JUDGMENT : P.D. AUDIKESAVALU, J.:— Heard Mr. S. Ravindran, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, Mr. Vignesh, Learned Counsel appearing for the Second Respondent and perused the materials placed on record, apart from the pleadings of the parties. 2. The Second Respondent invoking Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’ for short) had made a claim for Rs. 6,13,600/- as due towards increase in salary, arrears of bonus and leave salary from October 2006 to August 2010 from the Petitioner, who resisted it on the ground that the Second Respondent was not a ‘workman’ as per the definition in Section 2(s) of the Act and that the claim made did not arise out of any pre-existing right under any settlement, award or statutory provision. The First Respondent by order dated 18.01.2018 in C.P. No. 201 of 2011 held that the Second Respondent was a ‘workman’ and determined the amount payable to him by the Petitioner was Rs. 3,55,200/-, which is assailed by the Petitioner in this Writ Petition. 3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner focused his submissions on the perversity in the impugned order passed by the First Respondent in holding that the Second Respondent was a ‘workman’ for the purpose of the Act. 3,55,200/-, which is assailed by the Petitioner in this Writ Petition. 3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner focused his submissions on the perversity in the impugned order passed by the First Respondent in holding that the Second Respondent was a ‘workman’ for the purpose of the Act. It has been highlighted that the Petitioner had raised the contention before the First Respondent that the Second Respondent was recruited as Personnel Officer by the Petitioner on 29.11.1996 and in course of time, he had been promoted and posted as Manager (Personnel and HRD) and was performing managerial functions, and that the following documents were marked to substantiate the same:— Exhibit Remarks M1 Leter of duties and responsibilities prescribed to the 2nd respondent M2 Joint Managing Director's letter to ESI Corporation nominating the 2nd respondent as one of the authorized signatories of teh management M3 Authorization to represent the management given to 2nd respondent in respect of dipute raised by P. Thangaraj before Labour Officer, Coimbatore M4 Letter of adjournment filed by the 2nd respondent in the above case M5 Authorization to represent the management given to 2nd respondent in respect of petition filed by Assistant Inspector of Labour, Coimbatore in Minimum Wages case number 115 of 2007 M6 Authorization to represent the management given to 2nd respondent in respect of petition filed by Assistant Inspector of Labour, Coimbatore in Minimum Wages case number 137 of 2007 M7 The 2nd respondent's letter to Assistant Insp[ect of Labour, Coimbatore regarding interpretation of Section 3 of the Payment of Wages Act and issue relating to “Pay Master” M8 Written statement signed by 2nd respondent in Minimum Wages case number 113 of 2007 before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Coimbatore M9 Form - 10 under EPF Scheme in respect of resigned employees signed by 2nd respondent M10 Form - 5 under ESI Act signed by 2nd respondent in respect of payment of contribution for the period 01.10.2007 to 31.03.2008 M11 Resignation letter of R. Sathish Kumar accepted by 2nd respondent and recommending settlement of his dues along with gratuity settlement authorized by 2nd respondent M12 Resignation letter of Chitira Devi accepted by 2nd respondent adn recommending settlement of her dues along with gratuity settlement authorized by 2nd respondent M13 series Pay Roll for the month of May 2007 with the authorized signature of 2nd respondent on behalf of petitioner M14 The 2nd respondent's letter to High Range Security Services regarding revision of service charges with effect from 21.09.02006 M15 Nomination form of M. Palanisamy certified by the 2nd Respondent in terms of Payment of Gratuity Rules M16 Order placed by 2nd respondent for 36 set of uniforms with Lords Wear Private Limited, Nagpur M17 series Authorization given by petitioner to 2nd respondent under Section 36(2)(c) of the I.D. Act in respect of 10 non-employment cases before the Labour Officer, Coimbatore. In respect of non-employment of A. Krishnan, the 2nd respondent has signed the counter statement and subsequently signed a settlement with the saied workman. M18 series Email snapshot showing the 2nd respondent as Vice Chairman of National Institute of Personnel Management, Coimbatore Chapter. M19 series Lawyer notice by the 2nd respondent admitting his managerial position and seeking reconnection cell phone. M20 series Reply by the petitioner mentioning about the cell phone connection, News Paper Allowance and Repair and other allowance to the car owned by the 2nd respondent. M22 series Allowance for books and periodicals paid to the 2nd respondent by the Petitioner. M23 series Petrol and car maintenance allowance paid by the Petitioner to the 2nd respondent. 4. It is further pointed out that during cross-examination, the following admissions had also been made the Second Respondent in the proceedings before the First Respondent:— (i) He was qualified with 9 diploma certificates in personnel management. (ii) He was a law graduate. (iii) Personnel department was under his control. (iv) Exhibit M2 was authorization letter given to him in respect of ESI Corporation. (v) Exhibit M3 was authorization to act on behalf of management before the Labour Officer in respect of industrial dispute raised by workman Thangavel. (vi) Exhibit M4 is the adjournment letter signed by him in the above case. (vii) Exhibit M5 and M6 are letters of authorization given to him in respect of Minimum Wages case nos. 115 of 23007 and 132 of 2007. (viii) Exhibit M7 is the declaration given by the management appointing him as pay master in terms of the Payment of Wages Act. (ix) Exhibit M8 is the written statement signed by him in Minimum Wages case no. 113 of 2007. (x) PF return signed by him as authorized officer is Exhibit M9. (xi) ESI return signed by him as authorized officer is Exhibit M10. (xii) He would sign ESI contribution return, EPF contribution return, Labour Welfare Fund payment, Payment of Gratuity and Bonus after verifying the note prepared by Assistant working under him. Only after his signature the accounts department would settle the payment. He would sign the said settlement documents. (xiii) Exhibit M11 is the resignation and settlement of accounts of employee Sathish Kumar. (xiv) Exhibit M12 is the resignation and settlement of accounts of employee Chithra Devi. Only after his signature the accounts department would settle the payment. He would sign the said settlement documents. (xiii) Exhibit M11 is the resignation and settlement of accounts of employee Sathish Kumar. (xiv) Exhibit M12 is the resignation and settlement of accounts of employee Chithra Devi. (xv) He has been declared as a Pay Master in terms of the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act. (xvi) He would attest his signature as a Manager, whenever salary deduction is made in the salary of workmen. (xvii) Exhibit M13 series is salary slip of 4 workmen signed by him as manager. (xviii) Exhibit M14 is his letter to High Range Security Services. (xix) Exhibit M15 is Gratuity settlement form of M. Palanisamy duly signed by him. (xx) Exhibit M16 is his letter to Lords Wear Private Limited, Nagpur for supply of uniforms. (xxi) Exhibit M17 is the authorization letter given to him in respect of industrial dispute raised by workmen. (xxii) During the period 2010 - 2012, he was Vice Chairman of National Institute of Personnel Management, Coimbatore Chapter. (xxiii) Two employees were working under him. As a Manager he has granted leave to them. (xxiv) He has initiated disciplinary action against workman. (xxv) He has represented the management before quasi-judicial authorities. 5. It has been brought to notice that the binding decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in S.K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Company Limited [ (1994) 3 SCC 510 ] had been cited by the Petitioner in support of the rule to be applied in determining whether an employee is a ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Act, and the relevant passage reads as follows:— “9. …. it appears to us that whether or not an employee is a workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be determined with reference to his principal nature of duties and functions. Such question is required to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case and materials on record and it is not possible to lay down any straitjacket formula which can decide the dispute as to the real nature of duties and functions being performed by an employee in all cases. Such question is required to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case and materials on record and it is not possible to lay down any straitjacket formula which can decide the dispute as to the real nature of duties and functions being performed by an employee in all cases. When an employee is employed to do the types of work enumerated in the definition of workman under Section 2(s), there is hardly any difficulty in treating him as a workman under the appropriate classification but in the complexity of industrial or commercial organisations quite a large number of employees are often required to do more than one kind of work. In such cases, it becomes necessary to determine under which classification the employee will fall for the purpose of deciding whether he comes within the definition of workman or goes out of it. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd. v. Burmah Shell Management Staff Assn. [ (1970) 3 SCC 378 ]. In All India Reserve Bank Employees' Assn. v. Reserve Bank of India ( AIR 1966 SC 305 ) it has been held by this Court that the word ‘supervise’ and its derivatives are not words of precise import and must often be construed in the light of context, for unless controlled, they cover an easily simple oversight and direction as manual work coupled with the power of inspection and superintendence of the manual work of others. It has been rightly contended by both the learned counsel that the designation of an employee is not of much importance and what is important is the nature of duties being performed by the employee. The determinative factor is the main duties of the employee concerned and not some works incidentally done. In other words, what is, in substance, the work which employee does or what in substance he is employed to do. Viewed from this angle, if the employee is mainly doing supervisory work but incidentally or for a fraction of time also does some manual or clerical work, the employee should be held to be doing supervisory works. In other words, what is, in substance, the work which employee does or what in substance he is employed to do. Viewed from this angle, if the employee is mainly doing supervisory work but incidentally or for a fraction of time also does some manual or clerical work, the employee should be held to be doing supervisory works. Conversely, if the main work is of manual, clerical or of technical nature, the mere fact that some supervisory or other work is also done by the employee incidentally or only a small fraction of working time is devoted to some supervisory works, the employee will come within the purview of ‘workman’ as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.” 6. The First Respondent in the impugned order has dealt with the aforesaid contentions of the Petitioner on this aspect of the matter as follows:— “17. Regarding the contention of the respondent that the petitioner is not a workman it is seen from the evidence of W.W1 that he has admitted his status as Manager, Personnel and H.R.D. throughout and discharging duties of administrative and supervisor in nature. 18. No doubt exhibits M1, M3 to M18 indicate the desigations, authority given to him, power to sign the remarks nature of duties and functions discharged and performed by him. It is also to be seen from Ex.W3 letter of the petitioner dated 05.02.2010 that his nature of duties was that of a clerk. In the reply dated 22.11.2020 under Ex.M20 the respondent had not denied the nature of duties of the petitioner. Further it is seen from the above document of the management that they had signed in the status of Authorized Signatory. However, from the above documents and from the decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner it is quite clear that the petitioner did not have the power of appointment of labour, has not power to sanction leave or to recommend promotion or increment or to take any disciplinary action against any workman. Hence it is contended that the petitioner is a workman u/s 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent in this aspect does not merit consideration.” 7. Hence it is contended that the petitioner is a workman u/s 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent in this aspect does not merit consideration.” 7. In the aforesaid decision relied before the First Respondent, it has been laid down that in examining whether a person is a ‘workman’ for the purpose of the Act, the Labour Court must ascertain what is the principal nature work done performed by the employee concerned. However, the First Respondent in the impugned order had arrived at the conclusion that the Second Respondent was a ‘workman’ because he had carried out some clerical work as claimed in Ex. W-3 and did not have the power to appoint labour, sanction leave, recommend promotion or increment or take disciplinary action against any workmen, without even referring, much less considering the acceptability or otherwise of the evidence available on record relied by the Petitioner on the crucial question if it amounted to the main work that had been performed by the Second Respondent. There is also no discussion from the evidence in oral examination of the Second Respondent as to whether the main work that he carried out by him related to that of a ‘workman’ in terms of the definition in Section 2(s) of the Act. The First Respondent has rather adopted a strange method of reasoning that in the absence of evidence to show that the Second Respondent had not performed certain specific functions, which according to it are managerial in nature, he has to be treated as a ‘workman’, and that cannot be countenanced. 8. The question next falls for consideration as to whether such finding of the First Respondent could be legally sustained in the exercise of powers of judicial review by this Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa v. Giridhari Sahu [ (2019) 10 SCC 695 ], after referring to earlier decisions, has succinctly explained the scope of the certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court as follows:— “29. ….An error of law which becomes vulnerable to judicial scrutiny by way of Certiorari must also one which is apparent on the face of the record. ….An error of law which becomes vulnerable to judicial scrutiny by way of Certiorari must also one which is apparent on the face of the record. As held by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque [ AIR 1955 SC 233 ], as to what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, is a matter to be decided by the court on the facts of each case. A finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence would be perverse and in fact would constitute an error of law enabling the writ court to interfere. It is also to be noticed that if the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not support the finding, it would render the decision amenable to certiorari jurisdiction. This would be the same as a finding which is wholly unwarranted by the evidence which is what this Court has laid down in Perry and Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal, Judge of the Second Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta ( AIR 1970 SC 1334 ).” 9. Further the working test for perversity laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] reads as follows:— “7. ….It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.” 10. Tested with reference to the aforesaid parameters set out, it has to be held that the finding of fact arrived by the First Respondent that the Second Respondent was a ‘workman’ for the purpose of the Act, is founded upon irrelevant considerations and brushing aside germane evidence, which defies logic, amounting to a jurisdictional error of law apparent on the face of the record and has to be necessarily interfered as perverse by this Court. 11. 11. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned order dated 18.01.2018 in C.P. No. 201 of 2011 passed by the Labour Court, Coimbatore, is set aside and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration from the stage of arguments and shall be taken up for hearing on 02.09.2020 before the Labour Court and the parties through their Counsel shall appear on that date and the subsequent dates of hearings to which it may be adjourned. It is incumbent upon the Labour Court to deal with each aspect of the matter raised by both of the contesting parties by considering the evidence adduced by them in that regard in its entirety and pass reasoned order on merits in accordance with law following the prescribed procedure, uninfluenced and uninhibited by the conclusions arrived in the impugned order, which stands set aside. An endeavour shall be to expeditiously dispose the case and file report of compliance in that regard before the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court preferably by 31.10.2020. 12. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is ordered on the aforesaid terms. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs.