JUDGMENT Sachin Shankar Magadum, J. - The top noted second appeal is fi led by the defendant questioning the judgment and decree dated 20.12.2019 passed in R.A.No.109/2015 confirming the judgment and decree dated 16.09.2015 passed in O.S.No.68/2007. 2. The facts leading to this second appeal are as under: The father of respondent Nos.1 & 2 namely Shekharayya filed O.S.No.68/2007 for declaration and injunction by speci fical ly contending that he is the sole heir of late Shivagangavva and her son Mahantayya and as such he has acquired val id right and title over the suit schedule properties and consequently prayed for rel ief of injunction restraining the present appel lant/defendant from interfering with his possession and enjoyment over the suit properties. The original plaintif f Shekharayya speci fically averred in the plaint that after death of Shivagangavva and Mahantayya, he appl ied for change in Katha. The said varadhi was objected by present appel lant/defendant. Basing this as a cause of action, the present suit in O.S.No.68/2007 is filed by the father of respondent Nos.1 and 2 namely Shekharayya. The original plaintif f Shekharayya speci fical ly averred in the plaint that the present appel lant/defendant is stranger to the fami ly of the plainti f f. Original Plaintiff also disputed the status of the present appel lant/defendant as adopted son. 3. On receipt of the summons, the present appel lant/defendant contested the proceedings by fi l ing written statement. The present appel lant admitted that the propositus Sanganabasayya was the erstwhile owner of al l the suit schedule properties. However, the claim of plaintiff i.e., he is the sole surviving heir of Shivagangavva and Mahantayya was seriously disputed by present appel lant/defendant. A speci fic contention was taken in the written statement that the propositus Sanganabasayya had three sons and one daughter by name Shankaravva. Since Kallayya and Shivagangavva had no issues, they adopted Mahantayya. 4. The present appel lant further contended that Mahantayya who is the adopted son of Shivagangavva died issueless and this compel led Shivagangavva to take present the appel lant in adoption. The appellant/defendant also further contended that his status is admitted by Shivagangavva in a compromise decree passed in O.S.No.124/1992. 5. The Trial Court based on the rival contentions formulated the fol lowing issues. 1. Whether the plainti ffs prove that, they are sole heirs of late Shivagangavva and her son mahantayya? 2. The appellant/defendant also further contended that his status is admitted by Shivagangavva in a compromise decree passed in O.S.No.124/1992. 5. The Trial Court based on the rival contentions formulated the fol lowing issues. 1. Whether the plainti ffs prove that, they are sole heirs of late Shivagangavva and her son mahantayya? 2. Whether the defendant proves that, he is the adopted son of said Shivagangavva? 3. Whether the defendant proves that, suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as contended at para-8 of the written statement? 4. Whether the defendant proves that, suit property's value was rupees four lakh and more and this court has no pecuniary jurisdiction? 5. Whether the defendant proves that, no partition was taken place between original owners? 6. Whether the defendant proves that, suit is bad for non-joinder of other properties as contended at para-9 of the written statement? 7. Whether the defendants prove that, suit in the present from is not maintainable? 8. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the rel ief sought for? 9. What order or decree? 6. The respondents/plainti ffs led in oral evidence and to substantiate their case, examined plainti ff No.1A as PW.1 and rel ied on the documentary evidence at Ex.P.1 to P.7. The present appel lant in support of his contention examined himself as DW.1 and by way of rebuttal evidence relied on Ex.D.1 to D.6. Ex.D.3 is the certi fied copy of the compromise arrived in O.S.No.124/1992. 7. The Trial Court on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record rejected the rel ief of declaration and by moulding the rel ief granted 1/3 share to respondent-plainti ff by holding that they have failed to establ ish that they are the only Class-I heirs of late Shivagangavva and her son Mahantayya. Insofar as the contention of present appel lant i.e., adopted son of said Shivagangavva is concerned, it was also answered in the negative. 8. The Trial Court while answering issue No.2 has recorded a finding that the appel lant has fai led to establ ish factum of adoption. The Trial Court has held that in the absence of deed of adoption and ceremony indicating physical act of giving and taking, the appel lant cannot claim to be the adopted son of Shivagangavva, by relying on a compromise decree, wherein Shivagangavva has admitted that the present appel lant is her adopted son. The Trial Court has held that in the absence of deed of adoption and ceremony indicating physical act of giving and taking, the appel lant cannot claim to be the adopted son of Shivagangavva, by relying on a compromise decree, wherein Shivagangavva has admitted that the present appel lant is her adopted son. The Trial Court has also drawn an adverse inference against the present appel lant for having fai led to examine his genetive mother Parvatevva who was very much al ive when evidence was recorded. 9. The Trial Court has also taken judicial note of material fact that the defendant is identi fied by two separate names under two separate documents as per Ex.D.6(a) and Ex.D.7(a). Relying on these documents, the Trial Court has doubted the alleged adoption set up by the appel lant. 10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree insofar as finding recorded on Issue No.2, the present appel lant preferred R.A.No.109/2015. 11. The First Appel late Court on reappreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record insofar issue of adoption of appel lant/ defendant is concerned, has concurred with the reasonings assigned by the Trial Court. The First Appel late Court on re-appreciation has recorded a finding that the appellant has fai led to prove the factum of adoption. The First Appel late Court has also taken a view that merely because compromise decree was passed in view of consent of defendant in O.S.No.124/1992, that would not establish and prove the val id adoption of appel lant by Shivagangavva. The First Appel late Court on reappreciation of oral and documentary evidence has also taken note of Ex.D3 wherein the age of the defendant is mentioned as 16 years and thereby Appel late Court has expressed doubt in regard to val id adoption of appel lant. On these set of findings, on re-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, the Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal and thereby concurred with the reasons assigned by the Trial Court on Issue No.2. 12. The appel lant being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Courts below insofar as holding that the appel lant has fai led to establ ish that he is the adopted son of Shivagangavva is before this Court. 13. 12. The appel lant being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Courts below insofar as holding that the appel lant has fai led to establ ish that he is the adopted son of Shivagangavva is before this Court. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the appel lant would vehemently argue and contend before this Court that the findings of the Courts below that appel lant has fai led to prove that he is the adopted son of Shivagangavva is perverse, palpably erroneous and same suf fers from serious infirmities. He would vehemently argue and contend before this Court that when Shivagangavva has admitted in an unequivocal terms that the appellant is the adopted son as it is evident from the compromise decree passed in O.S.No.124/1992, both the Courts have erred in holding that, the factum the adoption is not establ ished by the appel lant. 14. In this background he would submit to this Court that the finding of the Courts below on Issue No.2 would give rise to substantial question of law. He would submit to this Court that when the compromise decreed arrived at between the appel lant and Shivagangavva indicates that the appel lant was taken in adoption by Shivagangavva, both the Courts ought to have held that the appel lant is the adopted son of Shivagangavva and consequently Issue No.2 ought to have been answered in the affirmative. 15. Heard learned counsel for the appel lant and examined the reasonings assigned by the Courts below on issue No.2. 16. The appel lant has rel ied on a compromise decree passed in O.S.No.124/1992 as per Ex.D.3. The parties have agreed to amicably settle the matter and in the said suit Shivagangavva who was arrayed as defendant has admitted that the present appel lant is her adopted son. The appel lant has not at al l furnished the detai ls in regard to factum of adoption. 17. As on 1992, the age of the appel lant/defendant is shown as 16 years. This would necessari ly indicate that appel lant was taken in adoption after the commencement of the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956. As per above said Act, any adoption has to be evidenced by way of a adoption deed. 17. As on 1992, the age of the appel lant/defendant is shown as 16 years. This would necessari ly indicate that appel lant was taken in adoption after the commencement of the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956. As per above said Act, any adoption has to be evidenced by way of a adoption deed. Further consequent to codi fication of Hindu Law, the essential ceremony of giving and taking in adoption of a chi ld is required to be reduced in writing. For the purpose of better understanding Section 11(vi) of the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956 is cul led out as under: "11. Other conditions for a val id adoption.- In every adoption, the fol lowing conditions must be compl ied with:- (i) xxxxx (i i) xxxxx (i ii) Xxxxx (iv) xxxxx (v) xxxxx (vi) the chi ld to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the chi ld from the fami ly of its birth or in the case of an abandoned chi ld or child whose parentage is not known, from the place or fami ly where it has been brought up to the fami ly of its adoption:" 18. On perusal of the above said section, it is clearly evident that Section 11 of the Act mandates that, a chi ld to be adopted must be actual ly given in and taken in adoption by the parents. Intention to transfer the child from the fami ly of his birth can be gathered only i f there is a ceremony of giving and taking. So, even if, the compromise decree in O.S.No.124/1992 is taken into consideration, the only factum of taking in adoption by Shivagangavva can be gathered. But whether the genetive parents had an intention to give appel lant in adoption is missing in the compromise. Clause (vi) to Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956 contemplates in an expressed terms that there must be actual ly giving and taking of the chi ld with intent to transfer the child from the fami ly of its birth to the family of its adoption. Clause (vi) to Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956 contemplates in an expressed terms that there must be actual ly giving and taking of the chi ld with intent to transfer the child from the fami ly of its birth to the family of its adoption. The physical act of giving and receiving was absolutely necessary for the val idity of an adoption, even before codification of the Hindu Law and the position under the Act is also identical and there has to be some overt-act to signi fy del ivery of chi ld to one fami ly to another. 19. On perusal of compromise decree at Ex.D.3, it indicates the factum of taking the chi ld by the adoptive mother Shivagangavva. This Act of taking is not sufficient to complete the process of adoption. The act of taking has to be necessari ly preceded by act of 'actual giving' by the genetive parents to complete the process of adoption and after commencement of the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956, the process of adoption needs to be reduced in writing. Since the ingredients of clause (vi) to Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956 are not complied with, the compromise decree under which the appel lant is declared to be the adopted son cannot be looked into since it is a void document. 20. Further the adoption deed needs to be engrossed on stamp of Rs.100 as per Article 3 of Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957. Both the Courts have drawn an inference against the appel lant/defendant for having fai led to examine his genetive mother namely Parvatavva who was very much al ive when the suit was pending. 21. The claim of the appel lant that his status of being an adopted son is adjudicated as per the compromise decree passed in O.S.no.124/1992 needs to be examined in terms of Section 5 of the Act. Section 5 is corollary to section 4 of the Act. For better understanding, Section 5 of the Act is cul led out as under: "5.. Adoptions to be regulated by this Chapter.- (1) No adoption shal l be made after the commencement of this Act by or to a Hindu except in accordance with the provisions contained in this Chapter, and any adoption made in contravention of the said provision shal l be void. Adoptions to be regulated by this Chapter.- (1) No adoption shal l be made after the commencement of this Act by or to a Hindu except in accordance with the provisions contained in this Chapter, and any adoption made in contravention of the said provision shal l be void. (2) An adoption which is void shal l neither create any rights in the adoptive fami ly in favour of any person which he or she could not have acquired except by reason of the adoption, nor destroy the rights of any person in the fami ly of his or her birth." Sub-Section (1) of Section 5 of the Act propounds two propositions, they are : i) Al l adoption made by Hindu must be in conformity with the provisions of the Act. ii) Any adoption made in contravention of provision of the Act shal l void. 22. On bare reading of the above said sections it clearly indicates that the compromise decree insofar as declaring that appel lant is the adopted son of Shivagangavva is void. It is wel l establ ished proposition of law that no consequences ensue a void transaction. A void transaction does not affect the respective possession or status of the parties. Sub-Section 2 of Section 5 by way of abundant caution reiterates this proposition it lays down as : a) A void adoption does not create any right or relationship in adoptive fami ly. b) A void adoption does not lead to destruction of any right or relationship existing before the adoption. 23. This clearly demonstrate that Section 5 lays down that after the coming in to force of the Act, all adoptions among the Hindus wi l l be regulated by the Act and since the compromise decree is in violation of Section 5 of the Act , the claim of the appel lant that he is an adopted son cannot be accepted and since the adoption is void, it would not create any rights in favour of appel lant in the adoptive fami ly as adopted son. 24. 24. Since compromise decree does not satisfy ingredients of Section 11(vi) of the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956 and Article 3 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 and since compromise decree as per Ex.D.3 is in contravention of Section 5 of the Act, this Court is of the view that, the concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below on issue No.2, wherein both the Courts have held that the appel lant is not an adopted son of Shivagangavva is in accordance with law and does not suffer from any infirmities. Substantial question of law raised by learned counsel for the appel lant in the top noted second appeal cannot be considered in the l ight of observations made above. Consequently, second appeal fails. Accordingly appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.