ORDER : Heard Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioners and Ms. Ranjana Mukherjee and Ms. Pooja Kumari, learned counsels for the respondent-Central Coalfields Limited. These writ petitions have been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard on merit. W.P. (S) No. 7704 of 2017 1. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for quashing the letter dated 22.07.2017 (Annexure-9), whereby, the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground has been rejected by the respondents. The further prayer is made for direction to the respondents to appoint the petitioner on compassionate ground under Para 9.3.0 of N.C.W.A. 2. The father of the petitioner was appointed on 24.04.1984 on the post of Driver with the respondent-CCL and he was working in KDH Colliery. In the service excerpt issued in favour of the petitioner’s father, the petitioner was shown as his dependent son. The father of the petitioner was suffering from kidney and eye problem and in that view of the matter, he offered for voluntary retirement under the policy of the respondent-CCL and requested to provide employment to the petitioner, who happened to be his son. The father of the petitioner was declared fit and accordingly request for voluntary retirement was turned down. Again on 25.02.2014, the father of the petitioner made an application before respondent no.5 stating therein that he is suffering from acute kidney problem etc. and he made a prayer for providing employment to the petitioner under Para 9.4.0 of N.C.W.A. The said application was forwarded to the competent authority and the father of the petitioner was declared unfit vide letter dated 13.01.2015. The father of the petitioner died in harness on 10.09.2015. Thereafter, the case of the petitioner was turned down on the ground that he is overage. 3. Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the impugned order on the ground that the petitioner has produced Aadhar Card and Driving License etc. to show that his age was below 35 years, but it has not been considered by the respondent-CCL in its right direction. 3. Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the impugned order on the ground that the petitioner has produced Aadhar Card and Driving License etc. to show that his age was below 35 years, but it has not been considered by the respondent-CCL in its right direction. He further submits that the petitioner has also produced the certificate issued by the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer, Ranchi, whereby, his age has been assessed as 30 to 35 years. He also submits that in view of the provision under N.C.W.A., the case of the petitioner is fit to be considered in right direction and the petitioner is entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. He further submits that a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent-CCL, wherein, it has been stated that the Medical Board has assessed the age of the petitioner as 35 to 40 years. He also submits that the case of the petitioner is covered in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mukarrab v. State of U.P., (2017) 2 SCC 210 , reported in (2017) 2 SCC 210 [: 2017 (1) JLJR (SC) 152]. 4. Paragraph 12 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “12. This Court in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, clarified that the review of judicial opinion shows that the Court should not take a hyper-technical approach while appreciating evidence for determination of age of the accused. If two views are possible, the Court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This approach was further reiterated by this Court in Rajinder Chandra v. State of Chhattisgarh, in which it laid down that the standard of proof for age determination is the degree of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.” 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sri Ganesh v. State of T.N., reported in (2017) 3 SCC 280 [: 2017(1) JLJR (SC) 196]. 6. Paragraphs 9 and 12 of the said judgment are quoted herein below: “9. The law on the point is well settled and succinctly stated in Ashwani Kumar case where this Court after taking into consideration relevant statutory provisions observed in paras 32 to 34 as under: “32. 6. Paragraphs 9 and 12 of the said judgment are quoted herein below: “9. The law on the point is well settled and succinctly stated in Ashwani Kumar case where this Court after taking into consideration relevant statutory provisions observed in paras 32 to 34 as under: “32. “Age determination inquiry” contemplated under Section 7-A of the Act read with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules enables the court to seek evidence and in that process, the court can obtain the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available. Only in the absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificates, the court needs to obtain the date of birth certificate from the school first attended other than a play school. Only in the absence of matriculation or equivalent certificate or the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, the court needs to obtain the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat (not an affidavit but certificates or documents). The question of obtaining medical opinion from a duly constituted Medical Board arises only if the abovementioned documents are unavailable. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, then the court, for reasons to be recorded, may, if considered necessary, give the benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his or her age on lower side within the margin of one year. 33. Once the court, following the abovementioned procedures, passes an order, that order shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or juvenile in conflict with law. It has been made clear in sub-rule (5) of Rule 12 that no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof after referring to sub-rule (3) of Rule 12. Further, Section 49 of the JJ Act also draws a presumption of the age of the juvenility on its determination. 34. Age determination inquiry contemplated under the JJ Act and the 2007 Rules has nothing to do with an enquiry under other legislations, like entry in service, retirement, promotion, etc. There may be situations where the entry made in the matriculation or equivalent certificates, date of birth certificate from the school first attended and even the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat may not be correct. There may be situations where the entry made in the matriculation or equivalent certificates, date of birth certificate from the school first attended and even the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat may not be correct. But court, Juvenile Justice Board or a committee functioning under the JJ Act is not expected to conduct such a roving enquiry and to go behind those certificates to examine the correctness of those documents, kept during the normal course of business. Only in cases where those documents or certificates are found to be fabricated or manipulated, the court, the Juvenile Justice Board or the committee need to go for medical report for age determination.” xxx xxx xxx 12. We thus find that the approach of the High Court in the present case was incorrect and completely misdirected. Even if we were to remand the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration, in our view it would be an empty formality in the face of finding of fact rendered by the trial court. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order under appeal. The view taken by the trial court is restored and the matter stands disposed of in terms of the directions issued by the trial court as stated above.” 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the unreported judgment rendered by a coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 6037 of 2002, dated 21.03.2003 and submits that the case of the petitioner is fully covered in view of this judgment, whereby, the Court has directed to accept a particular age. 8. Per contra, Ms. Pooja Kumari, learned counsel for the respondent-CCL submits that the case of the petitioner has been rightly rejected by the competent authority. She further submits that the father of the petitioner, namely, Late Gyanchand Prasad was designated as Dumber Operator at Rohini Project of N.K. Area and he died on 10.09.2015. The father of the petitioner applied for appointment of his son i.e. the petitioner under Para 9.4.0 of N.C.W.A. and the respondent-CCL has fairly declared him unfit after medical examination. She further submits that the father of the petitioner, namely, Late Gyanchand Prasad was designated as Dumber Operator at Rohini Project of N.K. Area and he died on 10.09.2015. The father of the petitioner applied for appointment of his son i.e. the petitioner under Para 9.4.0 of N.C.W.A. and the respondent-CCL has fairly declared him unfit after medical examination. She also submits that the application of the petitioner was considered and sent to Central Hospital, Gandhi Nagar for the purpose of pre-employment of age assessment and he appeared before the Board on 24.05.2017, wherein, his age was determined and assessed as 37 ½ years. The date of birth of the petitioner on the date of submission of his application i.e. 20.02.2015 stood as 24.11.1979 and as he was 35 years 02 months and 26 days, he was not allowed compassionate appointment. She draws attention of the Court to the circular of the respondent-CCL dated 22.10.2014 contained in Annexure-D of the counter affidavit and submits that if the age of the applicant is above 35 years and in case of spouse it is above 45 years, the applicant will have to submit voter I.D. card, Aadhar Card, Driving License, Ration Card, Birth Certificate under relevant Acts and School Transfer Certificate, in which, his age is recorded below 35 years, in that condition the age of the applicant will be assessed through Medical Board. She further submits that the report of the Medical Board is annexed at Annexure-E of the counter affidavit, wherein, the age of the petitioner was assessed between 35 to 40 years as on 24.05.2017 by the Medical Board. She further refers to the circular dated 07.07.1992, contained in Annexure-F of the counter affidavit and submits that in view of this circular, the midpoint of the age should be taken as the age of the concerned employee. By way of referring this circular, she further submits that the age of the petitioner was assessed as 35 to 40 years and as per this circular, his age was required to be considered as 37 ½ years. In that view of the matter, the petitioner’s case has been rightly rejected by the respondents. 9. On perusal of Annexure-E of the counter affidavit, it transpires that the Medical Board has assessed the age of the petitioner between 35 to 40 years. In that view of the matter, the petitioner’s case has been rightly rejected by the respondents. 9. On perusal of Annexure-E of the counter affidavit, it transpires that the Medical Board has assessed the age of the petitioner between 35 to 40 years. The circular dated 07.07.1992 provides that the midpoint age of the concerned employee will be considered. The petitioner has produced Aadhar Card and Driving License after the death of his father. Thus, it transpires from the aforesaid two circulars, which have been brought on record by way of filing counter affidavit, the petitioner is overage for appointment on compassionate ground. It is not a case where the respondent-CCL has not acted for appointment of the petitioner on compassionate ground in terms of their rules and regulations. In this case, the respondent-CCL has taken efforts in view of the circular so that the benefit of the same may be provided to the petitioner. 10. So far as the judgment relied by Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Sri Ganesh v. State of T.N. (supra) is concerned, that case was arising out of criminal case and the Court was considering about the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and in that case a plea of juvenility of the appellant was raised and thereafter such observation was made by the Court. Thus, that judgment is not helping the petitioner. 11. The another judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Mukarrab v. State of U.P. (supra) is also on the same line and arising out of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Thus, that judgment is also not helping the petitioner. 12. The judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. (S) No. 6037 of 2002 was on the basis of concession provided by the Court and the Court directed to accept the age of the petitioner as 60 years and in that case the retirement benefits of the petitioner of that case was not paid. Thus, the judgment relied in W.P. (S) No. 6037 of 2002 is also not helping the petitioner. 13. There is disputed question of fact about the date of birth of the petitioner and this Court is not inclined to go in roaming enquiry for determining the age of the petitioner. 14. Thus, the judgment relied in W.P. (S) No. 6037 of 2002 is also not helping the petitioner. 13. There is disputed question of fact about the date of birth of the petitioner and this Court is not inclined to go in roaming enquiry for determining the age of the petitioner. 14. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid reasons and circumstances, no relief can be extended to the petitioner. Accordingly, this writ petition stands dismissed. W.P. (S) No. 7727 of 2017 1. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for quashing the letter dated 08.06.2017 (Annexure-8), whereby, the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground has been rejected by the respondents. The further prayer is made for direction to the respondents to appoint the petitioner on compassionate ground under Para 9.3.0 of N.C.W.A. 2. The father of the petitioner was appointed on 01.12.1975 with the respondent-CCL and he was working in Bhurkunda Colliery. In the service excerpt issued in favour of the petitioner’s father, the age of the petitioner was wrongly mentioned as 11 years as on 01.04.1987. The petitioner produced various documents showing his date of birth as 26.07.1985. The father of the petitioner died in harness on 19.02.2015. The petitioner made an application for his employment under the provision of Para 9.3.0 of the N.C.W.A. In view of the discrepancy in the age of the petitioner appearing in the service excerpt of the petitioner’s father and his age appearing on the document furnished by the petitioner, the petitioner was asked to appear before the Gandhi Nagar Hospital for assessment of his age and the Hospital as assessed the age of the petitioner as 36 ½ years on the date of his application and, therefore, the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground was rejected by the respondents vide letter dated 08.06.2017. 3. Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the impugned order on the ground that the petitioner has produced Birth Certificate and School Leaving Certificate etc. to show that his age was below 35 years, but it has not been considered by the respondent-CCL in its right direction. He also submits that in view of the provision under N.C.W.A., the case of the petitioner is fit to be considered in right direction and the petitioner is entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. to show that his age was below 35 years, but it has not been considered by the respondent-CCL in its right direction. He also submits that in view of the provision under N.C.W.A., the case of the petitioner is fit to be considered in right direction and the petitioner is entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. He further submits that a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent-CCL, wherein, it has been stated that the Medical Board has assessed the age of the petitioner as 35 to 40 years. He also submits that the case of the petitioner is covered in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mukarrab v. State of U.P., (2017) 2 SCC 210 , reported in (2017) 2 SCC 210 [: 2017 (1) JLJR (SC) 152] 4. Paragraph 12 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “12. This Court in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, clarified that the review of judicial opinion shows that the Court should not take a hyper-technical approach while appreciating evidence for determination of age of the accused. If two views are possible, the Court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This approach was further reiterated by this Court in Rajinder Chandra v. State of Chhattisgarh, in which it laid down that the standard of proof for age determination is the degree of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.” 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sri Ganesh v. State of T.N., reported in (2017) 3 SCC 280 [: 2017(1) JLJR (SC) 196. 6. Paragraphs 9 and 12 of the said judgment are quoted herein below: “9. The law on the point is well settled and succinctly stated in Ashwani Kumar case where this Court after taking into consideration relevant statutory provisions observed in paras 32 to 34 as under: “32. “Age determination inquiry” contemplated under Section 7-A of the Act read with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules enables the court to seek evidence and in that process, the court can obtain the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available. “Age determination inquiry” contemplated under Section 7-A of the Act read with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules enables the court to seek evidence and in that process, the court can obtain the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available. Only in the absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificates, the court needs to obtain the date of birth certificate from the school first attended other than a play school. Only in the absence of matriculation or equivalent certificate or the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, the court needs to obtain the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat (not an affidavit but certificates or documents). The question of obtaining medical opinion from a duly constituted Medical Board arises only if the abovementioned documents are unavailable. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, then the court, for reasons to be recorded, may, if considered necessary, give the benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his or her age on lower side within the margin of one year. 33. Once the court, following the abovementioned procedures, passes an order, that order shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or juvenile in conflict with law. It has been made clear in sub-rule (5) of Rule 12 that no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof after referring to sub-rule (3) of Rule 12. Further, Section 49 of the JJ Act also draws a presumption of the age of the juvenility on its determination. 34. Age determination inquiry contemplated under the JJ Act and the 2007 Rules has nothing to do with an enquiry under other legislations, like entry in service, retirement, promotion, etc. There may be situations where the entry made in the matriculation or equivalent certificates, date of birth certificate from the school first attended and even the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat may not be correct. But court, Juvenile Justice Board or a committee functioning under the JJ Act is not expected to conduct such a roving enquiry and to go behind those certificates to examine the correctness of those documents, kept during the normal course of business. But court, Juvenile Justice Board or a committee functioning under the JJ Act is not expected to conduct such a roving enquiry and to go behind those certificates to examine the correctness of those documents, kept during the normal course of business. Only in cases where those documents or certificates are found to be fabricated or manipulated, the court, the Juvenile Justice Board or the committee need to go for medical report for age determination.” xxx xxx xxx 12. We thus find that the approach of the High Court in the present case was incorrect and completely misdirected. Even if we were to remand the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration, in our view it would be an empty formality in the face of finding of fact rendered by the trial court. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order under appeal. The view taken by the trial court is restored and the matter stands disposed of in terms of the directions issued by the trial court as stated above.” 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the unreported judgment rendered by a coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 6037 of 2002, dated 21.03.2003 and submits that the case of the petitioner is fully covered in view of this judgment, whereby, the Court has directed to accept a particular age. 8. Per contra, Ms. Ranjana Mukherjee, learned counsel for the respondent-CCL submits that the case of the petitioner has been rightly rejected by the competent authority. She further submits that the father of the petitioner, namely, Late Brij Lal was designated as Store Keeper at Bhurkunda Colliery and he died on 19.02.2015. After the death of the employee, the mother of the petitioner, namely, Smt. Ramsakhi Devi submitted a representation on 26.03.2016 for appointment of the petitioner on compassionate ground. She further submits that as per the provision of N.C.W.A., the maximum age limit of dependent for compassionate appointment is not required to be more than 35 years. However, the petitioner’s age was more than 35 years on the date of submission of application for compassionate appointment. The petitioner has produced various documents and as per those documents the age of the petitioner was less than 35 years as on the date of submission of the application for appointment on compassionate ground. However, the petitioner’s age was more than 35 years on the date of submission of application for compassionate appointment. The petitioner has produced various documents and as per those documents the age of the petitioner was less than 35 years as on the date of submission of the application for appointment on compassionate ground. She draws attention of the Court to the circular of the respondent-CCL dated 22.10.2014 contained in Annexure-G of the counter affidavit and submits that if the age of the applicant is above 35 years and in case of spouse it is above 45 years, the applicant will have to submit voter I.D. card, Aadhar Card, Driving License, Ration Card, Birth Certificate under relevant Acts and School Transfer Certificate, in which, his age is recorded below 35 years, in that condition the age of the applicant will be assessed through Medical Board. She further submits that the report of the Medical Board is annexed at Annexure-H of the counter affidavit, wherein, the age of the petitioner was assessed between 35 to 40 years as on 12.04.2017 by the Medical Board. She further refers to the circular dated 07.07.1992, contained in Annexure-I of the counter affidavit and submits that in view of this circular, the midpoint of the age should be taken as the age of the concerned employee. By way of referring this circular, she further submits that the age of the petitioner was assessed as 35 to 40 years and as per this circular, his age was required to be considered as 37 ½ years. In that view of the matter, the petitioner’s case has been rightly rejected by the respondents. 9. On perusal of Annexure-H of the counter affidavit, it transpires that the Medical Board has assessed the age of the petitioner between 35 to 40 years. The circular dated 07.07.1992 provides that the midpoint age of the concerned employee will be considered. The petitioner has produced Birth Certificate and School Leaving Certificate after the death of his father. Thus, it transpires from the aforesaid two circulars, which have been brought on record by way of filing counter affidavit, the petitioner is overage for appointment on compassionate ground. It is not a case where the respondent-CCL has not acted for appointment of the petitioner on compassionate ground in terms of their rules and regulations. Thus, it transpires from the aforesaid two circulars, which have been brought on record by way of filing counter affidavit, the petitioner is overage for appointment on compassionate ground. It is not a case where the respondent-CCL has not acted for appointment of the petitioner on compassionate ground in terms of their rules and regulations. In this case, the respondent-CCL has taken efforts in view of the circular so that the benefit of the same may be provided to the petitioner. 10. So far as the judgment relied by Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Sri Ganesh v. State of T.N. (supra) is concerned, that case was arising out of criminal case and the Court was considering about the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and in that case a plea of juvenility of the appellant was raised and thereafter such observation was made by the Court. Thus, that judgment is not helping the petitioner. 11. The another judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Mukarrab v. State of U.P. (supra) is also on the same line and arising out of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Thus, that judgment is also not helping the petitioner. 12. The judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. (S) No. 6037 of 2002 was on the basis of concession provided by the Court and the Court directed to accept the age of the petitioner as 60 years and in that case the retirement benefits of the petitioner of that case was not paid. Thus, the judgment relied in W.P. (S) No. 6037 of 2002 is also not helping the petitioner. 13. There is disputed question of fact about the date of birth of the petitioner and this Court is not inclined to go in roaming enquiry for determining the age of the petitioner. 14. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid reasons and circumstances, no relief can be extended to the petitioner. Accordingly, this writ petition stands dismissed.