JUDGMENT Ravindra V. Ghuge, J. - The appellant (Rupesh), original accused No.1 in Sessions Case No. 149 of 2011, is aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 25.09.2014, delivered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmednagar, thereby convicting the appellant for the offence of murdering his wife u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as "IPC"). Accused No.2 (Deepak A. Varpe) has been acquitted. 2. We have heard Shri. V.D. Sapkal, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the appellant and the learned APP for the State, extensively on 18.09.2020, 19.09.2020 and 21.09.2020. With their assistance, we have been taken through the R&P, threadbare. The testimony of the witnesses has been read out to us, elaborately. 3. This case is wholly based on circumstantial evidence and a motive for the appellant to kill his wife. PROSECUTION STORY 4. The prosecution has putforth the following case:- a] Latabai Jawale, mother of the deceased Jaishree w/o Rupesh Chaudhari, has lodged a complaint on 08.04.2011 with the Rahuri Police Station vide Crime No. 109/2011 alleging that Jaishree has been murdered by an unknown person. b] Pursuant to the FIR, the police launched an investigation and noticed that, the appellant-Rupesh was absconding. He was arrested on 09.04.2011. c] Latabai has stated in the FIR that, Jaishree was married to the appellant on 27.12.2010. On 03.04.2011, brother of the deceased namely Prakash had gone to Kankapur, Tq. Sangamner, Dist. Ahmednagar, to invite Jaishree to her parental home on the occasion of Gudipadwa. He accordingly brought Jaishree to Ambi, which is the parental home of the deceased. The second daughter of Latabai namely Archana w/o Ajit Shete, was also invited and she also had come to Ambi. d] On 06.04.2011, the appellant/ Rupesh had reached Ambi between 02:00 to 02:30 p.m. to meet Jaishree . He was in her residence for about 10 to 15 minutes., and thereafter left for his home at Kankapur, after having lunch with Prakash, brother of deceased Jaishree. e] On 07.04.2011, Jaishree, Latabai, father of Jaishree namely Manik and her brother Prakash were at home for the entire day. In between 09:00 to 09:15 p.m., Latabai was washing utensils in the front yard. Jaishree was near a Mango tree talking to her husband Rupesh on the cell phone of Prakash. e] On 07.04.2011, Jaishree, Latabai, father of Jaishree namely Manik and her brother Prakash were at home for the entire day. In between 09:00 to 09:15 p.m., Latabai was washing utensils in the front yard. Jaishree was near a Mango tree talking to her husband Rupesh on the cell phone of Prakash. While chatting with her husband, she walked a few steps towards Gadichakra Chari, which is a canal like spot through which water is supplied to the farmers. After washing utensils, Latabai proceeded to the Chari for answering the call of nature and since she did not see Jaishree who was addressed as "Mayee", she called out by uttering the word "Mayee". She heard a reply and hence she moved in the direction of the voice of Jaishree and found that she had fallen down near the Jujabi tree (Boriche Zad) at the Chari Road. f] Latabai lifted Mayee and asked her as to what has happened. Mayee was unable to say anything and she lost control over her neck and her head tilted onto her shoulder. Latabai noticed a large stab wound on her neck and she was bleeding profusely. Latabai shouted for help by calling out Prakash. Prakash was chit-chatting at the Chari and he rushed back after hearing the cries of his mother. Jaishree was then taken to a hospital at Shrirampur in the car of Shri Bhanudas Gangadhar Ghodekar. Latabai stayed back at home. g] After sometime, Latabai came to know that her daughter Jaishree was declared dead on arrival at the Kamgar Hospital, Shrirampur. She then accompanied her son Prakash to the Rahuri Police Station and lodged her complaint against an unknown assailant, on 08.04.2011. h] An additional statement of Latabai was recorded on 14.04.2011, in which she has narrated an incident that occurred prior to the marriage of Jaishree with Rupesh. Prakash had received a call from an unknown number and the lady who was on the line, told Prakash that she was having an affair with Rupesh and Jaishree should not be married to Rupesh. On account of this incident, Prakash accompanied his father to the house of Rupesh and spoke to his father. Father of Rupesh suggested to Jaishree's father Manik to ignore the phone call since somebody, who is jealous about the proposed marriage of Rupesh and Jaishree, has tried to play mischief. On account of this incident, Prakash accompanied his father to the house of Rupesh and spoke to his father. Father of Rupesh suggested to Jaishree's father Manik to ignore the phone call since somebody, who is jealous about the proposed marriage of Rupesh and Jaishree, has tried to play mischief. i] Latabai has further stated that, Jaishree travelled to her marital home after her marriage on 19.01.2011. On 19.01.2011, she had visited her parental home and she narrated to Latabai that her husband Rupesh is accusing her of having a love affair with an unknown man at village Ambi. Jaishree had countered the said allegation by stating that even Prakash had received a call from an unknown lady who claimed to be having a love affair with Rupesh and that Jaishree should not marry him. j] Latabai has further stated in her additional statement that Jaishree was murdered by Rupesh. He had spoken to Jaishree on Prakash's phone and had called her near the Mango and Jujube tree and had stabbed her on the neck with a knife. His friend Deepak Annasaheb Varpe had assisted him in the murder and is an accomplice. Both had travelled on a motorcycle and after committing the crime, both drove away. The clothes worn by Jaishree were seized by the Police and Latabai states in the additional statement that the knife and the motorcycle used by Rupesh while committing the crime, have been recovered according to the knowledge gathered by Latabai. k] During investigation, the police had seized a cell phone bearing number 9923757603 (hereinafter referred to as cell-X), while arresting Rupesh. A second cell phone with the number 9096825488 (hereinafter referred to as cell-Y) was found to be registered in the name of Rupesh. The deceased Jaishree did not have a cell phone and she used to speak to her husband Rupesh on the cell phone of her brother Prakash bearing no. 9767783819 (hereinafter referred to as cell-Z). l] Rupesh gave a memorandum and a panchanama u/s 27 of the Evidence Act was prepared, at Exh.55, recorded in between 08:00 am to 08:15 am on 12.04.2011. In the memorandum putforth by him, the relevant statement is that he was willing to deliver the motorcycle and his clothes worn at the time of the commission of the crime. l] Rupesh gave a memorandum and a panchanama u/s 27 of the Evidence Act was prepared, at Exh.55, recorded in between 08:00 am to 08:15 am on 12.04.2011. In the memorandum putforth by him, the relevant statement is that he was willing to deliver the motorcycle and his clothes worn at the time of the commission of the crime. Accordingly, he led the police to the place where he had hidden his motorcycle and the clothes and delivered these articles to the police, which were hidden below a mattress in a bed room of his house. m] Rupesh has then given a disclosure memorandum Exh.42 dated 13.04.2011 recorded between 10:10 am, to 10:20 am., and a panchanama u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, was drawn. He led the police to a distance requiring about 1 hour and 30 minutes and by taking different turns in different directions, he led the police to a particular spot which had shrubs and bushes. He entered the bushes and with a little searching, recovered a knife which he had hidden in the bushes. The knife was kept in a packet which was applied a Kagdi Seal (Paper Seal). n] Prakash, brother of the deceased has also recorded his statement with the police on 8-4-2011. He has stated that after the marriage proposal of Rupesh for his sister Jaishree was approved, he received a call on his cell phone from an unknown number and a lady informed him that she was having a love relationship with Rupesh and the marriage of Jaishree should not be solemnized with Rupesh. This issue was confronted to the father of Rupesh by Prakash and his father Manik who travelled to the residence of Rupesh. Father of Rupesh reacted by saying that people are jealous about the proposed marriage of Rupesh with Jaishree and hence, such phone calls should be ignored. Thereafter, the marriage was solemnized. o] On 19.01.2011 when Jaishree had visited her parents home, she had told Prakash that Rupesh was alleging that she has a love affair with an unknown man from village Ambi. She had reacted by saying that my brother had also received a call and a lady said that she has a love affair with Rupesh. Whenever Jaishree came home at Ambi, she used to say that Rupesh is constantly suspecting her character. She had reacted by saying that my brother had also received a call and a lady said that she has a love affair with Rupesh. Whenever Jaishree came home at Ambi, she used to say that Rupesh is constantly suspecting her character. p] Prakash has then narrated the incidents of 03.04.2011, 06.04.2011 and 07.04.2011 and 08.04.2011 which have been stated identically by his mother Latabai in her additional statement to the police. The version of Prakash is identical to the version of Latabai. q] The prosecution has examined the following witnesses:- PW1 - Latabai Jawale (informant) & mother of the deceased. PW2 - Prakash Jawale, brother of the deceased. PW3 - Sharad R. Shinde - panch witness to recovery memorandum Exh. 42, turned hostile and was cross-examined. PW4 - Kakasaheb Kadam - panch witness to mobile search panchanama - two cell instruments recovered. PW5 - Sanjay Kadam - panch witness for search of clothes - memorandum Exh. 55. PW6 - Sau. Archana Shete - sister of the deceased. PW7 - Dr. Sudha Kamble, who conducted post-mortem. PW8 - Nilesh Shinde - neighbour of the deceased. PW9 - Digambar Kapore - who carried muddemal. PW10 - Sanjay Mhase, who is panch witness with PW3. PW11 - Ankush Badadhe, who is spot panch. PW12 - Vitthal Khandagale, Head Constable, who recorded the FIR at Exh. 38. PW13 - Dr. Anil Momale, who conducted the post-mortem along with PW7. PW14 - Mukhtar Bagwan, Investigating Officer. PW15 - Sachin Shinde, who is the Nodal Officer for Idea Cellular and who issued certificate u/s 65 of the Evidence Act. PW16 - Chetan S. Patil, who is Nodal Officer for Airtel Cellular. r] After the recording of evidence of these 16 witnesses, the appellant as well as accused no. 2 - Deepak, were independently allowed to record their statements u/s 313. Each of these two accused were posed with 98 questions. Practically, the accused has putforth denial answers to almost all the questions. These answers are like "It is false", "I do not know" and "No". He has not taken any stand and has stated that he does not know as to why the witnesses are deposing against him, he did not desire to examine any witness, he did not desire to examine himself and he did not wish to say anything in the case. He has not taken any stand and has stated that he does not know as to why the witnesses are deposing against him, he did not desire to examine any witness, he did not desire to examine himself and he did not wish to say anything in the case. s] The Trial Court has considered the entire evidence available before it and vide the impugned Judgment, convicted the appellanthusband for committing the murder of his wife. The second accused - Deepak A. Varpe has been acquitted since there was no evidence to establish his involvement in the crime committed by the appellant. SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT 5. Shri Sapkal has raised the following issues in support of his contention that there is no evidence against the accused/ appellant, the investigation has not been properly conducted and there are several lacuna in the investigation :- a) This entire case is based on circumstantial evidence. b) Ambi was the parental home of the deceased and Kankapur was her marital home, which are about 60 to 70 Kms apart. c) PW1 Latabai has not stated in her complaint that the hands of Jaishree were tied behind her back. d) PW2 Prakash has stated that her hands were tied e) The handkerchief purportedly used for tying the hands of the deceased, has not been traced out. f) PW3 Sharad, panch witness to the disclosure panchanama Exhibit 42 has stated that the I.O. had asked him to sign on a paper which already had a script written on it. He refused to sign the paper. He cannot identify the person brought before him from the locker on 13-4- 2011 when the panchanama was prepared. Sharad had not proceeded to the place in Kolhar in pursuance of the statement made by the appellant. As Sharad was declared hostile, the APP was permitted to cross examine him and the said witness will have to be disbelieved. g) Both the disclosure statements, Exhibit 42 and Exhibit 55 (the latter is with regard to the recovery of the motorcycle and the blood stained clothes), cannot be read in evidence as the appellant had not made the said statements under his free will. h) The appellant was once handcuffed while being taken to the place where he had purportedly hidden the knife used in the crime (Exhibit 42). h) The appellant was once handcuffed while being taken to the place where he had purportedly hidden the knife used in the crime (Exhibit 42). i) The knife was not sealed at the place from where it was recovered. j) The place where the knife was allegedly hidden by the appellant, was accessible to the general public. k) Though two mobile instruments, viz. Cell-X and Cell-Y are said to be recovered from the appellant/ Rupesh, one phone Cell-X was not proved to be belonging to the appellant. l) The recovery of the blood stained clothes occurred on 12.04.2011 and the recovery of the knife occurred on 13.04.2011. Why have two disclosure and recovery panchanama been prepared by the investigating officer is the question raised. m) The Panchanama at the time of recovery was not carried out and Exhibit 42(1) (recovery of knife) and Exhibit 52 (1) (recovery of blood stained clothes and the motorcycle), were prepared in the police station after the police party returned to the station along with the appellant. n) The blood group of the appellant was not determined. o) The blood sample of the deceased was sent to the laboratory for determining her blood group and the test has remained inconclusive. As such, neither the blood group of the appellant, nor the blood group of the deceased has been determined. p) The blood said to be found on the knife as well as on the blood stained clothes of the appellant, are of blood group A. As the blood group of the appellant and the deceased has not been determined, there is no evidence to suggest that the blood group of the deceased may also be A and therefore, it matches the blood group of the blood found on the knife and the clothes of the appellant. q) The I.O. could have called for the call details as regards the exact nature of discussion between the deceased and the appellant on 07.04.2011. No evidence has come on record to indicate that the appellant had spoken to his wife in between 09:00 pm to 09:30 pm on 07.04.2011. Merely on the basis of the words of Latabai, Prakash and the alleged disclosure given by the appellant, that the trial Court could not have convicted the appellant. No evidence has come on record to indicate that the appellant had spoken to his wife in between 09:00 pm to 09:30 pm on 07.04.2011. Merely on the basis of the words of Latabai, Prakash and the alleged disclosure given by the appellant, that the trial Court could not have convicted the appellant. r) The seizure panchanama of the mobile Cell-X does not render any strength to the case of the prosecution as the call details of Cell-X were not brought on record. s) The testimony of PW15 and PW16, who are nodal officers of the cellular service providers, Idea and Airtel, are insignificant pieces of evidence. t) With regard to 07 sealed parcels sent by the I.O. to the regional forensic science laboratory at Nashik, there were two packets containing earth mixed with grass (No.1 and No.2). The gown worn by the deceased was in another packet No.3. The sweater of the deceased was wrapped in packet No.4. Her petticoat was in packet No.5. Her Bra was wrapped in packet No.6 and her nicker was wrapped in packet No.7. As such, the contents of packet Nos. 1 and 2 were actually the contents of a single packet and the articles in packet Nos. 3 to 7 have been separately packed in separate packets at the police station which would indicate that the sealing of the packets was done at the police station and not at the spot from where these articles were collected. u) The deposition of PW9 Digambar Kopare, muddemal carrier would indicate that he had received the clothes, knife, blood sample and viscera, all in sealed condition, on 15.04.2011 to be delivered to the forensic laboratory at Nashik. He had to return to Nashik on 16.04.2011 as the receiving clerk at the forensic laboratory refused to accept the Muddemal since a letter of the medical officer / autopsy surgeon was not produced. Digambar, therefore, brought back these articles and deposited them in the muddemal room and took the entry in the muddemal register. On 18.04.2011 he carried two letters received from the M.O. pertaining to the viscera and the blood sample and carried the articles with him to the forensic lab at Nashik. The receiving clerk them accepted the articles and issued a receipt. This creates a doubt in the investigation. On 18.04.2011 he carried two letters received from the M.O. pertaining to the viscera and the blood sample and carried the articles with him to the forensic lab at Nashik. The receiving clerk them accepted the articles and issued a receipt. This creates a doubt in the investigation. v) With regard to the spot panchanama, Exhibit 86, it is stated that PW2 Prakash had allegedly shown the spot where the crime took place. However, in his deposition before the Court, he has stated in paragraph 7 that the spot of the incident was not shown by him to the police. w) Latabai has admitted in cross-examination that, the Police arrested Rupesh and through the police, she learnt that Rupesh has committed murder of Jaishree , wife of Rupesh. x) Latabai has further admitted in cross-examination that it was for the first time on 14.04.2011 while recording her supplementary statement, that Mr. Bagwan, Police Officer had informed her about the commission of murder of Jaishree by Rupesh. y) She has further admitted that, on both the occasions, the police were inquiring with her, husband Manik and son Prakash as to who could be a suspected assailant and the said family members never raised suspicion against anybody. z) The brother of the deceased, Prakash has admitted in crossexamination that he learnt that Rupesh along with accused no. 2, after giving a stab blow on the neck of Jaishree, ran away and Rupesh committed the murder of Jaishree suspecting her character. aa) In the cross-examination of Prakash PW2, he has stated that, while recording his statement or supplementary statement, he had not stated to the police about Jaishree disclosing to him that her husband Rupesh was suspecting her character and was harassing her. The testimony of Prakash contradicts the statements made by him before the police under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. bb) PW3 - Sharad Shinde has admitted in cross-examination that the appellant was handcuffed as a precautionary measure and was taken to the spot at Kolhar for recovering the knife. This according to the appellant indicates that force was exerted on the appellant to extract a statement and that, neither disclosure nor discovery is proved. This according to the appellant indicates that force was exerted on the appellant to extract a statement and that, neither disclosure nor discovery is proved. cc) PW5 Sanjay Kadam has stated that, when the seizure panchanama of the shirt and the pant was carried out, both the clothes were sealed in a brown packet and a stamp containing signatures of the panchas was affixed on the packet. However, when the articles were sent to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, an acknowledgment at Exh.107 indicates that the full pant was wrapped in a paper labelled 9 and the full shirt was wrapped in a paper labelled 10. Contention is that the single packet containing the shirt and the pant was sealed at the time of seizure and later on the packet has been tampered with as the shirt and the pant were found in two different paper packets when sent to the Forensic Lab. dd) PW5 has stated that when he asked Mr. Bagwan the reason for summoning him, the I.O. had said to PW5 that accused Rupesh is going to deliver the clothes and the motorcycle and we have to prepare the panchanama of those articles. This would show that the I.O. was aware of what is to be recovered from the appellant and this was disclosed even to the panchas. ee) PW9, Mr. Digambar Kopare who had carried the muddemal articles to the office of the Chemical Analyser has stated in his evidence that he had collected the muddemal articles so as to be handed over to the C.A. He was sent back and he then delivered the articles on 18.04.2011. Therefore, there is no evidence as to where the muddemal was lying for three days. ff) Reliance has been placed upon the following reported judgments :- i) The State vs. Motia and other, (1955) AIR Raj. 82 . ii) Deoraj Deju Suvarna and others vs. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 BCR 85 . iii) Bhanudas Bagaji Salve vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 BCR(Cri) 22 . iv) Shankar Raju Banglorkar vs. State of Goa, (1992) 2 BCR 169 . v) Moses Fernandes and another vs. State through Public Prosecutor, (2003) BCR(Cri) 1351 . vi) Bhojrar alias Kamal Thapa vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 1 BCR(Cri) 355 : 2007 All M.R. (Cri) 117. iii) Bhanudas Bagaji Salve vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 BCR(Cri) 22 . iv) Shankar Raju Banglorkar vs. State of Goa, (1992) 2 BCR 169 . v) Moses Fernandes and another vs. State through Public Prosecutor, (2003) BCR(Cri) 1351 . vi) Bhojrar alias Kamal Thapa vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 1 BCR(Cri) 355 : 2007 All M.R. (Cri) 117. vii) Bajirao Bhimaji Dafal vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 2 MhLJ 794 2000 All M.R. (Cri) 174. viii) Lalchand Cheddilal Yadav vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 AllMR 795 : 2000 (3) Mh.L.J. 438 . ix) Shankar Gopal Patil and others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) BCR(Cri) 360 . x) Sameer Hasan Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) BCR(Cri) 751 . xi) Salim Akhtar alias Mota vs. State of U.P., (2003) CriLJ 2302 . xii) Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan and others vs. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal Nos.333-334/ 2017 decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 23.12.2019. xiii) Shaikh Mohamed Salim Karimullah and others vs. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 5 BCR 750 . xiv) Kiran Ashok Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 3 BCR(Cri) 33 . xv) Kamlabai Haribhau Lastane vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 3 BCR(Cri) 47 . gg) In the case of State vs Motia (supra), it is held that, the clothes have to be sealed and the seal must remain intact till it is opened by the C.A. for analysis. hh) In Deoraj Deju Suvarna (supra), it is held that if the appellant is handcuffed, the disclosure cannot be voluntary. Similar view is expressed in Shankar Raju Bagnorkar (supra). ii) In Bhojrar @ Kamal Thapa (supra), it is held that the weapon has to be sent to the Fingerprint Expert and this was not done in the present case. jj) In Shankar Gopal Patil (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has issued guidelines regarding the mode and manner of recording the disclosure statement. kk) In Sameer Hasan Shaikh (supra) and in Salim Akhtar alias Mota (supra), it is held that if a weapon is not sealed on the spot, then the possibility of tampering cannot be ruled out. It is also held that if a weapon is recovered from a place which is accessible to the public, there would be no meaning to the recovery u/s 27. It is also held that if a weapon is recovered from a place which is accessible to the public, there would be no meaning to the recovery u/s 27. ll) In the statement recorded u/s 313, the issue of determination of the blood group on the clothes of the deceased should have been confronted to the appellant. This is an illegality as incriminating circumstances have not been put to the appellant while recording the statement u/s 313. mm) The learned advocate for the appellant refers to the deposition of PW7 Dr. Sudha Kamble who conducted the postmortem wherein she has expressed an opinion in cross examination that the muddemal knife does not have a clean cut sharpness and injury No.1 may not be possible if the said muddemal knife is used. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PROSECUTOR 6. The learned APP has contradicted the submissions of the appellant. He contends that the appellant has extensively canvassed and has read the testimony of the 15 witnesses, sentence by sentence. The object of the appellant is to create a doubt in the case of the prosecution and it is for this purpose that lengthy submissions have been canvassed. 7. He submits that if the prosecution had exerted any pressure on the appellant or had subjected him to duress and coercion for extracting a confessional statement, the appellant had and was legally permitted to utilize the opportunity of explaining his side while making a statement under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. About 98 questions were posed to him when his statement u/s 313 was being recorded. He had the opportunity to confront the evidence with regard to he having made two statements through two independent memorandum u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. Exhibit 55(1) was a statement made by him on 12.04.2011 in which he not only voluntarily disclosed the place of hiding the knife, he led the police to the exact spot where he had hidden the knife. Question No.77 was with regard to such disclosure and the appellant merely answered by the same "it is false". Question No.78 was with regard to the discovery of the shirt and the pant and question No.80 was with regard to the recovery of his motorcycle. He merely kept on repeating "it is false". 8. Question No.77 was with regard to such disclosure and the appellant merely answered by the same "it is false". Question No.78 was with regard to the discovery of the shirt and the pant and question No.80 was with regard to the recovery of his motorcycle. He merely kept on repeating "it is false". 8. The learned APP submits that question Nos.81, 82 and 83 were with regard to his second memorandum of the recovery of the knife. He was simply answering with the words "it is false". Even in the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses, no suggestion was given to any of the panchas with regard to the memorandum and seizure of articles that force was exerted upon the appellant or that he was threatened and the statement was extracted from him. He has taken a blunt stand of merely saying "it is false". 9. The learned APP further submits that the appellant was given the opportunity of examining his witnesses and also to examine himself. He declined the opportunity and expressed that he did not desire to examine himself or his witnesses. Shri Sapkal contends that the appellant has a right to be silent. 10. He further submits that this is a case wherein the guilt has been established on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Witnesses like PW1,2 and 6 were nearest to the victim when the incident occurred and they had rushed to assist her. PW1 Latabai was terribly shocked upon seeing her daughter bleeding profusely and after noticing her daughter fallen on the ground, she started screaming for help by calling out to son Prakash, PW2. It was PW2 and PW6 who removed the handkerchief with which the hands of the victim were tied and had carried her to the hospital. If Latabai had failed to notice that the hands of Jaishree were tied when the stab injury occurred, it would not mean that the testimony of PW2 and PW6 could be discarded. 11. He further submits that the statement of Prakash was recorded by the police on 08.04.2011, wherein he has narrated about the hands of Jaishree being tied behind her back. The learned APP submits that this entire case has a clear chain of circumstantial evidence. The location of Cell-Y of the appellant was established to be under the same tower under which the deceased was found. The learned APP submits that this entire case has a clear chain of circumstantial evidence. The location of Cell-Y of the appellant was established to be under the same tower under which the deceased was found. The CDR and SDR details, proved before the trial Court by the nodal officers of the two cellular services providers, clearly indicate that at the time of the fatal attack on the victim in between 09.00 to 09.30 p.m. on 07.04.2011, Cell-Y and CellZ were under the same tower location. He, therefore, submits that in this backdrop, even if it is assumed that the I.O. had committed an irregularity in handcuffing the appellant, the knife and clothes recovered by him along with the CDR/SDR evidence available, would establish the chain of circumstantial evidence. 12. He then submits that the blood stained clothes and the knife were recovered at the behest of the appellant, which was exclusively within the knowledge of Rupesh. These articles were placed in packets and a paper seal was applied. It is nobody's case that the paper seals were tampered with or were destroyed and there has been no evidence even if such a contention is put forth. 13. In so far as the determination of the source of blood of the victim and the blood found on the clothes and the knife, is concerned, we find that the only source of blood was the blood oozing out of the wound suffered by Jayashri. The blood found on her gown, sweater, bra, petticoat and nicker is A blood group. The same blood group A is found in the blood stains on the clothes of the appellant which he has admitted of having worn on the date of the crime. Though the blood of Jaishree was sent to the lab, the test report was inconclusive. In State of Rajasthan V. Teja Ram, (1999) AIR SC 1776 , the Hon'ble Apex court has held that the failure of the Serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to disintegration of the serum in the meanwhile, does not mean that the blood stuck on the articles would not have been human blood at all. Sometimes, it happens, either because the stains being too insufficient or due to haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation that a serologist might fail to detect the origin of the blood. Sometimes, it happens, either because the stains being too insufficient or due to haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation that a serologist might fail to detect the origin of the blood. It is not the case of the appellant that the investigating agency has imported blood group A and sprinkled it at the place where the offence was committed or on the clothes and the body of the victim and on the clothes and the knife produced by the appellant. So also, these five articles that were sealed and a panchanama drawn at Exhibit 49, have been admitted at Exhibit 49, by the appellant/ accused. 14. In addition to Teja Ram (supra), the learned APP relies upon the judgment of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Shivaji Anandrao Chede, (2002) 4 MhLJ 201 and the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Neel Kumar alias Anil Kumar Vs. The State of Haryana, (2012) 5 SCC 766 . 15. The learned APP submits that the size of the blade of the muddemal knife article 14 can cause a deep stab injury. It is possible that the knife may have been used in such a way so as to cause a large wound since the appellant intended to cause the death of his wife. The personal knowledge of PW7 is an opinion expressed by her and cannot be termed to be gospel truth. The entire evidence brought on record cannot be rendered useless merely on account of an opinion expressed by PW7. He points out from the testimony of PW13 who had conducted the postmortem along with PW7. PW13 has expressed that the muddemal knife can cause the injury suffered by the victim. 16. We have perused the post-mortem report dated 08.04.2011, Exh. 62. The post-mortem began at 11:15 a.m., and concluded at 12:30 p.m. The clothes have been described and it has been recorded that the clothes were stained with blood. The injuries appearing on the body of the deceased have been set out in the P.M. report as under:- "17. Surface wounds and injuries :- (1) Stab injury on Right side of neck above right clavicle and to right side of tracheal region. Size 7cm x 4cm. Depths extend to neck muscles. O/E :- Right sternocleidomastoid cut, Right common carotid arteries ruptured. Surface wounds and injuries :- (1) Stab injury on Right side of neck above right clavicle and to right side of tracheal region. Size 7cm x 4cm. Depths extend to neck muscles. O/E :- Right sternocleidomastoid cut, Right common carotid arteries ruptured. (Neck skin, platysma, right sternocleidomastoid and neck muscles, right common carotid artery and jugular vessels ruptured). (2) Trachea cut at the level below thyroid cartilage, upper and lower end of cut trachea seen. (3) Oesophagus cut at level below thyroid cartilage. Food particles seen in the wound. (4) Contused lacerated wound above the stab wound of size 2 cm x 1 cm x 1 cm. (5) Abrasion on left food dorsal surface, 2 in number, linear of size (a) 4 cm (b) 5 cm. These injuries are ante-mortem in nature." Internal examination relevant to the case is with regard to thorax which indicates as under:- "20. Thorax:- (a) Walls, ribs cartilages : Intact, NP (b) Pleura : Intact, NP (c) Larynx, Trachea and Bronchi : Trachea cut at level below thyroid cartilage. Both the ends of cut trachea seen. (d) Right lung : Intact, pale. (e) Left Lung : Intact, pale. (f) Pericarbium : Intact (blood from heart preserved for chemical analysis). (g) Heart with weight : Intact. (h) Large vessels : Right carotid common artery and jugular vessels cut at level of neck above clavicle." DEATH - Whether Homicidal? 17. Though it is undisputed that the death of the deceased has been caused due to the stab injuries, we have referred to the post-mortem report and upon considering the same, it is clear to us that the death has been caused by a stab injury in the neck of the deceased. The appellant has laid stress on the aspect of PW7-Dr. Sudha Kamble who has expressed an opinion that the knife (article 14) shown to her is not likely to cause the injury due to which Jaishree died. The ld. APP relied upon the testimony of PW13 - Dr. Anil Momale who conducted the post-mortem along with PW7. We find that, Dr. Momale who is M.S. in E.N.T. had conducted the post-mortem along with Dr. Sudha Kamble and Dr. Jaya Chhatwani. He has expressed a view that there is a difference between a stab injury and an incise injury. APP relied upon the testimony of PW13 - Dr. Anil Momale who conducted the post-mortem along with PW7. We find that, Dr. Momale who is M.S. in E.N.T. had conducted the post-mortem along with Dr. Sudha Kamble and Dr. Jaya Chhatwani. He has expressed a view that there is a difference between a stab injury and an incise injury. He has perused the murder weapon and stated that it is serrated in nature and that the edges of the injury caused by the muddemal knife would not necessarily be irregular. A small serration visible on the knife would not result in the edges being irregular. He confirms that article 14 is capable of causing the injury at issue. 18. We find that Dr. Momale was examined, as earlier, a query was raised by the I.O. dated 15.04.2011, Exh.89, seeking an opinion as to whether the knife discovered and recovered at the instance of the appellant Rupesh could cause an injury that is found on the neck of the deceased. We also find that, though Dr.Kamble has expressed an opinion that injury no. 1 (stab injury) mentioned in column 17 of the P.M. report is not possible if the muddemal knife article 14 is used against the concerned part of the neck, she has categorically stated that "it is not true that whatever injury is caused due to weapon like muddemal article 14 would be zigzag in nature". (Dictated at 2:30 p.m. on 23.09.2020 in open court) 19. Pw-13 (Dr.Momale) has also stated that the knife article 14 can cause injury no. 1 mentioned in column no. 17 of the P.M. report (Exh.62). That injury can be caused by piercing the pointed and sharp edged portion of the knife with the right hand after holding the victim with the left hand, from the back side. That injury can also be caused by pushing the victim to the floor and then piercing/stabbing the victim on the neck. 20. We have perused the knife article 14 in the open court and we find that it has extremely minor/miniscule pointed edges at its blade which may be described as saw shaped edges. These edges are so miniscule that it would be difficult to term it as saw edges. However, the blade is not as smooth as a kitchen knife. After considering the probative value of the evidence of Dr. These edges are so miniscule that it would be difficult to term it as saw edges. However, the blade is not as smooth as a kitchen knife. After considering the probative value of the evidence of Dr. Momale and the statement of Dr. Kamble that whatever injuries that may be caused by the knife article 14, would not be zigzag in nature, that we find that the trial court has rightly concluded that the knife article 14 has been used for causing the stab injury on the neck of the victim. DISCOVERY AND RECOVERY OF THE KNIFE 21. It is undisputed that neither the parents nor the brother were aware as to which weapon was used for committing the murder of Jaishree. No knife was recovered or noticed when the spot panchanama took place. The appellant led the police, in view of the memorandum Exh.42 dated 13.04.2011, entered the bush and with a little searching, recovered the knife which, according to the prosecution, he had hidden in the said bush. 22. A pertinent issue has been raised by the learned Senior Advocate as regards the manner in which Exh.42 was prepared, the handcuffing of the appellant and the spot where the knife was hidden being accessible to the public at large. He solemnly submits that once an appellant is handcuffed, the entire evidence in relation to the discovery and recovery of the murder weapon, is to be discarded. 23. Pw3 Sharad, who has been declared hostile, had opened his examination-in-chief by stating that the I.O. had called him to the Police Station. On reaching the Police Station, the I.O. asked him to sign a paper which had a script already written. He refused to sign the said paper. Thereafter, somebody was brought from the lockup room who told something and that was reduced into writing. The witness did not know the person. The witness denied that he had proceeded to the place in Kolhar in pursuance of the statement made by the appellant. 24. We find from the cross-examination of PW3 Sharad that, not only has the truth surfaced, but his falsehood stated earlier was also exposed. The witness did not know the person. The witness denied that he had proceeded to the place in Kolhar in pursuance of the statement made by the appellant. 24. We find from the cross-examination of PW3 Sharad that, not only has the truth surfaced, but his falsehood stated earlier was also exposed. The cross-examination conducted by the learned Prosecutor indicates that Sharad admitted that the I.O. had told him that one appellant in police custody is intending to make a statement and he is going to produce something for which Sharad should act as a panch witness. He admitted that he gave his consent and also admitted that the appellant Rupesh was brought out of the lockup room to the chamber of I.O.. He identified Rupesh in Court. Sharad further admitted that the I.O. asked Rupesh to state whatever he desires in the presence of the panchas. Sharad further admitted that the police converted the statements of Rupesh into writing on a paper in the presence of both the panchas and such statements were made by Rupesh in the presence of the panchas. Sharad then admitted that Rupesh said that he will produce a knife, used in a crime, from the place where it was concealed. Sharad then identified Exh. 42, read the contents of said memorandum and admitted that the said statements were made by Rupesh in the presence of the panchas. 25. We find from the evidence that the I.O. carried the two panchas along with the appellant Rupesh and some police staff and they proceeded towards Kolhar in a government jeep. Sharad admits that after entering the limits of village Kolhar, appellant Rupesh instructed the driver to take the vehicle towards Pathare village by taking a left turn. On reaching the Rampur turn, Rupesh asked the driver to stop the jeep. He got down from the jeep along with these persons and proceeded towards a field having standing sugarcane crop, which is not accessible to the public at large. The panchas and the I.O. followed Rupesh who entered a thorny bush and took out a knife having a blade of steel of 9 inches length and a handle grip of red colour. Inclusive of the handle grip, the size of the knife was 9 inches. Sharad then admitted that the I.O. seized the knife. The panchas and the I.O. followed Rupesh who entered a thorny bush and took out a knife having a blade of steel of 9 inches length and a handle grip of red colour. Inclusive of the handle grip, the size of the knife was 9 inches. Sharad then admitted that the I.O. seized the knife. He identified the panchanama and his signature, as well as the signatures of another panch Sanjay, I.O. Bagwan and the signature and thumb impression of the appellant Rupesh. The panchanama is Exh.42-1. 26. In the cross-examination by the counsel for the appellant, he reverted to his earlier version that Mr. Bagwan asked him to sign a paper which was pre-written and he refused to sign. He does not say that Exhibit 42 was the same paper. He was then informed by Mr. Bagwan that a murder has taken place two three days ago and Sharad would not face any problem. Sharad denied that his signatures on Exh.42 and 42-1 were obtained on the instructions of Mr. Bagwan. He stated that, he has put his signatures on Exh.42-1 after returning to Police Station. He denied that Mr Bagwan led the appellant to a thorny bush and pointed towards the knife in the said bush. He admitted that the appellant was handcuffed as a precautionary measure. He denied the suggestion of the defence that the appellant had not made a disclosure statement Exh.42 and that the knife was not recovered from the thorny bush. He also denied the suggestion that he is deposing falsely at the instance of the relatives of the deceased or the I.O. He reiterated that there were blood stains on the blade of the knife when the seizure occurred. 27. The prosecution has examined the second panch witness PW10 Sanjay Ramdas Mhase, in relation to the discovery of the knife and the disclosure statement Exh.42 and the panchanama Exh.42-1. We find that the testimony of PW10 assumes significance in view of PW3 Sharad being a bit shaky, though ultimately supporting the prosecution. The learned Sessions Court had permitted the prosecution to cross-examine Sharad in view of the opening paragraph of his testimony. In crossexamination, he supported Exh.42 and the exercise of recovering the knife. We find that the testimony of PW10 assumes significance in view of PW3 Sharad being a bit shaky, though ultimately supporting the prosecution. The learned Sessions Court had permitted the prosecution to cross-examine Sharad in view of the opening paragraph of his testimony. In crossexamination, he supported Exh.42 and the exercise of recovering the knife. He has appeared a bit shaky in the cross-examination, but he refuted the theory of the defence that Exh.42 and 42-1 were not written in his presence or that he had not travelled with the police to the spot for recovering the knife or that no knife was recovered. 28. The testimony of PW10 (Sanjay Mhase) indicates that he acted as a panch along with Sharad. Sanjay has deposed that he identifies the appellant Rupesh who made a statement that he would produce the knife used in the crime. Whatever he stated was reduced into writing as a disclosure statement at Exh.42. Sharad has also identified the said statement, his signature and approved the contents to be true. 29. Pw-10 (Sanjay Mhase) has then stated that he accompanied the appellant along with Sharad, the I.O. and some police staff in a police vehicle. They proceeded to Kolhar via Rahuri factory and then from village Kolhar to village Pathare. Before Pathare, at the Rampur turn, Rupesh asked the driver to stop the vehicle. He got down from the vehicle, went to a thorny bush near a sugarcane field and he took out a knife which he had hidden in the bush. He handed it over to the police. He stated that, it was a steel knife with a red colour grip (wrongly typed as a white knife in the English version). We verified from the Marathi record which indicates that Sanjay has stated that the steel knife had a red grip. Article 14 (knife) has a red grip. He further stated that there were blood stains on the knife. Seizure panchanama Exh. 42/1 is identified by him, his signature along with the signatures of Sharad, Rupesh and I.O. Bagwan. He identified the knife shown to him which is article no. 14. 30. In cross-examination, he stated that he was not personally acquainted with Mr. Bagwan. He did not ask Mr. Bagwan about drawing any panchanama and he was told that the appellant is going to produce the knife and a panchanama is to be prepared. He identified the knife shown to him which is article no. 14. 30. In cross-examination, he stated that he was not personally acquainted with Mr. Bagwan. He did not ask Mr. Bagwan about drawing any panchanama and he was told that the appellant is going to produce the knife and a panchanama is to be prepared. He had signed along with the other panch on Exh.42 and 42/1, one after the other at the same time. He denied that he was deposing falsely about the disclosure statement Exh.42 made by Rupesh before him at the Rahuri Police Station. He reiterated that the knife article 14 was produced by Rupesh after he led the party to the place where he had concealed the weapon. 31. The learned Senior Advocate has strenuously canvassed three aspects before us to support his contention that though the knife may have been discovered and recovered and though the panchas may have supported the disclosure statement and the exercise of recovery of the knife, the following three issues would render this facet of the case as being a dis-utility:-. a. The appellant was handcuffed which indicates pressure tactics. b. Exh.42/1 panchanama was prepared after the party returned to the police station. c. One of the panch knew that the appellant was likely to produce the knife allegedly used in the commission of the crime. 32. He supports his contention by placing reliance upon Deoraj Deju Suvarna (supra), wherein, the learned Division Bench of this Court has held that, the article should be sealed and the accused should not be handcuffed. Further reliance is placed on the judgment delivered by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shankar Raju Banglorkar (supra). He has also relied upon the judgment delivered by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Moses Fernandes (supra) as to the manner of appreciating the testimony of panch witnesses. (Dictated in Court on 25.09.2020) 33. In Deoraj Deju Suvarna (supra), this Court had noted that the accused was handcuffed and therefore, there can be a doubt as regards the voluntary recovery of the murder weapon. However, in the said case, it is not mentioned as regards the distance which is traveled for enabling the recovery of weapons. (Dictated in Court on 25.09.2020) 33. In Deoraj Deju Suvarna (supra), this Court had noted that the accused was handcuffed and therefore, there can be a doubt as regards the voluntary recovery of the murder weapon. However, in the said case, it is not mentioned as regards the distance which is traveled for enabling the recovery of weapons. In the instant case, it has come on record that a distance of about 12 or more kilometers through villages had to be covered as per the directions of the appellant to reach the place from where he brought out the knife with blood stains. The conduct of the appellant has also been brought on record through evidence during the said journey by both the panch witnesses as well as by the I.O.. It clearly appears from the record that the appellant guided the driver of the vehicle while covering the distance as regards the directions and various turns that were required to be taken. The journey was on a village road and as per the directions of the appellant, the jeep driver was turning left and right and as the vehicle reached a particular spot, the appellant instructed the driver to stop the vehicle since he identified the spot. None of the panch witnesses have even whispered in their evidence that the I.O. was instructing the driver and that the appellant was a silent spectator. 34. There is nothing in the evidence recorded which can be pointed out by the appellant so as to convince us to believe the oral arguments of the learned Senior Advocate that the I.O. knew the spot and the appellant had no idea as regards the spot from where the knife was to be recovered. Both the panch witnesses have not stated that the appellant was silently following the instructions of the I.O.. In fact, both have deposed that the appellant was instructing the driver as regards the spot where the vehicle was to be halted. The evidence indicates that the appellant guided the driver to a spot at a place from where he got down from the vehicle and led the I.O. and the panch witnesses to a bush from which he himself brought out the knife with a little searching. 35. The evidence indicates that the appellant guided the driver to a spot at a place from where he got down from the vehicle and led the I.O. and the panch witnesses to a bush from which he himself brought out the knife with a little searching. 35. In our view, the observations of this Court in Deoraj Deju Suvarna (supra) would not assist the appellant since he has not put up any version as regards the recovery of the knife in his statement under Section 313. When he was specifically posed with question No.82 on the production of the knife from the bushes and the panchanama exhibit 42/1, his only reply was "it is false". It is not the case of the appellant that the prosecution had planted the knife and he had no idea in which direction was he traveling in the police jeep and in which direction, was he being taken. Though he had an opportunity of making a statement before the Trial Court when his Section 313 statement was recorded, he preferred to maintain silence and besides answering almost all questions by saying "it is false", he has not put forth any assertion. 36. The appellant had himself led the police party to the Rampur Phata by taking several turns as per his directions. The police party got down from the jeep and followed the appellant as per his instructions on the left side of the road as he went near the bush and after taking a search, he brought out one knife which is article 14. In cross-examination, no question was put to the I.O. that he had handcuffed the appellant. Though he was cross-examined at length, none of the advocates for the appellant persons even suggested to the I.O. that he had handcuffed the appellant. It is only PW-3 Sharad, who was declared hostile, who has said that the appellant was handcuffed as a "precautionary measure" so as to prevent his escape or fleeing. 37. In Union of India and others vs. Dhanwanti Devi and others, (1996) 6 SCC 44 , the Honourable Supreme Court has concluded that only the essence of the decision and its ratio is binding and not every observation found therein. Every decision must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved. A precedent by long recognition matures into the rule of Stare Decisis. Every decision must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved. A precedent by long recognition matures into the rule of Stare Decisis. We find it appropriate to reproduce paragraphs 9 and 10 in Dhanwanti Devi (supra) hereunder :- "9. Before adverting to and considering whether solatium and interest would be payable under the Act, at the outset, we will dispose of the objection raised by Shri Vaidyanathan that Hari Kishan Khosla case is not a binding precedent nor does it operate as ratio decidendi to be followed as a precedent and is per se per incuriam. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates - (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein not what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it, is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. 10. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents. It would, therefore, be necessary to see whether Hari Kishan Khosla case would form a binding precedent. Therein, admittedly the question that had arisen and was decided by the Bench of three Judges was whether solatium and interest are payable to an owner whose land was acquired under the provisions of the Central Act? On consideration of the facts, the relevant provisions in the Central Act and the previous precedents bearing on the topic, the Court had held that solatium and interest are not a part of compensation. It is a facet of the principle in the statute. On consideration of the facts, the relevant provisions in the Central Act and the previous precedents bearing on the topic, the Court had held that solatium and interest are not a part of compensation. It is a facet of the principle in the statute. The Central Act omitted to provide for payment of solatium and interest since preceding the acquisition the property was under requisition during which period compensation was paid to the owner. The position obtained and enjoyed by the Government during the period of requisition continued after acquisition. The same principle was applied without further elaboration on entitlement to payment of interest of an owner. It is true that the decisions relied on by Shri Vaidyanathan on the principle of payment of interest as part of compensation in respect of land acquired were brought to the attention of this Court for discussion. What would be its purport would be considered a little later. Suffice it to say for the present that the finding that solatium and interest are not payable for the lands acquired under the Central Act as part of compensation is a binding precedent. Obviously, therefore, this Court followed the ratio therein in District Judge, Udhampur case [supra]. The contention, therefore, that Hari Kishan Khosla case cannot be treated as a binding precedent since therein there is no ratio but a conclusion without discussion, is not tenable and devoid of force. In that view, it is not necessary to discuss in extenso the effect of the decisions cited by Shri Vaidyanathan. Equally, the contention of Shri Vaidyanathan that the ratio in Hari Kishan Khosla case is in conflict with the ratio in Satinder Singh case which was neither distinguished nor over ruled and that the decision of a co-ordinate Bench cannot have the effect of overruling decision of another co-ordinate Bench, cannot be given countenance. The effect of the ratio in Satinder Singh's case will be considered a little later; suffice it to state that there is no conflict in the ratio of these two cases if the facts in Satinder Singh case are closely analysed and the principle laid down therein is understood in its proper perspective. Therefore, Hari Kishan Khosla case cannot be held to be per incuriam nor has it the effect of overruling the ratio decidendi of Satinder Singh case." 38. Therefore, Hari Kishan Khosla case cannot be held to be per incuriam nor has it the effect of overruling the ratio decidendi of Satinder Singh case." 38. The learned Division Bench of this Court has dealt with the case of an accused being handcuffed when he discovered and brought out a knife stained with blood, in the case of Putlabai Bhimashankar Pattan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2010) AllMR(Cri) 2084 . It was concluded in paragraph 23 as under :- "23. The learned counsel further submitted that when the knife Article 22 was discovered at the instance of accused no.3 from the MIDC area he was handcuffed as is clear from the evidence of PW 6 Chandrakant Munjale. He placed reliance on the decisions of this court (Division Bench) in the case of (1) ( Shankar Raju Banglorkar vs. State of Goa, (1992) 2 BCR 169 (PB), (2) ( Devraj Suvarna vs. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 BCR 85 ) and (3) ( Laxman Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 5 BCR 45 ). It was urged by the learned counsel that recovery of the knife cannot be held to be voluntary as accused No.3 was handcuffed at the relevant time and therefore, the said recovery is not a circumstance which would support the case of the prosecution. In short, the said recovery is required to be discarded from consideration urged the learned defence counsel. We are not impressed by these submissions. There can be no doubt that when the accused is handcuffed he may not be free from fear of the police or duress or pressure. But, that itself cannot be a reason to discard the recovery of weapon if it was otherwise found to be supported by evidence of the panch witnesses and the Investigating Officer. Handcuffing of a person by itself cannot be a reason to generalise the hypothesis that such a discovery cannot be reliable. Each case will have to be examined in its own peculiar circumstances and in the facts of this case having regard to the testimony of PW 6 Chandrappa and PW 20 Appa Patil and the fact that knife was found to be stained with blood group A and B, we do not find any reason that accused No.3 had used such a knife while assaulting the deceased Vithal as well as the complainant Chanappa. The defence did not challenge the C.A.reports placed on record and exhibited." 39. In the case of The State of Maharashtra vs. Vitthal Tukaram Atugade, (2017) AllMR(Cri) 1274 , the learned Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with a similar case of an accused being handcuffed while discovering the body of the victim, has concluded in paragraphs 28 to 31 as under :- "28. It is well settled that the observations in a judgment cannot be de-hors the point which is sought to be raised and the facts in which such point is raised. The observations cannot by themselves form the ratio of the decision. The ratio of the decision is to be drawn after considering the facts of the case, the point which is sought to be raised in the matter, the arguments which are canvassed in support of rival contentions in relation to such point, the discussion made by the Court with reference to such point canvassed by the counsel for the parties and the ultimate decision arrived thereupon. On taking into consideration all these aspects, the ratio of the decision has to be gathered. Any sentence in a judgment cannot be read as a statutory provision and the ratio in that regard is well settled by catena of decisions of the Apex Court. This has been clearly explained in different decisions of the Apex court including in the matter of Union of India & Ors Vs. Dhanwanti Devi & Ors, (1996) 6 SCC 44 . It has clearly ruled therein that the decision is what it decides and not what follows from it. 29. In the decisions in the case of Prabho (supra) and Niranjan Panja (supra), the question did not arise specifically for consideration as to whether failure to record the information given by the accused would render the evidence relating to discovery by the accused inadmissible. However, this question arose directly for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq Vs State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 13 SCC 621 on which the learned APP has placed reliance. In the said case, the same question as in the present case specifically arose for consideration which can be seen from paragraph 169 of the judgment which reads thus:- "Now coming to the second argument of failure to record the information, it must be held that it is not always necessary. In the said case, the same question as in the present case specifically arose for consideration which can be seen from paragraph 169 of the judgment which reads thus:- "Now coming to the second argument of failure to record the information, it must be held that it is not always necessary. What is really important is the credibility of the evidence of the investigating agency about getting information/statement regarding the information from the accused. If the evidence of the investigating officer is found to be credible then even in the absence of a recorded statement, the evidence can be accepted and it could be held that it was the accused who provided the information on the basis of which a subsequent discovery was made. The question is that of credibility and not the formality of recording the statement. The essence of the proof of a discovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is only that it should be credibly proved that the discovery made was a relevant and material discovery which proceeded in pursuance of the information supplied by the accused in the custody. How the prosecution proved it, is to be judged by the Court but if the Court finds the fact of such information having been given by the accused in custody is credible and acceptable even in the absence of the recorded statement and in pursuance of that information some material discovery has been effected then the aspect of discovery will not suffer from any vice and can be acted upon." 30. In Suresh Chandra Bahri Vs. State of Bihar,1955 Supp1 SCC 80, no discovery statement was recorded by the investigating officer of the information supplied by the accused to him. Further no public witness was examined by the prosecution to support the theory that such an information was given by the accused to him in pursuance of which some material discovery was made. The Supreme Court, however, in spite of these two alleged defects, accepted the evidence of discovery against the accused on the basis of the evidence of the police officer. In the present case, we find the evidence of police officer PW-15 Bhimrao Waghmare to be wholly credible and reliable. He has not at all been shaken in his crossexamination. The Supreme Court, however, in spite of these two alleged defects, accepted the evidence of discovery against the accused on the basis of the evidence of the police officer. In the present case, we find the evidence of police officer PW-15 Bhimrao Waghmare to be wholly credible and reliable. He has not at all been shaken in his crossexamination. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation in relying on his evidence which shows that the spot where the dead body of the victim girl was buried was shown by the accused in presence of PW-8, the panch witness. In our view the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the accused are of no help to him. 31. Mr.Apte, thereafter would contend that when the alleged discovery of the spot of rape, the spot of burial of the dead body and the spot of concealment of slack of deceased was discovered at the instance of the accused, he was handcuffed and therefore the said discovery cannot be relied upon in the eyes of law. We are unable to accept the said submission for the reasons that, there can be no doubt when the accused was handcuffed he may not be free from fear of the police or duress or pressure. But, that itself cannot be a reason to discard the recovery of weapon if it was otherwise found to be supported by evidence of the panch witnesses and the Investigating Officer. That handcuffing of a person by itself cannot be a reason to generalise the hypothesis that such a discovery cannot be reliable. That each case will have to be examined in its own peculiar circumstances. We are fortified in taking this view by the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Putalabai Bhimashankar Pattan Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2010) AllMR(Cri) 2084 . In the present case the accused in the presence of PW-8 Subhash Karande, the panch witness, Smt. Kavita (PW-1) and Shri Bhimrao Waghamare (PW-15) the Investigating officer made disclosure statement which has been recorded as per Exhibit 33 in the form of memorandum statement. We therefore do not find any substance in the submission of Shri Apte in that behalf." 40. We therefore do not find any substance in the submission of Shri Apte in that behalf." 40. In the light of the above, we find that the view taken in the facts and circumstances of the case of Deoraj Deju Suvarna (supra), would not be applicable to this case. We are, therefore, of the view that there is no doubt as regards the proper recovery of the murder weapon. RECOVERY OF CLOTHES 41. The prosecution has put forth the case of recovery of the shirt and pant worn by the appellant at the time of committing the offence. Exhibit 55 is the "Accused Memorandum Form" which contains the statement made by the appellant. It is recorded in Marathi. He volunteered to handover the motorcycle and the clothes hidden by him. Salveram Changdeo Kadam (not examined) and Sanjay Rangnath Kadam (PW-5), were the panch witnesses. 42. We are to assess the manner in which the appellant has recovered the articles used in the commission of the crime, in the light of the evidence recorded, in order to draw a conclusion whether it was a voluntary disclosure. PW-5 (Sanjay) stated that he does not know the second panch Savleram. The appellant put forth his narration in the presence of PW-5 and Savleram and whatever he said in Marathi language, was recorded in Marathi at Exhibit 55. He has signed on Exhibit 55 after the text was written in his presence. He identified the said statement as well as the signature of Savleram, the I.O. and the signature and thumb impression of the appellant Rupesh whom he identified in Court. 43. Pw-5 has then narrated as to how the two panch, I.O. and jeep driver made the journey upto Kankapur Shivar as per the instructions of the appellant. At one place, the appellant asked the jeep driver to stop the jeep, he then got down and proceeded through a kaccha road. The other persons in the jeep followed him. On reaching the house, having roof of tiles, the appellant stopped and went inside that house. PW-5 and others followed him. The appellant recovered one pant of sky blue colour and one full shirt which was brown in colour and had blood stains on them. The I.O. seized these articles handed over by the appellant. On reaching the house, having roof of tiles, the appellant stopped and went inside that house. PW-5 and others followed him. The appellant recovered one pant of sky blue colour and one full shirt which was brown in colour and had blood stains on them. The I.O. seized these articles handed over by the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant traveled to the kitchen room and he pointed out the motorcycle - "Boxer" model of Kawasaki company, which was covered with a bed sheet. The motorcycle was also seized. A panchanama in respect of seizure of the clothes and motorcycle Exhibit 55/1 was prepared. PW-5 identified his signature and of Savleram, the signature of the I.O. and the signature and thumb impression of the appellant. The shirt and the pant were marked as article numbers 12 and 11, respectively. They were packed and sealed in a brown colour packet and a paper slip containing signatures of the panch was affixed on the packet. The house from which these articles were recovered, was the house of Rupesh i.e. the marital home of the deceased. 44. In cross examination, PW-5 has stated that his village Devlali Pravara is about 13 kilometers away from Rahuri. It takes about 15 to 20 minutes to reach Rahuri. He had never acted as a panch witness earlier. He was not acquainted with the procedure to be followed for drawing the panchnama. All these persons had traveled for about one and half hours to reach the place, wherefrom Rupesh intended to recover his clothes. After they returned to the police station, the I.O. prepared the panchanama and obtained the signatures of the panchas. 45. Pw-14 (I.O.) has stated in his deposition that Exhibit 55 was written down after the appellant made a statement. The appellant had instructed the path of the journey to village Kankapur. When the appellant asked the party to stop at a house, the vehicle was stopped. All got down and followed the appellant when he led them to a room. He had removed two articles from beneath a mattress on a cot. It was a sky blue full pant and a chocolate colour full shirt with blood stains thereon. The panchanama exhibit 55/1 was drawn. He identified the signatures of the other pancha, himself and the thumb impression and signature of the appellant. He had removed two articles from beneath a mattress on a cot. It was a sky blue full pant and a chocolate colour full shirt with blood stains thereon. The panchanama exhibit 55/1 was drawn. He identified the signatures of the other pancha, himself and the thumb impression and signature of the appellant. He narrated the manner in which the appellant then led the party to a portion behind the house and removed the cloth cover under which the motorcycle MH-17-P-1329 - Kawasaki Boxer was hidden. The said house belonged to accused No.1 (appellant herein). 46. It is obvious that there was no handcuffing of the appellant in this event of discovering and recovering the blood stained clothes and motorcycle. Subsequently, the chemical analysis indicated that the blood stains on the knife as well as the clothes, was of A group. The learned Senior Advocate submits that as the panchanama of the seizure exhibit 55/1 was carried out in the police station, a doubt is created. The learned APP has countered by submitting that the normal practice followed by the police in investigation is to seize the articles, seal them, apply a paper seal (kagadi seal) and after the party returns back to the police station, the panchanama of the seizure of the articles is carried out in the presence of the appellant. This procedure has been followed by the I.O. while carrying out the panchanama exhibit 42/1 and exhibit 55/1. The writing on exhibit 42/1 and exhibit 55/1 was done in the presence of the appellant in the police station. It is not the case of the appellant in his statement under Section 313 or even in cross-examination of PW-5 and PW-14 that the clothes and the motorcycle were planted inside his house or that the clothes were planted beneath the mattress on the bed kept in one of the bedrooms in his own house. Had this been so, naturally the family members of the deceased would not have allowed the police to place blood stained clothes beneath a mattress on a cot used for sleeping by some of the family members. 47. We are, therefore, of the view that the said procedure cannot be faulted and a minor lacuna, if any, would not demolish the entire evidence. The seizure of the articles is at the behest of the appellant. 47. We are, therefore, of the view that the said procedure cannot be faulted and a minor lacuna, if any, would not demolish the entire evidence. The seizure of the articles is at the behest of the appellant. It was within his exclusive knowledge and he led the police to the knife, the clothes and his motorcycle. BLOOD : ITS SOURCE AT THE SCENE OF CRIME AND ON THE ARTICLES 48. It is not in dispute that blood had heavily oozed out from the deep stab wound suffered by the deceased Jaishree. She had bled profusely to an extent that her gown, sweater, her bra, petticoat and her underwear were all stained with blood and the blood group was "A". The panchanama dated 08.04.2011 (exhibit 49) which records the description of the gown, sweater, peticoat, bra and underwear having blood stains, has been admitted in evidence by the defence. The roznama as well as the panchanama bears the endorsement of such admission. The learned Senior Counsel has not ventured into disputing this facet of the case. 49. We find from the evidence recorded that the report of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory dated 17.05.2012 (exhibit 105) indicates that the blood of the deceased labelled Ex.No.3 could not be determined as the results were inconclusive. This aspect has been strenuously highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel to contend that the blood group of the deceased has not been determined. He submits that it is insignificant that the blood found on the knife, shirt and pant of the appellant and all the above described clothing of the deceased, being blood group A. It does not indicate the involvement of the appellant as the Court is not aware of the blood group of the deceased. 50. The learned APP has relied upon the judgment delivered by the Honourable Apex Court in State of Rajasthan V. Teja Ram (supra) in which, the failure of the Serologist in determining the blood group, has been dealt with. It was observed by the Honourable Apex Court in paragraphs 20 to 27 as under :- "20. Another reason which the High Court advanced to repel the testimony of such a good number of probable witnesses is that they are all close relatives of the deceased and that independent witnesses were not examined by the prosecution. It was observed by the Honourable Apex Court in paragraphs 20 to 27 as under :- "20. Another reason which the High Court advanced to repel the testimony of such a good number of probable witnesses is that they are all close relatives of the deceased and that independent witnesses were not examined by the prosecution. The overinsistence on witnesses having no relation with the victims often results in criminal justice going awry. When any incident happens in a dwelling house, the most natural witnesses would be the inmates of that house. It is un-pragmatic to ignore such natural witnesses and insist on outsiders who would not have even seen any thing. If the Court has discerned from the evidence or even from the investigation records that some other independent person has witnessed any event connecting the incident in question then there is justification for making adverse comments against non-examination of such person as prosecution witness. Otherwise, merely on surmises the Court should not castigate a prosecution for not examining other persons of the locality as prosecution witnesses. Prosecution can be expected to examine only those who have witnessed the events and not those who have not seen it though the neighbourhood may be replete with other residents also. 21. One of the circumstances which the trial court relied on as incriminating the accused is the recovery of two axes (Kulhadis) on the strength of statements of A1 Teja Ram and A2 Ram Lal. They were subjected to chemical examination and the result is that both axes were found stained with blood. When they were further subjected to test by a Serologist, the blood on one axe was found to be of human origin, while the blood stain on the other axe was found to have so disintegrated that its origin became undetectable. Ex.P10 is the report of the Serologist. 22. The axes hidden beneath the rags were disinterred with the help of information elicited from the accused. According to PW 21 (the Investigation Officer) A1 Teja Ram told him "I have concealed the axe under some rags and kept it at the left corner of the hut in my farm at Dhokwa." The axe recovered pursuant thereto on 20.9.1981 as per Ex.P14 seizure memo was marked as Article No.8. According to PW 21 (the Investigation Officer) A1 Teja Ram told him "I have concealed the axe under some rags and kept it at the left corner of the hut in my farm at Dhokwa." The axe recovered pursuant thereto on 20.9.1981 as per Ex.P14 seizure memo was marked as Article No.8. Similarly, A2 Ram Lal has told the Investigating Officer that "I have concealed the axe under some rags and placed it on a slab in the store of my house." On the said information another axe was recovered on 23.9.1981 as per Ex.P3 Seizure Memo. That axe has been marked as Article 1. 23. The facts discovered from the aforementioned statements and recovery of the axes are that those weapons were concealed by the said two accused. 24. Normally, the above circumstance should have been given weighty consideration in the evaluation of circumstantial evidence. But the High Court down staged it on a reasoning which is difficult to sustain. This is what the High Court has observed regarding the evidence relating to the recovery of the two axes (Kulhadis): "The evidence of the blood stained Kulhadi is not sufficient as the prosecution has not been able to prove that Kulhadi which was stained with human blood was recovered from whom. Thus it is not clear whether the recovered Kulhadi was of Teja Ram or of Ramlal. The other infirmity in the Chemical Examiner's Report is that it does not mention the extent of blood seen on the Kulhadi. It has not been established clearly as to which particular accused, the incriminating axe belonged. As such, it can not be used against any one of these two accused." 25. Failure of the Serologist to detect the origin of the blood, due to disintegration of the serum in the meanwhile, does not mean that the blood stuck on the axe would not have been human blood at all. Sometimes it happens, either because the stain is too insufficient or due to hematological changes and plasmatic coagulation that a Serologist might fail to detect the origin of the blood. Will it then mean that the blood would be of some other origin? Such a guess work that blood on the other axe would have been animal blood is unrealistic and far-fetched in the broad spectrum of this case. Will it then mean that the blood would be of some other origin? Such a guess work that blood on the other axe would have been animal blood is unrealistic and far-fetched in the broad spectrum of this case. The effort of the criminal court should not be to prowl for imaginative doubts. Unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension which a judicially conscientious mind entertains with some objectivity no benefit can be claimed by the accused. 26. Learned counsel for the accused made an effort to sustain the rejection of the above said evidence for which he cited the decisions in Prabhu Babaji Navle v. State of Bombay, (1956) AIR SC 51 and Raghav Prapanna Tripathi vs. State of U.P., (1963) AIR SC 74 . In the former, Vivian Bose, J. has observed that the Chemical Examiner's duty is to indicate the number of blood stains found by him on each exhibit and the extent of each stain unless they are too minute or too numerous to be described in detail. It was a case in which one circumstance projected by the prosecution was just one spot of blood on a dhoti. Their Lordships felt that "blood could equally have spurted on the dhoti of a wholly innocent person passing through in the circumstances described by us earlier in the judgment". In the latter decision, this Court observed regarding the certificate of a chemical examiner that inasmuch as the blood stain is not proved to be of human origin the circumstance has no evidentiary value "in the circumstances" connecting the accused with the murder. The further part of the circumstance in that case showed that a shirt was seized from a dry cleaning establishment and the proprietor of the said establishment had testified that when the shirt was given to him for dry cleaning it was not blood stained. 27. We are unable to find out from the aforesaid decisions any legal ratio that in all cases where there was failure of detecting the origin of the blood the circumstance arising from recovery of the weapon would stand relegated to disutility. The observations in the aforesaid cases were made on the fact situation existed therein. They cannot be imported to a case where the facts are materially different." 51. The observations in the aforesaid cases were made on the fact situation existed therein. They cannot be imported to a case where the facts are materially different." 51. Thus, the issue is settled by the Honourable Apex Court that the failure of the Serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to disintegration of the serum, in the meanwhile, does not mean that the blood stuck onto the murder weapon would not have been human blood. It does happen, either because the stain is too insufficient or due to haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation that the serologist might fail to detect the origin of the blood. The Honourable Apex Court, therefore, questioned as to "Will it then mean that the blood would be of some other origin? Such a guess work that blood on the other axe would have been animal blood is unrealistic and far-fetched in the broad spectrum of this case. The effort of the criminal court should not be to prowl for imaginative doubts. Unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension which a judicially conscientious mind entertains with some objectivity, no benefit can be claimed by the accused." 52. In the case in hand, there is no dispute that the deceased bled profusely and her blood was found on the entire clothing including her innerwear as noted above. The blood fallen on the soil where she lay after the assault, was also analyzed and the blood stains found on the knife, shirt and pant worn by the appellant, all belonged to blood Group A, human blood group. The learned Senior Counsel has contended that if the blood of the deceased could not be determined, this entire evidence is to be discarded and ignored. The answer to his contention is found in paragraph 27 in the case of State of Rajasthan V. Teja Ram (supra) wherein, the Honourable Apex Court has concluded that the failure of detecting the origin of the blood, the circumstances arising from recovery of the weapon, would not stand relegated to dis-utility. It was in these circumstances that the judgment of acquittal delivered by the High Court, while upsetting the conviction handed down by the Trial Court, was interfered with by the Honourable Apex Court and the accused was held guilty. The conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court was restored. 53. It was in these circumstances that the judgment of acquittal delivered by the High Court, while upsetting the conviction handed down by the Trial Court, was interfered with by the Honourable Apex Court and the accused was held guilty. The conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court was restored. 53. We find from the case in hand that it is not the case of the defence that the deceased had never bled or the blood found on her entire clothing was planted by the police. In fact, as noted above, exhibit-49 pertaining to these clothing and the blood stains found thereon as recorded in the panchanama and these documents have been admitted in evidence by the defence. Exhibit 106 is the lab report dated 17.12.2012 delivered by the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory wherein, the blood stains found on the earth mixed with grass were kept in paper packet labelled 1 and 2, the gown (which was cut to be taken out) was wrapped in the paper packet labelled 3, the sweater in paper packet labelled 4, the petticoat (cut open) in paper packet labelled 5, the bra (cut open) in paper packet labelled 6 and the nicker (cut open) kept in paper packet labelled 7, were determined to be human species origin. The blood group to the extent of label 1 was inconclusive and no blood was found in the paper packet labelled 2. However, the blood found on the entire clothing item Nos.3 to 7 was determined to be human blood group A. 54. The said laboratory has also delivered it's report dated 17.12.2012 at Exhibit 107, which pertains to the full pant wrapped in paper packet label 9, full shirt wrapped in paper packet label 10 and the knife wrapped in paper packet label 11. The species origin was determined as being human blood and the blood group was determined to be A, which matches the blood that flowed from the wound, suffered by the deceased Jaishree, onto her clothing right upto her innerwear. 55. The learned Senior Counsel has vehemently contended that the appellant has a right to keep silent and he is not required to say anything in defence. Notwithstanding the said contention which may be permissible in law, we are considering the contentions of the appellant in the backdrop of the evidence recorded before the Trial Court. 55. The learned Senior Counsel has vehemently contended that the appellant has a right to keep silent and he is not required to say anything in defence. Notwithstanding the said contention which may be permissible in law, we are considering the contentions of the appellant in the backdrop of the evidence recorded before the Trial Court. We are of the view that if some material would have been placed before the Court to falsify Exhibit 42 and Exhibit 55, we could have assessed the contention of the appellant that he has never accompanied the police party and the panchas for the recovery of the knife, clothes and motorcycle. We have no material before us so as to contradict the cumulative effect of the evidence that the appellant made a disclosure statement as is permissible and the articles were discovered and seized under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. We are, therefore, convinced that the blood that oozed out of the wound of the deceased was of group A and which was found on her clothes as noted above, the murder weapon and the clothes of the appellant. Since the source of the blood was the wound inflicted on the body of the deceased that, it leads us to the irresistible conclusion that the blood group of the deceased was "A" and she had been murdered by the knife (article 14). CD RECORD AND SD RECORD (CDR & SDR) 56. Notwithstanding our conclusions as above, the involvement of the appellant in the murder of his wife, can also be tested on the basis of the mobile tower location of the appellant, as being the last link in the chain. As has been observed by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shivaji Anandrao Chede (supra), that when the case of the prosecution is entirely based on the circumstantial evidence, the chain has to be complete. The Trial Court has accepted and we have arrived at the same conclusion, that Jaishree had suffered a homicidal death and the material before us as discussed herein above, indicates the direct involvement of Rupesh in the light of the blood stains noticed on various articles. The Trial Court has accepted and we have arrived at the same conclusion, that Jaishree had suffered a homicidal death and the material before us as discussed herein above, indicates the direct involvement of Rupesh in the light of the blood stains noticed on various articles. Nevertheless, it would be necessary to rely upon the call details record (CDR) and the station details record (SDR) so as to conclusively assess whether, the appellant was at the same location at Ambi village in between 9:00 to 9:30 pm on 07.04.2011 when Jaishree was murdered. 57. The prosecution has examined PW-15 (Sachin Shinde), Nodal Officer for Idea Cellular and PW-16 (Chetan S. Patil), Nodal Officer for Airtel. The CDR and SDR would amount to electronic evidence and for which, a certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act is required. Sections 65-A and 65-B read as under :- "65-A. Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:- The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65-B. 65-B. Admissibility of electronic records.:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. (2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:- (a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer during the period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer; (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities; (c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities. (3) Where over any period, the function of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by computers, whether- (a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or (b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or (c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or (d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of computers, all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly. (4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,- (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced; (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer; (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it. (5) For the purposes of this section,- (a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment; (b) whether in the course of activities carried on by any official information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities; (c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section any reference to information being derived from other information shall be a reference to its being derived therefrom by calculation, comparison or any other process." 58. The prosecution has brought on record the certificate dated 08.07.2014 from Bharti Airtel Limited at Exhibit 113. The said certificate is accompanied with 08 pages of documents, which have been exhibited and the contents of which have been proved by evidence before the Trial Court. The prosecution has brought on record the certificate dated 08.07.2014 from Bharti Airtel Limited at Exhibit 113. The said certificate is accompanied with 08 pages of documents, which have been exhibited and the contents of which have been proved by evidence before the Trial Court. PW-15 (Sachin Shinde) has stated in his deposition that cell Z (mobile number 9767783819) belongs to PW-2 Prakash, brother of the deceased. He was a subscriber of Idea Cellular company. The call details were produced by PW-15 in view of the email received by his office from the office of the Superintendent of Police, Ahmednagar dated 08.04.2011, which is the very next day after Jaishree was murdered in between 9 to 9:30 pm on 07.04.2011. He has produced the CDR and SDR of cell Z. The certificate under Section 65-B for the said purpose was also brought on record as Exhibit 111. PW-15 has relied upon the documents that he has produced and has certified the truthfulness of the contents of the said documents. In the skeletal cross-examination, his testimony could not be demolished. He stated that the tower location depends upon its capacity. 59. From the said CDR record, it is visible that the appellant who had two cellphones, cell X and cell Y, had made one call on 07.04.2011 at 21:11 hours from cell X to cell Z. Cell X was with the appellant and cell Z was Jaishree's brother's phone. It is admitted that Jaishree did not have her own cell number and her husband used to speak to her only by calling on her brother's cellphone Z. This call lasted for 8 seconds. Prior thereto, a similar call was made at 20:40 hours from cell X to cell Z and the call lasted for 30 seconds. The crucial call is the one made by Rupesh from cell X to cell Z at 21:11 hours, which lasted for 289 seconds. 60. It cannot be ignored that when the appellant was arrested on 09.04.2011 at 04:30 pm, cell X was recovered from him. The second cell phone cell Y was found to be registered in his name. That cell phone was also recovered. The contention of the learned Senior Advocate is that the prosecution has failed to determine that cell X was being used by the appellant. The second cell phone cell Y was found to be registered in his name. That cell phone was also recovered. The contention of the learned Senior Advocate is that the prosecution has failed to determine that cell X was being used by the appellant. We do not find the said submission convincing for the reason that cell X was actually recovered from the appellant immediate to his arrest. 61. Pw-16 (Chetan Patil) relied upon the CDR and SDR, identified the said documents and has proved its contents by his deposition at Exhibit 112. The certificate produced under Section 65-B exhibit 113 has also been identified by him. We find from the CDR produced by PW-16 that there was yet another call between cell Z to cell Y. It tallies with the CDR produced by the Idea Cellular to the extent of the talk between cell Z and cell Y. The location of cell Z is at post Lakh Rahuri and the location of Rupesh's cell Y is at post Devlali Pravara, which tower covers the parental residence of the deceased. This call lasted for 24 seconds, which was an outgoing call made from the phone Z of Prakash, brother of the deceased. 62. As such, the calls made from cell X to cell Z and from cell Z to cell Y indicate that the tower location of appellant Rupesh (cell X and cell Y) was below the same tower which covers the deceased residing in her parental home. The learned Senior Counsel has laid a heavy stress on the failure of the prosecution in not bringing on record the tower location with reference to cell Z, which belongs to the brother of the deceased. He, therefore, contends that his talk with his wife and his presence close to her house, is not established. We do not find that the said contention deserves any consideration. The evidence brought on record by Bharti Airtel Cellular indicates that cell Y, registered in the name of the appellant , has his location established at post Devlali Pravara at 21:11:45 hours on 07.04.2011. If he was not involved in the offence of inflicting the stab injury on Jaishree in between 09 to 09:30 pm, he would not have been having his tower location in the close vicinity of the deceased. If he was not involved in the offence of inflicting the stab injury on Jaishree in between 09 to 09:30 pm, he would not have been having his tower location in the close vicinity of the deceased. It was only after 09.51.00 that his tower location has moved to an adjacent tower location, proving that he fled from the scene of crime. MOTIVE AND CONDUCT 63. The learned Senior Advocate has strenuously contended that in a case in which only circumstantial evidence is available, the prosecution is under an obligation to prove the motive behind the crime. This would not be the situation if direct evidence in the form of eyewitnesses is available. It is settled law that any amount of circumstantial evidence would not prove the guilt of the appellant until the motive is proved. The appellant, who was married only four months prior to the death of his wife, had no motive and there was no reason for him to murder his wife. The marriage was fresh and there were no altercations or a marital discord between him and the deceased. 64. The learned APP has contended that the appellant was constantly suspecting the character of his wife and had developed a serious doubt about her extramarital relations with a person from her village. He submits that the brother PW-2 and PW-6 sister of the deceased, have specifically stated in their depositions that the deceased used to narrate to them that her husband constantly harasses her by alleging that she has relations with a person from village Ambi. PW-2 has stated in his deposition that the deceased had disclosed to him during her first visit after marriage to the parental home that the appellant Rupesh used to suspect her character and used to humiliate her by alleging that she has illicit relationship with a youth from Ambi village. Even on 03.04.2011 when she visited her parents for Gudipadva, she disclosed that the appellant Rupesh was constantly ill-treating her and was suspecting her character. In cross-examination, PW-2 (Prakash) stated that he has not disclosed about Jaishree's narration that the appellant was suspecting her character and harassing her, when his statement or supplementary statement was recorded. He reiterated in the cross-examination that he was not lying about the appellant suspecting the character of Jaishree and her murder had occurred on account of his suspicion. In cross-examination, PW-2 (Prakash) stated that he has not disclosed about Jaishree's narration that the appellant was suspecting her character and harassing her, when his statement or supplementary statement was recorded. He reiterated in the cross-examination that he was not lying about the appellant suspecting the character of Jaishree and her murder had occurred on account of his suspicion. The learned Senior Advocate contends that this is an improvement in his version and the witness will have to be disbelieved to this extent. 65. Pw-6 (Archana), married sister of the deceased, has deposed that Jaishree and PW-6 were married on the same date in the same ceremony. After marriage, for the first time, both met at the time of the marriage of their maternal uncle's son when Jaishree disclosed to PW-6 that Rupesh suspects her character and alleges that she receives phone calls from a youth from village Ambi regarding her relationship. The appellant was mentally harassing Jaishree as he suspected her character. In the cross-examination, PW-6 has stated that when Jaishree was talking to the appellant Rupesh at village Ambi when he visited them on 06.04.2011, she did not notice that they were quarreling or exchanging hot words in her presence. She has further reiterated that Jaishree was complaining against the appellant Rupesh that he was suspecting her character and this was told to her by Jaishree when both attended the marriage of their maternal uncle's son. 66. In order to come to a firm conclusion as regards the motive in the mind of the appellant Rupesh to kill Jaishree, we have weighed the deposition of PW-2 (brother) and PW-6 (sister of the deceased). Even if it is assumed that the brother did not state in his statement or supplementary statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. before the police that Jaishree had disclosed to him the harassment at the hands of Rupesh with regard to her character, we find that the testimony of PW-6 is unshaken. Even if we ignore or discard the deposition of PW-2 to this extent on the ground of improvement of his story, the testimony of PW-6 is consistent all throughout. The possibility of a sister, who got married on the same date and in the same ceremony along with the other sister, narrating her matrimonial harassment to such a sister, is quite possible. The possibility of a sister, who got married on the same date and in the same ceremony along with the other sister, narrating her matrimonial harassment to such a sister, is quite possible. The comfort level between two sisters in sharing their matrimonial experiences cannot be ruled out. It is also possible that such a married girl would think of the discomfort and sadness that a mother may feel if such harassment is narrated to the mother within a space of two months. This could also be a reason as to why Jaishree first disclosed her harassment at the hands of Rupesh to her sister rather than narrating it to her mother, who would be disturbed. 67. We find from these pieces of evidence that the prosecution has been able to establish that the appellant Rupesh was suspecting the character of the deceased and had developed a feeling that she is disloyal to him and is having a relationship with a youth from Ambi village. The Trial Court has appreciated this aspect of the case. We find that suspicion was firmly embedded in the mind of the appellant Rupesh that his wife was in love with another person. We are of the view that if such a thought constantly lingers in the mind of the husband, he is bound to feel insecure, jealous and no husband would accept his wife having extramarital relations with another man. Whatever evidence that we have before us on this count and as PW-2 and PW-6 have maintained their statement in cross-examination, the motive to kill the deceased is available. 68. The Honourable Supreme Court has held, in Vivek Kalra vs. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 12 SCC 439 , that normally in cases based purely on circumstantial evidence, motive is a relevant fact. However, in cases where the chain of circumstances establishes beyond any doubt that it is the accused and the accused alone, who has committed the offence, the Court can hold the accused guilty and convict him even if the motive is not visible. It would be apposite to reproduce paragraph 6 hereunder :- "6. However, in cases where the chain of circumstances establishes beyond any doubt that it is the accused and the accused alone, who has committed the offence, the Court can hold the accused guilty and convict him even if the motive is not visible. It would be apposite to reproduce paragraph 6 hereunder :- "6. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and we agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that from the evidence of PW-11 one could not hold that the appellant had committed the murder of the deceased to take revenge on his uncle (PW11), who had not given him Rs.80,000/- kept in fixed deposit. We are, however, of the opinion that where prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence only, motive is a relevant fact and can be taken into consideration under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 but where the chain of other circumstances establish beyond reasonable doubt that it is the accused and accused alone who has committed the offence and this is one such case the Court cannot hold that in the absence of motive of the accused being established by the prosecution, the accused cannot be held guilty of the offence. In Ujjagar Singh v. State of Punjab, (2007) 13 SCC 90 , this Court observed: "It is true that in a case relating to circumstantial evidence motive does assume great importance but to say that the absence of motive would dislodge the entire prosecution story is perhaps giving this one factor an importance which is not due and (to use the clich ) the motive is in the mind of the accused and can seldom be fathomed with any degree of accuracy." CONDUCT OF RUPESH AFTER THE EVENT OF JAISHREE'S MURDER 69. The record reveals that after Jaishree was shifted to the Sakhar Kamgar Hospital and was declared dead on arrival, her family members went into a state of shock. The learned APP has canvassed that several attempts were made to contact Rupesh to convey to him that his wife Jaishree had been murdered. The reaction of her family members in attempting to call Rupesh cannot be doubted since they had no inkling that it could be Rupesh who had murdered Jaishree. The learned APP has canvassed that several attempts were made to contact Rupesh to convey to him that his wife Jaishree had been murdered. The reaction of her family members in attempting to call Rupesh cannot be doubted since they had no inkling that it could be Rupesh who had murdered Jaishree. PW-8 (Nilesh Sahebrao Shinde), occupation rickshaw driver and friend of PW-2, brother of the deceased, has deposed that the hands of Jaishree were tied behind her back. He along with PW-2 (Prakash) and PW-1 (Latabai) were near the body of Jaishree. One of them released the hands of Jaishree by loosening the handkerchief. It was through Prakash that PW-8 learnt that Rupesh was suspecting her character. PW-2 called Rupesh after 10:00 pm when Jaishree was declared dead, but could not establish contact with him as Rupesh did not answer the phone call from PW-2. 70. In cross-examination, PW-8 has truthfully stated that he did not try to call Rupesh since Rupesh was not accepting the phone calls from Prakash. The learned Senior Advocate has denied that Rupesh had declined to receive the call from PW-2 after the murder occurred. He also submits that the CDR does not indicate that PW-2 had called him after the murder. We are of the view that the CDR would not reflect blank calls. Unless a call from cell Z by PW-2 was answered by Rupesh on cell X or cell Y, the CDR would not reflect any details. We feel that it is most improbable that after Jaishree was pronounced dead at 10 pm which had to be followed by her postmortem and funeral, the bereaved family members would not call Rupesh to inform him the bad news. Going by the Hindu religion customs, we are of the view that the funeral had to take place at the hands of Rupesh and he had the right to light the funeral pyre and consign the body to the flames. The whereabouts of Rupesh after the death of Jaishree were unknown. He did not attend her funeral. He was arrested at 04:30 pm on 09.04.2011 from his residence and the arrest panchanama was drawn. 71. The Honourable Apex Court, in Vivek Kalra (supra), while dealing with the issue of motive and conduct in a murder case, which was founded on circumstantial evidence, has observed in paragraph 9 as under :- "9. He did not attend her funeral. He was arrested at 04:30 pm on 09.04.2011 from his residence and the arrest panchanama was drawn. 71. The Honourable Apex Court, in Vivek Kalra (supra), while dealing with the issue of motive and conduct in a murder case, which was founded on circumstantial evidence, has observed in paragraph 9 as under :- "9. It is true that PW-5 has stated that the appellant had a good behaviour and had no bad habit. Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, however, provides that the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent to it. Hence, any behaviour or conduct of the appellant would be relevant if it had nexus with the offence under Section 302 alleged to have been committed by him. This Court has held in Vikramjit Singh alias Vicky vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 12 SCC 306 at page 314: ".....Conduct of an accused must have nexus with the crime committed. It must form part of the evidence as regards his conduct either preceding, during or after the commission of the offence as envisaged under Section 8 of the Evidence Act...." The general good behaviour of the appellant and the fact that he had no bad habit have no nexus with the offence alleged against the appellant and are not relevant when other circumstances have established beyond reasonable doubt that it is the appellant and the appellant alone who has committed the murder of the deceased." 72. We do find that the submissions of the learned APP on this count to be worthy of appreciation. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 73. We are aware of the strict principles applicable to such cases in which the entire case is founded on circumstantial evidence. In Hanuman Govind Nargundkar and another vs. State of M.P., (1952) AIR SC 343 , the Honourable Apex Court (three Judges Bench), considered the effect of Section 367 of the Cr.P.C. and has observed in paragraph 10 as under :- "10. Assuming that the accused Nargundkar had taken the tenders to his house, the prosecution, in order to bring the guilt home to the accused, has yet to prove the other facts referred to above. Assuming that the accused Nargundkar had taken the tenders to his house, the prosecution, in order to bring the guilt home to the accused, has yet to prove the other facts referred to above. No direct evidence was adduced in proof of those facts. Reliance was placed by the prosecution and by the courts below on certain circumstances, and intrinsic evidence contained in the impugned document, Exhibit P-3A. In dealing with circumstantial evidence the rules specially applicable to such evidence must be borne in mind. In such cases there is always the danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof and therefore, it is right to recall the warning addressed by Baron Alderson, to the jury in Reg v. Hodge,1838 2 Lewin 227, where he said :- "The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting circumstances to one another, and even in straining them a little, if need be, to force them to from parts of one connected whole; and the more ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely was it, considering such matters, to overreach and mislead itself, to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete." It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and pendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. In spite of the forceful arguments addressed to us by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the State we have not been able to discover any such evidence either intrinsic within Exhibit P-3A or outside and we are constrained to observe that the courts below have just fallen into the error against which warning was uttered by Baron Alderson in the above mentioned case." 74. In Gagan Kanojia and another vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516 , the Honourable Apex Court has considered the manner of appreciation of circumstantial evidence and has concluded in paragraphs 9 and 10 as under :- "9. The prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence. Indisputably, charges can be proved on the basis of the circumstantial evidence, when direct evidence is not available. It is well-settled that in a case based on a circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove that within all human probabilities, the act must have been done by the accused. It is, however, necessary for the courts to remember that there is a long gap between 'may be true' and 'must be true'. Prosecution case is required to be covered by leading cogent, believable and credible evidence. Whereas the court must raise a presumption that the accused is innocent and in the event two views are possible, one indicating to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the defence available to the accused should be accepted, but at the same time, the court must not reject the evidence of the prosecution, proceeding on the basis that they are false, not trustworthy, unreliable and made on flimsy grounds or only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. The prosecution case, thus, must be judged in its entirety having regard to the totality of the circumstances. The approach of the court should be an integrated one and not truncated or isolated. The court should use the yardstick of probability and appreciate the intrinsic value of the evidence brought on records and analyze and assess the same objectively. 10. The prosecution case, thus, must be judged in its entirety having regard to the totality of the circumstances. The approach of the court should be an integrated one and not truncated or isolated. The court should use the yardstick of probability and appreciate the intrinsic value of the evidence brought on records and analyze and assess the same objectively. 10. We would proceed on the well-known principles in regard to appreciation of the circumstantial evidence which were noticed by the High Court in the following terms : "1) There must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 2) Circumstantial evidence can be reasonably made the basis of an accused person's conviction if it is of such character that it is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and is consistent only with his guilt. 3) There should be no missing links but it is not that everyone of the links must appear on the surface of the evidence, since some of these links may only be inferred from the proven facts. 4) On the availability of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. 5) It cannot be said that prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forwarded by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful it might be. Nor does it mean that prosecution evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise." (Emphasis supplied) 75. In Krishnan vs. State represented by the Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430 , it was held in paragraphs 15 to 18 as under:- "15. Before adverting to the above-stated arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, we shall at the threshold point out that in the present case there is no direct evidence to connect the accused with the commission of the offences and the prosecution case entirely rests on circumstantial evidence. Before adverting to the above-stated arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, we shall at the threshold point out that in the present case there is no direct evidence to connect the accused with the commission of the offences and the prosecution case entirely rests on circumstantial evidence. This Court in a series of decisions has consistently held that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:- (i) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (ii) those circumstances should be of definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (iii) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (iv) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. [See Gambhir v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 2 SCC 351 : ( AIR 1982 SC 1157 )]. See also Rama Nand v. State of H.P., (1981) 1 SCC 511 : ( AIR 1981 SC 738 ), Prem Thakur v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 462 : ( AIR 1983 SC 61 ), Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 SCC 330 : ( AIR 1983 SC 446 ), Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (1986) Supp1 SCC 676 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1921 ) and Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1987) 1 SCC 1 : ( AIR 1987 SC 350 ). 16. As far back as in 1952 in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P.,1952 AIR SC 3443, it was observed thus: "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 17. A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 : ( AIR 1984 SC 1622 ). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are (SCC pp. 185, para 153) : (i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established; (ii) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (iv) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (v) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 18. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P.,996 10 SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus: (SCC pp.206-207, para 21) "21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence." In Sashi Jenav. Khadal Swain, (2004) 4 SCC 236 , this Court again reiterated the well-settled principle of law on circumstantial evidence." 76. In Pohalya Motya Valvi vs. State of Maharashtra, (1979) AIR SC 1949 , the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the principles governing the appreciation of evidence in a case dependent upon circumstantial evidence are that each circumstance relied upon by the prosecution must be established by cogent, succinct and reliable evidence and that the circumstances relied upon must be such as cannot be explained on any hypothesis except the guilty of the accused. In other words, the circumstance must be of an incriminating character. All the proved circumstances must provide a complete chain, no link of which must be missing and they must unequivocally point to the guilt of the accused and exclude any hypothesis consistent with his innocence. 77. In view of the above, we are fully convinced that the Trial Court has not committed any error in convicting the appellant Rupesh for having committed the offence of murdering his wife punishable under 302 of the Indian Penal Code. We do not find that the Trial Court has committed any error in arriving at the said conclusion. As such, this Criminal Appeal is dismissed.