JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Birendra Singh, Sri S. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 3 and the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos. 1 and 2. 2. The instant petition has been filed invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the following prayer; "I. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the Possession Notice dated 13.3.2020 and Demand Notice dated 4.2.2019 issued by the respondent no.3 (Annexure No. 1 and 2 to the writ petition). 2. Issue any other suitable writ, order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. Award cost of the petition to the petitioner." 3. The proceedings initiated against the petitioner by issuing Demand Notice under Section 13 (2) dated 4.2.2019 and Possession Notice dated 13.3.2020 under Section 13 (4) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for the sake of brevity hereinafter referred to as 'SARFAESI Act” read with Rule 8 of Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. The aforesaid proceeding has been initiated in exercise of power conferred under Sub Section 12 of Section 13 read with Rule 8 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 on failure of repaying the loan amount. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is a private Limited Partnership Company incorporated on 8.7.2016 under the Companies Act 2013, which is carrying out business of importing and exporting, preparing, mining, cutting, polishing and processing for all types of marble and granite and other building materials. For establishment of the unit, which is situated over Khata No.114, Khasara No. 141 in Mauja Ghaskata, Tehsil Kheragarh, district Agra the partners of the petitioner applied for the loan and mortgaged the aforesaid property with the respondent no. 3 Bank of Maharashtra. The Bank granted loan of Rs. 45,00,000/- as a term loan and Rs. 15,00,000/- as cash credit limit, total amounting to Rs. 60,00,000/- in the year 2017. 3 Bank of Maharashtra. The Bank granted loan of Rs. 45,00,000/- as a term loan and Rs. 15,00,000/- as cash credit limit, total amounting to Rs. 60,00,000/- in the year 2017. An order was passed on 15.10.2018 by the Regional Officer, U.P. Pollution Control Board, after inspecting the unit on 20.9.2018 that it was being run without obtaining NOC and consent of Air and Water from Pollution Control Board and that the unit comes within the limit of Taj trapezium zone. As closure order was passed on 15.10.2018 the business activities of the unit have been closed as a result of which the deposit of regular instalment of the loan could not be made. However from 15.2.2019 till 30th September 2019 the instalment of the loan amount was paid. The respondent no. 3 has issued the impugned demand notice dated 4.2.2019 under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act. The possession notice was never served upon the petitioner nor any partners or representatives of the petitioner. The notice was only pasted at the main gate of the unit on the basis whereof the partner of the petitioner came to know about the proceeding initiated under the aforesaid Act. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that even no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner after the issuance of the impugned demand notice dated 4.2.2019 issued under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act only showing the reason that due to failure to adhere to the terms and conditions and had made default hence the account has been classified by the Bank as NPA on 31.1.2019. However, after the demand notice the petitioner has deposited the loan amount from 15.2.2019 uptill 30.9.2019. As the unit was closed due to the closure order the regular instalment of the loan amount could not be paid thereafter. The respondent no. 3 further proceeded arbitrarily by issuing possession notice dated 13.3.2020 under Section 13 (4) read with Rule 8 of the SARFAESI Act/Rules, 2002. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance before us the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this court dated 11.12.2018 passed in Writ-C No. 38578 of 2018 (Kumkum Tentiwal Vs. The respondent no. 3 further proceeded arbitrarily by issuing possession notice dated 13.3.2020 under Section 13 (4) read with Rule 8 of the SARFAESI Act/Rules, 2002. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance before us the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this court dated 11.12.2018 passed in Writ-C No. 38578 of 2018 (Kumkum Tentiwal Vs. State of U.P. and others) and contended that the order passed by the Additional District Magistrate for taking possession of the property in the said case was quashed as no opportunity of hearing was given before passing the order under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. 7. It is further contended that the Public Interest Litigation No. 1338 of 2018 (M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India) was filed before the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble Court vide order dated 6.12.2019 allowed permission by suspending the closure order of the U.P. Pollution Control Board dated 15.10.2018. The petitioner's unit reopened only on 16.3.2020 but was closed again due to lock down amid pandemic of Covid-19. However, the petitioner undertakes that he would be able to deposit the balance loan amount in easy instalments as may be directed by this court. The respondent bank has proceeded against the petitioner violating the statutory provisions of the Act, hence the issuance of the demand notice as well as the notice of possession are vitiated in law liable to be quashed. 8. Per contra the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.3 has raised objection and contended that the petitioner has an alternative remedy to take all these objections in a proceeding under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The petitioner had an opportunity to reply to the demand notice issued under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act within 60 days and failure of which has given rise to the respondent no.3 to declare the account as non performing asset (NPA) on 30.1.2019. The petitioner's account was declared as Non Performing Asset (NPA) much prior to the lock down due to pandemic Covid-19. The petitioner's account was declared as Non Performing Asset (NPA) much prior to the lock down due to pandemic Covid-19. Sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner to pay the balance loan amount and the petitioner could have also ample opportunity to redeem the secured assets in accordance with the provisions of Sub Section 8 of Section 13 of the Act but the petitioner has failed to repay the amount, as such the possession notice has been issued under Section 13 (4) read with Rule 8 of the SARFAESI Act by the impugned possession notice dated 13.3.2020. The petitioner was under legal obligation to pay the outstanding dues even otherwise an alternative remedy is available to the petitioner under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act against the action of the respondent no. 3, hence the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. 9. In support of his submission the learned counsel for the respondent no.3 has relied upon the various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, which is delineated herein as under; (I) 2010 (8) SCC 110 , United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tandon and others; (II) Civil Appeal No. 1281 of 2018 (arising out of SLP © No. 24610 of 2015) Authorized Officer, State Bank of Tranvancore and another Vs. Mathew K.C. and (III) Civil Appeal No. nil of 2018 (Arising out of SLP © No. 10215-10217 of 2016) ITC Limited Vs. Blue Coast Hotels Ltd and others. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 has submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above noted cases has declined interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by observing that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternative statutory remedies are available as ignoring the availability of statutory remedy and entertaining the writ petition granting interim relief have serious adverse impact on the right of bank and other financial institutions to recover their dues. The entire exercise for the recovery of loan have been initiated much prior to the lock down due to Covid-19 hence do not deserve any interim relief. 11. We have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 12. From the perusal of the impugned notices, the respondent no. The entire exercise for the recovery of loan have been initiated much prior to the lock down due to Covid-19 hence do not deserve any interim relief. 11. We have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 12. From the perusal of the impugned notices, the respondent no. 3 has initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act/Rules on account of failure of the petitioner to repay the loan amount. The statutory demand notice under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued on 4.2.2019 declaring the account by the Bank as Non performing Asset (NPA) on 21.1.2019. 13. From the pleadings it is not the case of the petitioner that he has replied through filing objections to the statutory notice issued under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act within 60 days from the date of notice as the petitioner neglected to pay the dues, hence the Possession Notice was issued under Section 13 (4) read with Rule 8 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 against which the petitioner has the remedy to prefer an appeal under Section 17 of the Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Further he has remedy to appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the Act against the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. 14. An extract of relevant provisions of the Act are reproduced herein below for ready reference; 13. Enforcement of security interest.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 or section 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of the court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Where any borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor under a security agreement, makes any default in repayment of secured debt or any installment thereof, and his account in respect of such debt is classified by the secured creditor as non-performing asset, then, the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor within sixty days from the date of notice failing which the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under sub-section (4). [Provided that— (i) the requirement of classification of secured debt as non-performing asset under this sub-section shall not apply to a borrower who has raised funds through issue of debt securities; and (ii) in the event of default, the debenture trustee shall be entitled to enforce security interest in the same manner as provided under this section with such modifications as may be necessary and in accordance with the terms and conditions of security documents executed in favour of the debenture trustee.] (3) The notice referred to in sub-section (2) shall give details of the amount payable by the borrower and the secured assets intended to be enforced by the secured creditor in the event of non-payment of secured debts by the borrower. (3A) If, on receipt of the notice under sub-section (2), the borrower makes any representation or raises any objection, the secured creditor shall consider such representation or objection and if the secured creditor comes to the conclusion that such representation or objection is not acceptable or tenable, he shall communicate within fifteen days of receipt of such representation or objection the reasons for non-acceptance of the representation or objection to the borrower: Provided that the reasons so communicated or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons shall not confer any right upon the borrower to prefer an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17 or the Court of District Judge under section 17A.] (4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt, namely:— (a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset; [(b) take over the management of the business of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realizing the secured asset: Provided that the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale shall be exercised only where the substantial part of the business of the borrower is held as security for the debt: Provided further that where the management of whole of the business or part of the business is severble, the secured creditor shall take over the management of such business of the borrower which is relatable to the security for the debt;] (c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to as the manager), to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor; (d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt. (5) Any payment made by any person referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (4) to the secured creditor shall give such person a valid discharge as if he has made payment to the borrower........... [(8) Where the amount of dues of the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him is tendered to the secured creditor at any time before the date of publication of notice for public auction or inviting quotations or tender from public or private treaty for transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale of the secured assets,— (i) the secured assets shall not be transferred by way of lease assignment or sale by the secured creditor; and (ii) in case, any step has been taken by the secured creditor for transfer by way of lease or assignment or sale of the assets before tendering of such amount under this sub-section, no further step shall be taken by such secured creditor for transfer by way of lease or assignment or sale of such secured assets.] 17. [Application against measures to recover secured debts].—(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorized officer under this Chapter, [may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed,] to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken: [Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.] [Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section.] (1A) An application under sub-section (1) shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction— (a) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises; (b) where the secured asset is located; or (c) the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being.] (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession, of the secured assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person, it may, by order,— (a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor as invalid; and (b) restore the possession of secured assets or management of secured assets to the borrower or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under sub-section (1), as the case may be; and (c) pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13.] 18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal- (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. 15. From the above provisions it is crystal clear that Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act contains enforcement of secured interest. Sub Section 2 of Section 13 enumerates first of many steps needed to be taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security interest. This sub section provides that if a borrower who is under a liability to a secured creditor, makes any default in repayment of secured debt and his account in respect of such debt is classified as non-performing asset, then the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge his liabilities within sixty days from the date of notice with an indication that if he fails to do so, the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of its rights in terms of Section 13 (4). Sub Section (3) of Section 13 lays down that notice issued under Section 13 (2) shall contain details of the amount payable by the borrower as also the details of the secured assets intended to be enforced by the bank or financial institution. Sub-section (3-A) of Section 13 lays down that the borrower may make a representation in response to the notice issued under Section 13 (2) and challenge the classification of his accounts as non-performing asset as also the quantum of amount specified in the notice. 16. However, in the instant case from the pleading it is not the case of the petitioner that he has replied through filing objection to the statutory demand notice dated 4.2.2019 issued under Section 13 (2) of the Act within sixty days from the date of the notice. As the petitioner neglected to pay the dues, hence the possession notice dated 13.3.2020 was issued under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act read with Rule 8 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. The procedure prescribed under Section 13 (2) and 13 (4) is mandatory and the recourse taken by the respondent no. 3 is in accordance with law. The petitioner had an opportunity to reply to the demand notice. Sub section 4 of Section 13 specifies various modes, which can be adopted by the secured creditor for recovery of secured debts. 17. The impugned Possession Notice had also drawn the attention of the petitioner to the provisions contained under sub-section 8 of Section 13 of the Act in respect of time available to redeem the secured assets and has also made clear that the borrower shall not transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise any of his secured assets referred to in the notice without prior written consent of the secured creditor. There is no reason put forth by the petitioner why the remedy available under Section 17 of the Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal was not efficacious and compelled him for by passing the same. The petitioner has the remedy to prefer an appeal under Section 17 of the Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Further he has right to appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the Act against the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, which is evident from the provisions quoted herein above. 18. The petitioner has the remedy to prefer an appeal under Section 17 of the Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Further he has right to appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the Act against the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, which is evident from the provisions quoted herein above. 18. The pleadings in the writ petition are in lackadaisical manner only alleging violation of principle of natural justice. If the petitioner would have invoked alternative remedy under Section 17 of the Act, it is incumbent upon the Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act to consider whether the measures taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security interest are in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules and if the measures taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with sub Section 4 of Section 13 of the Act could have directed the secured creditor to restore the management of the business or the secured assets to the borrower (the petitioner). 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the case law, which is not applicable under the circumstance of the case as in that case the question was involved that the borrower is entitled to right of hearing prior to any order passed by the District Magistrate while exercising the power under Section 14 of the Act to assist the secured creditor to take possession of the secured assets. Whereas in the present case despite notice under Section 13 (2) of the Act the petitioner did not pay any heed to pay the outstanding dues. Only after the demand notice dated 4.2.2019 the petitioner has deposited a paltry sum of loan amount as mentioned in paragraph 10 of the writ petition i.e. between 15.2.2019 to 30.9.2019, therefore the action taken by the respondent no. 3 for recovery of dues by issuing notice under Section 13 (2) and Section 13 (4) cannot be faulted with. The petitioner could have availed the remedy by filing an application under Section 17 (1) of the Act, when the remedies are available under the SARFAESI Act both to the borrower or creditor for the redressal of their grievance. 20. 3 for recovery of dues by issuing notice under Section 13 (2) and Section 13 (4) cannot be faulted with. The petitioner could have availed the remedy by filing an application under Section 17 (1) of the Act, when the remedies are available under the SARFAESI Act both to the borrower or creditor for the redressal of their grievance. 20. We are conscious of the settled law that discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not absolute and can be exercised judiciously in a given facts of the case and in accordance with law, hence in view of the aforesaid statutory remedy available to the petitioner the petition is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. The reasons for not entertaining the petition where there is efficacious and alternative remedy available has been dealt with in extenso by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another (Supra), which is reproduced as here under; "9. The statement of objects and reasons of the SARFAESI Act states that the banking and financial sector in the country was felt not to have a level playing field in comparison to other participants in the financial markets in the world. The financial institutions in India did not have the power to take possession of securities and sell them. The existing legal framework relating to commercial transactions had not kept pace with changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms resulting in tardy recovery of defaulting loans and mounting non-performing assets of banks and financial institutions. The Narasimhan Committee I and II as also the Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the Central Government Act had suggested enactment of new legislation for secularization and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of securities and sell them without court intervention which would enable them to realise long term assets, manage problems of liquidity, asset liability mismatches and improve recovery. The proceedings under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, (hereinafter referred to as 'the DRT Act') with passage of time, had become synonymous with those before regular courts affecting expeditious adjudication. All these aspects have not been kept in mind and considered before passing the impugned order. "10. The proceedings under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, (hereinafter referred to as 'the DRT Act') with passage of time, had become synonymous with those before regular courts affecting expeditious adjudication. All these aspects have not been kept in mind and considered before passing the impugned order. "10. Even prior to the SARFAESI Act, considering the alternate remedy available under the DRT Act it was held in Punjab National Bank vs. O.C. Krishnan and others, (2001) 6 SCC 569 , that :- "6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act." "In Satyawati Tandon (supra), the High Court had restrained further proceedings under Section 13 (4) of the Act. Upon a detailed consideration of the statutory scheme under the SARFAESI Act the availability of remedy to the aggrieved under Section 17 before the Tribunal and the appellate remedy under Section 18 before the Appellate Tribunal, the object and purpose of the legislation, it was observed that a writ petition ought not to be entertained in view of the alternate statutory remedy available holding :- "43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislation's enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. *** 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." "In Union Bank of India and another vs. Panchanan Subudhi, 2010 (15) SCC 552 , further proceedings under Section 13 (4) were stayed in the writ jurisdiction subject to deposit of Rs.10,00,000/- leading this Court to observe as follows : "7. In our view, the approach adopted by the High Court was clearly erroneous. When the respondent failed to abide by the terms of onetime settlement, there was no justification for the High Court to entertain the writ petition and that too by ignoring the fact that a statutory alternative remedy was available to the respondent under Section 17 of the Act." "The same view was reiterated in Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2011 (2) SCC 782 observing: "23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories.)" "In Ikbal (supra), it was observed that the action of the Bank under Section 13(4) of the 'SARFAESI Act' available to challenge by the aggrieved under Section 17 was an efficacious remedy and the institution directly under Article 226 was not sustainable, relying upon Satyawati Tandon (Supra), observing : "27. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented. 28…….In our view, there was no justification whatsoever for the learned Single Judge to allow the borrower to bypass the efficacious remedy provided to him under Section 17 and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction in his favour when he had disentitled himself for such relief by his conduct. The Single Judge was clearly in error in invoking his extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 in light of the peculiar facts indicated above. The Division Bench also erred in affirming the erroneous order of the Single Judge." "15. A similar view was taken in Punjab National Bank and another vs. Imperial Gift House and others, (2013) 14 SCC 622 , observing:- "3. Upon receipt of notice, the respondents filed representation under Section 13(3-A) of the Act, which was rejected. Thereafter, before any further action could be taken under Section 13(4) of the Act by the Bank, the writ petition was filed before the High Court. 4. In our view, the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition against the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Act and quashing the proceedings initiated by the Bank." 21. Thus from the above facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner has failed to make any representation in response to the notice dated 14.2.2019 within 60 days, which has nothing to do with the lock down due to pandemic of Covid-19. Thus from the above facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner has failed to make any representation in response to the notice dated 14.2.2019 within 60 days, which has nothing to do with the lock down due to pandemic of Covid-19. The loan was granted in 2017 the petitioner failed to adhere to the terms and conditions to repay the loan as stipulated. This compelled the respondent no. 3 to issue demand notice after declaring the account as NPA on 31.1.2019 much prior to the lock down. Thereafter despite repeated demand the outstanding amount was not paid. The petitioner could not even redeem the secured assets according to sub-section 8 of Section 13 of the Act. Thus the entire proceeding initiated against loan account declared as NPA prior to the Covid-19 lock down. After issuance of demand notice dated 4.2.2019 the petitioner has started depositing certain instalment from 15.2.2019 uptill September 2019, which in clear violation of the statutory provisions of the SARFAESI Act/Rules. The petitioner cannot be allowed to sit on the fence and wait and thereafter coming to the writ court for the redressal of his grievance. Parity with any judgment cannot also be given for all times to come as the circumstance of the present case is quiet distinct. The writ petition is manifestly not instituted to show any bona fide from any remote corner but only to some how stall further action of the respondent no.3 showing a bald desire to repay loan in instalmentas as may be directed by this court. 22. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Satyawati Tandon case (supra) while discussing various judgments dealing with the same issue has observed thus; "It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad AIR 1969 SC 556 , Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Harbanslal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others (2003) 2 SCC 107 and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass appropriate interim order. "It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." 23. In ITC Limited (Supra) also the Hon'ble Apex Court was of the view that the debtor is not entitled for the discretionary equitable relief under Article 226 and 136 of the Constitution of India. In the aforesaid case the Hon'ble Apex Court was of the view that non compliance of sub Section 3A of Section 13 cannot be of any avail to the debtor whose conduct has been merely to seek time and not repay the loan as promised on several occasions, while relying in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar, 1995 (4) SCC 683 wherein the Hon'ble Court observed as follows; “19. Digambar, 1995 (4) SCC 683 wherein the Hon'ble Court observed as follows; “19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person's entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refused to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.” 24. Thus from the above prolix and verbose discussion, in our considered opinion the Possession Notice dated 13.3.2020 issued under Sections 4 and 12 of Section 13 read with Rule 8 (1) and the demand notice dated 4.2.2019 issued under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act do not suffer from any error or irregularity, which may require any interference, hence we are not inclined to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.