ORDER : Heard Mr. Samavesh Bhanj Deo, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Shadab Bin Haque, the learned counsel for the respondent State. 2. This writ petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard. 3. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for quashing the order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the appellate authority. The further prayer is made for quashing the punishment order dated 05.11.2015 contained in Annexure-5. 4. The petitioner was appointed in Grade IV cadre by the Civil Surgeon, Hazaribagh vide letter dated 30.12.1982. The petitioner was promoted to the post of Clerk and subsequently he was transferred to the Primary Health Centre, Simariya. Later on, the service of the petitioner has been confirmed. The petitioner was working with all satisfaction. Pursuant to one complaint, filed in the year 2014 with regard to illegal appointment and promotion of the petitioner and the departmental enquiry was instituted against the petitioner. The petitioner was directed to appear in the departmental proceeding. The petitioner appeared and filed the show cause and the enquiry report was submitted. Out of 7 charges, the enquiry officer came to the conclusion that 5 charges have been proved and in 2 charges the petitioner has been exonerated. 5. Mr. Samavesh Bhanj Deo, the learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the impugned order on the ground that without supplying the second show cause and enquiry report the punishment order has been passed. He submits that in view of the well settled provision of law in view of “ECIL v. B. Karunakar” reported in (1993) 4 SCC 754 the impugned order cannot sustain in the eye of law. He relied in paragraph nos.25, 26 and 28 of which said judgment which are quoted hereinbelow: “25. He submits that in view of the well settled provision of law in view of “ECIL v. B. Karunakar” reported in (1993) 4 SCC 754 the impugned order cannot sustain in the eye of law. He relied in paragraph nos.25, 26 and 28 of which said judgment which are quoted hereinbelow: “25. While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the Forty-second Amendment. 26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer’s findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it. 28. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a “reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him”. The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that “where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed”, it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee’s reply to the enquiry officer’s report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer’s report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges.” 6. He further submits that the punishment are disproportionate to the charges. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges.” 6. He further submits that the punishment are disproportionate to the charges. He submits that the appellate authority has passed the impugned order without applying the mind. He further submits that in one line, the appeal has been dismissed. 7. On perusal of the appeal, the Court also finds that in one line, the appeal has been dismissed. A reference in this regard may be made in “Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney” reported in (2009) 4 SCC 240 . Paragraph no. 8 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “8. The purpose of disclosure of reasons, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, is that people must have confidence in the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. Unless reasons are disclosed, how can a person know whether the authority has applied its mind or not? Also, giving of reasons minimises the chances of arbitrariness. Hence, it is an essential requirement of the rule of law that some reasons, at least in brief, must be disclosed in a judicial or quasi-judicial order, even if it is an order of affirmation.” 8. Mr. Haque, the learned counsel for the respondent State submits that there is no illegality in the impugned order and after providing every opportunity to the petitioner, the impugned order has been passed. He further submits that a lenient view has been taken in view of the fact that the petitioner is going to retire within a year. 9. In view of the above facts, and considering the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “ECIL v. B. Karunakar” (supra) and in view of the fact that the second show cause and enquiry report has not been supplied to the petitioner, the punishment order cannot sustain in the eye of law. No reason has been assigned in disposing the appeal and in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney” (supra), the appellate order will also not sustain in the eye of law. Accordingly, the impugned orders dated 18.01.2017 and dated 05.11.2015 are quashed. 10. No reason has been assigned in disposing the appeal and in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney” (supra), the appellate order will also not sustain in the eye of law. Accordingly, the impugned orders dated 18.01.2017 and dated 05.11.2015 are quashed. 10. The matter is remitted back to the authority concerned who will take a fresh decision in the light of the observation made hereinabove and will pass appropriate reasoned order in accordance with law. 11. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed and disposed of. Petition allowed.