ORDER : In view of outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, case has been taken up through Video Conferencing. Concerned lawyers have no objection with regard to the proceeding, which has been held through Video Conferencing today at 10:30 a.m. onwards. They have no complaint in respect to the audio and video clarity and quality. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing impugned Award dated 20th February, 2002, passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.2 at Dhanbad in Ref. No. 146/1997, whereby and whereunder, the respondent No.1-learned Tribunal has held that action of the petitioner-Management in terminating the workman-respondent No.2 w.e.f. 24.01.1996 is not justified. The petitioner-Management was further directed to reinstate the respondent No.2 to his original post and to regularize his services as messenger-cum-Sweeper from the date of his termination. However, no back wages was allowed to respondent No.2-workman. 3. As per the factual matrix, the petitioner is a Rural Bank constituted under Regional Rural Bank Act, 1976, Punjab National Bank being the sponsored Bank. The workman-respondent No.2 was appointed/engaged as a Messenger-cum-Sweeper by the Management of petitioner-Bank w.e.f. 30.12.1988 on daily wages @ Rs.2/- per day. He was posted at Kpasia Branch and was at the disposal of Management of the Bank and discharging his duties as assigned by the Management, sincerely and to the best of his abilities and there was no complain related to his work from any corner. It is further stated that in course of his work, the respondent No.2-workman has submitted several representations before the Management-petitioner for regularization of his services as he had worked continuously for more than 240 days in a calendar year, but no heed was paid. All of sudden, the Management-petitioner terminated the respondent No.2-workman from services w.e.f. 24.01.1996 without giving any notice to him. Accordingly, the workman-respondent No.2 raised the dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (C), which ended in failure and the Govt. of India, Ministry of Labour referred the dispute before the Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal Dhanbad with the following terms of Reference: “Whether the action of the Management of Magadh Gramin bank, Gaya in terminating the workman Shri Ram Niwas Singh w.e.f. 24.01.1996 is legal and justified ? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to ? 4. Upon the receipt of the reference, the learned Tribunal registered the same as Ref. If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to ? 4. Upon the receipt of the reference, the learned Tribunal registered the same as Ref. case No. 146 of 1997 and issued notices upon the respective parties to submit their written statement, rejoinder, etc. Upon receipt of the notice, petitioner-Management appeared before the learned Tribunal and filed rejoinder. 5. The learned Labour Court, after hearing the parties at length and after perusing the documents and evidences brought on record, came to the conclusion vide Award dated 20.02.2002 that the action of the Management of Magadh Gramin Bank, Gaya in terminating the workman Sh. Ram Niwas Singh w.e.f. 24.01.1996 is not justified. Consequently, the Management was directed to reinstate him to his original post and to regularize his services as Messenger-cum-Sweeper from the date of his termination. However, it was further held that the concerned workman will not be entitled to get any back wages. Aggrieved by the Award for reinstatement and regularization of services of respondent No.2, the petitioner-Management has been constrained to knock the door of this Court. 6. Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Management assails the impugned Award on the ground that the impugned Award is illegal, without jurisdiction and beyond the terms of reference. The learned Tribunal has directed the Management to regularize the services of the Respondent No. 2, though the question of regularization was not there in term of the reference and also no document related to his appointment was produced by the respondent no. 2. He further submits that the learned Tribunal while passing the impugned Award in favour of the respondent No.2 has solely relied upon the recommendation dated 02.03.1998 of the then Branch Manager, but failed to appreciate that if the said recommendation is to be believed, then the respondent No.2-workman had worked till 02.03.1998 and as such, it can be comfortably said that question of termination of respondent No.2 w.e.f. 24.01.1996 is imaginary. The learned Tribunal has also failed to consider the fact that the Respondent No. 2-workman has not produced any document to prove that he was validly appointed as Messenger-cum-Sweeper. The learned Tribunal has also failed to consider the fact that the Respondent No. 2-workman has not produced any document to prove that he was validly appointed as Messenger-cum-Sweeper. Further, the workman has failed to produce letter of termination and attendance register to prove that he had worked for the period as claimed and also any document with regard to getting payment from Petitioner-Bank and as such, the impugned award is illegal, perverse and bad in eyes of Law. Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel further argues that the learned Tribunal failed to consider the fact that respondent No.2 was getting Rs.2/- per day means Rs.60 per month from the Branch Manager, which cannot be termed as salary for messenger-cum-sweeper as vide order dated 10.12.1990, Branch Manager was authorized to withdraw Rs.2/- per day from miscellaneous expenses for the purpose of cleaning and as such, he was free to take this work from any person on day to day basis. The respondent No.2 was never appointed by the competent authority and he was working on daily wages basis only. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel places heavy reliance on the Judgment of this Hon’ble Court in case of Ashok Prasad Vs. The Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal No.2 & Anr. passed in CWJC No.1990 of 1987 (R). 7. Per contra, counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent No.2. 8. Mrs. Rashmi Kumar, Amicus Curiae appearing for the respondents vehemently opposes the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-Management and submits that there is no illegality or any infirmity in the impugned Award. She submits that the respondent No.2 had worked under the petitioner-Management w.e.f. 30.12.1988 to 23.01.1996 and during this period he worked continuously for more than 240 days in each calendar year. The termination though orally was illegal and as such, learned Tribunal has rightly decided the reference in favour of the workman-respondent No.2. Learned counsel draws the attention of the Court towards Annexure 3 & 4 to the writ petition, which is the recommendation of the then Branch Manager of petitioner-Bank, wherein it is specifically mentioned that the respondent No.2 had worked in the said Bank during the aforesaid period. To buttress her arguments, learned Amicus Curiae places heavy reliance on the Judgment of this Hon’ble Court in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Vs. To buttress her arguments, learned Amicus Curiae places heavy reliance on the Judgment of this Hon’ble Court in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Vs. Smt. Shashi Kanta Rishi passed in W.P. (C) No.225 of 2005. 9. Be that as it may, having considered rival submission of the parties and on perusal of the records, it appears that admittedly, the respondent No.2 was not appointed by the Competent Authority and no appointment letter was ever produced and also evidence to that effect has not been laid by either of the parties before the learned Tribunal. The concerned workman was engaged as a daily-wager by the Petitioner-Bank, for which he received Rs.2/- per day, which is evident from Annexures 3 & 4 to the writ petition. 10. The case of Secretary, State of Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi & Ors., reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 is an authoritative pronouncement for the proposition that the Hon’ble Supreme Court (under Article 32) and the High Court (under Article 226) should not issue directions of absorption, regularization or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or ad hoc employees unless the recruitment itself was made regularly in terms of the constitutional scheme. 11. The power given to the Industrial and Labour Courts under Section 30 is very wide and the affirmative action mentioned therein is inclusive and not exhaustive. Employing badlis, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees is an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of the Schedule-IV. Once such unfair labour practice on the part of the employer is established in the complaint, the Industrial and Labour Courts are empowered to issue preventive as well as positive direction to an erring employer. 12. The extent to which Umadevi (supra) applies, in the arena of industrial adjudication, and affects the jurisdiction and power of Labour Courts or Industrial Tribunals to direct regularization, are issue which have proved to be prickly and thorny in equal measure. 13. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court while dealing with the similar issue in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Vs. Shashi Kanta Rishi passed in W.P.(C) No. 225/2005 has held thus: 28. 13. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court while dealing with the similar issue in case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Vs. Shashi Kanta Rishi passed in W.P.(C) No. 225/2005 has held thus: 28. The first significant decision, on the issue, appears to be U.P. Power Corporation Ltd vs Bijli Mazdoor Sangh, (2007) 5 SCC 755 , by a two Judge bench of the Supreme Court, speaking through Pasayat, J. The respondents, in the said case, were appointed as chowkidars, on muster-roll basis, and were being paid daily wages. Consequent to a decision, of the Corporation, that no casual workers would be engaged, the services of the respondents were terminated. The respondents moved the Industrial Tribunal, alleging infraction of Section 25-F of the ID Act, and succeeded. The Industrial Tribunal directed reinstatement of the workmen, but did not consider the issue of their regularization, though it was raised. The second respondent, in the said case, thereafter, raised another industrial dispute, seeking, inter alia, regularisation of his services. He also filed a writ petition, challenging the earlier award of the Industrial Tribunal, complaining that the issue of regularization had not been considered therein. Ultimately, the High Court remanded the matter to the Industrial Tribunal, to decide the issue of regularization of the said workmen. The Tribunal, adjudicating the remand, held that the workmen were deemed to have been regularised, on completion of three years of service with the Corporation. The Corporation moved the writ Court, thereagainst, but the High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the workmen were entitled to regularization. The Corporation appealed, further, to the Supreme Court, citing, in its support, Umadevi (supra). The workmen, per contra, sought to contend that Umadevi (supra) did not deal with the jurisdiction of the industrial adjudicator, which was a species sui generis. The Supreme Court, while accepting the fact that the powers of the industrial adjudicator were not in issue in Umadevi (supra), held, nevertheless, that "the foundational logic" in Umadevi (supra) was based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court, while accepting the fact that the powers of the industrial adjudicator were not in issue in Umadevi (supra), held, nevertheless, that "the foundational logic" in Umadevi (supra) was based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Having said that, the Supreme Court merely held, in conclusion, that "the industrial adjudicator can modify the relief, but that does not dilute the observations made by this Court in Umadevi case about the regularization." It is not possible to understand this judgment as categorically pronouncing on the issue of the power of the Industrial Tribunal to direct regularization, this way or that. 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of BSNL v. Bhurunal, (2014) 2 SCC (L & S) 373, has held thus :- “It is apparent that the aforesaid findings are findings of fact. Such findings are not to be interfered with by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Interference is permissible only in case these findings are totally perverse or based on no evidence. Insufficiency of evidence cannot be a ground to interdict these findings as it is not the function of this Court to reappreciate the evidence. It was because of this reason that the learned counsel for the appellant made frontal attack on the findings of the courts below and endeavoured to demonstrate that there was perversity in the fact-finding by CGIT which was glossed over by the High Court as well.” 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Gaurishanker (supra), it has been held thus :- 23. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has exceeded his jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as per the legal principles laid down by this Court in Harjinder Singh wherein this Court has held thus: (SCC p. 205, para 21) “21. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has exceeded his jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as per the legal principles laid down by this Court in Harjinder Singh wherein this Court has held thus: (SCC p. 205, para 21) “21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: ‘10. … The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.’ (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines12 AIR p. 928, para 10.)” The said principle has been reiterated by this Court in Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana13. 24. Therefore, in view of the abovesaid case, the learned Single Judge in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India erroneously interfered with the award of reinstatement and future salary from the date of award till date of reinstatement as rightly passed by the Labour Court recording valid and cogent reasons in answer to the points of dispute holding that the workman has worked from 1-1-1987 to 1-4-1992 and that non-compliance with the mandatory requirements under Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act by the respondent Department rendered its action of termination of the services of the workman as void ab initio in law and instead the High Court erroneously awarded a compensation of Rs 1,50,000 in lieu of reinstatement. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench under their supervisory jurisdiction should not have modified the award by awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement which is contrary to the well-settled principles of law laid down in a catena of cases by this Court. 16. Considering other aspects of the matter, it is also well settled that the orders of the Tribunal can only be interfered if there is gross illegality and the order is perverse and without jurisdiction. This Court, sitting under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can only interfere if the aforesaid elements are attracted. Since the Reference was regarding illegal termination of respondent No.2 from services of the petitioner-Bank and the learned Tribunal ought not have issued the direction for regularization of services of respondent No.2. 17. This Court is of considered view that as no appointment letter has been produced or any evidence to that point have been laid by either of the parties, save and except, the recommendation letter regarding work taken from the respondent No.2, there is no question of regularization of services of respondent No.2. As far as issue of reinstatement is concerned, this Court does not think proper to interfere with the observation of the learned Tribunal. 18. As a result, the part of impugned Award for regularization of service is set aside and accordingly, the impugned Award is modified to read as follow : ‘ … …… Consequently, the management to reinstate him to his original post as Messenger-cum-Sweeper from the date of his termination. However, the concerned workman will not be entitled to get any back wages.” 19. Accordingly, the Management is directed to reinstate the respondent No.2-workman to his original post, within a period of ten weeks’ from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 20. The impugned Award is modified to the extent mention above and accordingly, this writ petition stands disposed of. 21. Pending I.A., if any, also stands disposed of. 22. Let the LCR be transmitted to the court concerned. Writ petition disposed of.