JUDGEMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. On 11.03.2011, in the early morning Dr. Lalit Jain left home for a morning walk. When he did not come back home by 07:30 AM his family started making inquiries about him. At about 08:45 AM he called his family and told them that he would be back home soon. He called again at 09:40 AM and asked to arrange Twenty lakh rupees for paying ransom. He came back home the same evening and two days thereafter the accused persons who had come to Gandhi Maidan for collecting the ransom amount were nabbed by the police. They made disclosure before the police and confessed their involvement in the crime. After Dr. Lalit Jain had gone missing on 11.03.2011 his nephew lodged a report with the police and on the basis of the fardbeyan of Vivek Vinayak, Sadar P.S Case No.148 of 2011 was lodged on 12.03.2011 under section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code, against unknown. During the investigation statements of Masood Naiyar and Dr. Lalit Jain were recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and after the investigation a charge-sheet was laid against Md. Aslam, Manoj Kumar @ Babloo, Md. Noor and Md. Raju @ Afroz and they have faced the trial on the charge of kidnapping Dr. Lalit Jain for ransom. During the trial the prosecution has examined six witnesses to prove the charge under section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code against them and after the prosecution evidence was closed the learned trial Judge has examined the accused persons under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. In S.T. No. 556 of 2011 the appellants have been convicted and sentenced to R.I for life and a fine of Rs.5,000/- each under section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge has held that failure of the prosecution to hold TIP would not by itself disprove the prosecution case, the defense could not elicit any material to challenge credibility of the witnesses and nothing has been shown to infer false implication of the accused persons. The learned Judge has held that the facts established during the trial would prove that the chain of the evidences is so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground to doubt complicity of the accused persons in the occurrence. 3. The learned Judge has held that the facts established during the trial would prove that the chain of the evidences is so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground to doubt complicity of the accused persons in the occurrence. 3. PW-1, the informant has deposed in the Court that on 11.03.2011 his uncle like any other day had gone for a morning walk at about 05:00 am but he did not come back home by 07:30 am. On inquiry from others who were his companion over morning walk he was told that his uncle did not come for walk today. At about 08:45 am his uncle called on the landline telephone at home and said that he is fine and would come back home shortly. After about one hour he called again from his mobile no.9955500606 and asked to arrange a ransom amount of Twenty lakh rupees immediately. In his cross-examination PW-l has stated that he does not know the place from where his uncle had called and he has also admitted that his uncle did not disclose name of the abductor. PW-3 has not supported the prosecution case and in the Court he has not identified the appellants as the abductors of Dr. Lalit Jain. However, he admits that his statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded by the Magistrate and he has put his signature on his statement after having read and understood the contents thereof. During cross-examination by the defense he has stated that he was brought to the Court for recording his statement by the police and he has given statement at the instance of the police. At this stage we may indicate that evidence of a hostile witness in cross-examination by the defense is in the realm of hearsay and not admissible in evidence. PW-4 and PW-5 are the Magistrates who have recorded statement of PW-2 and PW-3 under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They have deposed in the Court that on the direction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate they have recorded statement of the witnesses under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. PW-6 is the investigating officer of this case. They have deposed in the Court that on the direction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate they have recorded statement of the witnesses under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. PW-6 is the investigating officer of this case. He has deposed in the Court that at about 09:45 AM on 11.03.2011 he has recorded fardbeyan of Vivek Vinayak and in course of investigation an information was received on 13.03.2011 that the accused persons involved in abduction of Dr. Lalit Jain would assemble at Gandhi Maidan to collect the ransom amount. He has gone there with the police force and arrested the appellants. From their possession revolver, country-made pistol and cartridges were recovered and a separate case under sections 25(1-B) a, 26 and 35 of the Arms Act and section 414 of the Indian Penal ode was registered against them. He has affirmed in the Court that the First Information Report in Sadar P.S Case No.151 of 2011 was lodged by him; it was marked as Exhibit-9 in the present case. The seizure-list prepared in the said case was also tendered in evidence in the present case and marked as Exhibit-10. He has admitted that the statement of Dr. Lalit Jain was recorded on 13.03.2011 and in his cross-examination he has further admitted that no TIP of the accused persons or the seized articles was conducted. In the context of a challenge by the defense on identification of the accused persons by name, he has stated that there may be several persons of the same name. 4. The case of the prosecution is largely based on the evidence of PW-2, the victim - but not solely on his testimony. He has deposed in the Court that at about 05:00 am on 11.03.2011 he came out for a morning walk. A silver-color car bearing a registration number from West Bengal was parked near his house and when he reached near the car 4-5 persons who were hiding behind the car overpowered him and forcibly brought him in the car on gun point. A band was put on his eyes and he was put on the floor of the back seat of the car. After running for about 30-35 minutes they stopped and three persons took him through a hilly terrain. About one hour thereafter his eye band was removed and one of the accused persons there disclosed his name Noor. A band was put on his eyes and he was put on the floor of the back seat of the car. After running for about 30-35 minutes they stopped and three persons took him through a hilly terrain. About one hour thereafter his eye band was removed and one of the accused persons there disclosed his name Noor. Brandishing a bhujali he was threatening him and asked to call from his mobile phone on his house landline number. He was told to call home again and ask his family to arrange Twenty lakh rupees for ransom. His nephew told him that the ransom amount is very large and it would take some time to arrange the money, whereupon the accused threatened to kill him. He was feeling sick and on his promise to pay ransom he was released. He was brought to Charwa Dam and from there he was taken on a motorcycle bearing no. JH01T-9019 and dropped near his house. 5. No one has seen the appellants abducting Dr. Lalit Jain in the morning of 11.03.2011 and after the appellants were arrested on 13.03.2011 and a separate case under the Arms Act was registered against them they were not put on Test Identification Parade. 6. The first challenge to the prosecution case is on the ground that the appellants were not identified by the victim and identification of an unknown person by name is most hazardous and cannot be made the sole basis for conviction. This contention is based primarily on the statement of PW-2 in his cross-examination that face of the accused persons was covered and statement of the investigating officer that several persons may carry the same name. 7. The identification of an accused by the witness in the court is a substantive piece of evidence and as a general rule the Court may act on the testimony of a single eye-witness to convict a person. Section 134 of the Evidence Act lays down that no particular number of witnesses is required in any case for the proof of a fact. In Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 14 SCC 150 ) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that : "28…it is clear that Indian legal system does not insist on plurality of witnesses. Section 134 of the Evidence Act lays down that no particular number of witnesses is required in any case for the proof of a fact. In Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 14 SCC 150 ) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that : "28…it is clear that Indian legal system does not insist on plurality of witnesses. Neither the legislature nor the judiciary mandates that there must be particular number of witnesses to record an order of conviction against the accused. Our legal system has always laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction". But then, the identification of an accused by a witness for the first time in the Court is considered a weak piece of evidence and it may not be considered safe to rely on such a piece of evidence to record conviction of the accused solely on that basis. Nonetheless, if testimony of a witness does not suffer from inherent improbability or inconsistency and it is shown that he had an opportunity to observe the conduct and characteristic features of an accused then identification of the accused by such a witness is accepted by the Court even without corroboration. It is now well-settled that necessity of Test Identification Parade to corroborate identification of an unknown accused in the court is a rule of prudence and not an absolute rule. In Kanta Prashad v. Delhi Administration AIR 1958 SC 350 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the failure to hold TIP does not make the evidence of identification in the trial inadmissible. In Sidhartha Vashisth alias Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even if there was no previous Test Identification the court may appreciate dock identification as being above board and more than conclusive. 8. The law on identification of an accused has been lucidly discussed in Simon v. State of Karnataka (2004) 2 SCC 694 . 8. The law on identification of an accused has been lucidly discussed in Simon v. State of Karnataka (2004) 2 SCC 694 . The star witness for the prosecution who had shown the appellants to the other witnesses had himself wrongly identified all the accused persons except Simon and on that basis it was urged that his testimony must be excluded and the conviction based on identification of such witness cannot be sustained. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that whether the identification of an accused for the first time in the Court in absence of any TIP can be made on the basis of the conviction depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed, thus: "14 The legal position the aspect of identification is well settled. Under Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the identity of the accused persons is a relevant fact. We have no difficulty in accepting the contention that evidence of mere identification of an accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test identification is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. Courts generally look for corroboration of the sole testimony of the witnesses in court so as to fix the identity of the accused who are strangers to them in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. It has also to be borne in mind that the aspect of identification parade belongs to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which obliges the investigating agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to claim, a test identification parade. Mere failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. What weight is to be attached to such identification is a matter for the courts of fact to examine. In appropriate cases, it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration (see Malkhansingh v. State of M.P.)." 9. Mere failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. What weight is to be attached to such identification is a matter for the courts of fact to examine. In appropriate cases, it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration (see Malkhansingh v. State of M.P.)." 9. One of the recognized modes of identification is face recognition and even if the face is covered eyes, ears, lips and other features of the face can be a safe guide to identify the accused. In course of the entire episode PW-2 had sufficient opportunity to observe the distinctive features of the appellants. A victim of abduction for ransom would remember the horror he has undergone during those frightful moments and the bizarre happenings involving him would stick in his mind indelibly. In Ravinder Kumar v. State of Punjab (2001) 7 SCC 690 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that human memory very often has a conditioned characteristic and anything which has any special or peculiar lineament creates an impact on the human mind lasting for long. In Motilal Yadav v. State of Bihar (2015) 2 SCC 647 , a six years old boy was abducted from Kahalgaon in Bihar and taken to Haldwani in Uttrakhand. In the Court, the father of the child and the rickshaw-puller who was taking the child to school identified the accused, who took away the child by telling him that his father was calling him at the railway station. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has accepted identification of the abductors by them to uphold their conviction under section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code. 10. In the backdrop of the above discussions, we would now examine the evidence of PW-2 in his cross-examination that face of the abductors was covered. The story of abduction of PW-2 for ransom involves few stages. His statement is that an eye band was put on him after he was taken in the car and when his eye band was removed, one of the accused persons disclosed his name. Though he does not say that at the time when he was overpowered and forcibly thrown in the car the abductors had covered their face, for a moment we would assume that their face was covered. Though he does not say that at the time when he was overpowered and forcibly thrown in the car the abductors had covered their face, for a moment we would assume that their face was covered. Later on when he became sick the abductors agreed to release him on the promise that he would pay the ransom amount. At this stage, he must have had extensive interactions with the abductors and here again he does not say that all the time the abductors had kept their face under cover. He was brought near Charwa Dam and from there taken on a motorcycle bearing registration no. JH01T-90 19 near his house. Plainly speaking, the statement of PW-2 in his cross-examination is a “one liner" that face of the abductors was covered. The question put to PW-2 in his cross-examination appears to be a vague one or at least is not reflected from this answer and to draw an inference on the basis of this "one liner" that all the time the accused persons had covered their face would be an unreasonable and unrealistic approach to evaluate his evidence. In “State of U. P v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC 302 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof involves a subjective element and forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge. The learned Sessions Judge has held that failure of the prosecution to hold TIP was not fatal and identification of an accused may be by body shape, gait, manner of walking and voice. The learned Sessions Judge has adopted a correct approach to evaluate the evidence of Dr. Lalit Jain and we do not see any reason to doubt identification of the appellants by him. 11. On dock identification of the appellants by PW-2, it is contended that the appellants were not identified in the Court by PW-2. This contention is based on the fact that there is no remark in the deposition of PW-2 that he has identified the appellants. This is a common practice that the trial Judge shall record at the end of the examination-in-chief of a witness whether he has identified the accused in the dock or not. This contention is based on the fact that there is no remark in the deposition of PW-2 that he has identified the appellants. This is a common practice that the trial Judge shall record at the end of the examination-in-chief of a witness whether he has identified the accused in the dock or not. In this case it was just a mistake during recording of the testimony of PW-2 that no such remark has been recorded by the trial Judge in the testimony of PW-2 but for that reason no inference can be drawn by the Court that the appellants were not identified by PW-2 in the Court. That is so also for the reason that the defense would have immediately intervened and asked the trial Judge to make a remark in the records had PW-2 failed to identify the appellants. No application was filed by the accused persons seeking incorporation of a remark in the deposition of PW-2 and no such plea was urged before the trial Court. The plea that there may be several persons of the same name and therefore conviction of the appellants on the evidence of PW-2 that he gathered their name from their talks cannot be recorded, has no legs to stand. There may be persons of the same name but this fact by itself would not create a doubt on identity of the abductors. 12. The case of the prosecution is built on the testimony of PW-2, but this is not the only piece of evidence against the appellants. There are other links which connect the appellants with abduction of PW-2 for ransom. Sadar P.S Case NO.151 of 2011 was registered against them on 13.03.2011 and it is contended that only after identity of the appellants was known to the investigating officer the witnesses have spoken their name. The investigating officer has stated in the Court that statement of PW-2 was recorded on 13.03.2011 and the defense has not challenged this fact, rather wants to make much of it on the ground of delay in recording his statement. The investigating officer has stated in the Court that statement of PW-2 was recorded on 13.03.2011 and the defense has not challenged this fact, rather wants to make much of it on the ground of delay in recording his statement. A secret information about the appellants gathering at Gandhi Maidan to collect the ransom amount was received by the investigating officer at 15:40 pm on 13.03.2011 and a First Information Report was lodged at 17:00 PM, but PW-2 and PW-6 were not cross-examined with respect to the time when statement of PW-2 was recorded by the investigating officer under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - whether before or after the registration of Sadar P.S Case No.151 of 2011. During the trial the credibility of the investigating officer was not challenged and the materials on record do not suggest that the investigating officer and for that matter the victim or any other witness had any motive to falsely implicate the appellants and that too in a serious crime like abduction for ransom. In State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil (2001) 1 SCC 652 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. 13. Next it was contended that PW-2 did not tell the name of the abductors when he called home and to the police immediately after his release. This submission has been made overlooking the fact that PW-2 made calls to home for arranging the ransom amount at the instance of the abductors and in their presence he could not have revealed their identity. Though conduct of PW-2 was not unnatural, there is no rule of law that only the unusual behaviour of a witness of a crime is enough to reject his evidence. PW-2 was sick and he was released by the abductors showing some sympathy on him on a bargain that he would pay the ransom amount. He must have been in a terrible state of mind and therefore it is not unusual and surprising that he did not disclose name of the abductors to the police soon after his return to home. He had just saved his life, many things might have been going through his mind and thinking about his next course of action. He must have been in a terrible state of mind and therefore it is not unusual and surprising that he did not disclose name of the abductors to the police soon after his return to home. He had just saved his life, many things might have been going through his mind and thinking about his next course of action. It is quite natural that he would not rush to the police and tell the name of the abductors. 14. The other circumstances also point out an accusing finger towards the appellants. In his fardbeyan which was recorded on 11.03.2011 at about 09:45 a.m., PW-1 has stated that his uncle made a call from his mobile phone on the landline telephone of his house and asked to arrange Twenty lakh rupees for ransom and said that the abductors were threatening to kill him if ransom amount was not paid to them. By that time the family of Dr. Lalit Jain had no clue about the abductor. The story narrated in the fardbeyan is based on the actual events happening in the last four hours after Dr. Lalit Jain had gone missing. Much has been said about delay in registration of the First Information Report, but we find that the delayed registration of the Report goes to show that the fardbeyan was recorded immediately after the occurrence and it was not ante-dated. The reason is that the First Information Report which was lodged the next day was still against unknown. There is no reason to believe that Dr. Lalit Jain cooked up a story of his own abduction for some other reason, may be personal reason. In his evidence he has stated that a car bearing a registration number from West Bengal was parked at about hundred feet from his house. The investigating officer has stated that the appellants came at Gandhi Maidan in a 'Accent' car and a motorcycle. The 'Accent' car has a registration number of West Bengal bearing registration no. WB02R-4098 and the seized motorcycle was of the same description that PW-2 has given; bearing Registration No. JH01T-9019. This is the motorcycle on which PW-2 was brought near his house and released by the abductors. PW-3, the taxi driver who had lent the car to Md. Noor has turned hostile but he has described the story of kidnapping in his statement under section 164 CrPC. This is the motorcycle on which PW-2 was brought near his house and released by the abductors. PW-3, the taxi driver who had lent the car to Md. Noor has turned hostile but he has described the story of kidnapping in his statement under section 164 CrPC. His statement under section 164 CrPC was recorded on 14.03.2011, that is after the appellants were arrested, but then, everything cannot be just fake and fabricated. The car used by the appellants belongs to him and there is no challenge by the defense to this fact. The seized articles in the Arms Act were not produced during the trial of this case and the effect of that may be that there was no material on record to establish ownership of the seized car, but the fact remains that it does not belong to the appellants. In his statement under section 164 CrPC which of course is not substantive evidence, PW-3 has narrated the story of abduction of Dr. Lalit Jain and for a limited purpose to seek assurance the Court can refer to his statement. We see that his statement under section 164 CrPC gives a similar narration of abduction of Dr. Lalit Jain for ransom as the prosecution story goes. The appellants had adopted a novel method for demanding ransom. They were making calls from the mobile phone of PW-2 and after their arrest a Sim-card of Mobile No.9955500606 which belongs to PW-2 was recovered from their possession. They had gathered at Gandhi Maidan carrying arms and on seeing the police party they tried to flee away. The circumstance that they started fleeing away if looked at in isolation may not have much significance, but in a case like the present one this is definitely a connecting link in the chain of circumstances. 15. The mistakes committed by the investigating officer has been labeled as biased investigation and the learned counsels for the appellants would urge that delay in registration of the First Information Report and further delay of two days in sending a copy of the Report to the court are suggesting that the fardbeyan was ante-dated. 15. The mistakes committed by the investigating officer has been labeled as biased investigation and the learned counsels for the appellants would urge that delay in registration of the First Information Report and further delay of two days in sending a copy of the Report to the court are suggesting that the fardbeyan was ante-dated. We do not find any substance in these submissions and nothing more is required to be stated except that absence of call details, call location and failure of the investigating officer to verify the place where PW-2 was detained or to examine independent witnesses would fade away in the face of clear, cogent and convincing evidence tendered by PW-2. This is also not correct to say that if the police party had gone to Gandhi Maidan in connection to the present case a second case under the Arms Act is an after-thought. We would indicate that an offence under the Arms Act is a distinct offence and registration of a separate case has not prejudiced the accused, 16. The testimony of a victim of crime who gives evidence on voir dire must be accepted more than sufficient to establish identity of the abductor provided no inherent improbability is shown in his evidence. Another ground can be that the accused is able to demonstrate that there is sufficient material to draw an inference on his false implication. In the present case, nothing of that kind has been shown and we have no hesitation to hold that Dr. Lalit Jain has identified the appellants in the Court and identity of the appellants as the abductors of Dr. Lalit Jain for extracting ransom is fully established by the prosecution. 17. The essential ingredients for constituting an offence under section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code are: (i) the accused kidnaps or abducts or keeps the victim in detention after kidnapping or abduction; (ii) threatens to cause death or hurt or causes apprehension of death or hurt or actually causes hurt or death; and (iii) the kidnapping, abduction or detention and the threats of death or hurt, apprehension of such death or hurt or actual death or hurt is caused to coerce the person concerned or someone else to do some thing or to forbear from doing something or to pay ransom. Section 383 of the Indian Penal Code defines "extortion" to mean intentionally putting any person in fear of any injury or to any other and thereby dishonestly induces the person to deliver any property or valuable security. PW-2 was abducted, wrongfully confined and put under fear of death or grievous hurt by the appellants to pay Twenty lakh rupees. The appellants were acting in concert, they came together and abducted PW-2. Some were guarding him and others were keeping a watch over the activity in his house. In “Malleshi v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 8 SCC 95 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that: "Ultimately the question to be decided is "what was the intention?". The intention of the appellants was quite clear. They abducted Dr. Lalit Jain for ransom but their first foray into the crime world did not succeed. 18. The cryptic examination of the appellants under section 313 CrPC has provided an opportunity to them to attack the judgment of conviction. In course of hearing we put specific questions to the learned counsels for the appellants that if at all the Court finds that prejudice has been caused to the appellants whether that alone can be a ground for acquittal or a mitigating circumstance to impose lesser punishment - in this case lesser punishment has been awarded. Again at the time when the judgment was reserved we gave liberty to the learned counsels to file written submissions. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel has referred to the decisions in Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand, (2020) SCC online SC 779, and Asraf Ali v. State of Assam (2008) 16 SCC 328 in the written submission to submit that if the incident dated 13.03.2011 is excluded from consideration there remains no evidence against the appellants. This argument does not even call for a consideration and is rejected by simply saying that arrest of the appellants and registration of a case under the Arms Act are just two tiny pieces of corroborative evidence and conviction of the appellants under section 364-A IPC is based on overwhelming independent evidence laid by the prosecution in this case. 19. The very idea of kidnapping rich people or their children for extracting ransom is abhorrent and a threat to the peace and tranquility in the society. 19. The very idea of kidnapping rich people or their children for extracting ransom is abhorrent and a threat to the peace and tranquility in the society. In its 42nd Report submitted in the year 1971 the Law Commission of India made a recommendation for making kidnapping or abduction for ransom an aggravated form of the offence of kidnapping for ransom which was punishable with rigorous imprisonment up to 14 years and fine. In the wake of international hostage crises the expression "any other person" was substituted by the expression "any foreign State or international inter-governmental organization or any other person” in section 364-A of the Indian Penal and after the aforesaid amendment any doubt on prosecution of a private person for the offence of kidnapping/abduction for ransom' has been removed. The concern shown by the Parliament in dealing with the offence of kidnapping for ransom is reflected in providing a deterrent punishment under section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code, even in a case where the kidnapping has not resulted in the death of the victim. The mercury is rising on the crime-graph and there is a growing tendency amongst the youth to earn quick buck. The Courts have a role to play in maintaining peace, prosperity and harmony in the society. If on purely technical points without looking at the cascading effect it may have acquittal is recorded that would be the end of the world for the victims. In Vikram Singh v. Union of India (2015) 9 SCC 502 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the instances of kidnapping for ransom must be dealt with in the harshest possible manner and an obligation rests on the Courts as well. The discussion on the effect of cryptic examination of the accused under section 313 CrPC must end with a reminder to ourselves what the Hon'ble Supreme Court has said in "Vikram Singh". 20. Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is founded on the principle that every individual has an inherent right to defend himself. In early days a prisoner was protected from questioning during the trial and only after the defense evidence was closed a prisoner was asked if he had to say anything but at the same time he was also warned that whatever he says will be taken down and may be given in evidence in the trial. In early days a prisoner was protected from questioning during the trial and only after the defense evidence was closed a prisoner was asked if he had to say anything but at the same time he was also warned that whatever he says will be taken down and may be given in evidence in the trial. After the introduction of inquisitorial trial the accused was subjected to searching examination during the trial, but, soon vices of inquisition were realized and Criminal evidence Act, 1898 was enacted in England. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1861 introduced in India contained some scope of inquisition during the examination of the accused and finally the provisions relating to examination of the accused were codified under section 342. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has reproduced section 342 of the old Code except the provision relating to drawing of adverse inference against the accused if he refuses to answer the question or gives a false answer. The provisions under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are imperative in nature. Though section 313 provides that the Court should question an accused generally on the case", in Dwarkanath Varma v. King Emperor AIR 1933 PC 124 the Privy Council has held that a question of general nature would not serve the purpose of section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (old Code). Tara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1951 SC 441 has held that the accused should be given opportunity to explain each and every material circumstance which are intended to be used against him and that a composite question is likely to mislead him. Then came Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 76 which has held that it is not sufficient compliance with section to generally ask the accused that "having heard the prosecution evidence what he has to say about it?". About the same time the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if an incriminating circumstance was not put to the accused when he was examined under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure then that circumstance should be excluded from consideration for recording conviction of the accused (refer, Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of MB, AIR 1953 SC 468 ). In course of time another view that failure to bring every inculpatory circumstance to the notice of the accused for his explanation may not invalidate the trial (refer, Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622 ) gained foothold and became an integral part of the criminal justice delivery system in India. The correct position in law appears to be that essentially examination of an accused under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a matter of choice for the Court and the principles of natural justice and fair trial require that every incriminating circumstance appearing against the accused in the prosecution evidence should be put to him to afford an opportunity to him to offer an explanation, but any failure to do so would not ipso facto result in acquittal of the accused. The accused is required to take a plea of prejudice, substantial prejudice, and demonstrate from the prosecution evidence how he has been prejudiced by not attracting his attention to a piece of evidence and that failure to afford an opportunity to him to explain the incriminating evidence has resulted in failure of justice. Where the trial is conducted otherwise in a fair manner, the charge was spelt out clearly to the accused, evidence is taken in his presence and the witnesses were cross-examined as the defense wanted to do, a ground of violation of the principles of fair trial that the inculpatory materials were not brought separately to the notice of the accused would not avail any benefit to the accused. After all, the very purpose of a trial is to find the guilty and punish him. A cryptic examination of the accused under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by putting "one liner" question, such as, "have you seen the prosecution evidence which says that on such and such date you have committed murder of X by gunshot" cannot be appreciated, but, in the end we would say that except in very exceptional cases this situation would at best be a point for consideration on the question of sentence, where the court has discretion. 21. In the final analysis, we hold that no prejudice was caused to the appellants during the trial and the charge under section 364-A IPC has been proved beyond reasonable doubts. 22. 21. In the final analysis, we hold that no prejudice was caused to the appellants during the trial and the charge under section 364-A IPC has been proved beyond reasonable doubts. 22. In the result, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.882 of 2012, Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.1035 of 2012, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 798 of 2014 and Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 941 of 2012 are dismissed. 23. The appellants shall serve the remaining sentence awarded to them in Sessions Trial Case No.556 of 2011. 24. Let a copy of the judgment be transmitted to the Court concerned and the concerned jail superintendent through 'Fax'. 25. Let the lower-court records be sent to the Court concerned forthwith. Ratnaker Bhengra, J. - I agree Appeals dismissed.