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2020 DIGILAW 11 (JHR)

Central Coalfields Limited through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director v. Fulmatia Devi, W/o Late Atwa Oraon

2020-01-07

RAVI RANJAN, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

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ORDER : Ravi Ranjan, J. This appeal is directed against the decision dated 13.11.2017 of a learned single Judge of this Court rendered in W.P. (S) No. 1264 of 2011 by which the writ petition has been allowed and respondent no. 3-General Manager (P & IR), Central Coalfields Limited, Ranchi has been directed to complete the formalities regarding appointment of the son of the deceased employee. 2. The writ petition was filed by the respondent-Fulmatia Devi for quashing of the order contained in Letter dated 17.01.2011 by which the application seeking employment of her son on compassionate ground has been declined. 3. Facts in brief, which will be necessary for consideration of lis, stand enumerated as under : Atwa Oraon who was working as “Trammer” at Central Saunda Colliery under Central Coalfields Limited died on 21.01.2008 and an application seeking employment for her son viz Sanichara was filed by the writ petitioner-Fulmatia Devi on 28.06.2008, which was received in the office of the respondents on 30.06.2008. The claim of appointment was declined on 17.01.2011 on the sole ground that the son of the deceased employee has crossed the age of 35 years, as on the date of application i.e. 28.06.2008 her son has attained the age of 35 years 2 months and 29 days. The date of birth or age etc. is admitted and, thus, there is no controversy regarding the same. However, the moot question which arose before the writ Court for consideration was as to whether the age of the claimant has to be considered on the date of application or on the date of death of the concerned employee. The writ Court has answered that the same must be the date of death of the employee and, as such, erroneously the compassionate appointment has been denied by the respondents. Hence, the present appeal has been preferred by the Central Coalfields Limited and others. 4. In the aforesaid background of the factual matrix, we have heard parties and perused the materials available on records. However, it is made clear that since none was appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner-private respondent despite service of notice, on 17.09.2019, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court has appointed Mr. Kumar Vaibhav, Advocate, to appear Amicus Curiae in the matter. In view thereof, we had the benefit of assistance by him also. 5. However, it is made clear that since none was appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner-private respondent despite service of notice, on 17.09.2019, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court has appointed Mr. Kumar Vaibhav, Advocate, to appear Amicus Curiae in the matter. In view thereof, we had the benefit of assistance by him also. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the date for consideration would be the date of application and not the date of death of the concerned employee. In support of his submission he has placed reliance upon a letter dated 25th July, 2003 issued by the Director (P & IR), Central Coalfields Limited addressed to the Director, (Personnel) of different subsidiaries of the Coal Companies. It appears from the aforesaid letter that the criteria for determination of age of dependent of kin for appointment on compassionate ground was discussed time to time in Consultative Committee meeting, in particular, held on 23.05.2003 and replying to the question, the Minister of the Department has clarified that the age on the date of application would be relevant for offering employment on compassionate ground so that candidates are not debarred on the ground of age at the time of appointment. 6. Learned counsel, on the strength of the aforesaid, submits that in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coal Field Ltd. and others [ (2007)8 SCC 549 ] and, in particular, in paragraph-10 thereof, the respondent had jurisdiction to issue such circular prescribing a period of limitation for filing application for grant of appointment on compassionate grounds. It is contended that this letter would also have a force of circular and, as such, it has to be considered that the age on the date of filing application would be relevant. 7. Per contra, Mr. Kumar Vaibhav, Amicus Curiae, has contended that a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 313 of 2018 (Pankaj Kumar Vs. It is contended that this letter would also have a force of circular and, as such, it has to be considered that the age on the date of filing application would be relevant. 7. Per contra, Mr. Kumar Vaibhav, Amicus Curiae, has contended that a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 313 of 2018 (Pankaj Kumar Vs. Employers in relation to the Management of Swang Washery of M/s Central Coalfields Limited) has held that the basis of obtaining employment under Clause 9.3.0 and 9.4.0 of the National Coal Wage Agreement (hereinafter referred to N.C.W.A.) is the death of the subsisting employee and, therefore, irrespective of the date on which application is made, minor claimant for the job has to be of specified age of 12 years or above on the date of death of the employee for keeping him on live roster, thus, the same would be the proper interpretation of the aforesaid clause. It is admitted at the Bar that the present case for appointment would be governed by Clause 9.3.0 of N.C.W.A.-VI, which lays down as under: “9.3.0 Provision of Employment to Dependants 9.3.1 Employment would be provided to one dependant of workers who are disabled permanently and also those who die while in service. The provision will be implemented as follows. 9.3.2 Employment to one dependant of the worker who dies while in service In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment/payment of monetary compensation would be governed by para 9.5.0. 9.3.3 The dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependant on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependant of the deceased. 9.3.4 the dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment.” (Emphasis is ours.) 8. In so far as male spouse is concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment.” (Emphasis is ours.) 8. It is further admitted position that under the settlement no period of limitation for filing any application or even requirement of filing of any application has been laid down. However, as has been discussed above, a circular was issued by the department by which 18 months’ period has been given for filing such application and the same has already been assumed to be valid by Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohan Mahto (supra). The moot question for consideration would be whether the required age should be considered on the date of death of an employee or on the date of such application. Before coming to take a stand on the said issue, it would be apt to refer to another provision which is 9.5.0 (iii) of N.C.W.A.-VI. For better appreciation, the same is extracted and reproduced as under: “9.5.0 Employment/Monetary compensation to female dependant Provision of employment/monetary compensation to female dependants of workmen who die while in service and who are declared medically unfit as per Clause 9.4.0 above would be regulated as under: (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) xxx xxx xxx (iii) In case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependant of the concerned worker is 12 years and above in age, he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualifications when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at paras (i) & (ii) above. This will be effective from 1.1.2000. (iv) xxx xxx xxx (v) xxx xxx xxx Note: xxx xxx xxx” (Emphasis is ours.) 9. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at paras (i) & (ii) above. This will be effective from 1.1.2000. (iv) xxx xxx xxx (v) xxx xxx xxx Note: xxx xxx xxx” (Emphasis is ours.) 9. From perusal of the aforesaid, it would appear that in case an employee dies in harness either in mine accident or for any other reasons or even if he is declared medically unfit to perform his duty and no employment could be offered to any of the dependants and the male dependant of the concerned worker is minor and is 12 years or above in age, he will be kept on a live roster and will be provided employment which is commensurate to his skill and qualification whenever he attains the age of 18 years. Question would be whether in that case also, i.e., for keeping on live roster, an application would be required and whether in such case any period of limitation is there for making such application and further, what would be the concerned date on which his age would be reckoned? A prudent person will answer the question only by saying that the age of the male dependant on the date of death of the concerned employee would have to be taken into consideration for keeping him on live roster. In such a situation, in our view, no other stand can be taken while dealing with Clause 9.3.4 of N.C.W.A.-VI where the settlement between the parties, which is obviously binding upon them, discloses the age of 35 years for giving employment on compassionate ground. In such a situation when no specific date on which such age is to be calculated having been given, a prudent person will only come to the conclusion that the date when such cause of action had arisen for appointment on compassionate ground or keeping the dependant on live roster on the basis of the agreement between the management and the workers-union, would be the relevant date. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohan Mahto (supra) has of course held that even though no period of limitation for filing such application having been given, a circular having come in existence saying that such period of 18 months, would not be invalid but it does not mean that the same would have to be stretched to that extent for holding that the age of the dependant on the date of filing of application would be relevant and not on the date of death of the concerned employee. If that would have been the intention of the parties to the agreement then there was no meaning of including a provision in the N.C.W.A. to keep a minor male dependant on live roster on the death of the worker if he was of 12 years or more in age. 10. Now coming to Annexure-7, it appears that this is nothing else than an opinion expressed by the Minister of Department during a meeting of Consultative Committee, clarifying that the age on the date of application should be relevant so that no candidate is kept out of the ambit of offering employment on the ground of being minor. In our view, this cannot be held to be a circular issued by the Coal India Limited because the letter only refers the opinion of the Minister of the Department and no circular has been issued in that regard and, thus, it cannot be held to have the same force as of the circular which had laid down the period of limitation for filing application for appointment on compassionate ground. Here, we would also mention that the National Coal Wage Agreement may not be under Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act rather would be covered under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act as it is not the outcome of any conciliation proceeding. This aspect was not brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Apex Court as the issue was neither raised by the parties nor answered but the same would be apparent from the preamble of memorandum of the National Coal Wage Agreement-VI. This aspect was not brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Apex Court as the issue was neither raised by the parties nor answered but the same would be apparent from the preamble of memorandum of the National Coal Wage Agreement-VI. However, since the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the limitation provided is valid then there would be no question of saying that the limitation would not be applicable in terms of the circular but at the same time even if it is taken to be as such then it would definitely mean that the date of consideration after the cause of action having been arisen by death of the concerned employee has been extended by 18 months and in the meantime if somebody has crossed the age of 35 years it would never debar him from consideration of appointment on compassionate ground. 11. Apart from the above, let it be noted that the agreement is definitely having a statutory fervor as it is either under Section 18(1) or Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it is a benevolent or beneficial provision. In such a case, there could be another method of reading the terms and conditions of the concerned agreement, in particular, when Clause 9.3.4 does not disclose that actually what would be the date on which the age should be considered rather it simply says that on the date of death of the employee, employment has to be offered to the person who has not crossed the age of 35 years. In such a situation, it can also be read that in case the applicant was minor on the date of death of the employee but had attained majority within the period of 18 months, i.e., the period of limitation, such benefit would have to be given to him for making an application for employment under the compassionate ground but in case such person was 35 years of age or less than 35 years of age on the date of death of the employee then even if he had crossed the age barrier of 35 years on the date of application but of 35 years or less in age on the date when the period of limitation of 18 months commenced on account of death of worker, in such case the benefit would again have to be given to him. Any other interpretation of the aforesaid provision of the National Coal Wage Agreement being a beneficial provision having statutory fervor, would negate its very object. A reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in National Textile Workers’ Union etc. Vs. P.R. Ramakrishnan and others ( AIR 1983 SC 75 ) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to lay down the ratio to the effect that the benevolent provisions should be construed taking into consideration the dominant purpose of the Statute, intention of Legislature and underlying policy. In another judgment rendered in Madan Singh Shekhawat Vs. Union of India and others [ (1999)6 SCC 459 ] the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that it would be the duty of the Court to interpret the provision, especially a beneficial provision, liberally so as to give it a wider meaning rather than a restrictive meaning which would negate the very object of the rule. It is not in dispute that the relevant provision under the agreement known as ‘National Coal Wage Agreement’ is for the benefit and welfare of the dependant of the workman and the agreement itself is under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The compassionate appointment in compliance of the provisions of the National Coal Wage Agreement would be different from offering compassionate appointments in the Government offices or public sector undertakings on the basis of executive instructions because it is a byproduct of a settlement between the parties binding the parties for the terms thereof and has statutory fervor. In such a situation, when the goal is benevolent, when the provision is beneficial, any other interpretation would destroy the very foundation of such provision. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are of the considered view that the impugned decision taken by the learned single Judge cannot be faulted with. 13. In the result, this appeal fails being devoid of any merits, accordingly, the same is dismissed.