ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Krishna Kumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Mohan Kumar Dubey, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State. 2. This writ petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard. 3. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for quashing the order dated 03.07.2019 contained in Annexure-2 whereby the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment has been rejected. 4. On 30.01.2011, at Village Hulsu at around 8 p.m., 10 to 12 naxals came and killed petitioner's brother late Bhola Sahu along with two others namely, Bali Sahu and Alok Sahu in front of the petitioner's house. The FIR was instituted vide FIR No.5/11 dated 31.01.2011 by the petitioner's father Mr. Mahabir Sahu under sections, 147, 148, 149, 364, 302 and 379 IPC, and section 17 of CLA Act against Sandeep Sahu and 10-12 unknown PLFI extremists for killing his son Bhola Sahu. By letter dated 28.08.2011 by Observer Mr. Manoj Kumar Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police (HQ)-II, Ranchi, the report submitted by him clearly stated about killing of Mr. Bhola Sahu by naxals. The said observation report is made Annexure-4 to the writ petition. By letter dated 18.03.2011, Superintendent of Police, Rural has also acknowledged this fact that late Bhola Sahu was innocent and was killed by the naxals. The death certificate of late Bhola Sahu dated 06.03.2011 is annexed as Annexure-6. At this background, the petitioner has also moved before this Court in W.P.(S) No.3063 of 2018 which was disposed of by order dated 12.09.2018 with a direction to the respondents to take a decision and pass a reasoned order. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner approached the respondents and by the impugned order the claim of the petitioner has been rejected and aggrieved of this, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Krishna Kumar, submits that there is victim compensation scheme of the Government of Jharkhand wherein the petitioner's father have received Rs.1 Lac and Rs.3 Lac by the State Government and Government of India respectively. In the Resolution dated 09.06. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Krishna Kumar, submits that there is victim compensation scheme of the Government of Jharkhand wherein the petitioner's father have received Rs.1 Lac and Rs.3 Lac by the State Government and Government of India respectively. In the Resolution dated 09.06. 2011, there is a provision of the compassionate appointment if the killing has occurred in the extremist/ naxal violence. The name of the petitioner was recommended by the District Compassionate Committee on 16.07.2016. As the petitioner was minor and in that view of the matter this petitioner was assured of consideration of his case when the petitioner will attain the age of majority. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that similarly situated persons namely, Shiv Pujan Sahu and Mrs. Sumati Devi have been given compassionate appointment whereas the petitioner has been left out and the case of the petitioner has been rejected on erroneous ground. He submits that clause 4(v) of the Government of India scheme does not stipulate that if any assistance is provided the employment will not be provided. He further submits that the Central Government has provided Rs.3 lacs and only on that ground, the case of the petitioner has been rejected, which is not the spirit of the scheme. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in W.P.(PIL) No.2584 of 2011 reported in 2014(1) JLJR 345 [Gopi Nath . Ghosh v. The State of Jharkhand and Anr], the Division Bench of this Court has issued direction vide order dated 10.01.2014 to ensure strict observance of compensation to the victim of naxal movement as per the Central and State scheme. It was also directed that if any application for compensation/benefit is received the said will be decided within six months from the date of receipt. 6. Per contra, Mr. Mohan Kumar Dubey, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State submits that the petitioner's father has been paid Rs.1 Lakh by the State and Rs.3 Lakhs by the Central Government, totalling to Rs.4 Lakhs have been paid to the father of the petitioner and thus, the petitioner is not entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. He submits that the case of the petitioner has been considered in right direction and there is no illegality in the impugned order and the case of the petitioner has been rightly rejected. He submits that the case of the petitioner has been considered in right direction and there is no illegality in the impugned order and the case of the petitioner has been rightly rejected. He further submits that the petitioner was not the bread-earner and in that view of the matter, the petitioner is not fit to be appointed on compassionate ground. To buttress his argument, he relied in the case of “MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh” reported in (2014) 13 SCC 583 .Paragraph no.6 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: 6. Every appointment to public office must be made by strictly adhering to the mandatory requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. An exception by providing employment on compassionate grounds has been carved out in order to remove the financial constraints on the bereaved family, which has lost its breadearner. Mere death of a government employee in harness does not entitle the family to claim compassionate employment. The competent authority has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased employee and it is only if it is satisfied that without providing employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis, that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. More so, the person claiming such appointment must possess required eligibility for the post. The consistent view that has been taken by the Court is that compassionate employment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, as it is not a vested right. The Court should not stretch the provision by liberal interpretation beyond permissible limits on humanitarian grounds. Such appointment should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years. 7. By relying on this judgment, Mr. Dubey, the learned counsel for the respondent State submits that it is well settled proposition of law that compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right and thus, the writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 8. In the light of the above submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the parties, the Court has perused the materials on record. 8. In the light of the above submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the parties, the Court has perused the materials on record. The Central Government Scheme which has been brought on record by way of filing supplementary counter affidavit of which introduction and objectives stipulate to assist the victim of terrorist violence (including militancy and insurgency) and communal violence. For the sake of brevity, the scheme and eligibility criteria clause 4(v) is quoted hereinbelow: “v) In case employment is given to any family member of a victim of terrorist violence, the family will not be entitled to assistance under the Scheme. However, in case such employment is given after the release of assistance under the scheme the assistance shall not be withdrawn.” 9. Clause 4(v) clearly says that employment will be given if the death is occurred due to terrorist violence and it further says that any assistance provided prior to the employment shall not be withdrawn. Thus, the clause 4(v) speaks otherwise, whereas in the impugned order it has been interpreted as the clause 4(v) bars the employment if the assistance is there. On a simple reading of this clause 4(v) no prudent person can come to that conclusion. Thus, merely on the ground that Rs.4 Lakhs have been provided to the father of the petitioner, the claim of the petitioner cannot be allowed to be rejected. The Government of Jharkhand scheme dated 09.06.2011 also stipulates that compensation and employment in case of terrorist violence death, shall be provided to the family. Who will be dependent has also been described in clause 3(ii) of the scheme and brother of the decease is one of the dependent described in clause 3(ii). Thus, it is not in dispute that the petitioner was entitled in view of clause 3(ii) for employment on compassionate ground. Similarly situated two persons have been provided compassionate employment and the case of the petitioner is also on the same footing. So far judgment relied by Mr. Dubey, the learned counsel for the respondent State is concerned, i.e., it is well settled that compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right and in that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scheme and came to the conclusion that at the time of death which scheme was operative will apply in the case of the persons concerned. In paragraph no.15 of the said judgment this aspect of the matter has also been considered that the application has to be considered in accordance with the scheme. The death of the brother of the petitioner in a naxal violence is not in dispute. On query from the Court, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent State very fairly submits that it was the death which occurred in naxal violence. The impugned order has been passed only on two grounds interpreting the scheme 4(v) of the Central Government and the petitioner has received Rs.4 Lakhs. In the impugned order only first two lines of clause 4(v) has been considered and the entire clause 4(v) has not been considered. It is well settled that entire clause needs to be read in its entirety for coming to a correct conclusion. Clause 4(v) speaks otherwise and two grounds taken in the impugned order cannot sustain in the eye of law. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 03.07.2019 is quashed. 10. The matter is remitted back to the respondent no.2 to consider afresh the case of the petitioner in the light of the discussions made hereinabove. This exercise shall be completed within 12 weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 11. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the writ petition is allowed and disposed of.