ORDER : 1. With the consent of the parties, hearing of the matter has been done through video conferencing and there is no complaint whatsoever regarding audio and visual quality. 2. The instant intra-Court appeal is directed against the order/judgment dated 14.02.2018 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (C) No. 6303 of 2003 whereby and whereunder the writ petition has been dismissed as the learned Single Judge has declined to interfere with the order dated 12.12.1998 passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Palamau in L.C. Case No. 14/1991-92 whereby the claim of pre-emption made by the Respondent No. 5 under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (Hereinafter to be referred as “the Act of 1961”) has been allowed, the order dated 26.11.2002 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau in L.C. Appeal No. 15/78/98-99 as also the order dated 11.10.2003 passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand in Board Case No. 55 of 2002. 3. The brief facts of the case which need to be enumerated herein, read as under:- The petitioner before the Writ Court, namely Radhika Devi, is the purchaser of the property being Plot No. 557 under Khata No. 285 measuring an area of 0.21 acres of Village Turuk-Taleya Purubdiha, P.S. Chainpur, District-Palamau from the respondent no. 6 by virtue of registered sale-deed no. 6553 dated 04.07.1991. The respondent no. 5 claiming herself to be adjoining Raiyat of the said cultivated land filed an application under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 before the Land Reform Deputy Collector, Palamau claiming her right of pre-emption which was registered as L.C. Case No. 14/91-92. The writ petitioner filed her response to the said application for pre-emption filed by respondent no. 5 before the original authority taking point that the property in question is homestead land and further that a portion of the property was gifted to her daughter by virtue of registered gift-deed dated 30.08.1991. According to the writ petitioner, the formalities in connection with the gift, including handing over the possession of the property to the daughter took place prior to the filing of application under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 but was registered on 30.08.1991 i.e. after filing of the application for pre-emption by the respondent no. 5. According to the writ petitioner, the formalities in connection with the gift, including handing over the possession of the property to the daughter took place prior to the filing of application under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 but was registered on 30.08.1991 i.e. after filing of the application for pre-emption by the respondent no. 5. The said application was rejected by Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Palamau by order dated 02.01.1992 passed in L.C. Case No. 14/91-92 against which, the appeal was filed before the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau, registered as Land Ceiling Appeal Case No. 15/10/92-93, which was also dismissed vide order dated 24.09.1993. Against the appellate order, the respondent no. 5 filed a revision case before the Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar at Patna which was registered as Revision Case No. 484 of 1993 wherein vide order dated 26.12.1996 the order passed by the lower authority was quashed and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration by recording a finding that the gift-deed involved in this case would be governed by the doctrine of lis pendens and accordingly, the said gift-deed could not thwart pre-emption. Further the Member, Board of Revenue also recorded that there is no finding in connection with the fact that whether the pre-emptor was an adjoining Raiyat or not. An issue was raised on behalf of the writ petitioner that the order dated 26.12.1996 did not prevent the authorities below to enter into the dispute as to whether the gift-deed would be governed by the doctrine of lis pendens or not and it was open to them to contend that the provision of Section 16 would not apply to the gift-deeds at all. So far as the point regarding the adjoining Raiyat is concerned, submission has been advanced that pursuant to the order of remand dated 26.12.1996 passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, the matter was examined afresh by the authorities below and the original authority i.e. Land Reforms Deputy Collector vide fresh order dated 12.12.1998, has decided the issues in favour of the pre-emptor, however, by recording a finding that the pre-emptor is the adjoining Raiyat. So far as the gift-deed is concerned, the said authority has refused to enter into the dispute in view of the categorical finding in earlier Revision Case No. 484 of 1993. So far as the gift-deed is concerned, the said authority has refused to enter into the dispute in view of the categorical finding in earlier Revision Case No. 484 of 1993. So far as the claim that the land in question is homestead land and accordingly Section 16(3) of the aforesaid Act would not apply is concerned, the aforesaid plea was rejected. Against the aforesaid order, an appeal was filed which was also rejected vide order dated 26.11.2002 wherein the non-applicability of the provisions to the homestead land was rejected and on the point of gift-deed the said authority refused to entertain the plea. Against the order passed by the appellate authority, the writ petitioner filed revision being Revision Case No. 55 of 2002 which was also dismissed vide order dated 11.10.2003. The order passed by the revisional authority dated 11.10.2003 in Revision Case No. 55 of 2002 was assailed before the writ court inter-alia on the ground that in refusing to enter into the merits so far as the plea regarding gift-deed is concerned, on the ground that the earlier revisional order passed in Revision Case No. 484 of 1993 has already decided the issue but the aforesaid finding is absolutely incorrect in view of the fact that the applicability of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act to the gift is concerned, was still open for consideration and having not considered the same, gross illegality has been committed. Further submission has been made before the writ court regarding homestead land which has also wrongly been decided by the revisional authority. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has relied upon a judgment reported in 1985 PLJR 662 in the case of Smt. Priyambada Devi vs. The Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna and Others to submit that Section 16(3) of the Act does not apply to gift-deed. Further reliance has been placed upon the judgment passed by this Court on 31.10.2014 in C.W.J.C. No. 72 of 1999(R) with C.W.J.C. No. 74 of 1999(R) by referring to para-5 of the said judgment which refers to the judgment reported in 1985 PLJR 662 . Further reliance has been placed upon the judgment passed by this Court on 31.10.2014 in C.W.J.C. No. 72 of 1999(R) with C.W.J.C. No. 74 of 1999(R) by referring to para-5 of the said judgment which refers to the judgment reported in 1985 PLJR 662 . On the point of claim of the property being homestead land, submission has been made on behalf of the petitioner that by virtue of specific amendment in Section 4 of the Act of 1961, reference to homestead was deleted vide amendment carried out in the year, 1973 and accordingly, when Section 4 is to be read with Section 3 then it can be construed that Section 16(3) of the Act will not be applicable to homestead land. While on the other hand, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 5 has defended the order passed by the authorities by raising an issue that the gift deed having been executed only on 30.08.1991 by way of registered document and the application for pre-emption having been filed on 21.08.1991 the doctrine of lis pendens will apply and no transfer of immovable property can be acknowledged unless it is done so by a registered document. It has further been submitted that by recording the finding to the effect that any alleged oral gift of a date prior to filing of pre-emption has no standing in the eyes of law. A document transferred into writing after the date of filing of a pre-emption is hit by doctrine of lis pendens under the Transfer of Property Act and such alleged gift would not cover pre-emption. It has further been submitted that the finding to the effect that principle of lis pendens was not challenged by the writ petitioner and as such it was not open to the authorities to enter into the issue as to whether the application under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 was maintainable due to the alleged gift and accordingly, the authorities below have rightly not entered into the above issue. So far as the issue regarding adjoining Raiyat is concerned, the original authority after remand as well as the appellate authority after remand, have given categorical finding that the respondent no. 5 was the adjoining Raiyat and from the order dated 11.10.2003 passed by the Member, Board of Revenue it appears that the same was not an issue before the revisional court. 5 was the adjoining Raiyat and from the order dated 11.10.2003 passed by the Member, Board of Revenue it appears that the same was not an issue before the revisional court. So far as the applicability of the provision of section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 is concerned, it was submitted on behalf of respondent no. 5 that the issue is covered by the Judgment passed by this Court in the case of Saikun Bibi vs. State of Jharkhand, 2005 (4) JLJR 3 wherein the definition of “land” has been considered and has been held that land includes “homestead” property also. The writ court, after taking into consideration the aforesaid rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, has come to a conclusive finding to the effect that the writ petitioner has failed to make out a case and accordingly the writ petition was dismissed. The aforesaid order is the subject matter of the instant intra-court appeal. 4. The appellant has raised the ground that save and except a gift deed made subsequent to the transfer is declared sham and farzi, the same is valid transaction and in view of the subsequent transaction the pre-emption application cannot be allowed but this legal position has not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge. Further, the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the previous order passed in revision as well as the present order has merged with each other, making it one order to decide all the issues and contrary view taken by the learned Single Judge is wholly unjust and unsustainable in the eye of law. The learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that doctrine of lis pendens is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case as the actual gift deed was given prior to filing of the pre-emption case which has specifically been pleaded by the appellant and not denied by the respondent. The learned Single Judge has wrongly applied the ratio as laid down in 1985 PLJR 662 as well as 2005(4) JLJR 3 while considering the issue of gift and adjacency and came to an erroneous finding which is not sustainable in the eye of law. 5. This Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the writ petitioner/appellant, had issued notice upon Respondent Nos. 5. This Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the writ petitioner/appellant, had issued notice upon Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7, as would appear from the order dated 18.01.2020 (Order No. 06) in pursuance thereof, notice was served upon Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 as per the service report kept at Flag ‘B’ of the paper book. The Respondent No. 5 appeared through vakalatnama and has been represented by learned counsel Mr. K.K.Ambastha. 6. This Court has proceeded to hear the matter on merit with the consent of the parties and after taking into consideration the fact that the notice has duly been served upon Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7. The Respondent No. 5 has appeared through vakalatnama but Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 have chosen not to appear. 7. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan Tiwary, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner/appellant has submitted by showing infirmity in the impugned order to the effect that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the applicability of provision of Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 with respect to the land which has been gifted prior to filing of the application under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961. He has further raised an issue that the learned Single Judge has endorsed/approved the finding recorded about the principle of lis pendens but in the facts and circumstances of this case, the principle of lis pendens will not be applicable as because the application under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 has been filed after the gift deed dated 29.07.1991. The application under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 has been filed on 21.08.1991 for a land which was gifted in favour of her daughter vide gift deed No. 9501 dated 29.07.1991, however, the aforesaid gift document was registered on 30.08.1991 but it is settled position of law that the registration of a document will go back to the date of execution of the document and, therefore, though the gift document dated 29.07.1991 was registered on 30.08.1991, it will go back to the date of execution of the gift deed i.e. 29.07.1991 and hence the application of pre-emption since has been filed on 21.08.1991, as per the provision of Section 16(1) of the Act of 1961 the pre-emption application will not be maintainable under the provision of Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 and in that view of the matter the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eye of law. 8. Mr. K.K. Ambastha, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 5 has vehemently argued by defending the order passed by the revenue authorities as also the learned Single Judge on the ground that there is a concurrent finding of the original authority which has been approved by the learned Single Judge and hence the same may not be interfered with. He further submits that there is no error in the impugned order and the learned Single Judge, by taking into consideration all factual aspects, has rightly not interfered with the impugned orders. It has further been submitted that the principle of lis pendens has rightly been considered in the facts and circumstances of the instant case by taking into consideration the date of application filed under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 i.e. on 21.08.1991 which is prior to the date of registration i.e. 30.08.1991 and hence the application under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 will well be maintainable. 9. This Court, after having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, deems it fit and proper to refer certain admitted facts before further proceeding with respect to scrutinizing the legality and propriety of the impugned orders. 9. This Court, after having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, deems it fit and proper to refer certain admitted facts before further proceeding with respect to scrutinizing the legality and propriety of the impugned orders. Admittedly, the writ petitioner, namely Smt. Radhika Devi, had purchased the property in question by virtue of registered sale letter being Registered Sale Letter No. 6553 dated 04.07.1991. One application was filed by Smt. Vadwanti Devi under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 on 21.08.1991. The said Smt. Radhika Devi, the appellant herein, has gifted 0.11 acre of the aforesaid land out of 0.21 acre, in favour of her daughter namely, Smt. Parmila Devi, by virtue of gift document No. 9501 dated 29.07.1991 which was registered on 30.08.1991. It was the contention of the opposite party namely, Smt. Vadwanti Devi, that since Smt. Radhika Devi, the writ petitioner, has gifted the property to the extent of 0.11 acre of land in favour of her daughter on 30.08.1991 while the application under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 was filed on 21.08.1991 and as such, the aforesaid gift is to be treated as Sham and Farzi which cannot be given any recognition and since the opposite party Smt. Vadwanti Devi is adjoining and adjacent Raiyat and, therefore, the application filed under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 is to be allowed. On the basis of the aforesaid fact the revenue authorities have come to a finding about the principle of lis pendens and in that view of the matter, the application filed under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 has been allowed. 10. The question which is to be considered by this Court is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of this case the principle of lis pendese will be applicable and further the provision of Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 would be applicable in a case of land which has already been gifted by the land-holder in favour of her daughter. Both the issues since are interlinked, both are to be answered simultaneously. 11. Before answering the aforesaid issues, the provision of Section 16 of the Act of 1961 is required to be referred, which reads as under:- 16. Restriction on future acquisition by transfer, etc. Both the issues since are interlinked, both are to be answered simultaneously. 11. Before answering the aforesaid issues, the provision of Section 16 of the Act of 1961 is required to be referred, which reads as under:- 16. Restriction on future acquisition by transfer, etc. - (1) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, either by himself or through any other person, acquire or possess by transfer, exchange, lease, mortgage, agreement or settlement any land which together with the land, if any, already held by him exceeds in the aggregate the ceiling area. Explanation - For the purpose of this Section “Transfer” does not include inheritance, bequest or gift. (2) (i) After the commencement of this Act, no document incorporating any transaction for acquisition or possession of any land by way of transfer, exchange, lease, mortgage, agreement or settlement shall be registered, unless a declaration in writing duly verified is made and filed by the transferee before the registering authority under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908), as to the total area of land held by himself or through any other person anywhere in the State. (ii) No such registering authority shall register any document evidencing any transaction if, from the declaration made under clause (i), it appears that the transaction has been effected in contravention of the provision of sub-section (1). (iii) No land shall be transferred, exchanged, leased, mortgaged, bequeathed or gifted without a document registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908). Explanation - Nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to have any effect on the provisions of the tenancy law of the area relating to transfer, exchange, lease, mortgage, agreement or settlement. Explanation - Nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to have any effect on the provisions of the tenancy law of the area relating to transfer, exchange, lease, mortgage, agreement or settlement. (3) (i) When any transfer of land is made after the commencement of the Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document, of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed: Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to ten percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the said period. (ii) On such deposit being made the co-sharer or the raiyat shall be entitled to be put in possession of the land irrespective of the fact that the application under clause (i) is pending for decision: Provided that where the application is rejected, the co-sharer or the raiyat, as the case may be, shall be evicted from the land and possession there of shall be restored to the transferee and the transferee shall be entitled to be paid a sum equal to ten per cent of the purchase money out of the deposit made under clause (i). (iii) If the application is allowed, the Collector shall by an order direct the transferee to convey the land in favour of the applicant by executing and registering a document of transfer within a period to be specified in the order and, if he neglects or refuses to comply with the direction, the procedure prescribed in Order 21, Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), shall be, so far as may be, followed. It is evident from the provision of Section 16 of the Act of 1961 that no person shall, after the commencement of this Act, either by himself or through any other person, acquire or possess by transfer, exchange, lease, mortgage, agreement or settlement any land which together with the land, if any, already held by him exceeds in the aggregate the ceiling area. As per the explanation contained therein, it stipulates that for the purpose of this Section “Transfer” does not include inheritance, bequest or gift. Sub-section (3) of Section 16 provides that when any transfer of land is made after the commencement of the Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document, of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed meaning thereby, the transfer of land is first to be made in favour of the adjoining and adjacent raiyat or the co-sharer and if not made, the co-sharer or raiyat of the adjoining land shall have a right to make an application within three months of the date of registration for transfer of the aforesaid land. Therefore, the word “Transfer” is of paramount consideration, as would appear from the explanation as contained in Section 16(1) that “Transfer” does not include inheritance, bequest or gift, meaning thereby, if the transfer has been made by way of inheritance or bequest or gift, the provision of Section 16 will not be applicable. As would appear from the facts of this case that the part of the land in question i.e. to the extent of 0.11 acre has been gifted by original title holder namely Smt. Radhika Devi on 29.07.1991 in favour of her daughter namely Smt. Parmila Devi, meaning thereby, the gift deed was executed on 29.07.1991, registration of the aforesaid document is dated 30.08.1991. The application under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 was filed by the respondent No. 5 on 21.08.1991 basis upon which it has been claimed that the said application has been made prior to the date of registration and after the date of execution of the gift deed i.e. on 29.07.1991, therefore, as per the principle of lis pendens, the aforesaid registration dated 30.08.1991 have got no value in the eye of law. 12. 12. This Court has examined the aforesaid issue by taking into consideration the effect of execution of gift deed vis-a-vis the deed of registration for which the provision of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 has been considered which reads as under:- 47. Time from which registered document operates - A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of registration. Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 therefore provides that a registered document shall operate from the time it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration. The scope of Section 47 of the Registration Act was the subject matter of consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in Hiralal Agrawal vs. Rampadarath Singh and Others, AIR 1969 SC 244 and the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated the position of law that sale would become complete only when the registration of the sale deed takes place and not before. Thus, by virtue of Section 47 of the Registration Act, it would relate back to the date of execution, however, by registration of the document transferring the immovable property, the transfer would become complete though it may have effect from a date anterior to the date of registration. Reference in this regard may also be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Principal Secretary, Government of Karnataka and Another vs. Ragini Narayan and Another, (2016) 10 SCC 424 wherein it has been held that the document registered on a subsequent date, operates from the date of execution, not from the date of registration. In another judgment rendered in the case of Gurbax Singh vs. Kartar Singh and Others, (2002) 2 SCC 611 , the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph 3 has held that in view of the provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 it is well settled that a document on subsequent registration will take effect from the time when it was executed and not from the time of its registration. 13. 13. The applicability of the provision of Section 16 of the Act of 1961 in the facts of this case would be there if the gift deed dated 29.07.1991 will be declared to be Sham and Farzi but the said gift deed having been executed on 29.07.1991 which is prior to the application filed under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 i.e. 21.08.1991, the said gift deed cannot be said to be sham and farzi as because the law is well settled that in absence of categorical finding or evidence that the gift deed executed on the date of pre-emption cannot be held to be a farzi or sham document. If the private respondents have failed to establish the above facts, no presumption can go into the said transaction merely because they coincided. In the case of Smt. Priyambada Devi vs. The Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna and Others, 1985 PLJR 662 , a Division Bench of the Patna High Court has held that the deed of gift executed before filing of pre-emption application but registered during the pendency of the application is excluded from the purview of pre-emption. Such a transaction can be hit by the provision of Section 16(3) of the Act only if there is an allegation of sham and farzi transaction and the authorities find the allegation true. In Raja Ram Singh vs. State of Bihar and Others, 1985 BBCJ 458 , it has been held that right of pre-emption is a very weak right and the pre-emptor is required to follow each and every mandate of law. Failure of impleading the transferor in an application for pre-emption must be fatal to its maintainability and, as such, an application has to be dismissed at the initial stage itself. In Gokul Mahto vs. State Bank of Bihar and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 11 it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that gifts are excluded from the purview of Section 16(3) of the Act. In Gokul Mahto vs. State Bank of Bihar and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 11 it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that gifts are excluded from the purview of Section 16(3) of the Act. Herein, admittedly the application under the provision of Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 was filed on 21.08.1991 for a property which has been gifted by way of gift on 29.07.1991, however the same was registered on 30.08.1991 but as per the provision of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, the date of registration will not have paramount importance, rather the date of registration of a document will go back to the date of execution of the sale. The date of registration is 30.08.1991 of the execution of sale dated 29.07.1991 and hence, applying the provision of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, the registration of gift deed will go back to the date of its execution i.e. 29.07.1991 and, therefore, the application under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 having been filed on 21.08.1991 of a gifted landed property, in view of the provision of Section 16(1) the gifted landed property would not come under the fold of definition of “Transfer” and as such, the provision of Section 16(3) will not be applicable and in that view of the matter, the principle of lis pendens as has been concluded by the revenue authorities which has been approved by the learned Single Judge, cannot be said to have any legal force. The further fact which is admitted that the pre-emption application filed under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 is with respect to an area of 0.21 acre as would appear from the original application as has been appended as Annexure-2 to the memo of appeal but the position of law herein is clear that the pre-emption application if filed, the same is to be filed with respect to the entire land, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Ram Chandra Srivastava and Others vs. Parsidh Narain Singh and Others, AIR 1971 Patna 302 wherein it has been held that the person claiming pre-emption must claim the right of reconveyance with respect to whole of the property to which it relates or to none at all. Herein, as has been expressed by us, out of the total area of 0.21 acre, an area of 0.11 acre has already been gifted by the writ petitioner in favour of her daughter which cannot come under the provision of Section 16(3) since the gifted landed property will not come under the fold of “Transfer” and, therefore, in that view of the matter also the application filed by the respondent No. 5 under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 cannot be held to be maintainable. The further admitted fact as has been held by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Abdullah Mian vs. Jodha Raut and Others, 1977 PLJR 371 wherein it has been held that if the applicant claiming pre-emption did not implead the subsequent transferee from the original transferee, although the fact of such transfer was known to him, such an omission is fatal, as the subsequent transferee had acquired a status by the aforesaid transfer. Herein also, the daughter of the writ petitioner has not been impleaded as party even though out of 0.21 acre of land, 0.11 acre of land has already been gifted in favour of her daughter. Same view has been reiterated by another Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of Kuteshwar Choubey vs. State of Bihar and Others, 1979 BBCJ 121 wherein it has been held that if the transferee transferred the land to another person before filing of the petition under Section 16(3) of the Act and, if the subsequent purchaser is not impleaded as a party to the proceeding, the pre-emption application cannot be allowed. Further, the Patna High Court in the case of Raju Kumar Prasad and Another vs. The Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna and Others, 1985 PLJR 215 has held as follows:- “9. In the case of Ramchandra Yadav vs. Anutha Yadav and Others, 1971 BLJR 994, this Court considered three situations of subsequent transfers by a purchaser, namely, (1) second purchaser taking a document executed and registered before the filing of the application. In such a case the second transferee gets a good title to the property and there is no question of his right being defeated by a subsequent application for pre-emption; (2) second sale deed being executed and registered after the filing of the application for pre-emption. In such a case the second transferee gets a good title to the property and there is no question of his right being defeated by a subsequent application for pre-emption; (2) second sale deed being executed and registered after the filing of the application for pre-emption. In such a case the second transfer is clearly hit by the doctrine of lis-pendense; and (3) document of sale being executed before the filing of the application for pre-emption, but registered after its filing. In such a case also the application for pre-emption would fail on account of the fact of registration of the document dating back to the date of execution of the deed.” The decision of the Patna High Court rendered in the case of Sushil Kumar Choudhary and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others, 1997 (1) PLJR 857 wherein the facts were to the effect that against the pre-emption application filed under Section 16(3) of the act, the purchasers took a stand that the lands were already transferred by way of gift and pre-emption was not maintainable because the donee was not made a party to the pre- emption proceeding. No step was taken by the pre-emptor to implead the donee before the original authority. However, he was impleaded for the first time before the revisional court. The Board of Revenue upheld the claims of pre-emption on the ground that the subsequent gift deed was farzi and fraudulent and was intended to frustrate the claims of pre-emption. The Court, however, held that the claim of pre-emption was not maintainable because the second transferee/donee was not impleaded before the Court of first instance even though the fact of second transfer/gift had come to light from the show cause filed by the vendors. 14. It is not in dispute that the transfer or gift, if found farzi then only the applicability of Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 would come but merely by raising such an issue without leading evidence to that effect and without impleading the donee, the same will not be sufficient for making applicability of provision of Section 16(3). In the case of Raju Kumar Prasad and Another vs. The Addl. In the case of Raju Kumar Prasad and Another vs. The Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna and Others (Supra) it has been held that right of pre-emption is a very weak right and the pre-emptor must make out a full proof case in order to succeed whereas such weak and tenuous claim of pre-emption can be legitimately affected and defeated by a bona fide transaction of gift prior to application. If the document of second sale being executed before filing of the application for pre-emption, but was registered after its filing, in that case also, right of pre-emption gets defeated by the subsequent transaction. Of course, it would be a case when the authorities have not declared subsequent transfer as sham and farzi. But in a decision rendered in Chandradip Singh and Another vs. The Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna and Others, AIR 1978 Patna 148, the Division Bench of the Patna High Court has held that in a case of allegation of fraudulent transfer by the pre-emptor, the onus would lie upon him to prove it. The fraud has to be pleaded and proved. For proving the fraud, the first court will have to investigate into the matter. For investigating into the matter, the primary requirement would be of impleading the subsequent transferees as parties since such declaration would definitely affect their rights, omission of which has since been held to be fatal for claim of pre-emption. 15. On the basis of the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Patna High Court which is also applicable to this Court since the aforesaid judgments are prior to the date of bifurcation i.e. 15.11.2000 and taking into consideration its binding effect upon this Division Bench, this Court after scrutinizing the factual aspect on record, has found from the impugned orders passed by the revenue authorities that there is no declaration with respect to the aforesaid gift deed to be sham and farzi. In that view of the matter, applying the judgment rendered in the case of Smt. Priyambada Devi vs. The Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna and Others (Supra), this Court is of the considered view that the gift deed dated 29.07.1991 cannot be termed as sham and farzi. 16. In that view of the matter, applying the judgment rendered in the case of Smt. Priyambada Devi vs. The Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna and Others (Supra), this Court is of the considered view that the gift deed dated 29.07.1991 cannot be termed as sham and farzi. 16. This Court, on the basis of the discussions made hereinabove, is of the view that the principle of lis pendens will not come into play in the facts and circumstances of this case as the registration of the executed gift deed i.e. 30.08.1991 will go back to the date of execution of the deed i.e. 29.07.1991 and, therefore, in view of the fact that the gifted landed property will not come under the domain of definition of “Transfer”, the provision of Section 16(3) of the Act of 1961 will not be applicable. It is settled position of law that while exercising the power of writ of certiorari, the writ court is to consider the fact on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or perversity in the finding being its limited scope. At this juncture, it would be proper for this Court to refer the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan and Others, AIR 1964 477 SC, wherein at paragraph no. 7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows:- “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh and Another vs. State of Punjab and Others, (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos. 12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” It is evident from the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex court in the judgments as referred hereinabove, the writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. This Court, on the basis of the detailed discussion made hereinabove and applying the principle of writ of certiorari, is of the view that the revenue authorities as also the learned Single Judge has not considered the legal aspects as discussed hereinabove and therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from perversity hence requires interference. 17. Accordingly, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is quashed and set aside. 18. The instant appeal is allowed. 19. In consequence thereof, the writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 6303 of 2003 stands allowed and the orders impugned therein also stand quashed and set aside.