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2020 DIGILAW 1051 (JHR)

Suresh Kumar Singh v. Central Coalfields Limited

2020-11-05

SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

body2020
ORDER 1. Heard Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. A.K. Sahani & Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned counsel appearing in W.P.(S) No.6725 of 2017, Mr. A.K. Sahani, the learned counsel assisted by vice counsel Mr. Ajit Kumar in W.P.(S) No. 3229 of 2018, W.P.(S) No. 2448 of 2018 and W.P.(S) No.2804 of 2018 on behalf of the petitioner(s) and Mr. A. K. Das and Mr. V. K. Dubey, the learned counsels appearing in WP(S) No.6725 of 2017 and WP(S) No.2448 of 2018 on behalf of respondent-CCL, respectively, Mr. Rajesh Lala, the learned counsel for respondent-ECL and Mr. Abhay Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.4 in WP(S) No.2804 of 2018, and Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel appearing in WP(S) No.3229 of 2018 on behalf of respondent-CCL. 2. These writ petitions have been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent these matters have been heard. 3. In all these writ petitions, the common question of law and fact are involved and in that view of the matter, all these writ petitions have been heard together. 4. For correct appreciation of the cases, the facts of each case are enumerated hereinbelow: 5. In W.P.(S) No. 6725 of 2017; the petitioner by a registered-deed was adopted as son by late Rameshwar Singh. The said Rameshwar Singh was appointed on the post of Security Guard on 10.11.1973. The service excerpts has been brought on record by way of Annexure-2 of late Rameshwar Singh. In the month of October, 1988 late Rameshwar Singh opted for voluntary retirement offering employment to the petitioner as his adopted son. In the secondary school examination, the name of the petitioner is filled up in the year 1984. The petitioner passed matriculation examination in the year 1985. On these documents, on 03.05.1989, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Typing Trainee Category-I and he has been promoted to other posts. In the secondary school examination, the name of the petitioner is filled up in the year 1984. The petitioner passed matriculation examination in the year 1985. On these documents, on 03.05.1989, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Typing Trainee Category-I and he has been promoted to other posts. By letter dated 02.02.2017, a charge sheet was issued to the petitioner by the respondent no.4 on the allegation that the deed of adoption signed on 25.01.1985 and on that day he has already crossed the age of 15 years and in view of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act it was not in terms of the Act and on the ground of fraud the name of biological father is differing, the said show cause has been issued. Aggrieved with this, the petitioner has challenged the said show cause in this writ petition. 6. In W.P.(S) No. 2448 of 2018; the charge-sheet is also under challenge dated 31.07.2017. The only difference of the fact in this writ petition is that the adoption-deed is not there. The petitioner was appointed vide Annexure-1 pursuant to recommendation of the Committee. 7. In W.P.(S) No.2804 of 2018; the only difference of the fact in this case is that the petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground after his father Ram Krishna Goswami died in harness on 11.06.2012 and thereafter the suit was filed between the aggrieved parties being Title Suit No.64 of 2013 in which the right of pensionary benefits etc have been decreed in which the respondent-ECL had also appeared. Rest of the facts are similar. The respondent no.4 is the first wife of late Ram Krishna Goswami. 8. In W.P.(S) No. 3229 of 2018; in this case also the charge sheet dated 02.02.2017 has been challenged. The petitioner was appointed by letter dated 19.01.1993 vide Annexure-3. Annexure-1 is the adoption-deed. Charge sheet was issued on 02.02.2017. Three charges were there and one of the charge is with regard to Clause-10(b) of the Adoption Act on the ground that the petitioner was married and crossed the age for valid adoption provided in clause 10(iv) of the Act i.e. more than 15 years. 9. Mr. Annexure-1 is the adoption-deed. Charge sheet was issued on 02.02.2017. Three charges were there and one of the charge is with regard to Clause-10(b) of the Adoption Act on the ground that the petitioner was married and crossed the age for valid adoption provided in clause 10(iv) of the Act i.e. more than 15 years. 9. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in the respective matter advanced his argument and submits that the charge sheet has been issued against the petitioner is bad in law in view of the fact that there is no misconduct on the part of the petitioner. He further assailed the impugned charge sheet on the ground that the petitioner has already served for almost 32 years and the said charge sheet has been issued after 32 years. He submits that the adoption-deed is here and the petitioner is nephew of late Rameshwar Singh and at the time of adoption, he was below 15 years of age. In the deed of adoption, it is indicated that the adoption was made earlier, however, the deed was executed later on. He submits that there is no fraudulent act on behalf of the petitioner. In view of the scheme of the respondent-CCL, the petitioner was offered appointment on 03.05.1989 and after 32 years of service, the charge sheet in such a nature is not maintainable. To buttress his arguments, he relied in the case of "UCO Bank & Ors. v. Rajendra Shankar Shukla" reported in (2018) 4 Supreme 257 . Paragraph nos.12 and 13 of the said judgments are quoted hereinbelow: "12. We do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court. However, it is necessary for us to highlight a few facts which were brought to our notice during the course of submissions made by learned counsel. The first issue of concern is the enormous delay of about 7 years in issuing a charge sheet against Shukla. There is no explanation for this unexplained delay. It appears that some internal discussions were going on within the Bank but that it took the Bank 7 years to make up its mind is totally unreasonable and unacceptable. On this ground itself the charge sheet against Shukla is liable to be set aside due to the inordinate and unexplained delay in its issuance. 13. It appears that some internal discussions were going on within the Bank but that it took the Bank 7 years to make up its mind is totally unreasonable and unacceptable. On this ground itself the charge sheet against Shukla is liable to be set aside due to the inordinate and unexplained delay in its issuance. 13. What compounds the default on the part of the Bank is that Shukla was placed in a higher category as a Manager on 19th July, 1994 while all these discussions were going on in the Bank. He was also allowed to cross the efficiency bar on 12th August, 1996 again while the discussions were going on. Surely, if the Bank was serious about proceeding against Shukla for misconduct, they would not only have taken prompt action in issuing a charge sheet but would not have granted him the benefit of being placed in a higher category or crossing the efficiency bar" 10. By way of relying on this judgment, Mr. Sinha, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case has also come to the conclusion that if the benefit of promotion after efficiency bar has been provided to the petitioner, meaning thereby the misconduct was not there. He submits that in this case there was only 7 years delay in issuance of charge sheet and the Supreme Court has interfered. He further relied in the case of "Md. Zamil Ahmed v. The State of Bihar & Ors." reported in (2016) 3 Supreme 370 . Paragraph nos.19 and 22 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: "19. In the light of aforementioned reasons, which rightly persuaded the State to grant compassionate appointment to the appellant, we do not find any justification on the part of the State to dig out the appellant's case after 15 years of his appointment and terminate his services on the ground that as per the State policy, the appellant did not fall within the definition of the expression "dependent of deceased" to claim compassionate appointment. 22. In these circumstances, we are of the view that there was no justification on the part of the State to woke up after the lapse of 15 years and terminate the services of the appellant on such ground. 22. In these circumstances, we are of the view that there was no justification on the part of the State to woke up after the lapse of 15 years and terminate the services of the appellant on such ground. In any case, we are of the view that whether it was a conscious decision of the State to give appointment to the appellant as we have held above or a case of mistake on the part of the State in giving appointment to the appellant which now as per the State was contrary to the policy as held by the learned Single Judge, the State by their own conduct having condoned their lapse due to passage of time of 15 years, it was too late on the part of the State to have raised such ground for cancelling the appellant's appointment and terminating his services. It was more so because the appellant was not responsible for making any false declaration and nor he suppressed any material fact for securing the appointment. The State was, therefore, not entitled to take advantage of their own mistake if they felt it to be so. The position would have been different if the appellant had committed some kind of fraud or manipulation or suppression of material fact for securing the appointment. As mentioned above such was not the case of the State." 11. By way of relying on this judgment, Mr. Sinha the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the Supreme Court has interfered in this matter as the charge sheet was issued after 15 years of appointment. Mr. Sinha, the learned Senior counsel further relied in the case of "Ratanlal @ Babulal Chun Hal Samsuka v. Sunda ratal Govardhandas Samsuka (D.) Th. Lrs. & Ors." reported in 2018 (1) JBCJ 425 [S.C]. Paragraph nos. 14 and 17 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: "14. Custom evolves by conduct, and it is therefore a mistake to measure its validity solely by the element of express sanction accorded by courts of law. The characteristic of the great majority of customs is that they are essentially non-litigious in origin. They arise not from any conflict of rights adjusted, but from practices prompted by the convenience of society. A judicial decision recognizing a custom may be relevant, but these are not indispensable for its establishment. The characteristic of the great majority of customs is that they are essentially non-litigious in origin. They arise not from any conflict of rights adjusted, but from practices prompted by the convenience of society. A judicial decision recognizing a custom may be relevant, but these are not indispensable for its establishment. When a custom is to be proved by judicial notice, the relevant test would be to see if the custom has been acted upon by a court of superior or a coordinate jurisdiction in the same jurisdiction to the extent that justifies the court, which is asked to apply it, in assuming that the persons or the class of persons concerned in that area look upon the same as binding in relation to circumstances similar to those under consideration. In this case at hand there was no pleading or proof which could justify that the above standards were met. 17. It is very much evident that the appellant in this case has failed to produce any evidence to prove that such practice has attained the status of general custom prevalent among the concerned community. Custom, on which the appellant is relying, is a matter of proof and cannot be based on a priori reasoning or logical and analogical deductions, as sought to be canvassed by the appellant herein. Hence the issue is answered against the appellant. 12. By way of relying on this judgment, Mr. Sinha, the learned Senior counsel submits that adoption-deed can only be examined in the Civil Court and in a departmental proceeding, this aspect of the matter are not allowed to be considered. He further relied in the case of "Jai Singh v. Shakuntala" reported in AIR 2002 SC 1428 . Paragraph nos.11 and 13 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: "11. It is also on record that in the reply filed by the appellant in proceedings under S. 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code initiated by his wife, the appellant described himself as a son of his natural father as also the voters list prepared in the year 1984 - it has thus been stated that these two documents on the face of it militates against the proof of adoption. 13. The deed records that the parents of Jai Singh have given him in adoption to Sunda Ram in the month of March and he had taken him on his lap. 13. The deed records that the parents of Jai Singh have given him in adoption to Sunda Ram in the month of March and he had taken him on his lap. No specific ceremonies have been noted neither any evidence has been tendered pertaining to the adoption in March, 1973. It is on this deed that Mr. Ramchandran, the learned senior Advocate appearing for the respondent contended that the document even on the face of it does not justify any consideration by reason of the recording that 'the adopted son shall have the same rights as a natural son has' - this insertion of preservation of his right as a natural son is rather significant and ought to be read along with the Will dated 14th February, 1974 wherein it has been recorded that 'entire property will be inherited by the adopted son, Jai Singh and no one else shall have any share in it'; whereas the recording of the Will that the testator being not desirous of giving any share to the daughter cannot but be termed to be otherwise in accordance with the normal human conduct under certain circumstances but recording to the effect "in case after my death my daughter Shakuntla claims any property that should be rejected" together with the recording that "this Will has been written in favour of my adopted son Jai Singh so that it may be used at the time of need" depict the true nature of the claim of the appellant which it has been argued for the respondent tantamounts to be utterly false. Mr. Ramchandran also placed reliance on S. 11 (vi) of the Act, which records that the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth to the family of its adoption. The give and take in adoption is a requirement, which stands as a sine qua non for a valid adoption and it is in this context that Mr. Ramchandran contended that the rebuttable presumption has thus been duly rebutted by the evidence put forth by the respondent and stands reinforced by the appellant's own evidence. 13. By way of relying on this judgment, Mr. Ramchandran contended that the rebuttable presumption has thus been duly rebutted by the evidence put forth by the respondent and stands reinforced by the appellant's own evidence. 13. By way of relying on this judgment, Mr. Sinha, the learned Senior counsel submits that once the adoption is there and no dispute has been raised, the same cannot be allowed to be re-opened in the departmental proceeding and the said adoption can only be questioned in a Civil Suit. 14. Mr. Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner also relied in the case of "State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakrishan". The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: "In State of Punjab and others vs. Chaman Lal Goyal ( 1995 (2) SCC 570 ), state of Punjab was aggrieved by the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana quashing memo of charges against Goyal and also the order appointing Inquiry Officer to inquire into those charges. In this case the incident, which was the subject-matter of charge, happened in December, 1986 and in early January, 1987, when Goyal was working as supdt. of Nabha High Security Jail. It was only on July 9, 1992 that memo of charges was issued to Goyal. He submitted his explanation of January 4, 1993 denying the charges. Inquiry Officer was appointed on July 20, 1993 and soon thereafter Goyal filed writ petition in the High Court on august 24, 1993. The High Court quashed the memo of charges on the principal ground of delay of five and a half years in serving the memo of charges, for which there was no acceptable explanation. This Court examined the factual position as to how the delay occurred and if Goyal had been prejudiced in any way on account of delay. This Court relied on the Principles laid down in A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak ( 1992 (1) SCC 225 ), and said, that though that case pertained to criminal prosecution the principles enunciated therein were broadly applicable to the pleas of delay in taking the disciplinary proceedings as well. This Court relied on the Principles laid down in A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak ( 1992 (1) SCC 225 ), and said, that though that case pertained to criminal prosecution the principles enunciated therein were broadly applicable to the pleas of delay in taking the disciplinary proceedings as well. Referring to decision in a.r. Antulay case this Court said:- "In paragraph 86 of the judgment, this Court mentioned the propositions emerging from the several decisions considered therein and observed that "ultimately the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors - balancing test or balancing process - and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case." It has also been held that, ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of the accused has been infringed, the charges, or the conviction, as the case may be, will be quashed. At the same time, it has been observed that that is not the only course open to the court and that in a given case, the nature of the offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it has been observed, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order as it finds just and equitable in the circumstance of the case." 15. Mr. A.K. Sahani, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in other two matters has adopted the argument of Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, the learned Senior counsel and only added the fact in W.P.(S) No.2804 of 2018 that the title suit has been decided in which the respondent E.C.L has also appeared wherein the pensionary benefits to first wife, second wife and the right of persons have been decided and the decree has been prepared. The said suit was not taken in the appeal and in that view of the matter, the charge sheet has wrongly been issued. 16. Mr. Abhay Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.4 in W.P.(S) No.2804 of 2018 submits that the respondent no.4 is the first wife and suppressing the fact of first wife, the petitioner has obtained employment thus, there is fraud on the part of the petitioner. 17. Mr. 16. Mr. Abhay Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.4 in W.P.(S) No.2804 of 2018 submits that the respondent no.4 is the first wife and suppressing the fact of first wife, the petitioner has obtained employment thus, there is fraud on the part of the petitioner. 17. Mr. A.K. Das, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-CCL in W.P.(S) No.6725 of 2017 submits that the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner(s) are misconceived in view of the fact that only a charge sheet has been issued and the departmental proceeding is still pending in view of the fact that there is stay operating in this writ petition and all the points the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner(s) can agitate before the enquiry officer. He submits that he is afraid that the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere at this stage or not. To buttress his argument, Mr. Das, the learned counsel for the respondent-CCL relied in the case of "Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and Others" reported in (2013) 6 SCC 515 . Paragraph nos.7, 8 and 14 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: "7. Aggrieved, the respondent management filed Writ Petition No. 1849 of 2003 before the High Court, and the learned Single Judge decided the said writ petition vide the judgment and order dated 20-4-2011, upholding the judgment of the Tribunal, and found the enquiry to be entirely defective and thus, illegal. 8. The respondent management filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 171 of 2011, and the Division Bench too, upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge, as well as that of the Tribunal, but simultaneously also held, that the respondents were at liberty to proceed with the enquiry afresh, as regards the said charges. Hence, this appeal. Enquiry at belated stage 14. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is dehors the limits of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the court. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question must be carefully examined taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of the charges involved therein. The court has to consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the court must weigh all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come to the conclusion which is just and proper considering the circumstances involved. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration that the said proceedings are allowed to be terminated only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. " 18. He further submits that the writ petition is pre-mature in view of the fact that only the charge sheet has been sought to be challenged in this writ petition and does not amount to the scope of judicial review. To buttress his argument, he relied in the case of "Union of India and Another v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana" reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28 . Paragraph nos. 13 and 14 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: "13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh, Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, Ulagappa v. Divisional Commr, Mysore, State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, etc. 14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance." 19. He further submits that in view of this judgment, no writ will lie under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He further relied in the case of "Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal" reported in (2013) 9 SCC 363 . Paragraph nos.13 and 14 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: "13. It is a settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an office by misrepresenting the facts or by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law. "Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal." (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath.) In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley the Court observed without equivocation that: (QBp. 712) "... No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything. " 14. In A.P State Financial Corpn. v. GAR Re-Rolling Mills and State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu this Court has observed that a writ court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. "Equity is, also, known to prevent the law from the crafty evasions and subtleties invented to evade law." 20. Mr. V.K. Dubey, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-CCL in WP(S) No.2448 of 2018 submits that there is no illegality in issuing the impugned order. He adopted the arguments of Mr. "Equity is, also, known to prevent the law from the crafty evasions and subtleties invented to evade law." 20. Mr. V.K. Dubey, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-CCL in WP(S) No.2448 of 2018 submits that there is no illegality in issuing the impugned order. He adopted the arguments of Mr. A.K. Das, the learned counsel for the respondent-CCL and he also relied on the same judgments on which Mr. Das, the learned counsel has relied. He referred to certain paragraphs in the counter affidavit and submits that the principles of natural justice are being followed. The petitioner has already appeared in the departmental proceeding in about 16 sittings. He has also cross-examined certain witnesses in the departmental proceeding and thus, the writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 21. Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-CCL in WP(S) No.3229 of 2018 submits that the petitioners have not chosen the correct forum in assailing the charge sheet. He submits that this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not interfere in view of the fact that this is only initiation of proceeding on the ground of certain fraudulent act which can be decided after going through all the materials by the enquiry officer and for that the enquiry officer has already been appointed. He submits that so far judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned, he is relying in the case of "Secretary, Ministry of Defence and Others v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha" reported in (2012) 11 SCC 565 Paragraph nos.10 and 12 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: "10. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, charge-sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the court. In fact, charge-sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the court. (Vide State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh, Ulagappa v. Commr, Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana.) 12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the charge-sheet cannot generally be a subject-matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings." 22. By way of relying on this judgment, Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel for the respondent-CCL submits that right of the petitioner does not adversely affect as only the charge sheet has been issued and at this stage the matter has not come to a conclusion. He further relied in the case of "Dy. Inspector General of Police v. K.S. Swaminathan" reported in (1996) 11 SCC 498 . Paragraph no.4 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: "4. It is settled law by a catena of decisions of this Court that if the charge memo is totally vague and does not disclose any misconduct for which the charges have been framed, the tribunal or the court would not be justified at that stage to go into whether the charges are true and could be gone into, for it would be a matter on production of the evidence for consideration at the enquiry by the enquiry officer. At the stage of framing of the charge, the statement of facts and the charge-sheet supplied are required to be looked into by the court or the tribunal as to the nature of the charges, i.e., whether the statement of facts and material in support thereof supplied to the delinquent officer would disclose the alleged misconduct. The Tribunal, therefore, was totally unjustified in going into the charges at that stage. It is not the case that the charge memo and the statement of facts do not disclose any misconduct alleged against the delinquent officer. Therefore, the Tribunal was totally wrong in quashing the charge memo. In similar circumstances, in respect of other persons involved in the same transactions, this Court in appeals arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 19453-63 of 1995 had on 9-2-1996 allowed the appeals, set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and remitted the matter holding that: "This is not the stage at which the truth or otherwise of the charges ought to be looked into. This is the uniform view taken by this Court in such matters." 23. In the light of the above arguments, the only question needs to be decided by this Court is, as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with the charge sheet or not? 24. The charges in all the cases are almost the same which say about the employment by way of pseudo adoption-deed. Thus, whether the petitioners have played a fraud or not that can be proved by way of laying evidences before the departmental proceeding as in this case it has already been initiated. The charge sheet is only initiation of the proceeding. The enquiry officer has not submitted the report as yet in view of the fact that stay is operating in these writ petitions except W.P.(S) No.2804 of 2018 and only on the apprehension that the petitioners will be dismissed, the charge sheet order has been challenged in these writ petitions. It is well-settled proposition of law that any writ on apprehension cannot be entertained. In the case relied by Mr. Sinha, the learned Senior counsel rendered in the case of "Md. It is well-settled proposition of law that any writ on apprehension cannot be entertained. In the case relied by Mr. Sinha, the learned Senior counsel rendered in the case of "Md. Zamil Ahmed v. The State of Bihar & Ors." [supra], the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph no.22 has held that the position would have been different if the appellant had committed some kind of fraud or manipulation or suppression of material fact for securing the appointment. In that case, fraudulent aspect was not there. Thus, in the present case, the case of "Md. Zamil Ahmed v. The State of Bihar & Ors."[supra] is distinguishable. In "UCO Bank & Ors. v. Rajendra Shankar Shukla" [supra] the petitioner was dismissed after superannuation. On this aspect, this judgment is also distinguishable under the facts and circumstances of the present case. These two judgments relied by Mr. Sinha, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, on the ground that the adoption-deed can be challenged only before the Civil Court and not in the departmental proceeding are on the different footing, however, the judgment about the adoption-deed which has been relied in the case of "Ratanlal @ Babulal Chunilal Samsuka" [supra] can be well placed in the departmental proceeding to agitate the points. The issue of obtaining appointment by mis-representation is no more res-integra. The question as to whether the petitioners have obtained the appointment fraudulently or not is required to be proved in the departmental proceeding which has not come to a logical end as yet in these matters. If the initial action is not in consonance with law, the subsequent conduct of a party cannot sanctify the same. The person violating the law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subjected to enquiry or investigation. Prima facie, it appears that the writ petitions are pre-matured in view of the fact that in one of the cases, the petitioner has already appeared before the enquiry officer in 16 proceedings. These are not rare and exceptional cases where the High Court can quash the charge sheet, particularly in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case as there are allegation of fraud as indicated in the charge sheet. 25. In the light of these discussions and the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "UCO Bank & Ors. v. Rajendra Shankar Shukla"', "Md. 25. In the light of these discussions and the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "UCO Bank & Ors. v. Rajendra Shankar Shukla"', "Md. Zamil Ahmed v. The State of Bihar & Ors." "Ratanlal @ Babulal Chunilal Samsuka v. Sundarabai Govardhandas Samsuka (D.) Th. Lrs. & Ors." "Jai Singh v. Shakuntala" and "State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakrishan" [supra] relied by Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner(s) and also the judgments rendered in the case of "Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and Others" "Union of India and Another v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana" and Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal" [supra] relied by Mr. A.K. Das, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-CCL, no relief can be extended to the petitioners in view of the fact that there is charge of fraudulently obtaining the appointment. It is well-settled proposition of law that the charge sheet is not liable to be quashed as it does not adversely affect the rights of the petitioners as it does not give rise to any cause of action, however, it can be quashed on the ground that the issuing authority are not competent to issue the same. In these cases, the jurisdiction of the issuing authority is not under challenge. Hence, these writ petitions stand dismissed. 26. It is open to the petitioners to demonstrate their points before the departmental proceeding. 27. The Interim order stands vacated. 28. In view of the fact that these writ petitions stand dismissed, all the I.As are also dismissed.