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2020 DIGILAW 1106 (JHR)

Central Coalfields Limited v. Radhe Manjhi

2020-11-26

RAVI RANJAN, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

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JUDGMENT : 1. The matter has been heard through video conferencing with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. None of the parties has raised any complaint regarding audio and visual quality. I.A. No.10970 of 2018 2. This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 537 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 3. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-CCL has submitted that the delay of 537 days in filing the instant appeal may be condoned as because there is sufficient reason in not filing the appeal within time. According to him, the legal opinion was sought for after the order dated 05.05.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge was communicated to the appellant-CCL. In pursuant to such legal opinion, the matter was discussed with the higher officials and a decision on the Head-Quarters level was taken to file an appeal, accordingly, the memorandum of appeal was drafted and the same was presented for filing on 26.11.2018 which caused delay of 537 days. Learned counsel further submits that if the aforesaid delay will not be condoned, the appellant will suffer irreparable loss and injury as because the appellant has got a good case on merit. 4. This Court while hearing the learned counsel for the appellant, had issued notice upon the respondent-writ petitioner vide order dated 03.01.2019 and pursuant thereto, appearance has been made through the learned counsel, namely, Mr. Om Prakash Prasad. Learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner although has not filed any reply-affidavit to the interlocutory application in question, however, oral objection has been made with respect to condoning the 537 days’ delay in filing the appeal. 5. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties, on the instant interlocutory application, and found it appropriate in the ends of justice to condone the delay so that the matter may be heard on merit, otherwise the issue will be said to have been decided on technicality without going into the merit of the issues. We, therefore, are of the view that the delay of 537 days in filing the appeal, is required to be condoned. 6. Accordingly, the delay of 537 days is condoned. In consequence thereof, I.A. No.10970 of 2018 stands allowed. L.P.A. No.696 of 2018 7. We, therefore, are of the view that the delay of 537 days in filing the appeal, is required to be condoned. 6. Accordingly, the delay of 537 days is condoned. In consequence thereof, I.A. No.10970 of 2018 stands allowed. L.P.A. No.696 of 2018 7. The instant intra-court appeal is directed against the order/judgment dated 05.05.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.3630 of 2011 whereby and whereunder by allowing the writ petition, the order dated 26/28.10.2002 passed by the Deputy Chief Personnel Manager (A)/ Sirka by which the application of the writ petitioner filed under Clause 9.3.2 of the National Coal Wage Agreement (hereinafter referred to as ‘N.C.W.A’) had been rejected on the ground of delay, a direction was given to the respondents to consider the case of the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground in the light of the provisions as contained in Clause 9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A. 8. The brief fact of the case, which requires to be enumerated, reads hereunder as: The father of the writ petitioner while working in the permanent establishment of the respondent-C.C.L had died on 28.06.1999. The mother of the writ petitioner made a communication dated 05.07.1999, addressed to the concerned competent authority of the respondent about the death of her husband, as a result of which, the name of his father was struck off from the roll of the company with effect from 29.06.1999. The mother of the writ petitioner requested the competent authority of the respondent-C.C.L to keep the name of the writ petitioner on live roster vide representation dated 05.07.1999 and further after attaining the age of majority, she made a request to the respondent-C.C.L to appoint her son on compassionate ground in terms of Clause 9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A vide her letter dated 25.12.2001. In pursuant of her request, the writ petitioner was called for interview vide letter dated 02.02.2002, in which the writ petitioner appeared before the Screening Committee, but the case of the writ petitioner was rejected vide decision dated 26/28.10.2002 and hence the writ petition was preferred challenging the order of rejection as also to consider the case of the writ petitioner under the provision of Clause 9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A. The writ petitioner has agitated the issue that the action of the respondents in rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner, is wholly illegal and arbitrary as the period of limitation is available only in case of Clause 9.3.2 of N.C.W.A and not in the case of Clause-9.5.0 (iii) thereof. It was contended before the writ Court that it was obligatory on the part of the respondents to keep the writ petitioner on live roster, particularly when his mother had made request in time and soon after attaining the age of majority further request was made for consideration of her application for appointment of her son. The petitioner has also relied upon a circular of B.C.C.L dated 24.01.2004 which according to the writ petitioner was not taken into consideration whereby Area Manager/Manager of the concerned mines was directed to immediately communicate the name of the dependants of the deceased employee to the Head-Quarters. In view of the aforesaid specific provision as contained in N.C.W.A even though an application was not submitted for enrolment in the live roster since no monetary compensation had been provided to the family of the writ petitioner, it was the duty of the respondent-C.C.L to get the petitioner enrolled on live roster. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Mohan Mahto vs. Central Coalfield Ltd. reported in (2007) 4 JLJR 144 (SC). The respondent-C.C.L put its appearance by filing detailed counter affidavit, vehemently opposing the contention of the writ petitioner by making submission for dismissal of the writ petition on the ground that the writ petitioner has approached this Court after nine years from the date of rejection i.e. 26/28.10.2002. The respondent-C.C.L put its appearance by filing detailed counter affidavit, vehemently opposing the contention of the writ petitioner by making submission for dismissal of the writ petition on the ground that the writ petitioner has approached this Court after nine years from the date of rejection i.e. 26/28.10.2002. The attention of the writ Court was drawn towards the provision of N.C.W.A pertaining to consideration of the case of dependant of the deceased employee, in case of having not attained the age of majority on the date of death, which provides to keep the male dependent aged within 15 years in the live roster. According to the appellant-CCL, the aforesaid circular of B.C.C.L is not applicable in the case of C.C.L and as such, this ground is not available to the writ petitioner as the case of the writ petitioner is barred by limitation. The writ Court, after delving into the issues and considering the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties, allowed the writ petition by quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 26/28.10.2002 by remitting the matter before the respondent authorities for reconsideration of the case of the writ petitioner, if he has not crossed the age of 35 years, which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 9. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel pressing the instant appeal, has vehemently argued about the delay in filing the instant writ petition. According to him, the impugned order was passed on 26/28.10.2002 but the writ petition was filed only in the year 2011 and as such, there is inordinate delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner and on that ground alone the writ petition ought to have been dismissed. According to him, the impugned order was passed on 26/28.10.2002 but the writ petition was filed only in the year 2011 and as such, there is inordinate delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner and on that ground alone the writ petition ought to have been dismissed. His further submission is that it is not a case where the provision as contained in Clause-9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A is applicable since as per the record of L.T.C Form-A, apart from the writ petitioner said to have not attained majority, first adult son and daughter were there in the family and as per the provision of Clause 9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A question of keeping the male dependant in the live roster will only arise, if there is no other adult male or female dependant in the family of the deceased employee, but that is not the case herein, and that is the reason the appellant-C.C.L has considered the case of the writ petitioner on the basis of the ground available as under Clause 9.3.2 of the N.C.W.A and hence, the case of the writ petitioner has directly been considered under Clause-9.3.0. The learned Single Judge has not taken into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter and, therefore, the order impugned is not sustainable in the eye of law. 10. In response to the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted, on instruction, that the eldest son namely Ganesh Manjhi had died prior to death of his father. So far as the daughter namely Kumari Jagri is concerned, she was married at the time of death of her father and hence, save and except the writ petitioner, no other dependant either the son or the daughter was alive at the time of death of the deceased employee. But, the authority while considering the case of the writ petitioner, has not examined this factual aspect and without doing so, they have come to the conclusion about the non-applicability of the provision of Clause-9.5.0, treating the case of the writ petitioner as under Clause-9.3.2 of the aforesaid agreement. 11. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length, appreciated the materials available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. This Court, has found certain admitted fact which requires to be referred herein. 11. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length, appreciated the materials available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. This Court, has found certain admitted fact which requires to be referred herein. The father of the writ petitioner died in harness on 28.06.1999. His mother made a communication on 05.07.1999 about the death of her husband, in consequence thereof, the name of father of the writ petitioner was struck off from the roll of the company with effect from 29.06.1999. It is the case of the writ petitioner that a request was made by his mother to keep the name of the writ petitioner on live roster vide representation dated 05.07.1999 which has been appended as Annexure-5 to the writ petition. The writ petitioner when attained majority, another request was made to provide employment on compassionate ground in favour of her son vide letter dated 25.12.2001 which has been appended as Annexure-7 to the writ petition. The appellant-C.C.L, in pursuant to the aforesaid request, had called the writ petitioner for interview vide letter dated 02.02.2002, in which the writ petitioner appeared but his case was rejected vide order dated 26/28.10.2002. 12. This Court has perused the prayer made by the writ petitioner, wherein the following prayer has been made: “I. For direction upon the respondents to consider the case of petitioner for compassionate appointment and give him compassionate appointment in the light of provisions contained under para 9.5.0 (iii) of the National Coal Wages Agreement-VI (hereinafter referred as N.C.W.A for sake of convenience) as the mother of the petitioner within time has informed the employer C.C. Ltd. about the death of her husband and further an application for keeping the matter regarding the appointment of petitioner on live roster has also been filed and further compassionate appointment in respondent company is not by virtue of policy decision rather as per bipartite agreement (N.C.W.A-VI), but till date no final decision has been taken by the respondents. II. For quashing of the order dated 26/28.10.2002 issued under the pen and signature of Dy. II. For quashing of the order dated 26/28.10.2002 issued under the pen and signature of Dy. Chief Personnel Manager (A)/Sirka whereby the application of the petitioner filed under clause 9.3.2 of the National Coal Wages Agreement VI/VII has been rejected on the ground of delay in submission of application.” It is thus evident that the first prayer made in the writ petition is to consider the case of the writ petitioner for compassionate appointment in the light of the provision as contained in Clause 9.5.0 (iii) of the National Coal Wage Agreement-VI while the second prayer is for quashing the order dated 26/28.10.2002, whereby the case of the writ petitioner was rejected by invoking the condition as stipulated under Clause 9.3.2 of the N.C.W.A-VI. It requires to refer herein that the National Coal Wage Agreement has been entered in between the Coal India Limited and the union of the workers to deal with the wage structure and other conditions of service including benefits of the employees of the Coal Industry under the recommendations of the Central Wage Board for Coal Mining Industry as accepted by the Government of India and made applicable with effect from 15.08.1967, the National Coal Wage Agreement-I, II, III, IV and V dated 11th December, 1974, 11th August, 1979, 11th November 1983, 27th July, 1989 and 19th January 1996 respectively. The aforesaid agreement is outside the conciliation proceeding and as such, it requires to be treated within the meaning of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and hence, the aforesaid agreement has got binding effect. The issue about applicability of National Coal Wage Agreement, as to whether the said agreement is having statutory fervour or not, has been decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Mahto (supra). It requires to refer herein that once bipartite agreement, by way of National Coal Wage Agreement, has been said to have got its statutory fervour within the meaning of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the terms and conditions contained therein bind the parties. It requires to refer herein that once bipartite agreement, by way of National Coal Wage Agreement, has been said to have got its statutory fervour within the meaning of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the terms and conditions contained therein bind the parties. It further requires to refer herein that the Industrial Disputes Act is by way of a beneficial legislation and once the bipartite agreement in terms of National Coal Wage Agreement has been entered pursuant to the provisions of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the same having got the statutory fervour, therefore, the terms and conditions of the agreement will also be said to have its beneficial effect upon the workman. 13. The instant case pertains to the bipartite agreement by way of National Coal Wage Agreement-VI i.e. from 01.07.1996 to 30.06.2001, as the date of death of the father of the writ petitioner is 28.06.1999. The concerned provisions of the N.C.W.A-VI i.e. Clause 9.3.0 and Clause 9.5.0 are reproduced herein below: “9.3.0 Provision of Employment to Dependants 9.3.1 Employment would be provided to one dependant of workers who are disabled permanently and also those who die while in service. The provision will be implemented as follows: 9.3.2. Employment to one dependant of the worker who dies while in service. In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment/payment of monetary compensation would be governed by para 9.5.0. 9.3.3 The dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependent on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependants of the deceased. 9.3.4 The dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment. 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment. 9.5.0. Employment/Monetary compensation to female dependant Provision of employment/monetary compensation to female dependants of workmen who die while in service and who are declared medically unfit as per Clause 9.4.0 above would be regulated as under :- (i) In case of death due to mine accident, the female dependant would have the option to either accept the monetary compensation of Rs.4000/- per month or employment irrespective of her age. (ii) In case of death/total permanent disablement due to causes other than mine accident and medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if the female dependant is below the age of 45 years she will have the option either to accept the monetary compensation of Rs.3000/- per month or employment. In case the female dependant is above 45 years of age she will be entitled only to monetary compensation and not to employment. (iii) In case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependant of the concerned worker is 12 years and above in age, he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualifications when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates (i) & (ii) at paras above. This will be effective from 1.1.2000. (iv) xxxx xxxxx xxxx (v) xxxx xxxxx xxxx” It is evident from the provision of Clause 9.3.2 of the N.C.W.A-VI which stipulates that one dependant of the worker who dies while in service shall be given employment. Under the aforesaid condition, the definition of dependant has been stipulated as under Clause 9.3.3, which means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependent on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependants of the deceased. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependent on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependants of the deceased. The condition stipulated under Clause 9.3.4 provides that the dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment. Clause 9.5.0 (iii) stipulates that in case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependant of the concerned worker is 12 years and above in age, he will be kept on live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualifications when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates (i) & (ii) above. This will be effective from 1.1.2000. 14. The question which is to be considered by us, in the facts and circumstances of this case, as to whether the provision as contained under Clause 9.3.2 will be applicable or Clause 9.5.0 (iii) of the N.C.W.A-VI. The provision as contained under Clause 9.3.2 will arise in a case where at the time of death of the deceased employee the dependant is major. It is further evident from the record that the respondent-C.C.L has issued circular time to time fixing the period of making application for consideration of the case for appointment on compassionate ground under Clause 9.3.2. The circular dated 12.12.1995 provides a period of six months. Subsequently, the circular dated 12.12.1995 was cancelled by introducing another circular dated 01.01.2002 making six months to one year. It is applicable from the year 2000, meaning thereby that in the given situation if the case of the writ petitioner was to be considered under Clause 9.3.2, the application ought to have been made within six months from the date of death. It is applicable from the year 2000, meaning thereby that in the given situation if the case of the writ petitioner was to be considered under Clause 9.3.2, the application ought to have been made within six months from the date of death. Herein, the date of death of the father of the writ petitioner is 28.06.1999 and as such the application for appointment on compassionate ground if conveyed, it ought to have been made within six months i.e. up to 28.12.1999, if at all the provision under Clause 9.3.2 will be said to be applicable. It further appears from the provision of Clause 9.5.0 that in case when there is no adult male or female dependant for consideration under Clause 9.3.2, rather the male dependant is 12 years and above such minor male dependant will have to be kept on live roster for his appointment when he attains the age of 18 years. The case of the writ petitioner before the writ Court was that name of the writ petitioner ought to have been kept on live roster as per Clause 9.5.0 since he was the sole dependant but minor at the time of death of his father i.e. 28.06.1999, which has seriously been objected by the learned counsel for the C.C.L mainly on the ground of L.T.C Form-A that one of the son namely, Ganesh Manjhi and daughter namely Kumari Jagri shown to have attained the age of 21 and 18 years respectively as would appear from Annexure-5 to the memo of appeal. There is no dispute that in case of adult dependant at the time of death of the deceased employee, there is no question of applicability of provision of Clause 9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A (VI) and herein, as per the LTC Form-A there are two adult dependants and as such, if said LTC Form-A will be taken to be true, there is no question of applicability of the provision as contained under Clause 9.5.0. At this juncture, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has submitted, on instruction, that Ganesh Manjhi, the eldest son of the deceased employee had died on 01.04.1999 i.e. prior to death of his father who died on 28.06.1999, has shown death certificate of said Ganesh Manjhi and when this Court has put query what to say about daughter, who is also shown to be of the age of 18 years, upon this, the reply has been made that she was already married but failed to produce any document. It requires to refer herein that neither the death certificate with respect to said Ganesh Manjhi nor the proof about marriage of the daughter of the deceased employee has been produced before the writ Court. The question of consideration of documents which was not available before the writ Court is concerned, since the National Coal Wage Agreement under the provision of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is beneficial in nature and as such, we have thought it proper to take lenient view taking into consideration the nature of the Act being beneficial in nature as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Textile Worker’s Union etc. vs. P.R. Ramakrishnan and Others reported in AIR 1983 SC 75 wherein it has been laid down that the beneficial provision should be taken into consideration for dominating purpose of the statute enshrined by a legislature and unlike policy. Keeping the aforesaid provision of law into consideration, we have thought it proper to consider the aforesaid document by accepting the version of the learned counsel of the writ petitioner subject to scrutiny by the respondents, both of the eldest son of the deceased, Ganesh Manjhi who died prior to death of the deceased employee and the marriage of the daughter who at the time of death of her father was major. But, admittedly these two documents have not been brought before the authority, making the provision of Clause 9.5.0 applicable rather the application filed by the mother of the writ petitioner which is appended as Annexure-4 to the memo of appeal dated 05.07.1999, wherefrom it is evident that there is no reference about death of the son of deceased employee and the marriage of the daughter, who were major at the time of death of the deceased employee rather it has been stated in the said application that one Radhe Manjhi, the son of the deceased employee since is minor, therefore, one post may be kept reserved awaiting his majority. The appellant has considered the application and rejected vide impugned order dated 26/28.10.2002, reference of which has been made vide communication dated 26/28.10.2002 under Annexure-11 to the memo of appeal, which reads as under: “Please refer to your proposal sent vide u.o.no. CGM(A)/P/799 dated 13-9-02, on the subject mentioned above. On examination of the case file it is found that date of death of ex-employee is 28-6-99 and date of submission of application is 26-12-01 i.e. after lapse of about 2 ½ years. Hence this case may not be considered as per prevailing norms.” It is evident from the said communication as contained in order dated 26/28.10.2002 that the application of the writ petitioner was considered and rejected on the ground of limitation since under the provision of Clause 9.5.0 of N.C.W.A (VI) there is no period of limitation prescribed therein. However, in Clause 9.3.2 of N.C.W.A-VI also there is no period of limitation provided under N.C.W.A but by virtue of circular dated 12.12.1995 prescribing the period of limitation for six months for making application superseding it by another circular dated 01.01.2002 extending the period from six months to one year is available, basis upon which, the appointment of the writ petitioner on compassionate ground has been rejected on the ground that application has been filed after 2 ½ years, therefore, the said rejection under Clause 9.3.2 of N.C.W.A-VI will be said to be the proper consideration for the case of the writ petitioner. But we have to consider as to whether condition stipulated under Clause 9.3.2 of the N.C.W.A will be applicable or to be considered under Clause 9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A. 15. But we have to consider as to whether condition stipulated under Clause 9.3.2 of the N.C.W.A will be applicable or to be considered under Clause 9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A. 15. We have found from the materials available on record that the application was filed by the mother of the writ petitioner on 05.07.1999 wherein the request has been made to keep the writ petitioner on live roster in view of the provision as contained in Clause 9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A-VI. According to our considered view, on the basis of materials available on record, the authority ought to have taken into consideration the application dated 05.07.1999 by examining the case of the writ petitioner as to whether the facts involved really attract the condition as stipulated under Clause 9.3.2 or under Clause 9.5.0. But, straightway the respondent authorities have put the case of the writ petitioner under the condition stipulated under Clause 9.3.2, which according to us, cannot be said to be justified decision. Plea has been made in this regard by the learned counsel for the appellant that two adult members of the deceased employee were already alive on the date of death of the deceased employee i.e. 28.06.1999 and therefore, the provision under Clause-9.5.0 will not be applicable. But, we find no force in this argument as because there is no consideration of this aspect in the decision as communicated to the writ petitioner vide communication dated 26/28.10.2002. The aforesaid argument can be said to be acceptable, if at all, the authority would have taken into consideration the availability of adult member on the date of death of the deceased employee. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant-C.C.L has further argued about the principle of delay and laches since the order was passed on 26/28.10.2002 but the writ petition has been filed in the year 2011 and as such there is delay of about nine years. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has vehemently opposed the submission on the ground that the order dated 26/28.10.2002 cannot be said to be an order since the order passed by the authority as referred in the communication dated 26/28.10.2002 has never been communicated. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has vehemently opposed the submission on the ground that the order dated 26/28.10.2002 cannot be said to be an order since the order passed by the authority as referred in the communication dated 26/28.10.2002 has never been communicated. We have examined the aforesaid submission and is of the view that there is no quarrel on the principle of applicability of delay and laches since the writ Court being Court of equity, the litigant is to approach the Court within reasonable time. Similarly, it is also settled that unless order is communicated, it cannot construed to be an order in the eyes of law. Herein, it is the admitted case, as has been admitted by learned counsel for the appellant-C.C.L, that save and except the communication i.e. 26/28.10.2002 which refers about the order of rejection of the claim of the writ petitioner, no such decision has ever been communicated to the writ petitioner and it is settled that merely keeping the decision on file without communication, such decision cannot create any rights in favour of a party, nor would it take away the rights of any affected party, till it is communicated. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bipromasz Bipron Trading SA vs. Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) reported in (2012) 6 SCC 384 wherein at paragraph- 33, it has been held as under: “33. The aforesaid observations make it clear that an order passed by an authority cannot be said to take effect unless the same is communicated to the party affected. The order passed by a competent authority or by an appropriate authority and kept with itself, could be changed, modified, cancelled and thus denuding such an order of the characteristics of a final order. Such an uncommunicated order can neither create any rights in favour of a party, nor take away the rights of any affected party, till it is communicated.” The admitted fact herein is, that the order of rejection has only been referred in the communication dated 26/28.10.2002 but the same has never been communicated as has been admitted by the respondents-CCL since no such document substantiating the communication have been produced before this Court even though entire record has been brought on record by way of affidavit as per directions of this Court. We have already referred hereinabove that we are dealing with the fact pertaining to beneficial legislation, therefore, if the respondents are taking the ground of delay and laches, it was their responsibility to communicate the rejection order, and only then, if the writ petition would not have been filed within reasonable time, this Court might have considered the applicability of principle of delay and laches, but it is not the case in hand. 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion made hereinabove, we are of the considered view that the rejection of the order as contained in communication dated 26/28.10.2002 by making applicability of the condition stipulated under Clause 9.3.2 of the N.C.W.A-VI, cannot be said to be justified one. 18. We have also gone across the order passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby and whereunder the communication dated 26/28.10.2002 has been quashed, in consequence thereof, the matter was remitted for fresh consideration for taking into consideration the condition stipulated under Clause 9.5.0 but that order we cannot approve, it is for the reason that before coming to such conclusion, the learned Single Judge ought to have dealt with the applicability of Clause 9.5.0 of N.C.W.A-VI i.e., should have assessed the availability of the adult members at the time of death of the deceased employee, and if it was found that none was there then such order should have been passed. But, the learned Single Judge without considering that aspect of the matter, has straightway applied the applicability of condition stipulated under Clause-9.5.0, therefore, we think it proper to modify the finding and part of the order as contained in the impugned order. Accordingly, the order impugned is modified to the extent by remitting the matter before the respondent authority to examine the contention of the writ petitioner about the death of the eldest son of the deceased employee said to have died on 01.04.1999 i.e. prior to the death of deceased employee and the fact about the marriage of his daughter before taking decision under Clause 9.5.0. 19. 19. Needless to say that before coming to such conclusion, the appellant-C.C.L will have liberty to assess/record sufficient evidence about the death of the eldest son i.e. Ganesh Manjhi and the marriage of the daughter of the deceased employee and if, conclusion is arrived at that no one in the family of the deceased employee was major at the time of death, certainly decision is required to be taken under Clause-9.5.0 of N.C.W.A but the authority, if comes to the conclusion that at the time of death of the concerned employee there was major dependant in the family of the deceased employee, there will be no requirement to take decision under Clause-9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A-VI and in that circumstances, the authority is not required to take further decision under Clause-9.3.2 taking into consideration the fact that the claim of the writ petitioner has already been rejected under Clause 9.3.2 on the ground of limitation. The appellant-CCL is directed to take decision within six months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order which shall be presented by the writ petitioner. 20. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands disposed of with the aforesaid direction. 21. Consequently, I.A. No.10971 of 2018 also stands disposed of.