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2020 DIGILAW 110 (UTT)

Renu Devi v. State Of Uttarakhand

2020-02-19

R.C.KHULBE, RAMESH RANGANATHAN

body2020
JUDGMENT Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J. (Oral) - Heard Mr. S.K. Mandal, learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner and Mr. S.S. Chaudhary, learned brief holder for the State of Uttarakhand-respondents and, with their consent, the Special Appeal is disposed of at the stage of admission. 2. This Special Appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 03 of 2019 dated 03.01.2019. The appellant herein filed the said Writ Petition seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to consider her case for appointment, to the post of Aaganbari Karyakarti at Aaganbari Centre, Mohalla Dhobiyan-01, Block Narsan, Tehsil Roorkee, District Haridwar, after amending the notification dated 26.11.2018. 3. Facts, to the limited extent necessary, are that the appellant-writ petitioner was initially appointed as an Aaganbari Sahayika on 03.05.2006 on a contractual basis. The appellant-writ petitioner continued to work in the said post, and her honorarium was revised from time to time. The petitioner belongs to the Other Backward Classes category. The fourth respondent issued a notification on 26.11.2018 inviting applications, for appointment to various posts of Aaganbari Karyakartis and Sahayikas, from candidates belonging to the Other Backward Classes. The said notification was published in the newspaper on 27.11.2018, wherein the upper age limit was fixed as 44 years. In terms of the said advertisement, first preference was to be given to working Aaganbari Karyakartis and Sahayikas. The advertisement also stipulated that a candidate, with experience as an Aaganbari Sahayika, would be given preference and additional marks. The appellant-writ petitioner applied for the post of Aaganbari Karyakarti on 12.12.2018, and was disqualified on the ground that she was aged 49 years which was beyond the upper age limit, prescribed in the advertisement, of 44 years. 4. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant-writ petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by filing Writ Petition (S/S) No. 03 of 2019, which was dismissed, by the learned Single Judge, by order dated 03.01.2019. 4. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant-writ petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by filing Writ Petition (S/S) No. 03 of 2019, which was dismissed, by the learned Single Judge, by order dated 03.01.2019. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge observed that the advertisement, giving preference to candidates with the required experience for appointment as an Aaganbari Karyakarti, could not be so interpreted as to mean that the maximum prescribed age limit of 44 years should be computed after excluding the period during which the applicant had worked as an Aaganbari Karyakarti/Sahayika; there was no illegality in fixing an upper age limit in the notification; the upper age limit was fixed as 44 years; and the mere fact that preferential treatment is given, to those working as Aaganbari Karyakartis and Sahayikas, did not mean that they would be entitled to add their service to the upper age limit of 44 years. The Writ Petition was, accordingly, dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, the present Special Appeal. 5. Mr. S.K. Mandal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner, would submit that, since the advertisement itself gives preference to those working as Aaganbari Karyakartis and Sahayikas, the period of service rendered by such candidates must be excluded while computing the upper age limit of 44 years; there is no rational basis for fixing 44 years as the upper age limit; the respondents should, at least, be directed to consider the appellant-writ petitioners representation seeking appointment after taking into consideration the long years of service rendered by her as an Aaganbari Sahayika as no advertisement had been issued, for appointment to the post of Aaganbari Karyakartis, for the past 12 years; and, in such circumstances, age relaxation should be provided. 6. We must express our inability to agree. Clause 3 of the advertisement specifically prescribes the upper age limit as 44 years. Among those applicants, who are aged 44 years or less, preference is required to be given to those who were, or are, working as Aaganbari Karyakartis and Sahayikas. Preference and additional marks, being given to those working as Aaganbari Karyakartis and Sahayikas, is distinct from prescription of the upper age limit in the advertisement. It is only among those applicants, who fall within the prescribed age limit of 44 years, is the manner of preference required to be determined. 7. Preference and additional marks, being given to those working as Aaganbari Karyakartis and Sahayikas, is distinct from prescription of the upper age limit in the advertisement. It is only among those applicants, who fall within the prescribed age limit of 44 years, is the manner of preference required to be determined. 7. We are, therefore, satisfied that the learned Single Judge was justified in refusing to grant the petitioner relief, since she was 49 years of age when she applied for the post of Aaganbari Karyakarti. It is for the competent authority, or the employer, to determine the upper age limit within which alone would an applicant be considered for appointment to the post of Aaganbari Karyakarti. This Court would not, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India , take up on itself the task of determining what the upper age limit should be. No mandamus can be issued to the authorities concerned to enhance the upper age limit prescribed in the advertisement. 8. In an intra-Court appeal, under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules , interference is justified only if the order under appeal suffers from a patent illegality. We find no such infirmity in the order under appeal necessitating interference. 9. The Special Appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs. 10. Suffice it to make it clear that neither the order under appeal, nor the order now passed by us, shall disable the appellant-writ petitioner from making a representation to the competent authority, and for the latter to consider the same, if it so chooses, in accordance with law.