JUDGMENT : 1. The matter has been heard through video conferencing with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. They have raised no complaint regarding audio and visual quality. 2. The writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whereby and whereunder order dated 12.04.2013 passed in Certificate Case No. 01/2003-2004 by the Certificate Officer directing the petitioner to deposit Rs.6,65,872/-, is under challenge. 3. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleadings made in the writ petition reads hereunder as: The petitioner's firm, namely, Gahlot & Chaudhary Steel Private Limited, entered into an agreement with the respondents-Jharkhand State Electricity Board (J.S.E.B), now Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigal Limited, in short 'JUVNL', for supply ofHigh Tension electricity connection. It is the case of the petitioner that since Unit of the petitioner was not functioning properly, as such due communication was made on 12.10.1998 to the Electrical Superintendent Engineer, Jamshedpur to disconnect the supply of electricity, which was received on 13.10.1998. The respondents-authority in pursuance to his request disconnected the power supply, but, according to the petitioner the copy of the bill was never supplied to him rather a certificate case was instituted against the petitioner in Form-I and certificate was signed on 28.05.2003. After signing of the certificate, the Certificate Officer had issued a notice under Section 7 of the Bihar and Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914 (herein after referred to as the ‘Act, 1914’) on 28.05.2003. Pursuant to the notice, the writ petitioner appeared before the Certificate Officer and filed objectionby taking recourse of Section 9 of the Act, 1914 stating, inter alia, that the entire proceeding is hopelessly barred by limitation under Article 14/137 of the Limitation Act as the proceeding has been initiated after more than three years. According to the writ petitioner, the power supply was disconnected on 10.12.1999 but the proceeding was instituted on 28.05.2003. It is further case of the writ petitioner that the certificate holder has charged fuel surcharge on unconsumed units and further, the tariff does not provide charge of fuel surcharge on unconsumed units. According to the writ petitioner, the power supply was disconnected on 10.12.1999 but the proceeding was instituted on 28.05.2003. It is further case of the writ petitioner that the certificate holder has charged fuel surcharge on unconsumed units and further, the tariff does not provide charge of fuel surcharge on unconsumed units. It is further the case of the writ petitioner that the matter was heard on merit on 28.05.2004 and office was directed to put up the file for passing appropriate order but no order was passed on 28.05.2004 and as such, the order dated 28.05.2004 is ante-dated since such order was never communicated to the petitioner. The petitioner had challenged the said order before this Court by invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 4021 of 2004 and while the aforesaid case was pending, the matter was considered by the respondents-authority and vide letter no. 207 dated 12.03.2007, the Chief Engineer (C & R) directed the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer that the matter of withdrawal of Certificate Case against the consumer (petitioner) was under consideration and as such it was decided that prior to withdrawal of Certificate Case an undertaking must be obtained from the consumer for payment of the amount save and except the amount pertaining to fuel surcharge amounting to Rs. 10,98,581/-as the matter was pending before the Hon’ble Apex Court and further the consumer must give undertaking for withdrawal of the writ petition pending before the Hon’bleHigh Court. The writ petitioner, pursuance to the undertaking furnished by him, has withdrawn the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 4021 of 2004, which was dismissed as not pressed. The writ petitioner paid the amount to the tune of Rs. 5,04,543/-. According to the writ petitioner, the Certificate Officer proceeded in the matter and instead of withdrawing the certificate case by order dated 12.04.2013 which was received by the petitioner on 22.04.2013, directed the petitioner to pay Rs. 6,65,872/-within 30 days, keeping Rs. 10,98,581/-in abeyance till final decision by Hon’ble Apex Court regarding fuel surcharge. In these backdrops, the instant writ petition has been filed by the writ petitioner questioning the decision of the Certificate Officer, by which, petitioner was directed to pay Rs.6,65,872/-. 4. Mr. Shankar Lal Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two fold arguments. 10,98,581/-in abeyance till final decision by Hon’ble Apex Court regarding fuel surcharge. In these backdrops, the instant writ petition has been filed by the writ petitioner questioning the decision of the Certificate Officer, by which, petitioner was directed to pay Rs.6,65,872/-. 4. Mr. Shankar Lal Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two fold arguments. Firstly, he has submitted that the proceeding is barred by limitation since in terms of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act, 1914, it has been stipulated that the certificate proceeding will only be allowed to be proceeded, if recovery by suit is not barred by law, but herein since the requisition for recovery of an amount falls due on 10.12.1999, the date of disconnection of the power supply,but the proceeding was instituted on 28.05.2003 and as such the same is barred under Article14 of the Limitation Act. His second limb of argument is that the writ petitioner has complied with the part of the terms of the agreement, as has been agreed by him vide agreement dated 31.12.2005 and hence, the impugned order cannot be said to be justified for the reason that the amount of Rs. 5,04,543/-has already been paid. So far as rest of the amount is concerned, as has been directed by the order of the Certificate Officer, cannot be said to be the liability of the writ petition in the terms of the aforesaid agreement. 5. Mr. MrinalKanti Roy, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-JSEB (now JUVNL), has vehemently opposed the submission and grounds agitated by learned counsel for the writ petitioner in assailing the impugned order dated 12.04.2013. He has submitted that so far as point of limitation is concerned, the same has been agitated in order to assail the impugned order, ought not to have been allowed to be agitated by the writ petitioner since the writ petitioner has already entered into an agreement on 31.12.2005 by accepting the liability, except the liability pertaining to fuel surcharge on account of pendency of case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Further the contention pertaining to casting of liability upon the writ petitioner amounting to Rs. Further the contention pertaining to casting of liability upon the writ petitioner amounting to Rs. 6,65,872/-is concerned, the same cannot be allowed to be agitated at this stage since whatever direction has been passed by the Certificate Officer that has been passed in the backdrop of signing of agreement between the parties and pendency of case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court pertaining to fuel surcharge and once the entire liability, except the liability pertaining to fuel surcharge which will depend upon the outcome of the decision of the case pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has been accepted, the writ petitioner cannot be allowed to seek waiver of the remaining amount of Rs.6,65,872/-and hence the impugned order cannot be said to be unjustified. 6. In reply to the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that he is required to go through the terms of the agreement but since agreement is not on record, therefore, he has sought for adjournment of the matter. 7. Mr. Roy, learned counsel for the respondents-JUVNL in response to such submission has submitted that since the writ petitioner is before the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as such he cannot be allowed to agitate the issue of fact rather if he has got any doubt with respect to terms and conditions of the agreement, he is at liberty to raise the issue before the appellate forum since statute provides alternative remedy of appeal. 8. This Court, having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and on going through the relevant documents available on record, deem it fit and proper to go through the undisputed facts of this case. Admittedly, herein the writ petitioner entered into an agreement for supply of High Tension power supply with the respondents-JSEB (now JUVNL). But for one reason or the other, the writ petitioner since was not in a position to run the unit, request was made for disconnection of power supply, which was accepted and the power supply of the petitioner’s unit was disconnected on 10.12.1999. Pursuant to disconnection of the electricity, requisition for issue of notice under Section 7 of the Act, 1914 was issued on 28.05.2003 casting liability upon the writ petitioner to the tune of Rs. 23,05,076/- (Rs. 22,69,196/- on account of energy dues and Rs. Pursuant to disconnection of the electricity, requisition for issue of notice under Section 7 of the Act, 1914 was issued on 28.05.2003 casting liability upon the writ petitioner to the tune of Rs. 23,05,076/- (Rs. 22,69,196/- on account of energy dues and Rs. 35,880/- for Court fee under Section 5(2) of the Act). The petitioner filed objection by taking recourse of Section 9 of the Act, 1914 denying the liability but the aforesaid objection of the writ petitioner was not accepted and order was passed on 28.05.2004 casting liability upon the writ petitioner to the tune of Rs. 23,05,076/-. But according to writ petitioner the said order was ante-dated as it was never communicated to the writ petitioner. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 4021 of 2004 but it was dismissed as not pressed vide order dated 27.05.2009 holding it to be infructuous. The content of the order dated 27.05.2009 is required to be referred, which reads hereunder as: “The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Matiuddin Khan submits that the writ petition has become infructuous and the same is accordingly dismissed as not pressed.” 9. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that during pendency of the writ petition, W.P.(C) No. 4021 of 2004, an agreement was entered in between the petitioner and authorities of the respondents-JUVNL on 31.12.2005. This fact has not been disputed by the parties since the same has found mention in the impugned order dated 12.04.2013. The copy of agreement dated 31.12.2005 is not the part of the record since the same has not been brought on record either by the writ petitioner or by the respondents but the reference has been made in impugned order and from its perusal it is evident that out of total amount of Rs. 23,05,076/-, a sum of Rs. 10,98,581/-has been kept in abeyance till final decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court regarding fuel surcharge but rest of the amount has been agreed to be paid by the petitioner, out of which sum of Rs. 5,04,543/-has been agreed to be paid by the writ petitioner in five instalments, which according to the writ petitioner has been paid but rest amount Rs. 5,04,543/-has been agreed to be paid by the writ petitioner in five instalments, which according to the writ petitioner has been paid but rest amount Rs. 6,65,872/- has not been paid, therefore, the Certificate Officer has again proceeded and passed order on 12.04.2013 directing the petitioner to make payment of rest of the amount to the tune of Rs. 6,65,872/-within 30 days while the amount of Rs. 10,98,581/-has been kept in abeyance till final decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. This Court, after going through the impugned order and on appreciation of rival submissions made on behalf of parties is of the view that once an agreement has been entered in between the parties, the terms and conditions of the agreement binds the parties. It further requires to refer herein that the writ petitioner has time and again put emphasis upon withdrawal of the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 4021 of 2004 but as would appear from Annexure 1 to the writ petition that the same has been held to be infructuous and in that view of the matter since has not been pressed, hence the same was dismissed. 11. As per the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, the said writ petition was not pressed on account of the fact that during pendency of the writ petition, an agreement dated 31.12.2005 was entered in between the writ petitioner and the respondents, but the fact remains that in pursuance to agreement dated 31.12.2005 the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 4021 of 2004 was held to be infructuous and the writ petition since has not been pressed accordingly the same was dismissed. 12. So far as the grievance of the writ petitioner about direction to pay Rs. 6,65,872/-is concerned, the same has been denied to be the liability of the writ petitioner, but as would appear from the impugned order that the writ petitioner was directed to pay the said amount in order to comply with the agreement/settlement arrived at in between the parties by virtue of agreement dated 31.12.2005. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he is not having the copy of agreement dated 31.12.2005 and as such he is not in a position to make any comment as to whether the said agreement says any provision about making payment of Rs. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he is not having the copy of agreement dated 31.12.2005 and as such he is not in a position to make any comment as to whether the said agreement says any provision about making payment of Rs. 6,65,872/-and on that pretext he has sought for adjournment, but this Court is of the view that since the case is of the year 2013 and now the writ petitioner is questioning the terms and conditions of the agreement, which according to considered view of this Court that once the writ petitioner entered into agreement accepting its liability it was incumbent upon the writ petitioner to come out with the agreement dated 31.12.2005 by bringing it on record to demonstrate the aforesaid issue but for the reasons best known to the petitioner the said agreement has not been brought on record. 14. Hence, only for the purpose of bringing the agreement dated 31.12.2005 on record, this Court does not find it a ground for adjournment of the matter, keeping the fact in consideration that the writ petition is pending since the year 2013 now we are in the end of year 2020. Further, the aforesaid agreement is not in dispute rather it is all along case of the writ petitioner that a settlement has been arrived at and in that view of the matter the writ petitioner cannot be allowed to question the agreement. It requires to refer herein that the writ petitioner has not pressed the earlier writ petition which also clarify about acceptance of agreement. Further, in the entire pleading of the writ petitioner it has nowhere been stated that there is deviation from the terms of the agreement 15. This Court, taking the facts in entirety as indicated herein above, is of the view that no positive direction can be issued by making intervention in the impugned order dated 12.04.2013. 16. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and dismissed. 17. In view of the disposal of the writ petition, I.A. No. 537 of 2014 also stands disposed of.