Court. 9. 9. Taking note of the position that in a proceeding initiated under the Act, 1971 the High Court could either punish or discharge the alleged contemner and in doing so, it could pass all such ancillary orders which are necessary for exercise of such powers but it could not issue any directions or orders regarding the main dispute or controversy between the parties which had led to the filing of writ petition, this Court, in A.P. Verma and others Vs. U.P. Laboratory Technicians Association and others, 1998 (3) AWC 2264 , held that if any order or direction is made by the Court concerning the merit of the controversy or dispute between the parties, or for implementation of any judgment or order, the same would be de hors the provision of the Act, 1971 and would be deemed to have been issued in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution, and such direction would, therefore, be amenable to an appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. The observations made in the judgment are as follows: "7. ...Thus there can be no doubt that in any proceeding initiated under the Contempt of Courts Act, the High Court can either punish or discharge the alleged contemner and in doing so it can pass all such ancillary orders which are necessary for exercise of such power but it cannot issue any directions or orders regarding the main dispute or controversy between the parties which has led to the filing of writ petition by either of the parties. However, if any order or direction is made by the Court concerning the merit of the controversy or dispute between the parties, or for implementation of any judgment or order, it will be de hors the provision of Contempt of Courts Act and they can only be deemed to have been issued in exercise of power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution. Such direction would, therefore, be amenable to an appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court as they are not issued in exercise of any power conferred by the Act..." 10. The aforementioned position of law has been restated in a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Sharma (supra). 11. Such direction would, therefore, be amenable to an appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court as they are not issued in exercise of any power conferred by the Act..." 10. The aforementioned position of law has been restated in a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Sharma (supra). 11. In the facts of the present case the order dated 04.03.2020, against which the present appeal has been preferred, is merely of a procedural nature and cannot in any manner be said to touch the merits of the controversy or the dispute between the parties so as to be deemed to have been issued in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji (supra) is to the effect that orders passed by the Court which are of a routine nature would not be “judgments” even if they cause some inconvenience to the parties. 13. In Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court again emphasised that routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment are not to be held as “judgments” for the purposes of filing intracourt appeals. It was also held that orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties, would not amount to “judgments”. 14. The decisions in the case of Anil Kumar Gupta and another, Subhash Chandra Tiwari and others and Vinod Kumar Sharma, which are sought to be relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant do not in any manner support the case of the appellant; rather the aforesaid judgments reiterate the settled legal principle that only if the High Court, in contempt proceedings decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, the said order would be amenable to an intracourt appeal. 15. In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the preliminary objection raised with regard to maintainability of the special appeal under the provisions of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, is sustained. 16. The special appeal is held to be not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed.