JUDGMENT : S. Manikumar, J. Challenging the judgment dated 25.09.2020 in W.P.(C) No.9400 of 2010, instant writ appeal is filed. 2. Short facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are that the petitioner/appellant purchased 17.51 acres of land covered by 7 Land Assignment files from the original assignees of 1993 registering sale deeds in the office of the Sub Registrar upon payment of sale consideration. The landed properties and the title to the same were genuine and undisputed, as evidenced by mutation of the land in the name of the petitioner, indicated by Exhibit P1. The land in question was occupied by the original assignees prior to the assignment, as evidenced by the indication of coffee cultivation. 3. According to the appellant, the Revenue Divisional Officer passed Exhibit P2 order illegally, canceling the said pattas, alleging that the assigned land was CHR land, that the land was obtained fraudulently, misrepresenting fact, and the land was alienated to the petitioner. The petitioner challenged Exhibit P2 order by preferring Exhibit P3 appeal before the District Collector, which also was dismissed vide Exhibit P4 order. The petitioner challenged Exhibit P4 order by preferring Exhibit P5 Revision Petition before the Land Revenue Commissioner, which is also dismissed vide Exhibit P6 order. The Tahsildar issued Exhibit-P7 notice, threatening to dispossess the petitioner of his land, even without giving opportunity to challenge Exhibit P6 order. 4. The orders canceling the pattas and the order of confirmation of said cancellation of patta by the revisional authority are unsustainable, and vitiated. The finding of the revisional authority that the land which was assigned, was unoccupied land, is not correct, as indicated by the physical evidence available in the land even now. The cancellation of patta for alienating the land before the expiry of 3 years can be resorted to, only if the land assigned was unoccupied. The finding of the revisional authority is one which is not available in the original order. The revisional authority disagreed with the finding of the original authority that the land was CHR land. The revisional authority arbitrarily maintained the original order of cancellation of patta by searching out a new ground which is not permissible in the process of adjudication by quasi judicial authorities. The authorities have not found anything to arrive at the conclusion that patta was obtained fraudulently and by misrepresenting the fact. The revisional authority arbitrarily maintained the original order of cancellation of patta by searching out a new ground which is not permissible in the process of adjudication by quasi judicial authorities. The authorities have not found anything to arrive at the conclusion that patta was obtained fraudulently and by misrepresenting the fact. There is nothing on record to establish the said allegation. On the other hand, if the mahazar available in the assignment files is examined, it can be seen that the land was occupied one. 5. On the above averments, writ petition was filed by the appellant for the following reliefs: “(i) Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any other Writ calling for the records of the case leading to Exhibit P2, P4 & P6 and quash the same. (ii) Issue a Writ declaring that the entering into of fresh finding in Exhibit P6 Revisional Order inconsistent with the finding in Exhibit P2 original order is not permitted in the proceedings of quasi judicial functions of the authorities who adjudicate questions on the basis of the records on file and evidence adduced and that it is against the administrative system of the Government. (iii) Issue a Writ declaring that the original order vide Exhibit P2 is not sustainable as the land in question is not CHR land as found by Revisional authority in Exhibit P6. (iv) Issue a Writ commanding the respondents not to take over the land of the petitioner pursuant to the cancellation of the pattas mentioned about in Exhibit P2 original order.” 6. Writ court, by the impugned judgment dated 25.09.2020, dismissed the writ petition as hereunder: “22. In the instant case, the appellate authority and the revisional authority found that the lands were unoccupied lands which were alienated soon after assignment in favour of the respective assignees, against the provisions of the Kerala Land Assignment Rules. The orders passed by the original authority, the appellate authority and the revisional authority cannot be treated as orders not supported by reasons. In exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court is not sitting in appeal over the findings arrived at by those fact finding authorities. The orders passed by the original authority, the appellate authority and the revisional authority cannot be treated as orders not supported by reasons. In exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court is not sitting in appeal over the findings arrived at by those fact finding authorities. No interference under Article 226 can be made on those orders, unless and until the petitioner is able to show that the findings arrived at by those authorities in the orders impugned are either perverse or patently illegal. 23. In the result, the writ petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the interim order of status quo granted on 19.03.2010 is vacated. The 3rd respondent District Collector and the 1st respondent Tahsildar shall take further course in order to evict the petitioner from the land in question, in case he was in occupation of the land as on 19.03.2010, the date on which this Court granted an order of status quo.” 7. Challenging the same, instant writ appeal is filed raising the following grounds: A. Learned Single judge dismissed the Writ Petition, without going into the details of irregularity and illegality in the proceedings of Revenue Divisional Officer that culminated in Exhibit P2 order of Revenue Divisional Officer. Learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated the grounds raised by the appellant in Exhibit P5 memorandum of appeal filed before the Secretary to the Government to come to the conclusion that Exhibit P2 order of Revenue Divisional Officer cancelling the pattas was irregular, illegal, vitiated and arbitrary. B. Learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated the contention of the appellant that the land was occupied land, duly cultivated by the assignee, especially in the absence of production of any evidence by the State to prove that the land was unoccupied land. C. Learned Single Judge ought to have rejected the stories of large scale encroachment and the press reports in that connection, canvassed by the Revenue Divisional Officer in Exhibit P2 order, to justify cancellation of patta. Learned Single Judge ought to have noted that the documents in proof of possession of land by the assignees in the light of assignment files were not at all perused by the Revenue Divisional Officer. Learned Single Judge ought to have noted that the documents in proof of possession of land by the assignees in the light of assignment files were not at all perused by the Revenue Divisional Officer. The District Collector or the Land Revenue Commissioner, who passed the final order, could not justify the allegations levelled against the assignment of land. The mahazar prepared during the assignment of land could have been a pathfinder to ascertain whether the land was occupied or unoccupied at the time of Assignment. The perusal of Annexure-A1 Land Register maintained in the Land Records Section is of greater importance for reliance and decision as to whether the assignee was in possession of the land assigned. The name of the assignee will figure in Annexure-A1 Land Register, if he had possession in the land. D. The District Collector failed to note that the Revenue Divisional Officer initiated the cancellation proceedings three years after the report of the Tahsildar dated 11-06-1998, and that reverification of the entire documents was necessary. The alleged report of Tahsildar was based on the cancellation of the pattas. The Notice of cancellation proceedings are said to have been issued to the assignees during 1995, but no evidence was produced. The appellant, who was the transferee of the land covered by pattas, which were cancelled, was not even issued notices of cancellation proceedings by the Revenue Divisional Officer though he was the only affected party. The District Collector did not care to note the said grave infirmity and illegality in the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer. The party aggrieved by the cancellation of patta, namely the appellant, was not given notice of enquiry by the Revenue Divisional Officer. E. The Revenue Divisional Officer had no reason for initiating the proceedings to cancel the pattas, in 1995. No party aggrieved by assignment of land had filed appeal against the order of assignment. The full reliance for initiating proceedings for cancellation of pattas after several years of assignment was on press reports and media propaganda. The property has ever been cultivated with cardamom before and after assignment. The property had been placed in the list of assignable land by the District Collector and there had been no procedural irregularity complained off in that connection during the sittings by the Assignment committee. The property has ever been cultivated with cardamom before and after assignment. The property had been placed in the list of assignable land by the District Collector and there had been no procedural irregularity complained off in that connection during the sittings by the Assignment committee. F. Proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 9.10.2002, Exhibit P2, was barred by limitation under Rules 8(3) and 21 of Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964. The order of assignment was passed in 1993. There was absolutely no reason or ground, provided under Rule 8(3) of Kerala Land Assignment Rules, for cancellation of Patta, by the Revenue Divisional Officer. The property assigned was agricultural land and occupied by assignees. It is usual that there will be tall trees in cardamom planted areas for shade and protection of the plant. There is nothing unusual in it. G. The absence of possession of Ration Card of the occupant of the land in the village is not the criterion to infer the absence of the occupant in the land, when inspected. The condition restraining alienation of land within 3 years of assignment is not stipulated in Annexures-A1 to A7 Assignment Certificate and hence, it has to be inferred and concluded that the land was occupied land. 8. Learned Government Pleader submitted that immediately after three months from the date of assignment, subject lands have been sold to the appellant, who started a resort. Now possession of the resort has also been taken. 9. Heard Mr. K. Reghu Kottappuram, learned counsel for the appellant, and perused the material available on record. 10. From the pleadings, it could be deduced that the property assigned was for agricultural purposes. Though the appellant has contended that nobody has appealed against the assignment, one cannot expect a revenue official to be a mute spectator, when there were many complaints and press reports. Order of the Revenue Divisional Officer is dated 09.10.2002 (ExhibitP2). In fact, the Sub Collector has conducted an inspection and seized the land acquisition files. Following the directions of the District Collector, Idukki, the Tahsildar, Devikulam, has conducted re-verification and submitted a report. Order of the Revenue Divisional Officer is dated 09.10.2002 (ExhibitP2). In fact, the Sub Collector has conducted an inspection and seized the land acquisition files. Following the directions of the District Collector, Idukki, the Tahsildar, Devikulam, has conducted re-verification and submitted a report. The Tahsildar, Devikulam, in his report dated 11.06.1998, has stated that the land was not in real possession of the assignee; he was not residing in the land; the land was full of trees, which means that land was not assignable, as it was C.H.R. land; the assignee was not residing in the land; and he had no address in the village. Report further revealed that there is fraud and misrepresentation in the assignment. 11. Exhibit P2 proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Devikulam, dated 09.10.2002, reads thus: “PROCEEDINGS OF THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER, DEVIKULAM (Present Shri T.T. Antony) No.K.Dis./1909/95/B5 Dated 9.10.2002 Sub: Land assignment -Devikulam Taluk -Pallivasal Village – Illegal Assignment of land in favour of Sri K.R. Krishnamani, Aswathibhavan, Pothamedu, Pallivasal – Cancellation of assignment – Orders issued. Ref: 1. LA Case No.147/93/PVL of the Special Tahsildar (LA) Devikulam. 2. Report No.B3-1323/96, Dated 11.6.98 of the Tahsildar, Devikulam. The Special Tahsildar (LA) Devikulam as per the reference first cited, assigned 2.54 acres of land in Sy.No.540 part of Pallivasal Village in favour of Sri K.R. Krishnamani, Aswathibhavan, Pothamedu, Pallivasal as per the L.A. Case No.147/93. Following widespread complaints and press reports that serious irregularities were being committed by L.A.staff of L.A. Special Officer, Devikulam that then Sub Collector conducted a raid of Vrindavan Lodge, Adimali and seized L.A. Files. The District Collector, Idukki ordered a verification of pattas during the period 1992-94. Accordingly, the Tahsildar, Devikulam has conducted the re-verification in this case and submitted the report as per the reference 2nd cited above. In this case, the party was heard. The land was not in real possession of the assignee. He was not residing in the land. The land was full of trees, which means that land was not assignable as it was C.H.R. Land. The assignee was not residing in the land. He had no address in the Village. The patta was obtained fraudulently and misrepresenting facts for the purpose of speculated real estate business as is proved by the fact that the land was alienated to one Prabhakara Kammath as soon as the patta was obtained. The assignee was not residing in the land. He had no address in the Village. The patta was obtained fraudulently and misrepresenting facts for the purpose of speculated real estate business as is proved by the fact that the land was alienated to one Prabhakara Kammath as soon as the patta was obtained. In many cases he is the purchaser as in L.A.No.168/93/PVL (2) L.A.No.145/93/PVL (3) L.A.No.137/93/PVL (4) L.A.No.143/93/PVL (5) L.A.No.169/93/PVL (6) L.A.No.146/93/PVL. In the result, I order that the patta in respect of 2.59 acres of land in Sy. No.540 Part of Pallivasal Village issued as per L.A.Case No.147/93/PVL by the Special Tahsildar (LA) Devikulam in favour of Sri.K.R.Krishna Mani, Aswathibhavan, Pothamedu, Pallivasal stands cancelled. Sd/- Revenue Divisional Officer Forwarded/By Order Sd/- Senior Superintendent. To Sri.K.R.Krishna Mani, Aswathibhavan, Pothamedu, Pallivasal (Through the Village Officer, Pallivasal)” 12. Though the appellant has contended that there was no credible evidence to arrive at a conclusion that none of the assignees ever lived in the subject area, upon verification of the land acquisition files, the District Collector, Idukki, the appellate authority, in Exhibit-P4 proceedings dated 23.01.2004, has recorded as hereunder: “Also on verification of all these L.A. Files, it is revealed that the patta was obtained fraudulently and misrepresenting facts for the purpose of special real estate business as is proved by the fact that the land was alienated to one Prabhakara Kammath as soon as the patta was obtained and also there is no valuable improvements on the land and the land covered in all these L.A. Cases are full of wild trees and also no one is residing in the land. The appellant's argument that the Revenue Divisional Officer had passed the order after a long lapse of 7 years and the appellant was not heard is not correct. The procedure for cancellation was initiated in 1995 and all procedural formalities were completed by the Revenue Divisional Officer. On 15.12.2003, a hearing was conducted and Adv. C.K.Babu was present on behalf of the petitioner. On perusal of records, the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Devikulam, is upheld and the appeal petitions are hereby rejected.” 13. Adverting to the rival contentions, the revisional authority, the Commissioner of Land Revenue, Trivandrum, has passed a detailed order dated 19.02.2010 (Exhibit-P6), which is extracted hereunder: “Proceeding of the Commissioner of Land Revenue Public Office Building, Museum Junction,Trivandrum-33 (Present : Dr. Adverting to the rival contentions, the revisional authority, the Commissioner of Land Revenue, Trivandrum, has passed a detailed order dated 19.02.2010 (Exhibit-P6), which is extracted hereunder: “Proceeding of the Commissioner of Land Revenue Public Office Building, Museum Junction,Trivandrum-33 (Present : Dr. K.M. Ramachanandan, I.A.S) L.R. J3-3838/06 Dated: 19.02.2010 Sub:- KLA Rules – Appeal preferred challenging order No.B4-78519/07 dtd. 31.7.08 of District Collector, Thiruvananthapuram-reg. Reg:- 1. Revision petitions (7 in number) No. LR J3-3834/06, J3-3837/06, J3-3839/06, J3-3840/06, J3-17357/06, J3-17425/06 by Shri. Prabhakara Kammath. Shri. Prabhakara Kamath Managing Director Revision Petitioner Pearl Sport Resorts Ltd. Pulleppady, Arangathu Road Cochin Tahsildar, Devikulam Respondent Brief History The petitioner Shri. Prabhakara Kammath bought 17.51 acres of land comprised in Sy. 540 pt. Of Pallivasal village, Devikulam Taluk, Idukki from seven different assignees. The name of the assignee, LA file No., extent of land held by each assignee, date of issuance of patta, date and document no. of alienation and file no., of this office is narrated as below. favour of the assignee which is against the provisions of Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964. In the above circumstances, the revision petitions are dismissed. Sd/-Commissioner” 14. Now, let us consider the statutory provisions. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 7 of the Kerala Land Assignment Act, 1960 (Act 30 of 1960), and in supersession of the rules for assignment of Government lands issued under notifications I and II G.O. (Press) No. 1029/Rev. dated 18-10-1958 published in the Kerala Gazette Extra Ordinary No. 107 as subsequently amended, the Government of Kerala has enacted the Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964, for the assignment of Government lands. 15. Rule 4 of the said Rules, 1964 speaks about the purposes for which land may be assigned and it reads thus: “4. Purposes for which land may be assigned. -Government lands may be assigned on registry for purposes of personal cultivation, house-sites and beneficial enjoyment of adjoining registered holdings.” 16. Rule 5 of the said Rules, 1964 specifies the maximum limits to be assigned for cultivation and it reads thus: “5. Maximum limits to be assigned for cultivation. Purposes for which land may be assigned. -Government lands may be assigned on registry for purposes of personal cultivation, house-sites and beneficial enjoyment of adjoining registered holdings.” 16. Rule 5 of the said Rules, 1964 specifies the maximum limits to be assigned for cultivation and it reads thus: “5. Maximum limits to be assigned for cultivation. -(1) The extent of land that shall be registered in favour of a single family for personal cultivation by members of the family shall not ordinarily exceed- (a) in the case of unoccupied lands, not more than one acre of land whether wet or dry, in the plains and not more than one acre of wetland or three acres of dry land in hilly tracts; (b) in the case of lands held on lease whether current or time expired or by way of encroachment not considered objectionable,- (i) where there are no valuable improvements effected on the land by the occupant, not more than one acre of land, whether wet or dry, in the plains and not more than one acre or wet land or three acres of dry land in hilly tracts; (ii) where there are valuable improvements effected on the land by the occupant, not more than [two acres of land wet or dry] in the plains and not more than two acres of wet land or four acres of dry land in hilly tracts; Note. -In the case of occupied lands and lands held on lease, whether current or time expired, or by way of encroachment not considered objectionable, where the occupant has not effected valuable improvements on the lands, one acre of wet land in the plains shall be deemed to be equivalent to one acre of dry land, and one acre of wet land in the hilly tracts shall be deemed to be equivalent to three acres of dry lands; and in the cases of lands held on lease whether current or time expired or by way of encroachments not considered objectionable where the occupant has effected valuable improvements on the lands, [one acre of wet land in the plains shall be deemed to be equivalent to one acre of dry land and one acre of wet land in the hilly tracts shall be deemed to be equivalent to two acres of dry land]. (2) When a family owns or holds any land over which it has proprietary right or has security or tenure, only the balance of extent of Government land necessary to make up the extent admissible under sub-rule (1) shall be granted to it on registry. xx xxx xxxxx” 17. Rule 8 of the Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964 speaks about the conditions of assignment on registry and it reads thus: “8. Conditions of assignment on registry. -[(1) Lands, granted on registry shall be heritable and alienable.] [(lA) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), unoccupied lands assigned on registry shall not be alienable for a period of three years from the date of registry. Provided that the assignee may mortgage such lands- [(a) to the Government or Co-operative Institutions or Tea Board or the Rubber Board or any other financial institutions recognised by the Government in this behalf, as security for obtaining loan for agricultural or land improvement purposes or for growing tea or rubber; and] (b) to the Government or Co-operative Institutions as security for obtaining loans for house construction under the Village Housing Project Scheme or any other housing schemes sponsored by the Government, if such house is required for the occupation of the assignee or his family]. (2) The assignee or a member of his family or his successor-in-interest shall reside in the land if it is granted as house site, or shall personally cultivate the same if it is granted for cultivation; and such resides or cultivation, as the case maybe, shall commence effectively within a period of one year, from the date of receipt of the patta or of the provisionals patta in cases where a provisional patta is issued in the first instance: Provided that- (I) in the case of assignment to military personnel or their dependents as the case may be, the assignee may cultivate the land by his own labourer by the labour of any member of his family and with the occasional assistants, if any of hired labour or servants on wages payable in cash or in kind but not in crop share; (II) the military personnel may apply for land anywhere in the State irrespective of the State to which they belong; and in the matter of assignment preference shall be given to persons belong to Kerala; (III) the military personnel may lease for cultivation purposes the lands assigned to them whilst they are away on active services. (3) The registry shall be liable to be cancelled for contravention of the provisions in [sub-rule (1A) or sub-rule (2)]. The registry may be cancelled also, if it found that it was grossly inequitable or was made under a mistake of facts or owing to misrepresentation of facts or in excess of the limits of the powers delegated to the assigning authority or that there was an irregularity in the procedure. In the event of cancellation of the registry, the assignee shall not be entitled to compensation for any improvements he may have made on the land. The authority competent to order such cancellation shall be the authority which granted the registry, or one superior to it; Provided the no registry of land shall be cancelled without giving the party or parties affected thereby, a reasonable opportunity of being heard: [Provided further that no assignment of Land shall be cancelled if the annual family income of the transferee occupant does not exceed Rs. 10,000 (Rupees Ten thousand only) and who does not own or possess any landed property, anywhere in the State; Provided also that in the case of a transfer of Land covered by the above Proviso the assignee shall not be eligible for further assignment of Land anywhere in the State].” 18. Rule 21 of the Rules, 1964 speaks about appeals and revisions to lie to Revenue Divisional Officer and it reads thus: “21. Appeal to lie to Revenue Divisional Officer etc. -[(1) An appeal shall lie to the Revenue Divisional Officer against an order passed by the Tahsildar or any other Officer not above the rank of a Tahsildar authorised by the Government under rule 23A, to the District Collector against an order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer or an Officer of the rank of Revenue Divisional Officer authorised by the Government under the said rule 23A, and to the Board of Revenue against an order passed by the District Collector;] (2) There shall be no second appeal. (3) Appeals shall be presented within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order by the aggrieved party. (4) The appellate authority may, in his or its discretion, admit an appeal, not submitted within time, if sufficient grounds exist for condoning the delay. (5) No appeal shall be admitted unless it is duly stamped and is accompanied by the original decision or order appealed against or a certified copy thereof. (6) The appellate authority may confirm, vary or cancel the decision or order appealed against. (7) No decision or order interfering with the original order, shall be made in appeal, without giving the party or parties interested thereon a reasonable opportunity to be heard. (8) The Board of Revenue shall be competent to revise, cancel or alter, on its own motion or otherwise any division made or order passed by the Tahsildar, [an Officer authorised by the Government under rule 23A], Revenue Divisional Officer or District Collector, under these rules: Provided that no proceedings in his behalf shall be initiated by the Board after the expiry of two years from the date of such decision or order, and no such decision or order shall be set aside or modified by it without giving the party affected thereby, a reasonable opportunity to be heard. [(9) The Government may at any time revise, cancel or alter on their own motion or otherwise any decision made or order passed by the Tahsildar, [an officer authorised by the Government under rule 23A], Revenue Divisional Officer, District Collector or the Board of Revenue under these rules: Provided that no such decision or order shall be revised, cancelled or altered under this sub-rule without giving the party affected thereby a reasonable opportunity of being heard.]” 19. Rule 23A of the Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964 reads thus: “23A. Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules the powers and functions which may be exercised and performed by a Tahsildar under these rules may be exercised and performed by any other any officer authorised by the Government in this behalf.” 20. One of the contentions raised before us by Mr. K. Reghu Kottappuram, learned counsel for the appellant, is that the revisional authority, the Commissioner of Land Revenue, Trivandrum, has recorded a new finding. As per Section 21 of the Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964, the revisional authority shall alter, on its own motion or otherwise any division made or order passed by the Tahsildar, [an Officer authorised by the Government under Rule 23A], Revenue Divisional Officer or District Collector, under these rules. Provided that, no proceedings in his behalf shall be initiated by the Board after the expiry of two years from the date of such decision or order, and no such decision or order shall be set aside or modified by it without giving the party affected thereby, a reasonable opportunity to be heard. 21. Though the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the authorities ought to have verified the registers, to ascertain possession of the lands by the assignees, in the case on hand, serious irregularities were committed by the land acquisition staff and the Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), in the matter of assignment. Sub Collector has conducted a raid and seized the land acquisition files. The Tahsildar, on directions, has submitted a detailed report, and therefore, the said contention cannot be countenanced. 22. Thus, suo motu, or on revision by the aggrieved, the revisional authority can record a finding of fact, even though not taken note of by the original or appellate authority. Sub Collector has conducted a raid and seized the land acquisition files. The Tahsildar, on directions, has submitted a detailed report, and therefore, the said contention cannot be countenanced. 22. Thus, suo motu, or on revision by the aggrieved, the revisional authority can record a finding of fact, even though not taken note of by the original or appellate authority. Conjoint reading of Rules 21 and 23A of the Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964, makes it clear that the said provisions empower the revisional authority to revise or alter the decision. Therefore, the contentions to the contra are negatived. 23. Now, let us consider a few decisions, as to whether concurrent findings of fact can be interfered in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (i) In Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare [1989 AIR 1247], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- “The first question, therefore, is whether or not to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact of the learned courts below. It has been said in a series of decisions that ordinarily this court in an appeal will not interfere with a finding of fact which is not shown to be perverse or based on no evidence, (Babu v. Dy. Director, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 756), but will interfere if material circumstances are ignored by the High Court. Prasad v. Govin-daswaray, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 84. In Dhanjibhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 603, it was observed that where a finding of fact has been rendered by a learned Single Judge of the High Court as a court of first instance and thereafter affirmed in appeal by an Appellate Bench of that High Court, this Court should be reluctant to interfere with the finding unless there is very strong reason to do so. There is no reason why this should not apply to cases where the first appellate court was the district court. It was noted in Ganga Bishan v. Jay Narayan, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 441, that ordinarily this Court, under Article 136 of the Constitution, would be averse to interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the High Court and the Trial Court. It was noted in Ganga Bishan v. Jay Narayan, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 441, that ordinarily this Court, under Article 136 of the Constitution, would be averse to interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the High Court and the Trial Court. But where there are material irregularities affecting the said findings or where the court feels that justice has failed and the findings are likely to result in unduly excessive hardship this court could not decline to interfere merely on the ground that findings in question are findings on fact. So also, in Uday Chand Dutt v. Saibal Sen, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 367, it was said that in an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India where there are concurrent findings of the courts below this court is not called upon to reconsider the entire evidence in detail to ascertain whether the findings are justified. In Ram Singh v. Ajay Chawla, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 514 where the concurrent finding was that the appellants were in unauthorised occupation of premises of which the respondents were the owners this court did not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact.” (ii) In Sheo Chand Chaudhary v. Adalat Hussain and Ors. [ 2003 (3) PLJR 100 ], the Patna High Court held as follows: “10. I have perused the impugned judgment and heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs (respondents) is right in his submission that the issues are concluded by concurrent findings of facts which bind this Court in second appellate jurisdiction and, therefore, this appeal is fit to be dismissed on this ground alone. Both the Courts below have concurrently found that the plaintiffs had perfected their title by adverse possession much before defendant No. 2 claimed to have taken settlement from Bhoodan Yagna Committee. It has further been concurrently found that the plaintiffs have all through been in possession and defendant No. 2 (appellant) never came in possession of the suit lands. Both the Courts below have further found that defendant No. 2 has not been able to prove his case of donation by Hathwa Raj in favour of Bhoodan Yagna Committee, nor has he been able to prove the Daan Patra by the Bhoodan Yagna Committee and the confirmation thereof. Both the Courts below have further found that defendant No. 2 has not been able to prove his case of donation by Hathwa Raj in favour of Bhoodan Yagna Committee, nor has he been able to prove the Daan Patra by the Bhoodan Yagna Committee and the confirmation thereof. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has, therefore, rightly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi (supra) which was also a case based on adverse possession. While reversing the judgment of the High Court passed in a Second appeal, the Supreme Court has held as follows in paragraphs 10 to 12 of the judgment: "It is settled law that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact." As the two Courts approached the evidence from a correct perspective and gave a concurrent finding of fact, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the said finding." To the same effect is another decision of this Court in the case of R. Ramachandran Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chittiar, 1963 (3) SCR 604 , where the Court observed as follows: "But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusion of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court, however, erroneous the said conclusion may appear to be to the High Court, because, as the Privy Council observed, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be there is no jurisdiction under Section 100 to correct that error." "11. The same view was taken in two earlier decisions of this Court in the cases of Pittaabhiramaswamy v. Hanymayya, AIR 1959 SC 57 and Rarubha Singh v. Achal Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1097 ." "12. Thus, the High Court in this case had no jurisdiction after reversing the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below on the question of adverse possession to remand the case to the Additional Judicial Commissioner on the question of title which also was concluded by the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the two Courts as indicated above." (iii) In G.Mahalingappa v. G.M. Savitha (Appeal (civil) 2867 of 2000 dated 09.08.2005), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:- "Let us now consider whether the concurrent findings of fact could be set aside by the High Court in the second appeal. It is well settled by diverse decisions of this Court that the High Court in second appeal is entitled to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact if the said concurrent findings of fact are based on non-consideration of an important piece of evidence in the nature of admission of one of the party to the suit, which is overlooked by the two courts below (See [ 2003 (7) SCC 481 , Deva (Dead) Through LRs Vs. Sajjan Kumar (Dead) by LRs]). It is equally well settled that under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, High Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of facts of the courts below without insufficient and just reasons. (See [2003(7)SCC 52, Sayeda Akhtar Vs. Abdul Ahad]). In second appeal, High Court is also not entitled to set aside concurrent findings of fact by giving its own findings contrary to the evidence on record. (See [ 2001 (4) SCC 694 , Saraswathi & Anr. Vs. S.Ganapathy & Anr.]). As held herein earlier the High Court had set aside the concurrent findings of fact not on consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties but set aside the concurrent findings of fact on the basis of findings contrary to the evidence on record and without considering the findings of fact arrived at by the appellate court and the trial court. From the judgment of the High Court we further find that the concurrent findings of fact were set aside not on consideration of the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below but only on the basis of the arguments of the learned Advocate of the respondent. This was also not permissible to the High Court in Second Appeal to come to a contrary findings of its own only on the basis of the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent without considering the findings of the trial court as well as the appellate court. (See [ 2002(9) SCC 735 , Gangajal Kunwar (Smt.) and Ors. Vs. Sarju Pandey (Dead) by LRs & Ors.]). It is equally settled that High Court in second appeal is not entitled to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below until and unless it is found that the concurrent findings of fact were perverse and not based on sound reasoning. Vs. Sarju Pandey (Dead) by LRs & Ors.]). It is equally settled that High Court in second appeal is not entitled to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below until and unless it is found that the concurrent findings of fact were perverse and not based on sound reasoning. We ourselves considered the evidence on record as well as the findings of fact arrived at by the two courts below. From such consideration we do not find that the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the appellate court as well as the trial court were either perverse or without any reason or based on non-consideration of important piece of evidence or admission of some of the parties. We are therefore of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the appellate court as well as the trial court which findings were rendered on consideration of the pleadings as well as the material (oral and documentary) evidence on record.” (iv) In Narayanan Rajendran and Ors. v. Lekshmy Sarojini and Ors. [ (2009) 5 SCC 264 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: 41. This court again reminded the High Courts in Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments v. P. Shanmugama [ (2005) 9 SCC 232 ] that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the finding of facts. 42. Again, this court in the case of State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi [ (2005) 10 SCC 139 ] has reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This court observed that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 43. Again, in the case of Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai [ (2005) 10 SCC 553 ], this court observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This court observed that it is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 44. This court observed that it is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 44. Again, in the case of Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh [ (2005) 12 SCC 270 ], this court with anguish has mentioned that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court. In this case, the findings of the trial court and the lower appellate court regarding readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract was set aside by the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. This court, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below.” (v) In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lakshmi Sugar and Oil Mills Ltd. and Ors. (2013) 10 SCC 509 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “The order passed by the District Consolidation Director/Collector, Hardoi also concurred with the view taken by the Officers below and held that there was no evidence on record to show that the subject land was ever held or occupied for agricultural purposes or that any agricultural activity was ever carried out on the same. These concurrent findings of fact, in our opinion, could not have been reversed by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The High Court obviously failed to appreciate that it was not sitting in appeal over the findings recorded by the authorities below. It could not reappraise the material and hold that the land was held or occupied for cultivation and substitute its own finding for that of the authorities. In as much as the High Court did so, it committed an error.........................” (vi) In Jagdamba Prasad (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors. v. Kripa Shankar (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors. [(2014) 5SCC 707], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: “18. Having said that the Revisional Authority exceeded its jurisdiction Under Section 48 of the Act, we have to hold that the High Court erred in concurring with the findings of the Revisional Authority by failing to observe that the Revisional Authority has exceeded its jurisdiction conferred upon it under the Act. Having said that the Revisional Authority exceeded its jurisdiction Under Section 48 of the Act, we have to hold that the High Court erred in concurring with the findings of the Revisional Authority by failing to observe that the Revisional Authority has exceeded its jurisdiction conferred upon it under the Act. The High Court further erred by recording its reason by interpreting the facts of the case. The Appellants had moved the High Court by way of a Writ Petition. Therefore, it is pertinent for us to mention the findings of this Court in the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 which has been reiterated in the case of Heinz India Private Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2012) 5 SCC 443 . This Court, in Tata Cellular case made the following observation: “77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law, 3. Committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. Abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety.” 24. Though the decisions considered are in relation to Civil proceedings, principles of law apply to writ proceedings as well. Whether the findings rendered by the authorities under the Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964, can be termed as perverse. In this context, we deem it fit to consider a few decisions, as to what perversity means: (i) In Arulvelu v. State reported in (2009) 10 SCC 206 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraphs 27, 29 and 30, explained what "perverse" means, as hereunder: "27. In this context, we deem it fit to consider a few decisions, as to what perversity means: (i) In Arulvelu v. State reported in (2009) 10 SCC 206 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraphs 27, 29 and 30, explained what "perverse" means, as hereunder: "27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English -International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English -1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. ...... 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at with no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of ‘perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under: "7. The meaning of ‘perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness -as distinguished from the legal permissibility -of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." (ii) In The General Manager (P) Punjab & Sind Bank v. Daya Singh [ (2010) 11 SCC 233 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as follows: "24. Absence of reasons in a disciplinary order would amount to denial of natural justice to the charge-sheeted employee. But the present case was certainly not one of that category. Once the charges were found to have been established, the High Court had no reason to interfere in the decision. Even though there was sufficient documentary evidence on record, the High Court has chosen to hold that the findings of the enquiry officer were perverse. A perverse finding is one which is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would arrive at. This has been held by this Court long back in Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, AIR 1994 SC 1341 . A perverse finding is one which is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would arrive at. This has been held by this Court long back in Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, AIR 1994 SC 1341 . Unless it is found that some relevant evidence has not been considered or that certain inadmissible material has been taken into consideration the finding cannot be said to be perverse. The legal position in this behalf has been recently reiterated in Arilvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 . The decision of the High Court cannot therefore be sustained." (iii) In S.R.Tiwari v. Union of India reported in (2013) 6 SCC 602 , at paragraph 30, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is against the weight of evidence, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." (iv) In Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Western Geco international Ltd. [ (2014) 9 SCC 263 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court observed thus: “29. No less important is the principle now recognised as a salutary juristic fundamental in administrative law that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same will not be sustained in a Court of law. Perversity or irrationality of decisions is tested on the touchstone of Wednesbury's principle of reasonableness. No less important is the principle now recognised as a salutary juristic fundamental in administrative law that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same will not be sustained in a Court of law. Perversity or irrationality of decisions is tested on the touchstone of Wednesbury's principle of reasonableness. Decisions that fall short of the standards of reasonableness are open to challenge in a Court of law often in writ jurisdiction of the Superior courts but no less in statutory processes wherever the same are available.” (v) What is 'perverse' has further been considered by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in RSA No.436 of 2000, titled 'Rubi Sood and another v. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud and others, decided on 28.05.2015, in the following manner:- "25..... A finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below can only be said to be perverse, which has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in miscarriage of justice, is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law. 26. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or even the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. 27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence, which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable persons would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. 28. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non application of mind and thus, stands vitiated." (vi) In Ashrufi Devi v. State of Uttarakhand and Ors. [Criminal Misc. Application No. 178 of 2012, decided On: 19.04.2017], the High Court of Uttarakhand observed thus: “10. [Criminal Misc. Application No. 178 of 2012, decided On: 19.04.2017], the High Court of Uttarakhand observed thus: “10. Concurrent findings of the two courts below can be upset by this Court only on the ground of perversity, which means 'outrageous defiance of logic'. Irrationality and perversity are recognized grounds of judicial review which is available on three grounds -illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. 11. It is also a settled law that the factual controversy need not be gone into by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid in the Section itself. The applicant, in the instant case, is unable to pass those tests.” 25. Whether the impugned orders of the authorities under the Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964, require interference on the principles of judicial review and on the said aspect, let us consider a few cases as to when judicial review is required. (i) In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [(1984) 3 All ER 935], Lord Diplock enunciated three grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review, viz. (i) illegality (ii) irrationality and (iii) procedural impropriety, as follows: “By "illegality" he means that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it, and whether he has or has not, is a justiciable question; by "irrationality" he means "Wednesbury unreasonableness". (i) illegality (ii) irrationality and (iii) procedural impropriety, as follows: “By "illegality" he means that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it, and whether he has or has not, is a justiciable question; by "irrationality" he means "Wednesbury unreasonableness". It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided, could have arrived at it; and by "procedural impropriety" he means not only failure to observe the basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness, but also failure to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which the tribunal's jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice." (ii) The principle of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" or irrationality, classified by Lord Diplock as one of the grounds for intervention in judicial review, was lucidly summarised by Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., reported in (1948) 1 KB 223 = (1947) 2 All ER 680, as follows: "...the court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view of seeing whether it has taken into account matters which it ought not to take into account, or conversely, has refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which it ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that the local authority, nevertheless, have come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere." (iii) In Tata Cellular v. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 , a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with a case relating to tender, as well as Government contract, and considered the decisions in the matter of judicial review on administrative action, which can be made applicable to the case on hand. The Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- “71. The Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- “71. Judicial quest in administrative matters has been to find that right balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters whether contractual or political in nature or issues of social policy; thus they are not essentially justiciable and the need to remedy any unfairness. Such an unfairness is set right by judicial review. 72. Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1986] AC 240 proclaimed thus: “'Judicial review' is a great weapon in the hands of the judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficent power. 73. Commenting upon this, Michael Supperstone and James Goudie, in their work on “Judicial Review” (1992 Edition), at page, 16 say: “If anyone were prompted to dismiss this sage warning as a mere obiter dictum from the most radical member of the higher judiciary of recent times, and therefore to be treated as an idiosyncratic aberration, it has received the endorsement of the law Lords generally. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on behalf of the Board when reversing an interventionist decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Butcher v. Petrocorp, exploration Ltd. 18 March 1991.” 75. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [1992] 3 All ER 141, Lord Brightman said : “Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. Judicial Review is concerned, not with the decision, with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will, in may view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power. In the same case Lord Hailsham commented on the purpose of the remedy by way of judicial review under RSC Ord 53 in the following terms; “This remedy, vastly increased in the extent, and rendered, over a long period in recent years, of infinitely more convenient access than that provided by the old prerogative writs and actions for a declaration, is intended to protect the individual against the abuse of power by a wide range of authorities, judicial quasi-judicial, and, as would originally have been though when I first practised at the Bar, administrative. It is not intended to take away from those authorities the powers and discretion properly vested in them by law and to substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions. It is intended to see that the relevant authorities are their powers in a proper manner. (p. 1160) R v. Panel take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin plc, Sir John Donaldson MR commented : “An application for judicial review is not an appeal'. In Lonrho plc v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1989] 2 All ER 609, Lord Keith said; “Judicial review is a protection and not a weapon. It is thus different from an appeal. When hearing an appeal the Court is concerned with the merits of the decision under appeal. In Re Amin, Lord Fraser observed that : “Judicial review is concerned not with the merits of a decision but with the manner in which the decision was made (1) Judicial review is entirely different from an ordinary appeal. It is made effective by the court quashing an administrative decision without substituting its own decision, and is to be contrasted with an appeal where the appellate tribunal substitutes is own decision on the merits for that of the administrative officer.” 76. In R v. Penal on Take overs and Mergers, ex p Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146, Lord Donaldson MR. referred to the Judicial review jurisdiction as being supervisory or 'longstop' jurisdiction. Unless that restriction on the power of the courts is observed, the court will, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power. 77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. committed an error of law 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice. 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached. or; 5. abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfillment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached. or; 5. abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfillment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case, shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under : (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it; (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness; (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out additional of further grounds in courts of time. As a matter of fact, in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Blind [1991] 1 AC 696, Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, "consider whether something has gone wrong of nature and degree which requires its intervention". 78. What is this charming principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness? Is it a magical formula? In Re: v. Askew, 1768 (4) 2168, Lord Mansfield considered the question whether mandamus should be granted against the College of Physicians. He expressed the relevant principles in two eloquent sentences. They gained greater value two centuries later: “It is true, that the judgment and discretion of determining upon this skill, ability, learning and sufficiency to exercise and practise this profession is trusted to the College of Physician: and this Court will not take it from them, nor interrupt them in the due and proper exercise of it. But their conduct in the exercise of this trust thus committed to them ought to be fair, can did and unprejudiced; not arbitrary, capricious, or biassed; much less, warped by resentment, or personal dislike.” 79. But their conduct in the exercise of this trust thus committed to them ought to be fair, can did and unprejudiced; not arbitrary, capricious, or biassed; much less, warped by resentment, or personal dislike.” 79. To quote again, Michael Supperstone and James Goudie; in their work 'judicial Review (1992 Edition) it is observed at pages 119 to 121 as under: “The assertion of a claim to examine the reasonableness being done by a public authority inevitably led to differences of judicial opinion as to the circumstances in which the court should intervene. These differences of opinion were resolved in two landmark cases which confined the circumstances for intervention to narrow limits. In Kruse v. Johnson a specially constituted divisional court had to consider the validity of a byelaw made by a local authority. In the leading judgment of Lord Russell of Killowen CJ the approach to he adopted by the court was set out. Such byelaws ought to be 'benevolently' interpreted, and credit ought to be given to those who have to administer them that they would be reasonably administered. they could be held invalid if unreasonable: where for instance bye laws were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes, if they were manifestly unjust, if they disclosed bad faith, or if they involved such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of citizens as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men. Lord Russell emphasised that a byelaws is not unreasonable just because particular judges might think it went further than was prudent or necessary or convenient. In 1947 the Court of Appeal confirmed a similar approach for the review of executive discretion generally in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation. This case was concerned with a complaint by the owners of a cinema in Wednesbury that it was unreasonable of the local authority to licence performances on Sunday only subject to a condition that 'no children under the age of 15 years shall be admitted to any entertainment whether accompanied by an adult or not'. In an extempore judgment, Lord Greene M.R. drew attention to the fact that the word 'unreasonable' had often been used in a sense which comprehended different grounds of review. In an extempore judgment, Lord Greene M.R. drew attention to the fact that the word 'unreasonable' had often been used in a sense which comprehended different grounds of review. (At page 229, where it was said that the dismissal of a teacher for having red hair (cited by Warrington LJ in Short v. Poole Corporation [1926] Ch 66 as an example of a 'frivolous and foolish reason') was, in another sense, taking into consideration extraneous matters, and might be so unreasonable that it could almost be described a being done in bad faith; see also R v. Tower Hamlets London Borough council, exp Chetnik Developments Ltd. [1988] AC 858, supra, He summarised the principles as follows : “The Court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether or not they have taken into account matter which they ought not to have taken into account, or, conversely, have refused to take into account 01 neglected to take into account matter which they ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that, although the local authority had kept within the four corners of the matters which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere. The power of the court to interfere of the court to interfere in each case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, as concerned only, to see whether the local authority has contravened the law by acting in excess of the power which Parliament has confided in them.” This summary by Lord Greene has been applied in countless subsequent cases. The modern statement of the principle is found in a passage in the speech of lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service: “By "irrationality" I mean that can now be succinctly referred to as "Wednesbury unreasonableness" Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 233. The modern statement of the principle is found in a passage in the speech of lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service: “By "irrationality" I mean that can now be succinctly referred to as "Wednesbury unreasonableness" Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 233. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at.” 80. At this stage, The Supreme Court Practice 1993 Volume 1 Pages 849-850, may be quoted: “4. Wednesbury principle -A decision of a Public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the Court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223; [1947] 2 All E.R. 680, per Lord Green M.R.)” 81. Two other facts of irrationality may be mentioned. “(1) It is open to the court to review the decision-maker's evaluation of the facts. The court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision-maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way, cannot be upheld. Thus, in Emma Hotels Ltd. v. Secretary of the State of Environment [1980] 41 P & CR 255, the Secretary of State referred to a number of factors which led him to the conclusion that a non-resident's bar in a hotel was operated in such a way that the bar was not in incident of the hotel use for planning purposes, but constituted a separate use. The Divisional Court analysed the factors which led the Secretary of State to that conclusion and, having done so, set it aside. Donaldson LJ said that he could not see on what basis the Secretary of State had reached his conclusion. (2) A decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial and unequal in its operation as between different classes. Donaldson LJ said that he could not see on what basis the Secretary of State had reached his conclusion. (2) A decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial and unequal in its operation as between different classes. On this basis in R v. Barnet London Borough Council, exp Johnson [1989] 88 LGR 73 the condition imposed by a local authority prohibiting participation by those affiliated with political parties at events to be held in the authority's parks was struck down.” 82. Bernard Schwartz in Administrative Law Second Edition page 584 has this to say: “If the scope of review is too broad, agencies are turned into little more than media for the transmission of cases to the courts. That would destroy the values of agencies created to secure the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous administration in complicated fields. At the same time, the scope of judicial inquiry must not be so restricted that it prevents full inquiry into the question of legality. If that question cannot be properly explored by the judge, the right to review becomes meaningless. "It makes judicial review of administrative orders a hopeless formality for the litigant.... It reduces the judicial process in such cases to a mere feint. Two overriding considerations have combined to narrow the scope of review. The first is that of deference to the administrative expert. In Chief Justice Neely's words, "I have very few illusions about my own limitations as a judge and from those limitations I generalize to the inherent limitations of all appellate courts reviewing rate cases. It must be remembered that this Court sees approximately 1, 262 cases a year with five judges. I am not an accountant, electrical engineer, financier, banker, stock broker, or systems management analyst. It is the height of folly to expect judges intelligently to review a 5,000 page record addressing the intricacies of public utility operation." It is not the function of a judge to act as a super board, or with the zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the administrator. The result is a theory of review that limits the extent to which the discretion of the expert may be scrutinized by the non-expert judge. The alternative is for the court to overrule the agency on technical matters where all the advantages of expertise lie with the agencies. The result is a theory of review that limits the extent to which the discretion of the expert may be scrutinized by the non-expert judge. The alternative is for the court to overrule the agency on technical matters where all the advantages of expertise lie with the agencies. If a Court were to review fully the decision of a body such a state board of medical examiners "it would find itself wandering amid the mazes of therapeutics of boggling at the mysteries of pharmacopoeia." Such a situation as a state court expressed it many years ago "is not a case of the blind leading the blind but of one who has always been deaf and blind insisting that he can see and hear better than one who has always had his eyesight and hearing and has always used them to the utmost advantage in ascertaining the truth in regard to the matter in question." The second consideration leading to narrow review that of calendar pressure. In practical terms it may be the more important consideration. More than any theory of limited review it is the pressure of the judicial calendar combined with the elephantine bulk of the record in so many review proceedings which leads to perfunctory affirmance of the vest majority of agency decision.” 83. A modern comprehensive statement about judicial review by Lord Denning is very apposite; it is perhaps worthwhile noting that he stresses the supervisory nature of the jurisdiction : “Parliament often entrusts the decision of a matter to a specified person or body, without providing for any appeal. It may be a judicial decision, or a quasi-judicial decision, or an administrative decision. Sometimes Parliament says its decision is to be final. At other times it says nothing about it. In all these cases the courts will not themselves take the place of the body to whom Parliament has entrusted the decision. The courts will not themselves embark on a rehearing of the matter: See Healey v. Minister of Health [1955] 1 QB 221. But nevertheless, the courts will, if called upon act in a supervisory capacity. They will see that the decision-making body acts fairly: see in re H.K. (an Infant) [1967] 2 QB 617 and Reg. v. Gaining Board for Great Britain; Ex parte Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417. The courts will ensure that the body acts in accordance with the law. They will see that the decision-making body acts fairly: see in re H.K. (an Infant) [1967] 2 QB 617 and Reg. v. Gaining Board for Great Britain; Ex parte Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 QB 417. The courts will ensure that the body acts in accordance with the law. If a question arises on the interpretation of words, the courts will decide it by declaring what is the correct interpretation: see Punton v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1963] 1 W.L.R. 186. And if the decision-making body has gone wrong in its interpretation they can set its order aside: see Ashbridge Investments Ltd. v. Minister of House and Local Government [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1320. (I know of some expressions to the contrary but they are not correct. If the decision-making body is influenced by considerations which ought not to influence it; or fails to take into account matters which it ought to take into account, the court will interfere: See Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] A.C. 997. If the decision-making body comes to its decision on no evidence or comes to an unreasonable finding -so unreasonable that a reasonable person would not have come to it -then again the courts will interfere: see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223. If the decision-making body goes outside its powers or misconstrues the extent of its powers, then, too the courts can interfere: see Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147. And, of course, if the body acts in bad faith or for an ulterior object, which is not authorised by law, its decision object, which is not authorised by law, its decision will be set aside: see Sydney Municipal Council v. Campbell [1925] A.C. 228. In exercising these powers, the courts will take into account any reason which the body may give for its decisions. If it gives no reasons -in a case when it may reasonably be expected to do so, the courts may infer that it has no good reason for reaching its conclusion, and act according: see Padfield's case (A.C. 997, 1007 and 1061).” 84. If it gives no reasons -in a case when it may reasonably be expected to do so, the courts may infer that it has no good reason for reaching its conclusion, and act according: see Padfield's case (A.C. 997, 1007 and 1061).” 84. We may usefully refer to Administrative Law Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy by Christopher F. Edley, JR (1990) Edn.) At page 96 it is stated thus : “A great deal of administrative law boils down to the scope of review problem; defining what degree of deference a court will accord an agency's findings, conclusions, and choices, including choice of procedures. It is misleading to speak of a "doctrine", or "the law", of scope of review. It is instead just a big problem, that is addressed piecemeal by a large collection of doctrines. Kenneth Culp Davis has offered a condensed summary of the subject : "Courts usually substitute (their own) judgment on the kind of questions of law that are within their special competence, but on other question they limit themselves to deciding reasonableness; they do not clarify the meaning of reasonableness but retain full discretion in each case to stretch it in either direction.” 85. In Universal Camera Corporation v. NLRB 340 US 474 at 488, Justice Frankfurter stated : “A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for certitude but cannot assure certainty of application. Some scope for judicial discretion in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual process of judging or by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry. It cannot be too often repeated that judges are not automata. The ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high competence and character and the constant play of an informed professional critique upon its work. Since the precise way in which courts interfere with agency findings cannot be imprisoned within any form of words, new formulas attempting to rephrase the old are not likely to be more helpful than the old. there are no talismanic words that can avoid the process of judgment. The difficulty is that we cannot escape, in relation to this problem the use of undefined defining terms.” 86. there are no talismanic words that can avoid the process of judgment. The difficulty is that we cannot escape, in relation to this problem the use of undefined defining terms.” 86. An innovative approach is made by Clive Lewis as to why the courts should be slow in quashing administrative (in his Judicial Remedies in Public Law 1992 Edition at pages 294-95). The illuminating passage reads as under : “The courts now recognise that the impact on the administration is relevant in the exercise of their remedial jurisdiction. Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burdens on the administration, divert resources towards re-opening decisions, and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. Earlier cases took the robust line that the law had to be observed, and the decision invalidated whatever the administrative inconvenience caused. The courts nowadays recognise that such an approach is not always appropriate and may not be in the wider public interest. The effect on the administrative process is relevant to the court' remedial discretion and any prove decisive. This is particularly the case when the challenge is procedural rather then substantive, or if the courts can be certain that the administrator would not reach a different decision even if the original decision were quashed. Judges may differ in the importance they attach to the disruption that quashing a decision will cause. They may also be influenced by the extent to which the illegality arises from the conduct of the administrative body itself, and their view of that conduct. The current approach is best exemplified by R. v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex p. Argyll Group [1986] 1 W.L.R. 763.” 87. Sir John Donaldson M.R. in R. v. Monopolies Commission, Ex p. Argyll Plc. (C.A.) [1986] 1 WLR 736, observed thus : “We are sitting as a public law court concerned to review an administrative decision, albeit one which has to be reached by the application of judicial or quasi-judicial principles. We have to approach our duties with a proper awareness of the needs of public administration. I cannot catalogue then-all, but, in the present context, would draw attention to a few which are relevant. Good public administration is concerned with substance rather than form. ...Good public administration is concerned with speed of decision, particular in the final field. ...Good public administration requires a proper consideration of the public interest. I cannot catalogue then-all, but, in the present context, would draw attention to a few which are relevant. Good public administration is concerned with substance rather than form. ...Good public administration is concerned with speed of decision, particular in the final field. ...Good public administration requires a proper consideration of the public interest. In this context, the Secretary of State is the guardian of the public interest. ...Good public administration requires a proper consideration of the legitimate interests of individual citizens, however rich and powerful they may be and whether they are natural or judicial persons. But in judging the relevance of an interest, however legitimate , regard has to be had to the purpose of the administrative process concerned. ...Lastly, good public administration requires decisiveness and finality, unless there dare compelling reasons to the contrary. 88. We may now look at some of the pronouncements of this Court including the authorities cited by Mr. Ashok Sen Fasih Chaudhary v. Director General, Doordarshan ( AIR 1989 SC 157 ) was a case in which the Court was concerned with the award of a contract for show of sponsored TV serial. At page 92 in paragraphs 5 and 6 it was held thus : “It is well settled that there should be fair play in action in a situation like the present one, as was observed by this Court in Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana AIR 1985 SC 1147 , 268-69. It is also well settled that the authorities like the Doordarshan should act fairly and their action should be legitimate and fair and transactions should be without any aversion, malice or affection. Nothing should be done which gives the impression of favouritism or nepotism. See the observations of this Court in Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther v. Kerala Financial Corporation [1988] 1 SCR 1079. While, as mentioned hereinbefore, fairplay in action in matters like the present one is an essential requirement, similarly, however, 'free play in the joints', is also a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere as the present one. Judged from that standpoint of view, though all the proposals might not have been considered strictly in accordance with order of precedence, it appears that these were considered fairly, reasonably, objectively and without any malice or ill-will.” 89. Judged from that standpoint of view, though all the proposals might not have been considered strictly in accordance with order of precedence, it appears that these were considered fairly, reasonably, objectively and without any malice or ill-will.” 89. In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council [ AIR 1991 SC 1153 ], the concept of reasonableness in administrative law came to be dealt with elaborately by one of us, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was). In paragraphs 37 to 46 the Court observed thus : “It was urged that the basic concept of the manner of the development of the real estate and disposal of occupancy rights were visited by unreasonableness. It is a truism, doctrinally, that powers must be exercised reasonably. But as Prof. Wade points out : “The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with the no less important doctrine that the court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which Parliament appointed to take the decision. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds, it acts as ultra vires. The court must therefore resist the temptation to draw the bounds too tightly, merely according to its own opinion. It must strive to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choices which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Decisions which are extravagant or capricious cannot be legitimate. But if the decision is within the confines of reasonableness, it is no part of the court's function to look further into its merits. 'With the question whether a particular policy is wise or foolish the court is not concerned; it can only interfere if to pursue it is beyond the powers of the authority....” In the arguments there is some general misapprehension of the scope of the "reasonableness" test in administrative law. By whose standards of reasonableness that a matter is to be decided? Some phrases which pass from one branch of law to another -as did the expressions 'void' and 'voidable' from private law areas to public law situations -carry over with them meanings that may be inapposite in the changed context. Some such thing has happened to the word "reasonable", "reasonableness" etc. Some phrases which pass from one branch of law to another -as did the expressions 'void' and 'voidable' from private law areas to public law situations -carry over with them meanings that may be inapposite in the changed context. Some such thing has happened to the word "reasonable", "reasonableness" etc. In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail Road Company justice frankfurter said : “A phrase begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas.” Different contexts in which the operation of "reasonableness" as a test of validity operates must be kept distinguished. For instance as the arguments in the present case invoke, the administrative law test of 'reasonableness' as the touchstone of validity of the impugned resolutions is different from the test of the 'reasonable man' familiar to the law of torts, whom English law figuratively identifies as the "man on the Clapham omnibus". In the latter case the standards of the 'reasonable man', to the extent a reasonable man' is court's creation, is in a manner of saying, a mere transferred epithet Lord Radcliffe observed: (All ER p.160) “By this time, it might seem that the parties themselves have become so far disembodied spirits that their actual persons should be allowed to rest in peace. In their place there rises the figure of the fair and reasonable man. And the spokesman of the fair and reasonable man, who represents after all no more than the anthropomorphic conception of justice, is, and must be, the court itself....” See Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C. [1956] 2 All ER 145. “Yet another area of reasonableness which must be distinguished is the constitutional standards of reasonableness; of the restrictions on the fundamental rights of which the court of judicial review is the arbiter. The administrative law test of reasonableness is not by the standards of the "reasonable man" of the torts law. Prof. Wade says: “This is not therefore the standard of 'the man on the Clapham omnibus'. It is the standard indicated by a true construction of the Act which distinguishes between what the statutory authority may or may not be authorised to do. It distinguishes between proper use and improper abuse of power. Prof. Wade says: “This is not therefore the standard of 'the man on the Clapham omnibus'. It is the standard indicated by a true construction of the Act which distinguishes between what the statutory authority may or may not be authorised to do. It distinguishes between proper use and improper abuse of power. It is often expressed by saying that the decision is unlawful if it is one to which no reasonable authority could have come. This is the essence of what is now commonly called 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' after the new famous case in what Lord Greene, M.R. expounded it.” 90. Referring to the doctrine of unreasonableness, Prof. Wade says in Administration Law (supra): “The point to not is that a thing is not unreasonable in the legal sense merely because the Court thinks it is unwise.” 91. In F.C.I. v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries ( AIR 1993 SC 1601 ), it was observed thus: “In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law : A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fairplay in action'. (iv) In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, reported in (2000) 10 SCC 664 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a public interest litigation, dealt with a case of construction of Sardar Sarovar Dam, and considered the principles laid down on judicial review of administrative decisions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “229. It is now well settled that the courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of policy decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is the type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policy-making process and the courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken. The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people's fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under the Constitution. Even then any challenge to such a policy decision must be before the execution of the project is undertaken. The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people's fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under the Constitution. Even then any challenge to such a policy decision must be before the execution of the project is undertaken. Any delay in the execution of the project means overrun in costs and the decision to undertake a project, if challenged after its execution has commenced, should be thrown out at the very threshold on the ground of laches if the petitioner had the knowledge of such a decision and could have approached the court at that time. Just because a petition is termed as a PIL does not mean that ordinary principles applicable to litigation will not apply. Laches is one of them. 230. Public interest litigation (PIL) was an innovation essentially to safeguard and protect the human rights of those people who were unable to protect themselves. With the passage of time PIL jurisdiction has been ballooning so as to encompass within its ambit subjects such as probity in public life, granting of largesse in the form of licences, protecting environment and the like. But the balloon should not be inflated so much that it bursts. Public interest litigation should not be allowed to degenerate to becoming publicity interest litigation or private inquisitiveness litigation. 231. While exercising jurisdiction in PIL cases the court has not forsaken its duty and role as a court of law dispensing justice in accordance with law. It is only where there has been a failure on the part of any authority in acting according to law or in non-action or acting in violation of the law that the court has stepped in. No directions are issued which are in conflict with any legal provisions. Directions have, in appropriate cases, been given where the law is silent and inaction would result in violation of the fundamental rights or other legal provisions. 232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that the court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework, a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the court's jurisdiction. 233. 232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that the court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework, a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the court's jurisdiction. 233. At the same time, in exercise of its enormous power the court should not be called upon to or undertake governmental duties or functions. The courts cannot run the Government nor can the administration indulge in abuse or non-use of power and get away with it. The essence of judicial review is a constitutional fundamental. The role of the higher judiciary under the Constitution casts on it a great obligation as the sentinel to defend the values of the Constitution and the rights of Indians. The courts must, therefore, act within their judicially permissible limitations to uphold the rule of law and harness their power in public interest. It is precisely for this reason that it has been consistently held by this Court that in matters of policy the court will not interfere. When there is a valid law requiring the Government to act in a particular manner the court ought not to, without striking down the law, give any direction which is not in accordance with law. In other words the court itself is not above the law.” (v) In State of U.P. & Anr. v. Johri Mal, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 714 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: "The scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi-judicial or administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of the omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law or do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to the other organs of the State. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of the omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law or do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court." (vi) In Rameshwar Prasad & Ors. (VI) v. Union of India & Anr., reported in (2006) 2 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed thus: "A person entrusted with discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his attention to matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules he may truly be said to be acting unreasonably. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. It is an unwritten rule of law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to be subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote." (vii) In Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel v. Anilbhai Jayanitbhai Patel and Ors., reported in (2006) 8 SCC 200 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para 18, observed as under:- "18. Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of judicial review may not be exercised unless the administrative decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardised formula, universally applicable to all cases, can be evolved. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society. Though judicial restraint, albeit self-recognised, is the order of the day, yet an administrative decision or action which is based on wholly irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from consideration the relevant material; or it is so absurd that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the given material, may be struck down. In other words, when a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to intervene. It is nevertheless, trite that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision." The following passage from Professor Bernard Schwartz's book Administrative Law (Third Edition) aptly echo's our thoughts on the scope of judicial review: "Reviewing courts, the cases are now insisting, may not simply renounce their responsibility by mumbling an indiscriminate litany of deference to expertise. Due deference to the agency does not mean abdication of the duty of judicial review and rubber-stamping of agency action: We must accord the agency considerable, but not too much deference; it is entitled to exercise its discretion, but only so far and no further." Quoting Judge Leventhal from Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F. 2d 841 (D.C.Cir. 1970), he further says: "...the reviewing court must intervene if it "becomes aware...that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making..." (viii) In Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 645 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraphs 50 and 51, observed as under:- "50. There should be judicial restraint while making judicial review in administrative matters. Where irrelevant aspects have been eschewed from consideration and no relevant aspect has been ignored and the administrative decisions have nexus with the facts on record, there is no scope for interference. There should be judicial restraint while making judicial review in administrative matters. Where irrelevant aspects have been eschewed from consideration and no relevant aspect has been ignored and the administrative decisions have nexus with the facts on record, there is no scope for interference. The duty of the court is (a) to confine itself to the question of legality; (b) to decide whether the decision making authority exceeded its powers (c) committed an error of law (d) committed breach of the rules of natural justice and (e) reached a decision which no reasonable Tribunal would have reached or (f) abused its powers. Administrative action is subject to control by judicial review in the following manner: (i) Illegality.-This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. ….....Professor De Smith in his classical work "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" 4th Edition at pages 285-287 states the legal position in his own terse language that the relevant principles formulated by the Courts may be broadly summarized as follows. The authority in which discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorized to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. The court will be slow to interfere in such matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability enumerated above; like illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety." (ix) In Bank of India v. T. Jogram reported in (2007) 7 SCC 236 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is well settled principle of law that Judicial review is not against the decision, but is against the decision making process. (x) In State of Maharashtra v. Prakash Prahland Patil [ (2009) 12 SCC 159 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court, at paragraphs 5 and 6, held as follows : “5. The scope for judicial review has been examined by this court in several cases. It has been consistently held that the power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the supreme lex to other organs of the State. A mere wrong decision, without anything more, in most of the cases will not be sufficient to attract the power of judicial review. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon a court is limited to see that the authority concerned functions within its limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice. 6. The courts cannot be called upon to undertake governmental duties and functions. Courts should not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. While exercising power of judicial review the court is more concerned with the decision making process than the merit of the decision itself.” (xi) In All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K.Shyam Kumar [ (2010) 6 SCC 614 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as follows: “22. Judicial review conventionally is concerned with the question of jurisdiction and natural justice and the Court is not much concerned with the merits of the decision but how the decision was reached. Judicial review conventionally is concerned with the question of jurisdiction and natural justice and the Court is not much concerned with the merits of the decision but how the decision was reached. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister of State for Civil Service (1984) 3 All ER 935 the (GCHQ Case) the House of Lords rationalized the grounds of judicial review and ruled that the basis of judicial review could be highlighted under three principal heads, namely, illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. Illegality as a ground of judicial review means that the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making powers and must give effect to it. Grounds such as acting ultra vires, errors of law and/or fact, onerous conditions, improper purpose, relevant and irrelevant factors, acting in bad faith, fettering discretion, unauthorized delegation, failure to act etc., fall under the heading "illegality". Procedural impropriety may be due to the failure to comply with the mandatory procedures such as breach of natural justice, such as audi alteram partem, absence of bias, the duty to act fairly, legitimate expectations, failure to give reasons etc. 23. Ground of irrationality takes in Wednesbury unreasonableness propounded in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation (1947) 2 All ER 680, Lord Greene MR alluded to the grounds of attack which could be made against the decision, citing unreasonableness as an ‘umbrella concept' which covers the major heads of review and pointed out that the court can interfere with a decision if it is so absurd that no reasonable decision maker would in law come to it. In GCHQ Case (supra) Lord Diplock fashioned the principle of unreasonableness and preferred to use the term irrationality as follows: "By ‘irrationality' I mean what can now be succinctly referred to as "Wednesbury's unreasonableness", ...... It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it." 24. In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind (1991) 1 All ER 720, the House of Lords reexamined the reasonableness of the exercise of the Home Secretary's discretion to issue a notice banning the transmission of speech by representatives of the Irish Republican Army and its political party, Sinn Fein. In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind (1991) 1 All ER 720, the House of Lords reexamined the reasonableness of the exercise of the Home Secretary's discretion to issue a notice banning the transmission of speech by representatives of the Irish Republican Army and its political party, Sinn Fein. Court ruled that the exercise of the Home Secretary's power did not amount to an unreasonable exercise of discretion despite the issue involving a denial of freedom of expression. House of Lords however, stressed that in all cases raising a human rights issue proportionality is the appropriate standard of review. 25. The House of Lords in R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001) 2 AC 532 demonstrated how the traditional test of Wednesbury unreasonableness has moved towards the doctrine of necessity and proportionality. Lord Steyn noted that the criteria of proportionality are more precise and more sophisticated than traditional grounds of review and went on to outline three concrete differences between the two:- (1) Proportionality may require the reviewing Court to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions. (2) Proportionality test may go further than the traditional grounds of review in as much as it may require attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations. (3) Even the heightened scrutiny test is not necessarily appropriate to the protection of human rights. Lord Steyn also felt most cases would be decided in the same way whatever approach is adopted, though conceded for human right cases proportionality is the appropriate test. 26. The question arose as to whether doctrine of proportionality applies only where fundamental human rights are in issue or whether it will come to provide all aspects of judicial review. Lord Steyn in R. (Alconbury Development Limited) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (2001) 2 All ER 929 stated as follows:- "I consider that even without reference to the Human Rights Act, 1998 the time has come to recognize that this principle (proportionality) is part of English administrative law not only when Judges are dealing with Community acts but also when they are dealing with acts subject to domestic law. Trying to keep the Wednesbury principle and proportionality in separate compartments seems to me to be unnecessary and confusing". Lord Steyn was of the opinion that the difference between both the principles was in practice much less than it was sometimes suggested and whatever principle was applied the result in the case was the same. 27. Whether the proportionality will ultimately supersede the concept of reasonableness or rationality was also considered by Dyson Lord Justice in R. (Association of British Civilian Internees: Far East Region) v Secretary of State for Defence [2003] QB 1397 and stated as follows:- "We have difficulty in seeing what justification there now is for retaining Wednesbury test ..... but we consider that it is not for this Court to perform burial rights. The continuing existence of the Wednesbury test has been acknowledged by the House of Lords on more than one occasion. A survey of the various judgments of House of Lords, Court of Appeals, etc. would reveal for the time being both the tests continued to co-exist." 28. Position in English Administrative Law is that both the tests that is. Wednesbury and proportionality continue to coexist and the proportionality test is more and more applied, when there is violation of human rights, and fundamental freedom and the Wednesbury finds its presence more on the domestic law when there is violations of citizens ordinary rights. Proportionality principle has not so far replaced the Wednesbury principle and the time has not reached to say goodbye to Wednesbury much less its burial. 29. In Huang case (2007) 4 All ER 15 (HL), the House of Lords was concerned with the question whether denial of asylum infringes Article 8 (Right to Respect Family Life) of the Human Rights Act, 1998. House of Lords ruled that it was the duty of the authorities when faced with individuals who did not qualify under the rules to consider whether the refusal of asylum status was unlawful on the ground that it violated the individual's right to family life. A structured proportionality test has emerged from that decision in the context of the violation of human rights. In R (Daly) (supra) the House of Lords considered both common law and Article 8 of the convention and ruled that the policy of excluding prisoners from their cells while prison officers conducted searches, which included scrutinizing privileged legal correspondence, was unlawful. 30. In R (Daly) (supra) the House of Lords considered both common law and Article 8 of the convention and ruled that the policy of excluding prisoners from their cells while prison officers conducted searches, which included scrutinizing privileged legal correspondence, was unlawful. 30. Both the above-mentioned cases, mainly concerned with the violation of human rights under the Human Rights Act, 1998 but demonstrated the movement away from the traditional test of Wednesbury unreasonableness towards the test of proportionality. But it is not safe to conclude that the principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness has been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality. 31. Justice S.B. Sinha, as His Lordship then was, speaking for the Bench in State of U.P., v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava and Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 276 after referring to the judgment of the Court of appeal in Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2005) 3 All ER 435, R. v. Secretary of State of the Home Department, ex parte Daly (2001) 3 All ER 433 (HL) opined that Wednesbury principle may not now be held to be applicable in view of the development in constitutional law and held as follows:- "24. While saying so, we are not oblivious of the fact that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality. 25. It is interesting to note that the Wednesbury principles may not now be held to be applicable in view of the development in constitutional law on this behalf. See, for example, Huang v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt. wherein referring to R. v. Secretary of State of the Home Department, ex parte Daly, it was held that in certain cases, the adjudicator may require to conduct a judicial exercise which is not merely more intrusive than Wednesbury, but involves a full-blown merit judgment, which is yet more than ex p. Daly, requires a judicial review where the court has to decide a proportionality issue." 32. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava case was later followed in Indian Airlines Ltd., v. Prabha D.Kanan [ (2006) 11 SCC 67 ]. Following the above mentioned two judgments in Jitendra Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana and Another (2008) 2 SCC 161 , the Bench has referred to a passage in HWR Wade and CF Forsyth on Administrative Law, 9th Edition. Following the above mentioned two judgments in Jitendra Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana and Another (2008) 2 SCC 161 , the Bench has referred to a passage in HWR Wade and CF Forsyth on Administrative Law, 9th Edition. (2004), pages 371-372 with the caption "Goodbye to Wednesbury" and quoted from the book which reads as follows:- "The Wednesbury doctrine is now in terminal decline but the coup de grace has not yet fallen, despite calls for it from very high authorities" and opined that in some jurisdictions the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to doctrine of proportionality." 33. Indian Airlines Ltd.'s case and Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava's case (supra) were again followed in State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Hazarilal, (2008) 3 SCC 273 and the Bench opined as follows:- "Furthermore the legal parameters of judicial review have undergone a change. Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness has been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality.". 34. With due respect, we are unable to subscribe to that view, which is an overstatement of the English Administrative Law. 35. Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness as such has not been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality though that test is being applied more and more when violation of human rights is alleged. H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth in the 10th Edition of Administrative Law (2009), has omitted the passage quoted by this court in Jitender Kumar case and stated as follows: "Notwithstanding the apparent persuasiveness of these views the coup de grace has not yet fallen on Wednesbury unreasonableness. Where a matter falls outside the ambit of 1998 Act, the doctrine is regularly relied upon by the courts. Reports of its imminent demise are perhaps exaggerated." (emphasis applied). 36. Wednesbury and Proportionality -Wednesbury applies to a decision which is so reprehensible in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral or ethical standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the issue to be decided could have arrived at it. Proportionality as a legal test is capable of being more precise and fastidious than a reasonableness test as well as requiring a more intrusive review of a decision made by a public authority which requires the courts to ‘assess the balance or equation' struck by the decision maker. Proportionality as a legal test is capable of being more precise and fastidious than a reasonableness test as well as requiring a more intrusive review of a decision made by a public authority which requires the courts to ‘assess the balance or equation' struck by the decision maker. Proportionality test in some jurisdictions is also described as the "least injurious means" or "minimal impairment" test so as to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens and to ensure a fair balance between individual rights and public interest. Suffice to say that there has been an overlapping of all these tests in its content and structure, it is difficult to compartmentalize or lay down a straight jacket formula and to say that Wednesbury has met with its death knell is too tall a statement. Let us, however, recognize the fact that the current trend seems to favour proportionality test but Wednesbury has not met with its judicial burial and a state burial, with full honours is surely not to happen in the near future. 37. Proportionality requires the Court to judge whether action taken was really needed as well as whether it was within the range of courses of action which could reasonably be followed. Proportionality is more concerned with the aims and intention of the decision-maker and whether the decision-maker has achieved more or less the correct balance or equilibrium. Courts entrusted with the task of judicial review has to examine whether decision taken by the authority is proportionate, i.e. well balanced and harmonious, to this extent court may indulge in a merit review and if the court finds that the decision is proportionate, it seldom interferes with the decision taken and if it finds that the decision is disproportionate i.e. if the court feels that it is not well balanced or harmonious and does not stand to reason it may tend to interfere. 38. Leyland and Anthony on Textbook on Administrative Law 5th edn. OUP, 2005) at p.331 has amply put as follows: "Proportionality works on the assumption that administrative action ought not to go beyond what is necessary to achieve its desired results (in every day terms, that you should not use a sledgehammer to crack a nut) and in contrast to irrationality is often understood to bring the courts much closer to reviewing the merits of a decision". 39. 39. Courts have to develop an indefeasible and principled approach to proportionality till that is done there will always be an overlapping between the traditional grounds of review and the principle of proportionality and the cases would continue to be decided in the same manner whichever principle is adopted. Proportionality as the word indicates has reference to variables or comparison, it enables the Court to apply the principle with various degrees of intensity and offers a potentially deeper inquiry into the reasons, projected by the decision maker.” (xii) In Union of India v. Rajasthan High Court reported in (2017) 2 SCC 599 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the scope of judicial review, at paragraph 13, held as follows: “13. ........The powers under Article 226 are wide – wide enough to reach out to injustice wherever it may originate. These powers have been construed liberally and have been applied expansively where human rights have been violated. But, the notion of injustice is relatable to justice under the law. Justice should not be made to depend upon the individual perception of a decision maker on where a balance or solution should lie. Judges are expected to apply standards which are objective and well defined by law and founded upon constitutional principle. When they do so, judges walk the path on a road well-travelled. When judicial creativity leads judges to roads less travelled, in search of justice, they have yet to remain firmly rooted in law and the Constitution. The distinction between what lies within and what lies outside the power of judicial review is necessary to preserve the sanctity of judicial power. Judicial power is respected and adhered to in a system based on the rule of law precisely for its nuanced and restrained exercise. If these restraints are not maintained the court as an institution would invite a justifiable criticism of encroaching upon a terrain on which it singularly lacks expertise and which is entrusted for governance to the legislative and executive arms of government. Judgments are enforced, above all, because of the belief which society and arms of governance of a democratic society hold in the sanctity of the judicial process. This sanctity is based on institutional prestige. Institutional authority is established over long years, by a steadfast commitment to a calibrated exercise of judicial power. Judgments are enforced, above all, because of the belief which society and arms of governance of a democratic society hold in the sanctity of the judicial process. This sanctity is based on institutional prestige. Institutional authority is established over long years, by a steadfast commitment to a calibrated exercise of judicial power. Fear of consequences is one reason why citizens obey the law as well as judicial decisions. But there are far stronger reasons why they do so and the foundation for that must be carefully preserved. That is the rationale for the principle that judicial review is confined to cases where there is a breach of law or of the Constitution.” (xiii) In Royal Medical Trust v. Union of India [ (2017) 16 SCC 605 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court, on the scope of judicial review, held as follows: “The principle of judicial review by the constitutional courts have been lucidly stated in many authorities of this Court. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 , dealing with the concept of Judicial Review, the Court held:- “Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment proclaimed: ‘Judicial review’ is a great weapon in the hands of the judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficial power.” Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and James Goudie in their work Judicial Review (1992 Edn.) at p. 16 say: “If anyone were prompted to dismiss this sage warning as a mere obiter dictum from the most radical member of the higher judiciary of recent times, and therefore to be treated as an idiosyncratic aberration, it has received the endorsement of the Law Lords generally. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on behalf of the Board when reversing an interventionist decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Butcher v. Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. 18-3-1991.” Observance of judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court’s ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court’s ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself.” After so stating, reference was made to the law enunciated in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141 wherein, it has been ruled:- “Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. * * * Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power.” 45. In the said case, the Court also referred to R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex. P. Datafin plc (1987) 1 All ER 564 wherein Sir John Donaldson, M.R. Commented:- “An application for judicial review is not an appeal.” 46. The three Judge Bench further held:- “The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law, 3. Committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. Reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers.” 47. The Court further opined that in the process of judicial review, it is only concerned with the manner in which the decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty is to act fairly. It will vary from case to case. Explicating further, it ruled:- “Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. Explicating further, it ruled:- “Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Brind, Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, “consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention”. 48. Thereafter, the Court referred to the authorities in R. v. Askew 20 and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service and further expressed:- “At this stage, The Supreme Court Practice, 1993, Vol. 1, pp. 849850, may be quoted: “4. Wednesbury principle.— A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it. (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., per Lord Greene, M.R.)” We may hasten to add, though the decision was rendered in the context of justification of grant of contract but the principles set out as regards the judicial review are of extreme significance. 49. Discussing at length, the principle of judicial review in many decisions, the two Judge Bench in Reliance Telecom Ltd. & Another v. Union of India & Another, has held:- 20 (1768) 4 Burr 2186 : 98 ER 139 21 (1985) 1 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 22 (2017) 4 SCC 269 “As we find, the decision taken by the Central Government is based upon certain norms and parameters. Though criticism has been advanced that it is perverse and irrational, yet we are disposed to think that it is a policy decision which subserves the consumers’ interest. Though criticism has been advanced that it is perverse and irrational, yet we are disposed to think that it is a policy decision which subserves the consumers’ interest. It is extremely difficult to say that the decision to conduct the auction in such a manner can be considered to be mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.” 50. Thus analysed, it is evincible that the exercise of power of judicial review and the extent to which it has to be done will vary from case to case. It is necessary to state with emphasis that it has its own complexity and would depend upon the factual projection. The broad principles have been laid down in Tata Cellular (supra) and other decisions make it absolutely clear that judicial review, by no stretch of imagination, can be equated with the power of appeal, for while exercising the power under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution, the constitutional courts do not exercise such power. The process of adjudication on merit by re-appreciation of the materials brought on record which is the duty of the appellate court is not permissible. 51. The duty of the Court in exercise of the power of judicial review to zealously guard the human rights, fundamental rights and the citizens’ right of life and liberty as also many non-statutory powers of governmental bodies as regards their control over property and assets of various kinds. [See : Union of India and Anr. v. S.B. Vohra (2004) 2 SCC 150 ]” 26. Case of the respondents is that there is fraud and suppression in getting assignment of land and subsequent transfer of patta by the assignees to the appellant. Whether fraud vitiates the orders, we deem it fit to consider the following decisions: (i) In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. ( AIR 1994 SC 853 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: "1. Fraud-avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and honest in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree -by the first court or by the highest court -has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and honest in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree -by the first court or by the highest court -has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. 8.............A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage.............” (ii) In Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare and Ors. [ (2002) 5 SCC 685 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “34. Coming to the first exception, it is almost settled law that fraud vitiates any act or order passed by any quasi-judicial authority even if no power of review is conferred upon it. In fact, fraud vitiates all actions. In Smith v. East Elloe Rural Distt. Council [(1956) 1 All ER 855], it was stated that the effect of fraud would normally be to vitiate all acts and orders. In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd. [ (1996) 5 SCC 550 ] it was held that a power to cancel/recall an order which has been obtained by forgery or fraud applies not only to courts of law, but also to statutory tribunals which do not have power of review. Thus, fraud or forgery practised by a political party while obtaining a registration, if comes to the notice of the Election Commission, it is open to the Commission to deregister such a political party.” (iii) In Ganpatbhai Mahijibhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat and Ors. [ (2008) 12 SCC 353 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “12..............It is now a well settled principle that fraud vitiates all solemn acts. If an order is obtained by reason of commission of fraud, even the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with for setting aside the same. In T. Vijendradas and Anr. v. M. Subramanian and Ors. ( AIR 2008 SC 563 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus; “21. ...When a fraud is practiced on a court, the same is rendered a nullity. In T. Vijendradas and Anr. v. M. Subramanian and Ors. ( AIR 2008 SC 563 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus; “21. ...When a fraud is practiced on a court, the same is rendered a nullity. In a case of nullity, even the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with. [Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Ors. v. Ajay Kumar Das and Ors. (2002) II LLJ 1057 SC & A. Umarani v. Registrar, Cooperative societies and Ors. (2004) III LLJ 780 SC] 22. Once it is held that by reason of commission of a fraud, a decree is rendered to be void rendering all subsequent proceedings taken pursuant thereto also nullity, in our opinion, it would be wholly inequitable to confer a benefit on a party, who is a beneficiary thereunder....” 13. The object and purport of a statute must be given effect to. If there is a conflicting interest, the Court may adjust equities but under no circumstance it should refuse to consider the merit of the matter, when its attention is drawn that suppression of material facts has taken place or commission of fraud on Court has been committed.” (iv) In Badami (Deceased) By her L.Rs. v. Bhali ( AIR 2012 SC 2858 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “19. Presently, we shall refer as to how this Court has dealt with the concept of fraud. In S.B. Noronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna AIR 1980 SC 193 while dealing with the concept of estoppel and fraud a two-Judge Bench has stated that it is an old maxim that estoppels are odious, although considerable inroad into this maxim has been made by modern law. Even so, "a judgment obtained by fraud or collusion, even, it seems a judgment of the House of Lords, may be treated as a nullity". (See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 16 Fourth Edition para 1553). The point is that the sanction granted Under Section 21, if it has been procured by fraud or collusion, cannot withstand invalidity because, otherwise, high public policy will be given as hostage to successful collusion. 20. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. AIR 1994 SC 853 this Court commenced the verdict with the following words: "Fraud-avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. 20. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. AIR 1994 SC 853 this Court commenced the verdict with the following words: "Fraud-avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non-est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree -by the first court or by the highest court -has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings.” (v) In Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam v. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh (Dead) through L.Rs. and Ors. [ (2019) 14 SCC 449 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus: “66. Fraud vitiates every solemn proceeding and no right can be claimed by a fraudster on the ground of technicalities. On behalf of Appellants, reliance has been placed on the definition of fraud as defined in the Black's Law Dictionary, which is as under: “Fraud means : (1) A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment. Fraud is usually a tort, but in some cases (esp. when the conduct is willful) it may be a crime. (2) A misrepresentation made recklessly without belief in its truth to induce another person to act. (3) A tort arising from a knowing misrepresentation, concealment of material fact, or reckless misrepresentation made to induce another to act to his or her detriment. (4) Unconscionable dealing; esp., in contract law, the unconscientious use of the power arising out of the parties' relative positions and resulting in an unconscionable bargain.” Halsbury's Law of England has defined fraud as follows : “Whenever a person makes a false statement which he does not actually and honestly believe to be true, for purpose of civil liability, the statement is as fraudulent as if he had stated that which he did know to be true, or known or believed to be false. Proof of absence of actual and honest belief is all that is necessary to satisfy the requirement of the law, whether the representation has been made recklessly or deliberately, indifference or reckless on the part of the representor as the truth or falsity of the representation affords merely an instance of absence of such a belief.” In KERR on the Law of Fraud and Mistake, fraud has been defined thus: “It is not easy to give a definition of what constitutes fraud in the extensive significance in which that term is understood by Civil Courts of Justice. The Courts have always avoided hampering themselves by defining or laying down as a general proposition what shall be held to constitute fraud. Fraud is infinite in variety... Courts have always declined to define it, ... reserving to themselves the liberty to deal with it under whatever form it may present itself. Fraud ... may be said to include property all acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue or unconscientious advantage is taken of another. All surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and other unfair ways that are used to cheat anyone is considered as fraud. Fraud in all cases implies a willful act on the part of anyone, whereby another is sought to be deprived, by illegal or inequitable means, of what he is entitled to.” 67. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, (2003) 8 SCC 319 , wherein it was observed that fraud vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together and it cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res-judicata. This Court observed as under: “15. Commission of fraud on court and suppression of material facts are the core issues involved in these matters. Fraud, as is well-known, vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. 16. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person, or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of former either by word or letter. 17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. 18. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person, or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of former either by word or letter. 17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. 18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by willfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. *** *** *** 23. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. *** *** *** 25. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res-judicata. (Emphasis supplied) 69. In Jai Narain Parasrampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf, [ (2006) 7 SCC 756 ], this Court observed that fraud vitiates every solemn act. Any order or decree obtained by practicing fraud is a nullity. This Court held as under: “55. It is now well settled that fraud vitiated all solemn act. Any order or decree obtained by practicing fraud is a nullity. [See -(1) Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 319 followed in (2) Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, and Anr. v. Girdhari Lal Yadav, (2004) 6 SCC 325 ; (3) State of A.P. and Anr. v. T. Suryachandra Rao, : (2005) 6 SCC 149 ; (4) Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector and Anr., (2005) 7 SCC 190 ; (5) Lillykutty v. Scrutiny Committee, SC & ST Ors., (2005) 8 SCC 283 ; (6) Chief Engineer, M.S.E.B. and Anr. v. Girdhari Lal Yadav, (2004) 6 SCC 325 ; (3) State of A.P. and Anr. v. T. Suryachandra Rao, : (2005) 6 SCC 149 ; (4) Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector and Anr., (2005) 7 SCC 190 ; (5) Lillykutty v. Scrutiny Committee, SC & ST Ors., (2005) 8 SCC 283 ; (6) Chief Engineer, M.S.E.B. and Anr. v. Suresh Raghunath Bhokare, (2005) 10 SCC 465 ; (7) Smt. Satya v. Shri Teja Singh, (1975) 1 SCC 120 ; (8) Mahboob Sahab v. Sayed Ismail, (1995) 3 SCC 693 ; and (9) Asharfi Lal v. Koili, (1995) 4 SCC 163 .] (Emphasis supplied) 27. Unless perversity is writ large on the face of the decisions rendered by the lower authorities, it is not desirable for the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower authorities. If the findings of the authorities below are concurrent, if had been rendered by considering the evidence, such a decision can never be said to be not in accordance with law. 28. When a decision is obtained by playing fraud, either on the court or on the administrative authority, principles enunciated supra apply to both. Fraud played on the authorities in getting the land assigned is proved on evidence. Transfer made within the prohibited period is also borne out by records. There is no procedural impropriety. 29. Scrutiny of records by the Revenue Divisional Officer shows that the evidence had been taken into consideration and a decision was arrived at, which, in turn, on facts, was confirmed by the Appellate Authority. The revisional authority has also found no error in the order of the Appellate Authority. Under these circumstances, on a finding of fact, when there is concurrent finding, this Court cannot interfere with the same, while exercising writ jurisdiction. The revisional authority has also found no error in the order of the Appellate Authority. Under these circumstances, on a finding of fact, when there is concurrent finding, this Court cannot interfere with the same, while exercising writ jurisdiction. This is fortified by the general principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the High Court does not normally interfere with findings of fact unless they are based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence or on misreading of evidence or ignorance of material evidence or unless the finding is one of jurisdictional fact, or is based on extraneous considerations or suffers from some other legal infirmity, or there has been violation of principles of natural justice or it is arbitrary or capricious, or involves mixed question of law and facts. 30. Giving due consideration to the facts on hand, submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant, and the decisions taken note of, we are of the considered view that there is absolutely no ground to hold that the impugned judgment is erroneous, either on facts or law. The judgment of the learned single Judge dated 25.09.2020 in W.P. (C) No.9400 of 2020 is sustained. Writ appeal is dismissed.