JUDGMENT : SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. In S.T. No. 615 of 2009 Shatrughan Thakur, the appellant, has been convicted and sentenced to R.I. for life and a fine of Rs.5,000/- under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (in short, IPC) for committing murder of Dhaneshwari Devi @ Munia, his wife. 2. Katkamsandi P.S. Case No. 178 of 2009 was lodged on 23.07.2009 on the basis of the fardbeyan of Bhikhani Devi which was recorded at 07:00 AM on 23.07.2009 at the house of the appellant, which is the place of occurrence. The informant has stated that her daughter was married to the appellant about 15 years back and they were blessed with two children, a son and a daughter. The appellant had drinking habits and he would assault his wife and threaten to kill her. Her daughter with children had, therefore, come back to her and after some time the appellant also came there. Somehow she could reason with the appellant who promised not to commit marpit with his wife and started living with his wife and children in her house. On 21.07.2009 they had gone to Tetaria Tola, Village-Basantpur and stayed in the house of the appellant. At that time her other daughter and grand-children were also with her. In the night they slept in different rooms and the appellant went to sleep on Varandah. Around 03:00 A.M. in the night when her grandson tried to wake up his mother he saw one injury on the temple of his mother. The doors of the house were closed from outside and the appellant had fled away. During the investigation confessional statement of the appellant was recorded and according to the witnesses at his instance the crime weapon was recovered from a well. It has also transpired that after the occurrence he had consumed poison and was admitted in the hospital for treatment. The children of the appellant stated before the police that they have seen their father assaulting the mother. On completion of the investigation a charge-sheet was filed and the appellant was sent up for trial. He has faced the trial on the charge under section 302 IPC for committing murder of his wife. In the trial, the prosecution has examined 10 witnesses out of whom PW-1, PW-2, PW-4, PW-8 and PW-9 are closely related to Dhaneshwari Devi. On completion of the investigation a charge-sheet was filed and the appellant was sent up for trial. He has faced the trial on the charge under section 302 IPC for committing murder of his wife. In the trial, the prosecution has examined 10 witnesses out of whom PW-1, PW-2, PW-4, PW-8 and PW-9 are closely related to Dhaneshwari Devi. PW-5 and PW-6 are the inquest and seizure witnesses and PW-10 is a co-villager of the appellant who has turned hostile. At one stage, PW-5 was also declared hostile at the instance of the prosecution. 3. PW-8 and PW-9, the children of the appellant, who were prime witnesses for the prosecution have however simply stated in the Court that their mother has died. The learned trial Judge has therefore looked into the circumstantial evidence brought on record by the prosecution to prove the charge against the appellant. The learned trial Judge has accepted the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 and came to a finding that the ocular evidence is sufficiently corroborated by the medical evidence. The learned trial Judge has further held that the appellant who was sleeping in his house in the night of 22.07.2009 has failed to offer an explanation. In his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, Cr PC) and therefore a presumption under Section 106 of the Evidence Act must be raised on his culpability in the crime. 4. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that confessional statement of the appellant is not admissible in evidence and merely on the basis of the circumstance that the appellant was sleeping on the Varandah of his house in the fateful night a presumption under section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be raised. The learned counsel has relied on the decisions in "Madhu v. State of Kerala" reported in (2012) 2 SCC 399 , "State of U.P. v. Kishanpal" reported in (2008) 16 SCC 73 , "Navaneethakrishnan v. State" reported in (2018) 16 SCC 161 and "Rajkumar v. State of M.P." reported in (2004) 12 SCC 77 . 5. The learned counsel has relied on the decisions in "Madhu v. State of Kerala" reported in (2012) 2 SCC 399 , "State of U.P. v. Kishanpal" reported in (2008) 16 SCC 73 , "Navaneethakrishnan v. State" reported in (2018) 16 SCC 161 and "Rajkumar v. State of M.P." reported in (2004) 12 SCC 77 . 5. In a case based on circumstantial evidence the circumstances on the basis of which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must be fully established, of a conclusive nature and must exclude all possible hypothesis except the one which must unerringly establish that it was the accused, who has committed the crime. In "Padala Veera Reddy Vs. State of A.P." reported in 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : "10. ... when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence such evidence must satisfy the following tests : (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence." 6. In order to prove the charge of murder the prosecution has relied on the following circumstances against the appellant : (i) harassment, beating and threat by the appellant to his wife, (ii) homicidal death of Dhaneshwari Devi, (iii) presence of the appellant in his house in the night of 22.07.2009, (iv) abscondence of the appellant from his house, (v) confession of the appellant, and (vi) dead body of Dhaneshwari Devi found in a pool of blood in her matrimonial home. 7. We are inclined to accept the submission raised on behalf of the appellant that his confessional statement cannot be relied upon by the prosecution. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the restrictions under section 25 and section 26 of the Evidence Act. 7. We are inclined to accept the submission raised on behalf of the appellant that his confessional statement cannot be relied upon by the prosecution. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the restrictions under section 25 and section 26 of the Evidence Act. Section 27 carves out a limited exception to the extent that certain statements made by an accused in police custody can be proved by the prosecution provided the disclosure by the accused leads to discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused while in custody of a police officer. In "Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor" reported in AIR 1947 PC 67 the Judicial Committee of Privy Council has observed that the "fact discovered" embraces the place from which the object is recovered and knowledge of the accused as to this and the information given by him must distinctly relate to this fact. It has further been held that the information as to past user, or the past history of the object produced does not relate to me discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. 8. PW-5, Manoj Kumar who is the inquest and seizure witness has stated in his cross-examination by the prosecution that PW-6 has not signed the papers in his presence. PW-6, Anuj Kumar Sharma who is a witness to the inquest and the seizure-memo has however stated in the Court that the seizure-memo which was marked as Exhibit-6 was prepared in his presence and it was signed by PW-5 also. The signature of PW-5 on the inquest report which was marked as Exhibit-5/1 (with objection) has been admitted by him. They are witness to seizure of blood-stained soil from the room in which the dead body of Dhaneshwari Devi was lying. However, the recovery of the crime weapon which according to the prosecution was recovered at the pointing out of the appellant from a well has not been proved. The learned trial Judge has recorded a finding that in course of investigation tangi was not seized. The effect of this would be that no new fact was discovered by the investigating officer pursuant to the confessional statement of the appellant so as to bring a part of his disclosure within the purview of section 27 of the Evidence Act. 9. The effect of this would be that no new fact was discovered by the investigating officer pursuant to the confessional statement of the appellant so as to bring a part of his disclosure within the purview of section 27 of the Evidence Act. 9. The presence of PW-1 and PW-2 in the night of 22.07.2009 in the house of the appellant in which Dhaneshwari Devi was found dead is established from their evidence. PW-1 is the brother of Dhaneshwari Devi who has deposed in the Court that he had gone to the house of the appellant at Basantpur. At that time his sister, mother and appellant were also at home. In the night the appellant did not take food and in the morning PW-1 has found his sister dead. The appellant had bolted the house from outside and fled away. PW-2 is the mother of Dhaneshwari Devi. In the Court she has reproduced her statement recorded in her fardbeyan. She has stated that she alongwith her daughter and son-in-law had gone to Katkamsandi market and from there they had gone to the house of her son-in-law. She has stated that in the night they stayed there and that the appellant has assaulted his wife with a tangi due to which she has died. In their cross-examination, PW-1 and PW-2 have stood to their grounds and stated that in the night of 22.07.2009 the appellant was sleeping in his house. What appears from the cross-examination of PW-1, that the appellant had offered liquor to him in the night, we would infer that the defence has admitted his presence in his house in the night of 22.07.2009. PW-1 has further stated that there were two rooms in the house and the appellant had slept in the Varandah. PW-2 has also stated about two adjoining rooms in the house of the appellant and a Varandah. In her cross-examination she has stated that after committing murder of his wife the appellant repented and when tried to consume poison near the village pond he was caught by the villagers and handed over to the police. There is virtually no challenge by the defence to the presence of PW-1 and PW-2 in the house of the appellant in the night of 22.07.2009. They are specific in their testimony. They are definite about presence of the appellant in the night of 22.07.2009 in his own house. There is virtually no challenge by the defence to the presence of PW-1 and PW-2 in the house of the appellant in the night of 22.07.2009. They are specific in their testimony. They are definite about presence of the appellant in the night of 22.07.2009 in his own house. The prosecution has also proved that the appellant would commit marpit with his wife and at times he would threaten to kill his wife. The evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 on this issue is not hearsay. They have stated in their examination-in-chief that the appellant was a drunkard and would commit marpit with his wife. No suggestion was given to these witnesses in their cross-examinations that they have not seen any incident of marpit or threat by the appellant to his wife. The appellant was staying with them for quite some time and they had occasions to see the appellant fighting with his wife. The investigating officer has stated in the Court that in their statement the prosecution witnesses have made similar statements about the occurrence and they have supported the FIR allegations. The fardbeyan of PW-2 was recorded early morning on 23.07.2009 and in her fardbeyan she has made specific allegations about harassment, torture, beating and threat to his wife by the appellant. In these facts, we find no reason to disbelieve the prosecution case that the appellant was beating his wife and would threaten to kill her. 10. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that no motive has been established by the prosecution and since there is no evidence to establish that the appellant has committed murder of his wife in the end benefit of doubt should be given to him. We are not inclined to accept this submission for the simple reason that the importance of motive in a case based on circumstantial evidence cannot be denied but cannot be over-stressed also. 11. In Surinder Pal Jain v. Delhi Administration reported in (1993) Supp. (3) SCC 681 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed, thus; "11. …..In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes pertinent significance as existence of the motive is an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning in such a case. 11. In Surinder Pal Jain v. Delhi Administration reported in (1993) Supp. (3) SCC 681 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed, thus; "11. …..In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes pertinent significance as existence of the motive is an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning in such a case. The absence motive, however, puts the court on its guard to scrutinise the circumstances more carefully to ensure that suspicion and conjecture do not take place of legal proof." 12. Motive alone is not sufficient to record a finding on complicity or innocence of an accused and as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Atley v. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1955 SC 807 that where there is no clear proof of motive the prosecution case cannot be disbelieved. It is well-settled that many a times motive may not be known to the others and sometimes a mere dislike may be a motive for the crime [refer, "Subedar Tiwari v. State of U.P." reported in (1989) Supp. (1) SCC 91]. The appellant was a habitual drinker and would quarrel with his wife. Obviously his wife would have been objecting to his drinking habits and this may be a reason he was annoyed with his wife. The reason for the quarrel and threat by him to kill his wife is therefore not far to seek. 13. Another circumstance which has been pressed by the prosecution against the appellant is that he bolted the doors of the house from outside and fled away. This has come in the evidence of PW-2 and not controverted by the defence in her cross-examination that showing repentance he tried to consume poison and he was caught by the villagers. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel for the appellant has tried to demonstrate that this circumstance that the house was bolted from outside has not been proved by the prosecution, primarily for the reason that the investigating officer has not found any sign of breaking of the doors. PW-1 and PW-2 who were sleeping in the house of the appellant in the night of 22.07.2009 have deposed in the Court that the doors of the house were closed from outside and there is no real suggestion put to them that the doors were not bolted from outside. PW-1 and PW-2 who were sleeping in the house of the appellant in the night of 22.07.2009 have deposed in the Court that the doors of the house were closed from outside and there is no real suggestion put to them that the doors were not bolted from outside. The investigating officer was also not put to any question whether he found any sign of the breaking of the doors. The appellant after the occurrence was not found at home and his abscondence from his house is an admitted position. We would keep in mind that generally abscondence is considered a weak piece of evidence and without any other independent evidence suggesting complicity of the accused abscondence is not considered an incriminating circumstance. A person may be found absconding from his house due to fear or on account of apprehension of arrest but merely for that reason an inference on complicity of a person in the crime cannot be drawn. In "Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B." reported in (2011) 11 SCC 754 the Supreme Court has held as under : "31. ……It is a settled legal proposition that in case a person is absconding after commission of offence of which he may not even be the author, such a circumstance alone may not be enough to draw an adverse inference against him as it would go against the doctrine of innocence. It is quite possible that he may be running away merely on being suspected, out of fear of police arrest and harassment. (Vide Matru v. State of U.P., Paramjeet Singh v. State of Uttarakhand and Dara Singh v. Republic of India.) Thus, in view of the law referred to hereinabove, mere abscondence of the appellant cannot be taken as a circumstance which gives rise to draw an adverse inference against him." 14. However, in the present case, abscondence of the appellant is not the only circumstance indicating to his complicity in death of Dhaneshwari Devi. There are other cogent and clinching materials brought on record by the prosecution on account of which abscondence of the appellant from his house after the death of his wife would become another incriminating material against him. In "Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P." reported in (1993) 2 SCC 684 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the circumstance of abscondence of an accused, thus; "23. In "Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P." reported in (1993) 2 SCC 684 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the circumstance of abscondence of an accused, thus; "23. A closer link with the conduct of the appellants both at the time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter is also the circumstance relating to their absconding. Md. Baduruddin PW-15, the investigating officer, deposed that he had taken up the investigation of the case and having examined PWs 1-4 had caused search to be made for the accused but they were not found in the village and despite search, they could not be traced. Appellant 1 surrendered before the court on November 10, 1981 while appellant 2 surrendered in the court on December 7, 1981. No explanation, worth the name, much less a satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the appellants about their absence from the village till they surrendered in the court in the face of such a gruesome 'tragedy'. Indeed, absconding by itself may not be a positive circumstance consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused because it is not unknown that even innocent persons may run away for fear of being falsely involved in a criminal case and arrested by the police, but coupled with the other circumstances which we have discussed above, the absconding of the appellants assumes importance and significance. The prosecution has successfully established this circumstance also to connect the appellants with the crime." 15. The homicidal death of Dhaneshwari Devi in her matrimonial home is not in dispute. PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 have found her dead body with one injury on her temple. PW-7, Dr. Ajay Kumar Singh, who has conducted the post-mortem examination, has found one lacerated wound of the size of "3 inches x 2 inches x 2 inches" over the left side of her face, near the left ear. In his opinion, the injury was ante-mortem in nature, caused by heavy cutting object and the time elapsed since death of Dhaneshwari Devi was about 10 to 12 hours from the post-mortem examination. The cause of death was hemorrhage and shock due to lacerated wound caused to her. In his opinion, the injury was ante-mortem in nature, caused by heavy cutting object and the time elapsed since death of Dhaneshwari Devi was about 10 to 12 hours from the post-mortem examination. The cause of death was hemorrhage and shock due to lacerated wound caused to her. The crime weapon was not recovered by the investigating officer and there is no serological report on the blood collected by the investigating officer from the room in which the dead body of Dhaneshwari Devi was lying, still, this lacuna in the prosecution case is not of such dimension to entertain any doubt on homicidal death of Dhaneshwari Devi. 16. The appellant is the husband and in the night Dhaneshwari Devi has died he was sleeping in his house. The law enjoins upon him to say how his wife has died. He has a right to remain silent but his silence in his examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. to the incriminating circumstances which would raise a strong suspicion on his complicity in the crime would be an important factor to decide on his involvement in the crime. In "Pudhu Raja v. State" reported in (2012) 11 SCC 196 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that it is obligatory on the part of the accused while being examined under section 313 Cr.P.C. to furnish some explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances associated with his involvement in the crime. 17. But there is another rule of evidence closely associated with the adverse inference that can be raised against the accused and which is statutorily recognized under section 106 of the Evidence Act. The provisions of section 106 are very clear and do not admit any ambiguity. When a fact is specially within the knowledge of a person the burden of proving that fact is upon him but before an adverse inference is sought to be raised against the accused under section 106 of the Evidence Act it must first be shown that some facts were pre-dominantly and without exception within the knowledge of the accused, still, he has failed to furnish a probable and satisfactory explanation. In "Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer" reported in AIR 1956 SC 404 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that section 106 of the Evidence Act is not intended to relieve the prosecution of discharging the initial burden. In "Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer" reported in AIR 1956 SC 404 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that section 106 of the Evidence Act is not intended to relieve the prosecution of discharging the initial burden. We are also conscious that merely because death of a woman has taken place in her matrimonial home that by itself is not sufficient to raise a presumption under section 106 of the Evidence Act to hold an accused guilty for murder [refer, Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2011) 15 SCC 285 ]. In the present case, the prosecution has however discharged initial burden by making out a prima-facie case against the appellant. PW-8 and PW-9 who stated before the investigating officer that they have seen their father committing murder of the mother have not supported the prosecution and some doubt may arise why the prosecution witnesses who were sleeping in the same house could not detect the crime, notwithstanding that, we find that the circumstances proved by the prosecution through cogent and consistent evidence prove that the appellant has committed murder of his wife. He has not raised a plea that Dhaneshwari Devi could have been killed by someone else and that there was a possibility of an outsider entering his house. He himself was sleeping on the Varandah and he was nurturing some grudge which is reflected in the evidence of PW-1 that he did not take food in the night. In "Tulsiram Shahadu Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra" reported in (2012) 10 SCC 373 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts and that the Court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as to the most probable position when inferring the existence of facts from other set of proved facts. With reference to section 114 of the Evidence Act the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that this provision in law empowers the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to happen and in that process the Court shall have recourse to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in addition to the facts of the case. in addition to the facts of the case. The evidence on quarrel, beating and threat by the appellant to his wife, his presence in the house in the night of 22.07.2009, his abscondence from his house in the morning and homicidal death of his wife in his house, are the conclusive circumstances which point out towards the guilt of the appellant, however, in his examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. he has not offered any plausible explanation. 18. In Jayantilal Verma v. State of M.P. (Now Chhattisgarh) reported in 2020 SCC Online SC 945 a wife was found dead in her matrimonial home and the medical evidence was not conclusive whether the strangulation was homicidal or suicidal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it was an obligation on the accused to give a plausible explanation regarding the cause of death in the statement recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. and mere denial could not be the answer in such a situation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : "26. We are confronted with a factual situation where the appellant herein, as a husband is alleged to have caused the death of his wife by strangulation. The fact that the family members were in the home same time before is also quite obvious. No explanation has been given as to how the wife could have received the injuries. This is a strong circumstance indicating that he is responsible for commission of the crime. Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (supra). The appellant herein was under an obligation to give a plausible explanation regarding the cause of the death in the statement recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 and mere denial could not be the answer in such a situation." 19. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we find that the prosecution has proved that the chain of circumstances is complete and the circumstances so proved establish that the appellant has committed murder of his wife in the night of 22.07.2009. The judgment of conviction of the appellant in S.T. No. 615 of 2009 is based on correct appreciation of the materials on record and we find no grounds to disagree with the findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 405 of 2017 is dismissed. 20. Let the lower Court records be sent to the Court concerned forthwith. 21. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 405 of 2017 is dismissed. 20. Let the lower Court records be sent to the Court concerned forthwith. 21. Let a copy of the Judgement be transmitted to the Court concerned and concerned Jail Superintendent through FAX. Appeal dismissed.