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2020 DIGILAW 1046 (KER)

Lissie Hospital, Represented by its Director v. Labour Court

2020-12-09

A.M.BADAR

body2020
JUDGMENT : A.M. BADAR, J.— Employer - Lissie Hospital, ie, party No. 2 to the Industrial Disputes, No. 8 of 2016, by this petition, is challenging the interim order dated 6/02/2019 passed by the learned Labour Court, Ernakulam, thereby rejecting the preliminary objection raised by the Employer regarding maintainability of the industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, apart from allowing the impleadment application filed by 17 workmen of the petitioner. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/employer/party No. 2 at sufficient length of time. The learned counsel argued that the appropriate Government ought not to have referred the alleged industrial dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court, Ernakulam as the first party to that dispute, namely Lissie Hospital Employees Union was defunct. The said trade union had not filed its return right from the year 1997 and as such was not competent to raise the industrial dispute. As the said Union had lost its capacity to raise industrial dispute way back in the year 1997, its application dated 16/11/2015, Ext. P10 was of no consequence and as such, ought not to have been considered by the appropriate Government for referring the industrial dispute for adjudication. It is further argued that the employer/party No. 1 had preferred an application under the Right To Information Act, so also the interim application for directing the party No. 2 - Union for producing necessary documents. The Union had admitted in its affidavit that there was no dispute under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Dispute Act and the matter falls under Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act as the workmen are seeking impleadment. This, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner/employer, demonstrates that the industrial dispute cannot be validly entertained by the learned Labour Court and as such, preliminary objection of the employer ought to have been upheld by the learned Labour Court. My attention was drawn to the exhibits to the petition, so also the impugned order at Ext.P1 to demonstrate that the learned Labour Court erred in rejecting the preliminary objection and in allowing the application for impleadment filed by the workmen. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner - employer on the judgment of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the matter of Duncans Industries Limited. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner - employer on the judgment of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the matter of Duncans Industries Limited. Kanpur v. Presiding Officer reported in 2010 LLR 403, Kerala State Co-operative Employees Front v. Chandramathi Amma reported in (1996) 1 KLT 540 , so also on Fibre Foam (P) Ltd. v. Kannan Nair reported in 1979 KLT 30 . 3. I have also heard the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 4. At the outset, it needs to mention that this Court is dealing with the matter falling under the Industrial Disputes Act and more particularly regarding reference of industrial dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court by the appropriate Government. Parameters for consideration in such matters by this Court are no longer res integra. It is now well settled that welfare statutes are required to be construed in favour of the subject for advancing remedy and for suppressing the mischief. This Court can interfere in this impugned order when such an order suffers from error on the point of law reflecting on record patently so as to warrant interference. This Court cannot act as a Court of appeal in dealing with challenge to the orders of the inferior Tribunal unless and until it is shown that such order results in grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law requiring intervention. 5. In the case in hand, respondents No. 3 to 18 claimed that they were workers of Lissie Hospital, ie, the petitioner herein. It cannot be disputed that the 2nd respondent Lissie Hospital Employees Union was the registered Trade Union operating in the field. The order at Ext.P7 passed on 02-06-2018 shows that registration of the 2nd respondent Union stands cancelled. Thus cancellation of registration of the 2nd respondent Union took place from 02/06/2018. The cause for the same was non-submission of yearly return after the year 1997. However, cancellation of registration operates prospectively from 02/06/2018 onwards. It cannot be retrospective and therefore, the acts committed by the 2nd respondent Union prior to cancellation of its registration cannot be termed as illegal or invalid. 6. The 2nd respondent Union while its registration was in vogue, made an application raising industrial dispute on 16/11/2015 (Ext.P10), which ultimately culminated in an order of reference of the industrial dispute dated 15/03/2016 (Ext.P11). 6. The 2nd respondent Union while its registration was in vogue, made an application raising industrial dispute on 16/11/2015 (Ext.P10), which ultimately culminated in an order of reference of the industrial dispute dated 15/03/2016 (Ext.P11). This makes it clear that even when the industrial dispute was referred to the Labour Court, Ernakulam by the appropriate Government on 15.03.2016, registration of the 2nd respondent Union was subsisting. It was cancelled subsequently on 02.06.2010 vide order at Ext.P7. Therefore, it cannot be said that the reference of the Industrial Dispute at the instance of the appropriate Government to the Labour Court was bad at its inception. In the matter of Duncans Industries Ltd. Kanpur (supra), there was objection to the reference of industrial dispute on the ground that Union was not holding membership of the concerned workers. Such is not the case at hand. It is not averred in the instant case that respondent No. 3 to 18 workmen were not the members of the 2nd respondent Union. Hence the judgments so cited had no application to the case in hand. 7. It is seen that during pendency of the industrial dispute, respondent No. 3 to 18 workmen had preferred an application for their impleadment as party to the industrial dispute regarding their dismissal. By the impugned order, the learned Labour Court, Ernakulam was pleased to allow that application. The learned Labour Court had taken aid of Section 2A(2) for allowing the said application. Needless to mention that by incorporation of Section 2A(2) in the ID Act, even an individual workman is permitted to raise his grievance in the matter of industrial dispute before the appropriate Court. The learned Labour Court while allowing the application for impleadment and rejecting the preliminary objection has held that the legislature intended to redress the grievances of individual workman in an industrial dispute notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10 of the ID Act. It cannot be said that by such observation, the learned Labour Court has committed any illegality while interpreting the welfare statute. In the matter of Kerala State Employees Cooperative Front (supra), this Court had observed that even there can be impleadment of parties to the industrial dispute in exercise of powers under Section 18 of the ID Act. Reliance on this citation by the learned Labour Court is certainly not misplaced. 8. In the matter of Kerala State Employees Cooperative Front (supra), this Court had observed that even there can be impleadment of parties to the industrial dispute in exercise of powers under Section 18 of the ID Act. Reliance on this citation by the learned Labour Court is certainly not misplaced. 8. In the matter of Fibre Foam (P) Ltd. (supra), the question which was for consideration was whether any workmen is entitled to receive from the employer, any money or benefit. Provisions of Section 33C(2) was under consideration in that matter. Such is not the case in hand. 9. In the light of foregoing discussion, I am unable to find any error of law committed by the learned Labour Court while passing the impugned order nor it can be said that the impugned order has resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. 10. In the result, the petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.