ORDER : The prayer in the above Criminal Miscellaneous Case filed under Sec.482 of the Cr.P.C. is as follows : “........set aside Annexure A6 common order dated 07-10-2020 passed in Annexure A2 CMP No.2502 of 2020 and Annexure A3 CMP No.2503 of 2020 in C.C.No.2430 of 2015 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court No.II, Nedumangad and allow the same by re opening the evidence and send the handwriting and signature for scientific opinion.” 2. Heard Sri. Abu Mathew, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/complainant and Sri. Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for R-1 (State). Registry has reported that registered speed post notice duly sent to contesting respondent No.2 on 21.10.2020 with hearing date 28.10.2020 has been duly delivered to said party on 26.10.2020. Though notice has been duly served on R-2 (accused), there is no appearance for that party. 3. On account of the stay order granted by this Court, further proceedings in the trial in C.C.No.2430/2015 on the file of the JFCM-II, Nedumangad, Thiruvananthapuram district, has been stayed and hence any further delay in the disposal of this case is unwarranted. The petitioner is the complainant and the 2nd respondent is the sole accused in the impugned C.C.No.2430/2015 on the file of the JFCM-II, Nedumangad, alleging that accused has committed the offence punishable under Secs.500 & 501 of the IPC. The order under challenge in this petition filed under Sec.482 is the one at the impugned Anx.A6 common order dated 7.10.2020 rendered by the said trial court on CMP Nos.2502/2020 and 2503/2020 in the said calendar case. The case set up in the impugned Anx.A1 private criminal complaint is that, the petitioner/complainant was a music teacher in the Town Lower Primary School, Nedumangad, Thiruvananthapuram district, and has now retired from service, and that the accused is her neighbour during the relevant period in the year 1984, and the accused has submitted false complaint before the AEO, Nedumangad, and has made defamatory statements against the complainant that she is highly immoral from her college days and that she is teaching in private music school during her duty time, etc. Further, the accused has alleged that the complainant is behind the suicide of one Smt. Thankamani, a common neighbour of the parties. Further, the accused has alleged that the complainant is behind the suicide of one Smt. Thankamani, a common neighbour of the parties. Further the complainant would urge that, apart from filing a false complaint against her, the accused has created defamatory posters containing statements that the complainant is responsible for the suicide of the aforesaid Smt. Thankamani, and that those posters were fixed in and around the house of the complainant and thereby the accused has defamed the complainant, it is alleged. Further that, the accused used to abuse the complainant public for which the Nedumangad Police has registered a case against the accused and the same is pending before the JFCM-II, Nedumangad, as C.C.No.863/2013. 4. Further it is stated that, in the trial of the complaint, the petitioner and other witnesses were examined as PWs 1 to 5 and documents on behalf of the prosecution as Exts.P-2 to P-11 were marked. Further that, the original complaint submitted by the accused before the AEO was called for from the office of the AEO, Nedumangad, and the same was marked in the trial as Ext.X1(a) through PW4, the incumbent who was then holding the post of AEO. Thereafter the complainant sought time to adduce more evidence and the court below disallowed said prayer and closed the evidence of the complainant. The complainant was constrained to ask for more time to adduce more evidence as the accused has taken the extreme stand by way of suggestions during the cross examination of the witnesses concerned, as well as the Sec.313 Cr.P.C. questioning process that the signatures in the abovesaid documents as per Exts.P-1 to P-5 and Ext.X1 (a) are not that of the accused. Therefore, the petitioner is compelled to take steps to adduce evidence to show that signatures in Exts.P-1 to P-5 and Ext.X1 (a) are that of the petitioner accused. It is for this purpose that the complainant had sought time and the said plea was rejected by the trial court and the evidence was closed. The petitioner was constrained to file Anx.A2 C.M.P. No .2502/2020 in the above C.C. to reopen the evidence and as well as the consequential Anx.A3 C.M.P. No.2503/2020 in above C.C., requesting the trial court to take necessary action to send Exts.P-1 to P-5 and Ext.X1 (a) for expert opinion to ascertain whether the signature in those documents are that of the accused. That, the 2nd respondent accused had filed objections to abovesaid Anxs.A2 & A3 petitions. The petitioner would now complain that, without considering the merits of the arguments of the petitioner complainant and on account of total non application of judicial mind, the court below has passed the impugned Anx.A6 common order dated 7.10.2020 on C.M.P. No. 2502/2020 as well as C.M.P. No.2503/2020 in C.C.No.2430/2015 on the file of the JFCM-II, Nedumangad, whereby the abovesaid request of the petitioner has been rejected. It is this impugned order at Anx.A6 dated 7.10.2020, that is under challenge in this petition filed under Sec.482 of the Cr.P.C. Further it is pointed out that, the complainant had sought time for evidence on 29.9.2020 and the Sec.313 Cr.P.C. Questioning process of the accused was recorded by the trial court on 1.10.2020 and that Anxs.A2 & A3 petitions were filed on 1.10.2020 and Anxs.A4 & A5 objections were filed by the accused on 5.10.2020 and it is thereafter the impugned Anx.A6 common order of rejection was granted by the trial court on 7.10.2020. 5. The counsel for the petitioner would urge that the court below has thoroughly failed in not considering the facts and circumstances of the case in its proper perspective and that Ext.X1 (a) document was under the official custody of the AEO, Nedumangad, till the examination of PW4 AEO and that the AEO is the statutory officer as per the Kerala Education Act and the Kerala Education Rules framed there under. Further the petitioner would urge that the court below ought to have considered Ext.X1 (a) original letter was available only after examination of PW4 AEO on 29.9.2020 and therefore the court below ought to have allowed Anxs.A2 & A3 petitions in the interest of justice. Further the counsel for the petitioner would urge that the court below has failed in not considering the crucial relevant fact that the admitted signature of the accused are in the records of the court like the vakalat of the accused given in this case so as to compare the handwriting and signature in documents as per Exts.P-1 to P-5 and Ext.X1 (a). 6. After hearing both sides and after consideration of the pleadings and materials on record it is seen from a mere reading of impugned Anx.A6 order that two main grounds are cited by the trial court for rejecting the plea of the petitioner. 6. After hearing both sides and after consideration of the pleadings and materials on record it is seen from a mere reading of impugned Anx.A6 order that two main grounds are cited by the trial court for rejecting the plea of the petitioner. The first appears to be that, this Court had earlier ordered that the trial in the instant calender case C.C.No.2430/2015 on the file of the JFCM-II, Nedumangad, should be duly completed by the said trial court within the time limit mentioned therein, and that the said time limit had expired by 29.7.2020 and that the trial court had addressed this Court for extension of three more months time on 16.7.2020, but that no order is seem passed by this Court on the said request of the trial court for extension of time. That, since the prosecution is over and the accused has been examined under Sec.313 Cr.P.C., the process of obtaining expert opinion regarding the authenticity or otherwise of the signatures in abovesaid documents in question will be a time consuming process. In other words, the trial court appears to be strained by the fact that the time limit stipulated by this Court for completion of trial in this case has already expired and extension of time has not been granted by this Court and therefore, if the pleas of the petitioner are allowed, it will amount to violating the time line stipulated by this Court. 7. The second and rather more crucial ground stated by the trial court in Anx.A6 order is to the effect that, no contemporaneous document signed or written by the accused, nor any admitted signature of the accused is produced by the petitioner and only when there are admitted signatures, it can be send for expert opinion for its comparison with disputed signatures, etc. After hearing this Court is of the considered opinion that, the grounds cited by the trial court for rejection of pleas of the petitioner are illegal and improper and not taking into consideration the crucial and relevant aspects of the matter and based on the irrelevant considerations, and hence the impugned order or rejection is liable for interdiction at the hands of this Court. It has to be borne in mind that even going by the pleadings and materials on record it appears that, trial in this case has started as early as on 18.6.2020 and thereafter the documents as Exts.P-1 to P-5 were marked in trial thereafter in June, 2020. The original letter of the AEO has been marked as Ext.X1 (a) during the examination of PW4 AEO on 29.9.2020. On the same day itself the complainant has sought time for further evidence. The trial court without heeding to the plea of the complainant has ordered the closure of evidence. So, the most important aspect of the matter is that the original of Ext.X1 (a) document was under the official custody of AEO, Nedumangad, till the examination of PW4 AEO on 29.9.2020 and for the first time the said original document produced and marked as Ext.X1 (a) in the trial on 29.9.2020. On the very same day, the accused has made a plea that he should be given time for further evidence as the accused has taken the stand that signatures in the documents as per Exts.P-1 to P-5 and Ext.X1 (a) are not his. The said plea of the complainant has been rejected by the trial court and the evidence was then ordered to be closed. The trial court has recorded the statement of accused under Sec.313 Cr.P.C. on 1.10.2020. On the same day itself, the complainant has filed Anxs.A2 & A3 petitions making the abovesaid pleas. Therefore, since the last of abovesaid documents was made available and marked for the first time only on 29.9.2020, the complainant cannot be accused of any delay in the matter for requesting for time for further evidence. Since, the accused has taken the stand that the signatures in abovesaid documents are not this, then the only way out for the complainant to prove his case is to seek time for further evidence including the aspect of sending those documents for expert opinion regarding signature and handwriting etc. The first ground of rejection made by the trial court cannot be countenanced by this Court. True, that this Court may have directed that the trial should be completed within a reasonable time limit, and the said time limit may have been expired. But, that itself cannot be the end of the road in a trial. The first ground of rejection made by the trial court cannot be countenanced by this Court. True, that this Court may have directed that the trial should be completed within a reasonable time limit, and the said time limit may have been expired. But, that itself cannot be the end of the road in a trial. Where there are genuine and relevant reasons, this Court can certainly consider the plea for time extension. It appears that the trial court was strained by the fact that, since the plea for time extension has not been responded to by this Court, the trial court may err in transgressing said time line. The said stand of the trial court, though in a way understandable, cannot be the legal basis to determine like the present case. The complainant in the private criminal complaint should be given reasonable opportunity to prove his case in the manner known to law. The last of abovesaid documents, viz, Ext.X1 (a) was made available and marked for the first time only on 29.9.2020, on which day the complainant has made the request for time to adduce further evidence inasmuch as the accused has taken up the plea that the signatures in the documents are not of his. The said plea has been wrongly rejected by the trial court. Sec.313 Cr.P.C. questioning process of the accused was done 1.10.2020, and immediately thereafter on the same day the complainant has filed the instant applications with the abovesaid pleas. 8. Therefore, as observed herein above, the complainant cannot be in any manner be accused of any deliberate delay on his part to protract the trial. In this context it is relevant to note that the petitioner complainant has asserted that the accused herein has already executed vakalat in favour of his counsel authorising him to appear and defend for the cause of the accused in the present trial court, and that the said vakalat contains the original admitted signature of the accused and the same can be easily used as the basis being taken as one of the admitted original signatures of the accused. This aspect of the matter has been crucially overlooked by the trial court. This aspect of the matter has been crucially overlooked by the trial court. Further, the constitutional bench of five judge bench of the Apex Court in the celebrated decision in The State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad and others [ AIR 1961 SC 1808 , para 16] has held that the giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm or fingers or specimen hand writings or showing parts of the body by way of identification by the accused are not included in the expression to be a 'witness' as occurring in Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution of India. It will be pertinent to refer to para 16 of the abovesaid decision of the Apex Court in Kathi Kalu Oghad's case supra, which reads as follows : “(16) In view of these considerations, we have come to the following conclusions :- (1) An accused person cannot be said to have been compelled to be a witness against himself simply because he made a statement while in police custody, without anything more.' In other words, the mere fact of being in police custody at the time when the statement in question was 'made would not., by itself, as a proposition of law, lend itself to the inference that the accused was compelled to make the statement, though that fact, in conjunction with other circumstances disclosed in evidence in a particular case, would be a relevant consideration in an enquiry whether or not the accused person had been compelled to make the impugned statement. (2) The mere questioning of an accused person by a police officer, resulting in a voluntary statement, which may ultimately turn out to be incriminatory, is not compulsion'. (3) To be a witness' is not equivalent to garnishing evidence' in its widest significance ; that is to say, as including not merely making of oral or written statements but also production of documents or giving materials which may be relevant at a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. (4) Giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm or fingers or specimen writings or showing parts of the body by way of identification were not included in the expression to be a witness. (4) Giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm or fingers or specimen writings or showing parts of the body by way of identification were not included in the expression to be a witness. (5) 'To be a witness' means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts by an oral statement or a statement in writing, made or given in Court or otherwise. (6) 'To be a witness' in its ordinary grammatical sense means giving oral testimony in Court. Case law has gone beyond this strict literal interpretation of the expression which may now bear a wider meaning, namely, bearing testimony in Court or out of Court by a person accused of an offence, orally or in writing. (7) To bring the statement in question within the prohibition of Art. 20(3), the person accused must have stood in the character of an accused person At the time he made the statement. It is not enough that he should become an accused, any time after the statement has been made” 9. Further, this Court has held in the decision in Lilly v. Vijayalaxmi [ 1985 KLT 696 ] that, direction by the criminal trial court to the accused to give specimen signature and handwriting will not come within the scope of testimonial compulsion as envisaged in Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution of India. The scope and ambit of constitutional protection guaranteed to an accused against testimonial compulsion as envisaged in Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution of India has been dealt with in detail in the Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Selvi v. State of Karnataka [ (2010) 7 SCC 263 ]. It will be pertinent to refer to para Nos. 111, 118, 128 & 133 of the decision of the Apex Court in the Selvi's case supra, which reads as follows : “111. In response to John Wigmore's thesis about the separate foundations of the 'rule against involuntary confessions', we must recognise the infusion of constitutional values into all branches of law, including procedural areas such as the law of evidence. While the above-mentioned criticisms have been made in academic commentaries, we must defer to the judicial precedents that control the scope of Article 20(3). While the above-mentioned criticisms have been made in academic commentaries, we must defer to the judicial precedents that control the scope of Article 20(3). For instance, the interrelationship between the privilege against self-incrimination and the requirements of observing due process of law were emphasized by William Douglas, J. in Rochin v. California, 342 US 166 (1951), at p. 178: "As an original matter it might be debatable whether the provision in the Fifth Amendment that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself' serves the ends of justice. Not all civilized legal procedures recognize it. But the choice was made by the framers, a choice which sets a standard for legal trials in this country. The Framers made it a standard of due process for prosecutions by the Federal Government. If it is a requirement of due process for a trial in the federal courthouse, it is impossible for me to say it is not a requirement of due process for a trial in the state courthouse." I-A. Whether the investigative use of the impugned techniques creates a likelihood of incrimination for the subject? xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 118. The opinion also explained the significance of having a counsel present during a custodial interrogation. It was noted, Id. at pp. 469-470: "The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of their rights. A mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end. Prosecutors themselves claim that the admonishment of the right to remain silent without more 'will benefit only the recidivist and the professional.' [Brief for the National District Attorneys Association as amicus curiae, p. 14] Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process. Prosecutors themselves claim that the admonishment of the right to remain silent without more 'will benefit only the recidivist and the professional.' [Brief for the National District Attorneys Association as amicus curiae, p. 14] Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process. [Cited from Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485 ...] Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires." xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 128. We can now examine the various circumstances that could 'expose a person to criminal charges'. The scenario under consideration is one where a person in custody is compelled to reveal information which aids the investigation efforts. The information so revealed can prove to be incriminatory in the following ways: - The statements made in custody could be directly relied upon by the prosecution to strengthen their case. However, if it is shown that such statements were made under circumstances of compulsion, they will be excluded from the evidence. - Another possibility is that of 'derivative use', i.e. when information revealed during questioning leads to the discovery of independent materials, thereby furnishing a link in the chain of evidence gathered by the investigators. - Yet another possibility is that of 'transactional use', i.e. when the information revealed can prove to be helpful for the investigation and prosecution in cases other than the one being investigated. - A common practice is that of extracting materials or information, which are then compared with materials that are already in the possession of the investigators. For instance, handwriting samples and specimen signatures are routinely obtained for the purpose of identification or corroboration. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 133. We have already referred to the language of Section 161, CrPC which protects the accused as well as suspects and witnesses who are examined during the course of investigation in a criminal case. It would also be useful to refer to Sections 162, 163 and 164 of the CrPC which lay down procedural safeguards in respect of statements made by persons during the course of investigation. It would also be useful to refer to Sections 162, 163 and 164 of the CrPC which lay down procedural safeguards in respect of statements made by persons during the course of investigation. However, Section 27 of the Evidence Act incorporates the 'theory of confirmation by subsequent facts' - i.e. statements made in custody are admissible to the extent that they can be proved by the subsequent discovery of facts. It is quite possible that the content of the custodial statements could directly lead to the subsequent discovery of relevant facts rather than their discovery through independent means. Hence such statements could also be described as those which 'furnish a link in the chain of evidence' needed for a successful prosecution. This provision reads as follows: "27. How much of information received from accused may be proved. -Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved."” 10. So also, it is pertinent to refer to the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions as in Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State of Karnataka [ (1997) 7 SCC 110 , para 38] which reads as follows : “38. As a matter of extreme caution and judicial sobriety, the Court should not normally take upon itself the responsibility of comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature or handwriting and in the event of the slightest doubt, leave the matter to the wisdom of experts. But this does not mean that the Court has not the power to compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature as this power is clearly available under Section 73 of the Act. [See: State (Delhi Admn.) v. Pali Ram.]” 11. The abovesaid aspects have been eschewed from consideration by the trial court and in view of the abovesaid aspects, the trial court could have easily ordered that the specimen signature and handwriting of the accused could also be obtained for being forwarded to the Forensic Sciences Laboratory (FSL) for expert opinion determine as to whether the signatures/handwriting in the abovesaid documents as per Exts.P-1 to P-5 and Ext.X1 (a) are that of the accused or not. The upshot of the above discussion is that, the impugned rejection order made by the trial court as per Anx.A6 is not sustainable in the eye of law, for it amount to violating the right of the complainant to secure reasonable opportunity to prove his case in the manner known to law. In that view of the matter it is ordered that, the impugned Anx.A6 order will stand set aside. Consequentially it is ordered that the trial court will pass necessary orders on Anx.A2 petition to reopen evidence and may pass necessary orders on Anx.A3 petition in order to send Exts.P-1 to P-5 and Ext.X1 (a) documents for expert opinion by the FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, without any further delay. In that regard the trial court will ensure that the specimen signatures and handwriting of the accused are taken in the presence of the court and in accordance with the appropriate procedure for being send for analysis by the FSL in order to help the said agency to give an expert opinion the signatures and handwriting in Exts.P-1 to P-5 and Ext.X1 (a) are that of the accused or not. Orders actions in that regard shall be duly rendered by the trial court without any further delay at any rate within 2 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 12. The trial court will ensure that the requisition in the prescribed proforma is send to the FSL on the abovesaid aspects. The Director of FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, will ensure that the process of analysis by the experts for giving the expert opinion on the above aspects shall be duly rendered and completed within 2 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The trial court will ensure that the abovesaid requisition with requisite materials are duly send to the Director of FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, along with a copy of this order and along with a covering letter informing the said Directorate about the abovesaid directions of this Court and to ensure its compliance. 13. The trial court will ensure that the abovesaid requisition with requisite materials are duly send to the Director of FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, along with a copy of this order and along with a covering letter informing the said Directorate about the abovesaid directions of this Court and to ensure its compliance. 13. The learned Prosecutor is requested to ensure that the Director General of Prosecution may immediately communicate a copy of this order to the Director of FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, with the instructions that the abovesaid directions shall be complied with by the said FSL authorities within the time limit mentioned herein above immediately on receipt of requisition in that regard from the trial court and within the abovesaid time limit stipulated by this Court herein above. 14. After receipt of the expert opinion from the FSL, the trial court will ensure that the trial process is duly completed without much delay preferably within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of expert opinion from the FSL as aforestated. With these observations and directions, the above Criminal Miscellaneous Case will stand finally disposed of.