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2020 DIGILAW 1104 (JHR)

Bokaro Ispat Kamgar v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City

2020-11-26

S.N.PATHAK

body2020
JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing and setting aside the Award dated 25.08.2001, passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City, in Ref. Case No. 05 of 1992, whereby the learned Labour Court has held that superannuating the petitioner from service w.e.f. 31.10.1990 is proper and justified and he is not entitled to get any relief. 3. Case of the petitioner is that on 14.10.1977, the management of Bokaro Steel Ltd. (for short ‘BSL’) appointed the workman-Rajni Kant Mahtha to the post of ‘Khalasi’ under of land looser scheme and at the time of his appointment, his age was 40 years and as such, he was to superannuate in the month of October, 1995, on attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 58 years. It is the further case of the petitioner that age of workman-Rajni Kant Mahtha was also assessed by a Medical Board constituted by the respondent-Management and on assessment, the Medical Board found the workman-Rajni Kant Mahtha as 40 years of age on the date of his appointment. It is the specific case of the petitioner that when the concerned workman was discharging his duties, all of a sudden he received a letter dated 20.09.1990 issued by respondent-management, whereby it was informed to the workman-Rajni Kant Mahtha that he is going to superannuate on 31.10.1990, on attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 58 years. Hence, for the first time the petitioner came to know that in Column 13 of the Personal Data Form by making certain manipulation, his age has been mentioned as 45 years in place of 40 years and as the custodian of personal data of petitioner-workman was management, the petitioner cannot be held liable. After receipt of letter dated 20.09.1990, the workman-Rajni Kant Mahtha submitted nine numbers of representations to the respondent-management for redressal of his grievance but the respondent-management kept mum over the matter. Finding no other alternative remedy, the workman-Rajni Kant Mahtha through his sponsoring Union, raised an industrial dispute, which was referred by the concerned Department of the State Govt. to learned Labour Court, Bokaro. By the same reference, the case of another workman namely, Md. Gafoor was also referred for adjudication by learned Court, as the both cases were standing on similar footing. 4. Upon receipt of the notification, the learned Labour Court registered the case as Ref. to learned Labour Court, Bokaro. By the same reference, the case of another workman namely, Md. Gafoor was also referred for adjudication by learned Court, as the both cases were standing on similar footing. 4. Upon receipt of the notification, the learned Labour Court registered the case as Ref. Case No. 5 of 1992 and issued notices to the parties. Upon receipt of the notices, both parties appeared and filed their respective written statements. The management has adduced oral evidence of two witnesses whereas, the Union has also adduced oral evidences of two witnesses. Thereafter, learned Labour Court, after hearing the parties and perusing the documents and evidences brought on record, for the reasons best known to it, allowed the case of Md. Gafoor and rejected the case of the present workman-Rajni Kant Mahtha, though both the cases stands on similar footings. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner-Union has knocked the door of this Court. 5. Mr. M.K. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Union submits that the Award dated 28.08.2001 is arbitrary, malafide and bad in facts as well as in law. Learned counsel further argues that learned Labour Court has erred in allowing the case of petitioner though case of similarly situated co-employee Md. Gafoor was allowed. Learned counsel also submits that the learned Labour Court has failed to consider the fact that custodian of the personal data of an employee is the Management of BSL and any changes made in the same was due to laches on the part of the respondent-Management. Learned Labour Court while passing the Award has not considered the assessment made by the Medical Board where also his age was assessed to be 40 years on the date of his appointment. Learned counsel further argues that Rajesh Mohan Jha, Management’s Witness No. 1 in his deposition has also stated that there is difference in the signature of the workman below the cutting in his date of birth and signature available at the last column of his personal data form. Learned counsel further argues that different yardstick has been adopted by the learned Labour Court in considering the case of workman-Rajni Kant Mahtha and Md. Gafoor, though the cases of both the workmen were same and similar. Learned counsel further argues that different yardstick has been adopted by the learned Labour Court in considering the case of workman-Rajni Kant Mahtha and Md. Gafoor, though the cases of both the workmen were same and similar. Learned counsel further argues that even if reference is made after retirement for correction in date of birth, the same is maintainable as there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman concerned. Learned counsel accordingly submits that for the reasons stated above, the Award dated 25.08.2001 is fit to be quashed and set aside. 6. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Mr. G.M. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Management vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and argues that workman-Rajni Kant Mahtha has not only accepted the findings contained in Award dated 25.08.2001 but has also received the entire retiral benefits such as P.F., Gratuity, Leave Encashment, which were released on 19.02.1993 and 11.02.1993 and after receiving the same, the workman raised an Industrial Disputes for correction in his date of birth. Learned counsel further argues that though workman-Rajni Kant Mahtha claimed that he declared his age as 40 years but neither any supporting document has been called for from him by the Management nor copy of such document has been produced by him before the learned Labour Court. Learned counsel further argues that prior to 1990, workman-Rajni Kant Mahtha never raised any dispute regarding discrepancies in his age as recorded in his personal data form. Learned counsel submits that for the aforesaid reasons, there is no illegality or any infirmity in the Award passed by learned Labour Court and as such, no interference is warranted in the instant writ application. Learned counsel further argues that the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this High Court in catena of decisions has held that no correction in the date of birth can be made at the fag end of service career but in the instant case dispute regarding correction of the date of birth has been made after superannuation and after receiving the entire retiral benefits, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 7. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warranted in the instant writ application. 7. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warranted in the instant writ application. Admittedly, the petitioner appointed in the year 1977 and continued to work without any murmuring till the date of his superannuation i.e. 31.10.1990. Thereafter, after his retirement, he received all the retiral benefits without any demur or protest and in the year 1992, for the first time he raised an industrial dispute regarding correction of his date of birth. No document has been produced by the petitioner to show that his age 45 years as noted in his personal data form at the time of his employment, was not found to be correct by the Medical Officer of the respondent-Management. Learned Labour Court, after perusing the evidences and hearing the parties, passed the Award in favour of the Management, which is fully justified and no interference is required. 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court in catena of decisions has held that request for change of date of birth in service records at the fag end of service career is not sustainable and in the present case, the petitioner had raised the disputes after his superannuation. In case of State of Tamil Nandu Vs. T.V.Venugopalan, reported (1994) 6 SCC 302 , the Hon’ble Apex Court was clearly of the opinion that the government servant should not be permitted to correct the date of birth at the fag end of his service career. The Court, in very strong words, observed as under:- ".....The government servant having declared his date of birth as entered in the service register to be correct, would not be permitted at the fag end of his service career to raise a dispute as regards the correctness of the entries in the service register. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department & Ors. Vs. R. Kirubakaran, reported in 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 155, has held as under: “7. An application for correction of the date of birth [by a public servant cannot be entertained at the fag end of his service]. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department & Ors. Vs. R. Kirubakaran, reported in 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 155, has held as under: “7. An application for correction of the date of birth [by a public servant cannot be entertained at the fag end of his service]. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotion forever. …According to us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or the tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. … the onus is on the applicant to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book.” 9. This Hon’ble Court dealing with the similar issue in case of Manik Chand Ghosh Vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2004 (1) JCR 51 (Jhr.), has held that, date of birth once recorded and entered in the service record, counter signed by the government servant, he should not be permitted to challenge at the fag end of his service. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble & Ors., reported in (2010) 14 SCC 423 has held that: “16. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble & Ors., reported in (2010) 14 SCC 423 has held that: “16. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Vs. Raj Kumar Agnihotri [ (2005) 11 SCC 465 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 96]. In this case, this Court has considered a number of judgments of this Court and observed that the grievances as to the date of birth in the service record should not be permitted at the fag end of the service career. 17. In another judgment in State of Uttaranchal Vs. Pitamber Dutt Semwal [ (2005) 11 SCC 477 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 106] relief was denied to the government employee on the ground that he sought correction in the service record after nearly 30 years of service. While setting aside the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the decision after almost three decades.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterating the same view, in case of State of M.P. v. Premlal Shrivas, reported in (2011) 9 SCC 664 has held as under:- “8. It needs to be emphasised that in matters involving correction of date of birth of a government servant, particularly on the eve of his superannuation or at the fag end of his career, the court or the tribunal has to be circumspect, cautious and careful while issuing direction for correction of date of birth, recorded in the service book at the time of entry into any government service. Unless the court or the tribunal is fully satisfied on the basis of the irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth and that such a claim is made in accordance with the procedure prescribed or as per the consistent procedure adopted by the department concerned, as the case may be, and a real injustice has been caused to the person concerned, the court or the tribunal should be loath to issue a direction for correction of the service book. Time and again this Court has expressed the view that if a government servant makes a request for correction of the recorded date of birth after lapse of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. No court or the tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights. 12. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the delay of over two decades in applying for the correction of date of birth is ex facie fatal to the case of the respondent, notwithstanding the fact that there was no specific rule or order, framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application could be filed. It is trite that even in such a situation such an application should be filed which can be held to be reasonable. The application filed by the respondent 25 years after his induction into service, by no standards, can be held to be reasonable, more so when not a feeble attempt was made to explain the said delay. There is also no substance in the plea of the respondent that since Rule 84 of the M.P. Financial Code does not prescribe the time-limit within which an application is to be filed, the appellants were duty-bound to correct the clerical error in recording of his date of birth in the service book.” Similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Shyam Kishore Singh, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 411 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, “request for change of the date of birth in the service records at the fag end of service is not sustainable.” 10. Time and again it has been held that if government servants sleep over their right and are not vigilant, the Court cannot come to their rescue/ aid and grant relief only because they were ignorant of the Rules. Time and again it has been held that if government servants sleep over their right and are not vigilant, the Court cannot come to their rescue/ aid and grant relief only because they were ignorant of the Rules. These decisions lead to a different dimension of the case that correction of date of birth at the fag end would be at the cost of large number of employees, therefore, any correction at the fag end must be discouraged by the Court. 11. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, this Court is in full agreement with the Award date 25.08.2001 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City in Ref. Case No. 05 of 1992 and the same requires no interference. 12. The writ petition merits dismissal and the same is hereby dismissed.