ORDER : Heard Mr. Pankaj Kumar Choudhary, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ankur Sinha, the learned counsel for the respondent State and Mr. Krishna Murari, the learned counsel appearing for the JEPC. 2. This writ petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard. 3. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for quashing the letter dated 18.06.2016 contained in Annexure-6 issued by the respondent no.6 whereby it has been directed to cancel the contract of the services of the petitioner to work as para teacher in Upgraded Primary School in Bishanpur, Aloobera, Amrapara, Pakur. The petitioner was selected on the post of para teacher following due process of law and his selection was duly recommended by the respondent no.6 vide letter dated 09.03.2016 contained in Annexure-1. The petitioner had joined the service. The petitioner started working as para teacher in Bisunpur, Aloodaha. The petitioner is the only teacher present in the school and since then he is single handedly managing the school without any complaint. On 08.06.2016, the petitioner applied for leave since his family was not keeping up good health which was allowed by the Chairman, Gram Siksha Samiti, contained in Annexure-3. On 09.06.2016 while the petitioner was on leave, and the petitioner's school was inspected, which was found to be closed and the petitioner was not found in the school. Thereafter, the impugned order has been passed. 4. Mr. Choudhary, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that in view of Annexure-3 the petitioner was on leave with effect from 09.06.2016 to 10.06.2016. He submits that on 09.06.2016 the school was inspected and without considering this aspect of the matter that the petitioner was on leave, the impugned order has been passed. He submits that the petitioner has worked for 10 years. He submits that in violation of principle of natural justice, the impugned order has been passed. 5. Mr. He submits that on 09.06.2016 the school was inspected and without considering this aspect of the matter that the petitioner was on leave, the impugned order has been passed. He submits that the petitioner has worked for 10 years. He submits that in violation of principle of natural justice, the impugned order has been passed. 5. Mr. Krishna Murari, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-JEPC submits that the petitioner's service has been governed by the agreement only and the agreement has been cancelled, the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not interfere in the matter in view of the fact that the petitioner's service has not been governed by any statutory rule. He relied in the case rendered in case of “SBI v. S.N. Goyal” reported in (2008) 8 SCC 92 . Paragraph no.17 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow : 17. Where the relationship of master and servant is purely contractual, it is well settled that a contract of personal service is not specifically enforceable, having regard to the bar contained in Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Even if the termination of the contract of employment (by dismissal or otherwise) is found to be illegal or in breach, the remedy of the employee is only to seek damages and not specific performance. Courts will neither declare such termination to be a nullity nor declare that the contract of employment subsists nor grant the consequential relief of reinstatement. The three well-recognised exceptions to this rule are : (i) where a civil servant is removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India (or any law made under Article 309); (ii) where a workman having the protection of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is wrongly terminated from service; and (iii) where an employee of a statutory body is terminated from service in breach or violation of any mandatory provision of a statute or statutory rules. There is thus a clear distinction between public employment governed by statutory rules and private employment governed purely by contract. The test for deciding the nature of relief—damages or reinstatement with consequential reliefs—is whether the employment is governed purely by contract or by a statute or statutory rules. There is thus a clear distinction between public employment governed by statutory rules and private employment governed purely by contract. The test for deciding the nature of relief—damages or reinstatement with consequential reliefs—is whether the employment is governed purely by contract or by a statute or statutory rules. Even where the employer is a statutory body, where the relationship is purely governed by contract with no element of statutory governance, the contract of personal service will not be specifically enforceable. Conversely, where the employer is a non-statutory body, but the employment is governed by a statute or statutory rules, a declaration that the termination is null and void and that the employee should be reinstated can be granted by courts. (Vide S.B. Dutt (Dr.) v. University of Delhi, U.P. Warehousing Corpn. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain, J. Tiwari v. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir and Dipak Kumar Biswas v. Director of Public Instruction.)” 6. The learned counsel for the respondent State submits that the petitioner was found absent and that is why the impugned order has been passed. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the law with regard to the contractual appointment and agreement are well settled and the Court is in agreement of the judgment relied by Mr. Krishna Murari, the learned counsel in case of “SBI v. S.N. Goyal” [supra]. At the same time, it is well settled proposition of law that arbitrary action even in case of contract service can be looked into by the Court. A reference in this regard may be made in the case of “Shrilekha Vidyarthi (Kumari) v. State of U.P.” reported in (1991) 1 SCC 212 . Paragraph nos.13, 15, 24, 29, 36, 39 and 48 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: “13. The learned Additional Advocate General contended that clause (3) of para 7.06 says that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side and not appointment to a post under the government; and the government has the power to terminate the appointment at any time ‘without assigning any cause’. The learned Additional Advocate General contended that clause (3) of para 7.06 says that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side and not appointment to a post under the government; and the government has the power to terminate the appointment at any time ‘without assigning any cause’. He contended that this power to terminate the appointment at any time without assigning any cause and the clear statement that the appointment is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side is sufficient to indicate that the relationship is the same as that of a private client and his counsel. In our opinion, this provision has to be read not in isolation, but in the context in which it appears and along with the connected provisions, already referred to. The expression ‘professional engagement’ is used therein to distinguish it from ‘appointment to a post under the government’ in the strict sense. This, however, does not necessarily mean that a person who is not a government servant holding a post under the government does not hold any public office and the engagement is purely private with no public element attaching to it. This part of clause (3) of para 7.06 means only this and no more. The other part of clause (3) which enables the government to terminate the appointment ‘at any time without assigning any cause’ can also not be considered in the manner suggested by the learned Additional Advocate General. The expression ‘at any time’ merely means that the termination may be made even during the subsistence of the term of appointment and ‘without assigning any cause’ means without communicating any cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated. However, ‘without assigning any cause’ is not to be equated with ‘without existence of any cause’. It merely means that the reason for which the termination is made need not to be assigned or communicated to the appointee. It was held in Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India that the expression ‘without assigning any reason’ implies that the decision has to be communicated, but reasons for the decision have not to be stated; but the reasons must exist, otherwise, the decision would be arbitrary. It was held in Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India that the expression ‘without assigning any reason’ implies that the decision has to be communicated, but reasons for the decision have not to be stated; but the reasons must exist, otherwise, the decision would be arbitrary. The non-assigning of reasons or the non-communication thereof may be based on public policy, but termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy. Clause (3) of para 7.06 must, therefore, be understood to mean that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is not to be equated with appointment to a post under the government in the strict sense, which does not necessarily mean that it results in denuding the office of its public character; and that the appointment may be terminated even during currency of the term by only communicating the decision of termination without communicating the reasons which led to the termination. It does not mean that the appointment is at the sweet will of the government which can be terminated at any time, even without the existence of any cogent reason during the subsistence of the term. The construction, suggested on behalf of the State of U.P. of this provision, if accepted, would amount to conceding arbitrary power of termination to the government, which by itself is sufficient to reject the contention and thereby save it from any attack to its validity. “15. A brief reference to some decisions of this Court, in which the character of engagement of a Government Counsel was considered, may be made. In Mahadeo v. Shantibhai it was held that a lawyer engaged by the Railway Administration during the continuance of the engagement was holding an ‘office of profit’. The engagement of the Railway counsel was similar to that of the Government Counsel in the present case. It was pointed out that by ‘office’ is meant the right and duty to exercise an employment or a position of authority and trust to which certain duties are attached; and such an engagement satisfied that test. The engagement of the Railway counsel was similar to that of the Government Counsel in the present case. It was pointed out that by ‘office’ is meant the right and duty to exercise an employment or a position of authority and trust to which certain duties are attached; and such an engagement satisfied that test. Even though the decision was rendered in the context of disqualification under the Election Law by holding an ‘office of profit’, yet it is useful for appreciating the nature of such an engagement or appointment of a counsel by the government. In Mundrika Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar the nature of appointment of Government Pleaders came up for consideration and it was said that the office of a Government Pleader, as defined in Section 2(7) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is a public office. Krishna Iyer, J., in that decision, also pointed out that the (SCC p. 707, para 16) “governments under our Constitution shall not play with Law Offices on political or other impertinent considerations as it may affect the legality of the action and subvert the rule of law itself”. In that decision, an earlier Madras decision was quoted with approval, wherein, it was clearly held that the duties of the Government Pleader are of a public nature and that the office of a Government Pleader is a public office. The relevant extract is as under : (SCC pp. 706-07, para 15) “… A Government Pleader is more than an advocate for a litigant. He holds a public office. We recall with approval the observations a Division Bench of the Madras High Court made in Ramachandran v. Alagiriswami and regard the view there, expressed about a Government Pleader’s office, as broadly correct even in the Bihar set up. … the duties of the Government Pleader, Madras are duties of a public nature. Besides, as already explained the public are genuinely concerned with the manner in which Government Pleader discharges his duties because, if he handles his cases badly, they have ultimately to foot the bill. … * * * I consider that the most useful test to be applied to determine the question is that laid down by Erle, J. in (1851) 17 QB 149. The three criteria are, source of the office, the tenure and the duties. … * * * I consider that the most useful test to be applied to determine the question is that laid down by Erle, J. in (1851) 17 QB 149. The three criteria are, source of the office, the tenure and the duties. I have applied that test and I am of opinion that the conclusion that the office is a public office is irresistible.” Similarly, in Mukul Dalal v. Union of India, it was held that (SCC pp. 149 & 152, para 6 & 9) “the office of the Public Prosecutor is a public one” and “the primacy given to the Public Prosecutor under the Scheme of the Code (CrPC) has a social purpose”. 24. The State cannot be attributed the split personality of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in the contractual field so as to impress on it all the characteristics of the State at the threshold while making a contract requiring it to fulfil the obligation of Article 14 of the Constitution and thereafter permitting it to cast off its garb of State to adorn the new robe of a private body during the subsistence of the contract enabling it to act arbitrarily subject only to the contractual obligations and remedies flowing from it. It is really the nature of its personality as State which is significant and must characterize all its actions, in whatever field, and not the nature of function, contractual or otherwise, which is decisive of the nature of scrutiny permitted for examining the validity of its act. The requirement of Article 14 being the duty to act fairly, justly and reasonably, there is nothing which militates against the concept of requiring the State always to so act, even in contractual matters. There is a basic difference between the acts of the State which must invariably be in pubic interest and those of a private individual, engaged in similar activities, being primarily for personal gain, which may or may not promote public interest. Viewed in this manner, in which we find no conceptual difficulty or anachronism, we find no reason why the requirement of Article 14 should not extend even in the sphere of contractual matters for regulating the conduct of the State activity. 29. Viewed in this manner, in which we find no conceptual difficulty or anachronism, we find no reason why the requirement of Article 14 should not extend even in the sphere of contractual matters for regulating the conduct of the State activity. 29. It can no longer be doubted at this point of time that Article 14 of the Constitution of India applies also to matters of governmental policy and if the policy or any action of the government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. (See Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu and Kashmir). In Col. A.S. Sangwan v. Union of India while the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by the statute or rule, was held to be wide, it was emphasised as imperative and implicit in Article 14 of the Constitution that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone, irrespective of the field of activity of the State, has long been settled. Later decisions of this Court have reinforced the foundation of this tenet and it would be sufficient to refer only to two recent decisions of this Court for this purpose. 36. The meaning and true import of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely stated or defined. The question, whether an impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned act and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no impediment in following that procedure, performance of the act otherwise and in a manner which does not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable, may itself attract the vice of arbitrariness. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason, is arbitrary. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason, is arbitrary. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. It is trite that ‘be you ever so high, the laws are above you’. This is what men in power must remember, always. 39. No doubt, it is for the person alleging arbitrariness who has to prove it. This can be done by showing in the first instance that the impugned State action is uninformed by reason inasmuch as there is no discernible principle on which it is based or it is contrary to the prescribed mode of exercise of the power or is unreasonable. If this is shown, then the burden is shifted to the State to repel the attack by disclosing the material and reasons which led to the action being taken in order to show that it was an informed decision which was reasonable. If after a prima facie case of arbitrariness is made out, the State is unable to show that the decision is an informed action which is reasonable, the State action must perish as arbitrary. 48. In our view, bringing the State activity in contractual matters also within the purview of judicial review is inevitable and is a logical corollary to the stage already reached in the decisions of this Court so far. Having fortunately reached this point, we should not now turn back or take a turn in a different direction or merely stop there. In our opinion, two recent decisions in Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons and Mahabir Auto Stores also lead in the same direction without saying so in clear terms. This appears to be also the trend of the recent English decisions. It is in consonance with our commitment to openness which implies scrutiny of every State action to provide an effective check against arbitrariness and abuse of power. We would much rather be wrong in saying so rather than be wrong in not saying so. This appears to be also the trend of the recent English decisions. It is in consonance with our commitment to openness which implies scrutiny of every State action to provide an effective check against arbitrariness and abuse of power. We would much rather be wrong in saying so rather than be wrong in not saying so. Non-arbitrariness, being a necessary concomitant of the rule of law, it is imperative that all actions of every public functionary, in whatever sphere, must be guided by reason and not humour, whim, caprice or personal predilections of the persons entrusted with the task on behalf of the State and exercise of all power must be for public good instead of being an abuse of the power.” In the case in hand, it appears that the petitioner was on leave in view of Annexure-3 which has been received by Gram Shiksha Simiti. The Court is liberal if the scheme in question is continuing and it is desirable that if the performance of the contractual employee is up to the mark they should not be disturbed. A reference in this regard may be made in the case of “Md. Abdul Kadir and Another v. Director General of Police” reported in (2009) 6 SCC 611 . Paragraph no.15 and 16 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “15. On completion of the project or discontinuance of the scheme, those who were engaged with reference to or in connection with such project or scheme cannot claim any right to continue in service, nor seek regularisation in some other project or service. [See Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi Admn., Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. v. Employees’ Union, U.P. Land Development Corpn. v. Amar Singh, Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. v. Anil Kumar Mishra, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), Indian Council of Medical Research v. K. Rajyalakshmi and Lal Mohammad v. Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd.] In view of this settled position, the appellants will not be entitled to regularisation. 16. We may next consider the challenge to the procedure of annual termination and reappointment introduced by the Circular dated 17-3-1995. The PIF Scheme and the PIF Additional Scheme were introduced by the Government of India. The Scheme does not contemplate or require such periodical termination and reappointment. 16. We may next consider the challenge to the procedure of annual termination and reappointment introduced by the Circular dated 17-3-1995. The PIF Scheme and the PIF Additional Scheme were introduced by the Government of India. The Scheme does not contemplate or require such periodical termination and reappointment. Only ex-servicemen are eligible to be selected under the Scheme and that too after undergoing regular selection process under the Scheme. They joined the Scheme being under the impression that they will be continued as long as the PIF Additional Scheme was continued. The artificial annual breaks and reappointments were introduced by the State agency entrusted with the operation of the Scheme. This Court has always frowned upon artificial breaks in service.” 8. In view of the above facts and considering this aspect of the matter that the petitioner has already applied for leave on 08.06.2016 contained in Annexure-3 and before issuing the impugned order, this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the respondent authorities. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 18.06.2016 is quashed and the matter is remitted back to the respondent no.4. He will take a fresh decision after providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 9. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the writ petition is disposed of. Petition disposed of.