JUDGMENT : With consent of both the parties, the matter has been taken up today for hearing through V.C. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner for quashing and setting aside the order dated 06.08.2014 issued vide no. P VIII-6/2014 EC-2 whereby the petitioner’s service has been terminated forthwith and also for setting aside the office order dated 09.08.2014, which was passed in partial modification of the order dated 06.8.2014 to the extent that period of unauthorized absence with effect from 13.5.2014 to 23.7.2014 and 04.8.2014 to the date of termination i.e. 06.8.2014 may be treated as Dies Non. 3. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner draws attention of this court towards the impugned order as contained in Annexure 4 to this writ application, whereby the petitioner was terminated forthwith from the services of the respondents and it was directed that he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice. He further referred to Annexure 5, which further clarified that the above named recruit-petitioner has since deserted from RIMS, Ranchi on 04.08.2014 before termination order could be served on him, it was requested to hand over the original copy of the termination order dated 06.08.2014 along with copy of the said Annexure 5. He further submits that it was clearly stated in the modified impugned order that the petitioner was referred to RIMS, Ranchi on 04.08.2014 by Medical Officer of C.H. C.R.P.F., Ranchi for treatment but the individual managed to escape/deserted on 04.08.2014 and not yet reported in the Group Centre. While referring to the above impugned orders, Mr. Kumar contended that the impugned order of termination, being stigmatic in nature, should have been passed by giving proper opportunity to the petitioner by giving Notice of hearing. He further contended that it is true that the petitioner was a probationer and as such the rule of a permanent employee will not be attracted, however, so far as basic principles of natural justice is concerned, the same should have been complied with by the respondent authorities. Learned senior counsel further referred to a judgment rendered in the case of Jagdish Mitter Vs. Learned senior counsel further referred to a judgment rendered in the case of Jagdish Mitter Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1964 SC 449 , wherein the five judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that Article 311 of the Constitution applies to temporary servants or probationers. In this regard, paragraph 9 of the aforesaid judgment is referred to herein below: “9. It is also now settled that the protection of Article 311 can be invoked not only by permanent public servant, but also by public servants who are employed as temporary servants, or probationers, [vide Parshotam Lal Dhingra case 1958 SCR 828 at pp. 856-57 (p. 858)], and so, there can be no difficulty in holding that if a temporary public servant or a probationer is served with an order by which his services are terminated, and the order unambiguously indicates that the said termination is the result of punishment sought to be imposed on him, he can legitimately invoke the protection of Article 311 and challenge the validity of the said termination on the ground that the mandatory provisions of Article 311(2) have not been complied with. In other words, a temporary public servant or a probationer cannot be dismissed or removed from service without affording him the protection guaranteed by Article 311(2).” Learned senior counsel further referred to a judgment passed by this Court in the case of Upender Yadav & Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors. [W.P.(S) No. 2626 of 2014] and submits that this petitioner has been terminated under Rule 5 of Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965, and in the aforesaid case also the petitioner was a probationer and was terminated under the same rule, but the impugned order of termination was quashed and set aside by this Court by holding that the order is bad in law as the same has been passed without following the principles of natural justice. The relevant paragraph of the order dated 22.4.2019 passed in the case of Upender Yadav (Supra) is quoted herein below: “It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the issue regarding non-disclosure of pendency of criminal cases has cropped up in W.P. No. 2930 of 2011 in case of Het Ram Meena vs. Union of India & Ors. before the High Court of Delhi and upon the orders passed by the High Court of Delhi, the respondents had issued a circular dated 01.02.2012 which is annexed as Annexure – B of the counter affidavit. Clause -2(I) is relevant which is quoted hereinbelow:- “2(I) A candidate is required to declare in the application form, whether he has been arrested, prosecuted or convicted by a court for any criminal offence. If a candidate does not disclose the fact of his/her involvement and/or arrest in criminal case(s), complaint case(s), preventive proceedings etc. under IPC or any other Act of the Central or State Government in the application form, during medical examination as well as in the attestation/verification form and the fact subsequently comes to the notice of recruiting authorities/ is found out from the verification report received from the District authorities or otherwise, his candidature/appointment will be cancelled. However, in case of the candidate has already been appointed, while cancelling/terminating the appointment, the principle of natural justice shall be followed and opportunity of being heard would be accorded to the candidate.” Thus, the authorities themselves had prescribed the procedure that in such case of suppression of pendency of criminal case is the cause, action can be taken against the erring candidates/employee after following the principle of natural justice. ………………………….. ………………………….. It is admitted position that the petitioners have been removed from the services on account of suppression of pendency of criminal cases. It is not a case of termination exercising power under Sub Rule-1 of Rule-5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965. Rather, the petitioners have been removed on account of suppression. This arena is covered by the circular of the respondents itself. The circular contemplates that in such a situation before passing any order, principle of natural justice has to be followed. The said circular is in compliance of the order of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi and further this issue has been settled by the Apex court also (Supra).” Relying upon the aforesaid judgments Mr. Kumar contended that the impugned orders are bad in law, inasmuch as, no opportunity was given to the petitioner and the provisions as enshrined in Article 311 of the Constitution of India has not been followed. Per Contra, Mr. Kumar contended that the impugned orders are bad in law, inasmuch as, no opportunity was given to the petitioner and the provisions as enshrined in Article 311 of the Constitution of India has not been followed. Per Contra, Mr. Rajiv Sinha, learned ASGI, appearing for the respondent-CRPF opposed the prayer of the petitioner and submits that the judgments referred to by the senior counsel for the petitioner is not applicable in this case, inasmuch as, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of SAMSHER SINGH vs. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER, which was passed by a Seven Judge Bench, has held that a probationer/temporary employee is not entitled for the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. In this regard he referred to Paragraph 64 of the aforesaid judgment reported in (1974) 2 SCC 831 . Learned ASGI further relied upon the judgment passed in the case of RAJESH KUMAR SRIVASTAVA vs. STATE OF JHARKHAND AND OTHERS as reported in (2011) 4 SCC 447 and contended that a person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in service and also for confirmation. There are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis. At that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the probationer are generally under scrutiny and on the basis of his overall performance a decision is generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be released from service and the impugned order is basically a termination simpliciter. In this regard, he referred to paragraph 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the judgment passed in the case of Rajesh Kumar (Supra), which is quoted herein below. “9. The records placed before us disclose that at the time when the impugned order was passed, the appellant was working as a Probationer Munsif. A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service. There are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of confirmation. A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service. There are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of confirmation. At that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the probationer (appellant) are generally under scrutiny and on the basis of his overall performance a decision is generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be released from service. In the present case, in the course of adjudging such suitability it was found by the respondents that the performance of the appellant was not satisfactory and therefore he was not suitable for the job. 10. The aforesaid decision to release him from service was taken by the respondents considering his overall performance, conduct and suitability for the job. While taking a decision in this regard neither is any notice required to be given to the appellant nor is he required to be given any opportunity of hearing Strictly speaking, it is not a case of removal as sought to be made out by the appellant, but was a case of simple discharge from service. It is, therefore, only a termination simpliciter and not removal from service on the grounds of indiscipline or misconduct. While adjudging his performance, conduct and overall suitability, his performance record as also the report from the higher authorities were called for and they were looked into before any decision was taken as to whether the officer concerned should be continued in service or not. 11. In a recent decision of this Court in Rajesh Kohli v. High Court of J & K, almost a similar issue cropped up for consideration, in which this Court has held that the High Court has a solemn duty to consider and appreciate the service of a judicial officer before confirming him in service and for this not only judicial performance but also probity as to how one has conducted himself is relevant and important. It was also held in the same decision that upright and honest judicial officers are needed in the District Judiciary which is the bedrock of our judicial system. 12. It was also held in the same decision that upright and honest judicial officers are needed in the District Judiciary which is the bedrock of our judicial system. 12. The order of termination passed in the present case is a fallout of his unsatisfactory service adjudged on the basis of his overall performance and the manner in which he conducted himself. Such decision cannot be said to be stigmatic or punitive. This is a case of termination of service simpliciter and not a case of stigmatic termination and, therefore, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court.” He further relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Surjit Kumar Vs. National Airport Authority & Anr. reported in 2013 SCC OnLine Del 2649 and submits that this case is almost similar to that case as the petitioner is only a temporary employee and he has been terminated by a non-stigmatic order; as such, the petitioner cannot have any grievance with respect to non-compliance of the principles of natural justice as the petitioner is bound by the terms of the temporary employees. Relying upon the aforesaid contentions and the judgments referred to hereinabove, learned ASGI reiterated that no case is made out by the petitioner and the impugned order of termination is non stigmatic and will not affect his future prospects. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents available on record it transpires that admittedly, the petitioner was a probationer and he was terminated forthwith by the impugned order dated 06.08.2014 and it was directed that he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice. The said impugned order was further modified by Order dated 09.08.2014, whereby the period of unauthorized absence to be treated as Dies-Non was modified as from 13.5.2014 to 23.7.2014 and 4.8.2014 to the date of termination order, i.e. 6.8.2014. 5. An order of termination simpliciter passed during the period of probation has been generating debate since long. Way back in the year 1964, the issue has been discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Mitter Vs. Union of India (Supra) and thereafter, in the case of Samsher Singh (Supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down the law in paragraph-64 as under: “64. Way back in the year 1964, the issue has been discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Mitter Vs. Union of India (Supra) and thereafter, in the case of Samsher Singh (Supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down the law in paragraph-64 as under: “64. Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an enquiry. But in those cases the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311 (2) he can claim protection. In Gopi Kishore Prasad v. Union of India it was said that if the Government proceeded against the probationer in the direct way without casting any aspersion on his honesty or competence, his discharge would not have the effect of removal by way of punishment. Instead of taking the easy course, the Government chose the more difficult one of starting proceedings against him and branding him as a dishonest and incompetent officer.” Thereafter, several judgments have been rendered on this issue. From the long line of judgments it appears that whether the order of termination is simpliciter or punitive has ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Many a times the distinction between the foundation and motive in relation to an order of termination either is thin or overlapping. From the long line of judgments it appears that whether the order of termination is simpliciter or punitive has ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Many a times the distinction between the foundation and motive in relation to an order of termination either is thin or overlapping. It may be difficult either to categorize or classify strictly the orders of termination simpliciter falling in one or the other category, based on misconduct as foundation for passing the order of termination simpliciter on motive on the ground of unsuitability to continue in service. If the form and language of the so-called order of termination simpliciter of a probationer clearly indicates that it is punitive in nature or/and it is stigmatic, there may not be any need to go into the details of the background and surrounding circumstances in testing whether the order of termination is simpliciter or punitive. However, in cases where the services of a probationer are terminated by an order of termination simpliciter and the language and form of it do not show that either it is punitive or stigmatic on the face of it but in some cases there may be a background and attending circumstances to show that misconduct was the real basis and design to terminate the services of a probationer. In other words, the façade of the termination order may be simpliciter, but the real face behind it is to get rid of the services of a probationer on the basis of misconduct. In such cases it becomes necessary to travel beyond the order of termination simpliciter to find out what in realty is the background and what weighed with the employer to terminate the services of a probationer. 6. In the case of Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. Vs. Central University of Kerala and Others reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 91, Hon’ble Apex Court has held at Paragraph 9 as under: “9. It is well-established position that the material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in the order of termination of the probationer, but might be contained in “any document referred to in the termination order”. Such reference may inevitably affect the future prospects of the incumbent and if so, the order must be construed as ex-facie stigmatic order of termination. Such reference may inevitably affect the future prospects of the incumbent and if so, the order must be construed as ex-facie stigmatic order of termination. A three- Judge Bench of this Court in Indra Pal Gupta v. Managing Committee, Model Inter College, Thora1 had occasion to deal with somewhat similar situation. In that case, the order of termination referred to the decision of the Managing Committee and subsequent approval by the competent authority as the basis for termination. The resolution of the Managing Committee in turn referred to a report of the Manager which indicated serious issues and that was made the basis for the decision by the Committee to terminate probation of the employee concerned. Relying on the aforementioned decision, the Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta, observed as follows:— “32. The next question is whether the reference in the impugned order to the three earlier letters amounts to a stigma if those three letters contained anything in the nature of a stigma even though the order of termination itself did not contain anything offensive. 33. Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon Indra Pal Gupta v. Managing Committee, Model Inter College (1984) 3 SCC 384 decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court. In that case, the order of termination of probation, which is extracted in the judgment, reads as follows: (SCC p. 386, para 1) “With reference to the above (viz. termination of service as Principal), I have to mention that in view of Resolution No. 2 of the Managing Committee dated April 27, 1969 (copy enclosed) and subsequent approval by the D.I.O.S., Bulandshahr, you are hereby informed that your service as Principal of this Institution is terminated….” Now the copy of the resolution of the Managing Committee appended to the order of termination stated that the report of the Manager was read at the meeting and that the facts contained in the report of the Manager being serious and not in the interests of the institution, that therefore the Committee unanimously resolved to terminate his probation. The report of the Manager was not extracted in the enclosure to the termination order but was extracted in the counter filed in the case and read as follows: (SCC p. 388, para 3) “It will be evident from the above that the Principal's stay will not be in the interest of the Institution. It is also evident that the seriousness of the lapses is enough to justify dismissal but no educational institution should take all this botheration. As such my suggestion is that our purpose will be served by termination of his services. Why, then, we should enter into any botheration. For this, i.e., for termination of his period of probation, too, the approval of the D.I.O.S. will be necessary. Accordingly, any delay in this matter may also be harmful to our interests. Accordingly, I suggest that instead of taking any serious action, the period of probation of Shri Inder Pal Gupta be terminated without waiting for the period to end.” It was held by Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) (p. 392) that the letter of termination referred to the resolution of the Managing Committee, that the said resolution was made part of the order as an enclosure and that the resolution in its turn referred to the report of the Manager. A copy of the Manager's report had been filed along with the counter and the said report was the “foundation”. Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) held that the Manager's report contained words amounting to a stigma. The learned Judge said: “This is a clear case where the order of termination issued is merely a camouflage for an order imposing a penalty of termination of service on the ground of misconduct …”, that these findings in the Manager's report amounted to a “mark of disgrace or infamy” and that the appellant there was visited with evil consequences. The officer was reinstated with all the benefits of back wages and continuity of service. 34. It will be seen from the above case that the resolution of the Committee was part of the termination order being an enclosure to it. But the offensive part was not really contained in the order of termination nor in the resolution which was an enclosure to the order of termination but in the Manager's report which was referred to in the enclosure. But the offensive part was not really contained in the order of termination nor in the resolution which was an enclosure to the order of termination but in the Manager's report which was referred to in the enclosure. The said report of the Manager was placed before the Court along with the counter. The allegations in the Manager's report were the basis for the termination and the said report contained words amounting to a stigma. The termination order was, as stated above, set aside. 35. The above decision is, in our view, a clear authority for the proposition that the material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in the order of termination of the probationer but might be contained in any document referred to in the termination order or in its annexures. Obviously, such a document could be asked for or called for by any future employer of the probationer. In such a case, the order of termination would stand vitiated on the ground that no regular enquiry was conducted. We shall presently consider whether, on the facts of the case before us, the documents referred to in the impugned order contain any stigma.” 7. In yet another recent judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajasthan High Court vs. Ved Priya and Anr. reported in 2020 SCC online Supreme Court 337, at Paragraph 19 and 21, reiterated the law as under: “19. Probationers have no indefeasible right to continue in employment until confirmed, and they can be relieved by the competent authority if found unsuitable. Its only in a very limited category of cases that such probationers can seek protection under the principles of natural justice, say when they are ‘removed’ in a manner which prejudices their future prospects in alternate fields or casts aspersions on their character or violates their constitutional rights. In such cases of ‘stigmatic’ removal only that a reasonable opportunity of hearing is sine-quanon. Way back in Parshotamlal Dhingra v.Union of India, a Constitution Bench opined that: “28……In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. Way back in Parshotamlal Dhingra v.Union of India, a Constitution Bench opined that: “28……In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, chose to furnish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with.” 21. True it is that the form of an order is not crucial to determine whether it is simpliciter or punitive in nature. An order of termination of service though innocuously worded may, in the facts and circumstances of a peculiar case, also be aimed at punishing the official on probation and in that case it would undoubtedly be an infraction of Article 311 of the Constitution. The Court in the process of judicial review of such order can always lift the veil to find out as to whether or not the order was meant to visit the probationer with penal consequences. If the Court finds that the real motive behind the order was to ‘punish’ the official, it may always strike down the same for want of reasonable opportunity of being heard.” 8. Thus, after going through the aforesaid discussions and judgments relied upon by respective parties it is necessary to examine the instant case. For better appreciation, the impugned order dated 06.08.2014 (Annexure 4) is quoted herein below. Thus, after going through the aforesaid discussions and judgments relied upon by respective parties it is necessary to examine the instant case. For better appreciation, the impugned order dated 06.08.2014 (Annexure 4) is quoted herein below. “ In pursuance of Sub-Rule[1] of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Service [Temporary Service] Rule 1965, I, KRISHNA KANT PANDEY, COMMANDANT of Group centre Ranchi, hereby terminate forthwith the services of No.135172261 RT/GD Pintu Kumar Yadav of this GC [allotted to 94 Bn] and direct that he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his service or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month. 2. The period of unauthorized absence wef 13/05/2014 to till date of termination order issued is hereby regularized as ‘DIES NON’.” The aforesaid impugned order dated 06.08.2014 was further modified by the respondent authority by its order dated 09.08.2014 (Annexure 5) and copies of which were forwarded to other officials along with enclosures. At this stage, it is relevant to quote the corrigendum order dated 09.08.2014: “Reference this office order of even number dated 06/08/2014 vide which termination order has been issued in respect of Force No.135172261 RT/GD Pintu Kumar Yadav of this GC [allotteds to 94 Bn] wef 06/08/2014. 2. A partial modification with regard to period of unauthorized absence in r/o Force No. 135172261 Ex RT/GD Pintu Kumar Yadav is hereby made as per para No. (2) of order cited ibid to be read as under:- FOR READ The period of unauthorized absence wef 13/05/2014 to till date of termination order issued is hereby regularized as ‘DIES NON’. The period of unauthorized absence wef 13/05/2014 to 23/07/2014 and 04/08/2014 to the date of termination order i.e. 06/08/2014 may be treated as ‘DIES NON’. …………………………… …………………………… Copy forwarded to :- 1. The DIG [Medical], CH, CRPF, Ranchi for information w.r. his signal No. P.VII-1/2014-CH dated 05/08/2014 2. The Commandant-94 Bn. CRPF, at location. [REGD POST] 3. The SP, Giridih, Jharkhand for information and necessary action please. [REGD POST] encl:-4 leaves 4. The SHO, GIRNI, Distt-Giridih, Jharkhand for information and necessary action please. …………………………… …………………………… Copy forwarded to :- 1. The DIG [Medical], CH, CRPF, Ranchi for information w.r. his signal No. P.VII-1/2014-CH dated 05/08/2014 2. The Commandant-94 Bn. CRPF, at location. [REGD POST] 3. The SP, Giridih, Jharkhand for information and necessary action please. [REGD POST] encl:-4 leaves 4. The SHO, GIRNI, Distt-Giridih, Jharkhand for information and necessary action please. The above named recruit named Pintu Kumar Yadav of this Group Centre [allotted to 94 Bn, CRPF] bearing Force No.135172261 RT/GD, has since been deserted from RIMS, RANCHI on 04/08/2014 i.e. before serving him ‘TERMINATION ORDER’ issued vide this office order of e/no. dated 06/08/2014, therefore it is requested to hand over the original copy of termination order dated 06/08/2014 alongwith copy of this order issued against him. The said recruit was referred to RIMS, Ranchi on 04/08/2014 by Medical Officer of CH.CRPF, Ranchi for treatment but the individual managed to escape/deserted on 04/08/2014 and not yet reported in this Group Centre. In this connection, an FIR has also been lodged on 05/08/2014 in PSBariyatu, Ranchi under information to PS-Nagri, Ranchi. Accordingly, copies of this office order cited ibid are also being enclosed herewith for further handing over to the individual. After being handed over original copies of ibid orders to the said individual, a token of being receipt may also be obtained in another copies and the same may please forwarded to this office duly attested for records” 9. From bare perusal of the impugned order (Annexure 4) as well as the corrigendum (Annexure 5), it clearly transpires that the petitioner has been terminated on the ground of unauthorized absence as in Annexure 5 the very fact finds place that the petitioner was referred to RIMS, Ranchi on 04/08/2014 by Medical Officer of CH.CRPF, Ranchi for treatment but the individual managed to escape/deserted on 04/08/2014 and did not report in the Group Centre. In this connection, an FIR has also been lodged on 05/08/2014 in PS-Bariyatu, Ranchi under information to PS-Nagri, Ranchi. From Annexure 5, it appears that a copy was also sent to SHO Girni District, Giridih. Thus, from the conjoint reading of the impugned orders; Annexure-4 & 5, it can be easily inferred that the respondents have terminated the petitioner from service on the ground of unauthorized absence which is, certainly, a stigmatic order. From Annexure 5, it appears that a copy was also sent to SHO Girni District, Giridih. Thus, from the conjoint reading of the impugned orders; Annexure-4 & 5, it can be easily inferred that the respondents have terminated the petitioner from service on the ground of unauthorized absence which is, certainly, a stigmatic order. Further, from the averments made in the counter affidavit, it clearly transpires that the petitioner has been punished for his misconduct. In this regard Paragraph 14 to 18 of the counter affidavit dated 14.01.2016 is reproduced herein below: “14. That on going through, the submission of the petitioner in support of justification for unauthorized absence of 72 days, it was found irregular on the ground that if his health was actually not sound between 28.4.2014 to 12.05.2014 (leave period), he should have visited the concerned doctor for treatment on or before 12.5.2014. But as per the medical documents submitted by him on 23.07.2014, it appears that he visited Sadar Hospital, District Rural Health Society, Giridih on 20.05.2014 at his own. That means, he willingly remained himself OSL with effect from 13.05.2014. Practically he should have reported at Group Centre, CRPF, Ranchi on 13.05.2014 itself after available 15 days EL. 15. That moreover, it advice for medical rest of 27 days w.e.f. 20.05.2014 given by the concerned Medical Officer is considered for a time being, then, the petitioner was supposed to report at this GC on 16.06.2014 itself (after expiry of 27 days Medical rest). But the petitioner also failed to comply the same and reported at his own on 23.07.2014 (AN) which shows his rude and indiscipline attitude. 16. That beside above fact, the petitioner vide his application dated 23.7.2014 (in support of justification for 72 days unauthorized absence), admitted that due to suffering from “Chicken Pox” disease, he was unable to join duties on due date, whereas, Medical OPD slip issued by Sadar Hospital, District Rural Health Society, Giridih,advised 27 days Medical Rest with effect from 20.05.2014. The reason for illness submitted by the petitioner itself quite different and bogus with regard to the diagnosis made on OPD slip dated 20.05.2014. Hence, the petitioner tried to misguide this department from one and another pretext and failed to submit valid and logical reasons/documents in support for spending unauthorized 72 days. 17. That, in the whole context, it was observed that in a very short spell (approx. Hence, the petitioner tried to misguide this department from one and another pretext and failed to submit valid and logical reasons/documents in support for spending unauthorized 72 days. 17. That, in the whole context, it was observed that in a very short spell (approx. one year) of service in this department, the petitioner remained himself absented for more than 100 days at his own without permission and intimation of the competent authority. Not only above aspects, he also misguided this department instead of submitting logical/valid reason/documents in support of submission of correct justification for over staying from leave/unauthorized absence. The conduct of the petitioner was against the good discipline and order of the Force. He used to remain himself absented from leave from time and again which indicated that he was not willing to serve this Force. His attitude also proves that he was such an indiscipline person and fond of remaining over staying from leave at his own discretion. The conduct and attitude of the petitioner might affected adversely to other Jawans of this disciplined Force. 18. That accordingly aggrieved with repeated misconduct, adverse attitude and arrogant behavior of the petitioner, the competent authority i.e. the Commandant, Group Centre, CRPF, Ranchi vide GC, CRPF, Ranchi Office Order NO. P.VIII-6/2014-EC-II dated 06.08.2014 had terminated him from service with effect from 06.08.2014 and also stroked off from the strength of this Force with effect from 06.08.2014 as per Rule 5 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. ” 10. From the facts stated herein above; especially the stand taken by the respondents in their counter affidavit as well as the office order dated 09.08.2014, which was passed in partial modification of the order dated 06.08.2014, it is evident that the termination order may appear simpliciter but the attending circumstances show that misconduct was the real basis of the termination. As such, this Court holds that the impugned orders (Annexure-4 & 5), being stigmatic and punitive in nature, has been passed without following the principles of natural justice which is against the settled principles of law. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussions and judicial pronouncements, the impugned orders as contained in order dated 06.08.2014 issued vide No. P VIII-6/2014 EC-2 and Order dated 09.08.2014 issued vide No.P.VIII-6/2014-EC-2, are hereby, quashed and set-aside for want of reasonable opportunity of being heard given to the petitioner. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussions and judicial pronouncements, the impugned orders as contained in order dated 06.08.2014 issued vide No. P VIII-6/2014 EC-2 and Order dated 09.08.2014 issued vide No.P.VIII-6/2014-EC-2, are hereby, quashed and set-aside for want of reasonable opportunity of being heard given to the petitioner. However, the respondent authorities will be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law, if so advised. 12. Consequently, the instant writ application is allowed and disposed of.