ORDER : The cases are taken up through video conferencing. 2. The present batch of writ petitions have been preferred for quashing the letter no.1010 dated 28.06.2019 followed by consequential letter no. 1020 dated 28.06.2019 [in W.P.(C) No. 3737 of 2019), letter no.1011 dated 28.06.2019 followed by consequential letter no. 1015 dated 28.06.2019 [in W.P.(C) No. 3485 of 2019], letter No. 1012 dated 28.06.2019 followed by consequential letter no.1017 dated 28.06.2019 [in W.P.(C) No. 3646 of 2019], letter No.1013 dated 28.06.2019 followed by consequential letter no.1016 dated 28.06.2019 [in W.P.(C) No. 3649 of 2019) and letter No. 1014 dated 28.06.2019 followed by consequential letter no. 1018 dated 28.06.2019 [in W.P.(C) No. 3677 of 2019] whereby the respondent no. 6-the District Mining Officer, Chatra has communicated the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Chatra (the respondent no. 5) regarding premature termination of stone mining leases granted to the petitioners. Further prayer has been made for issuance of direction upon the respondent no. 1 to constitute Standing Site Inspection Committee to determine the nature of the land situated at village Karmali, Khata No. 01, Plot No. 02 (Part), District – Chatra, Jharkhand (hereinafter referred as the said land). 3. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petitions is that the mining leases were granted to the petitioners for a period of 10 years and they were doing the mining activities after getting requisite permissions from the competent authority as also by paying the royalty to the State Government. During the period of subsistence of the lease, some complaints were received from certain NGOs against the mining activities being done by the petitioners over the said land claiming that the said activities would cause the environmental degradation and also give rise to land dispute etc. Thereafter, a three-member committee was constituted by the respondent no.5 to verify the allegations made by the NGOs. The committee submitted its report on 11.07.2018 stating the nature of the said land as “Gair Majarua Khas Jungle” which was purportedly concealed by the then Circle Officer, Huntergunj in the earlier report. It was further reported that the mining area was within 500 meters of the human habitat. The committee submitted its report on 11.07.2018 stating the nature of the said land as “Gair Majarua Khas Jungle” which was purportedly concealed by the then Circle Officer, Huntergunj in the earlier report. It was further reported that the mining area was within 500 meters of the human habitat. Thereafter, respective show cause notices were issued to the petitioners alleging that the nature of the said land was “Jungle Jhari” and in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad Vs. Union of India reported in (2011) 7 SCC 338 , no mining operation was permissible in the said area. It was further alleged that the mining area was within 500 meters of human habitat. The petitioners replied the respective show causes notices and claimed that the nature of the said land was changed from “Jungle Jhari” to “Tand” which would be evident from the different government records like Register-II, sale deeds and revenue receipts existing much prior to the commencement of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (in short “the Act, 1980”) and as such the said land would not be treated as “Jungle Jhari” within the meaning of ‘forest’ under the provisions of the Act, 1980. It was further replied that the land of the petitioners were not identified as forest land by the Committee constituted vide Notification No.2520 dated 26.07.2001 issued by the Department of Forest and Environment, Government of Jharkhand in compliance of order dated 12.12.1996 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in W.P.(C) No.202 of 1995. It was also replied that issuance of 30 days’ notice by the respondent no. 6 for premature termination of stone mining lease on the ground of the said land allegedly having been recorded as “Jungle Jhari” land in revenue records did not violate the terms and conditions of mining lease. So far the allegation of suppression of fact regarding existence of human habitat within 500 meters area is concerned, it was replied that the said issue was curable in nature and the petitioners might be directed to take steps for shifting the houses after paying appropriate compensation for damages to the third parties in terms with rule 69 of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 (in short “the Rules, 2004) read with lease deed Part VII Clause 4. Subsequent to filing of respective replies by the petitioners, the respondent no. 5, vide letter no. 1261 dated 11.08.2018 sought legal opinion from the learned Advocate General, Jharkhand on certain points, who vide letter dated 16.09.2018 opined that not only the ‘Khatiyan’ can be said to be the government record in ordinary sense but the other records as such Register-II, Jamabandi records or other documents which are maintained by the Government under any law or statutory rules, are also said to be the government records. It was further opined that if as per the government records, the nature of user of a land has changed or has undergone any change from “jungle” to “Parti” or “Tand” prior to 25.10.1980, then as on the date of enactment of the Act, 1980 or thereafter, the nature of the land in question shall be treated as what has been recorded in those government records irrespective of nature of land shown in the previous/anterior records. After receipt of the legal opinion from the learned Advocate General, the respondent no.5 passed the order of resumption of the mining leases of the petitioners stating that it prima facie appeared from the records submitted by the petitioners that the nature of land had been changed prior to 25.10.1980 from “Jungle Jhari” to “Tand”. It was further stated in the said order that the question of mining lease area being within 500 meters from the human habitat is a curable irregularity and as such the lessees would take written permission from the affected persons before resuming mining operation as well as they will also follow the guidelines of environmental law. The NGOs however again started protesting the mining operation resulting in issuance of direction by the respondent no.5 to stop the mining activities, however in pursuance of the direction of this Court contained in order dated 05.11.2018 passed in the writ petitions i.e. W.P.(C) No. 5527 of 2018 along with four other connected cases filed by the petitioners, the mining activities of the petitioners were again resumed. In the meantime, the respondent no. 5, vide letter no. 1722 dated 05.12.2018 sought direction from the respondent no. 2- the Secretary, Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand, regarding current status of the land in question which was replied by the Joint Secretary, Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand vide memo no. In the meantime, the respondent no. 5, vide letter no. 1722 dated 05.12.2018 sought direction from the respondent no. 2- the Secretary, Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand, regarding current status of the land in question which was replied by the Joint Secretary, Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand vide memo no. 2281 dated 24.06.2019 attaching note-sheet of the opinion given by the Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand according to which those land which are recorded as Gair Majarua and its nature is “Jungle Jhari” as per the survey made prior to 25.10.1980, are treated as forest land for the purpose of Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and mining activity upon such land is not permissible. Thereafter, the respondent no.6 on the direction of the respondent no.5, issued the impugned letters dated 28.06.2019 cancelling the stone mining leases granted to the petitioners directing them to remove their equipments from their respective leased area. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondent no.5 merely accepted the views of Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand received through the Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand and without applying his independent mind as well as without providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, directed the respondent no. 6 to issue the impugned letters which is against the principles of natural justice. It is further submitted that the impugned letters are contrary to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (supra.) as the test for determination of forest land is based upon government records as on 25.10.1980 and not only on ‘Khatiyan’. If other government records prepared prior to the date of coming into force of the Act, 1980, prove that the status of land has changed from ‘Jungle Jhari’ to ‘Tand’ then that piece of land is a non-forest land. If other government records prepared prior to the date of coming into force of the Act, 1980, prove that the status of land has changed from ‘Jungle Jhari’ to ‘Tand’ then that piece of land is a non-forest land. In the present case, the government records like register-II, rent receipts and sale deed dated 14.04.1973 of adjoining land of the same plot sufficiently indicate that the nature of the said land has been changed from ‘Jungle Jhari’ to ‘Raiyati Tand’ even before coming into force of the Act, 1980 and as such in view of the judgment rendered in the case of T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (supra.), the respondents ought to have got the land verified by the Committee constituted vide notification no.2520 dated 26.07.2001 issued by the Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand. However till date, respondents have not identified the said land as forest land. The respondent no.5 also accepted the said fact while seeking opinion of the learned Advocate General, Jharkhand. It is also submitted that the Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand, neither commented nor contradicted the said fact in its opinion dated 21.05.2019. The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India in its Order F.No.17-43/2018-FC dated 05.03.2019 has mentioned that in case of doubt regarding the status of land, the same has to be verified by the Committee as suggested in mater of Lafarge Umiam Mining Private Limited- the applicant in the case of T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (supra). However, the Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand, did not comply the direction dated 05.03.2019 though the status of the said land is not clear as would be evident from the conflicting reports of Additional Collector, Chatra, opinion of learned Advocate General, Jharkhand and the Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand. However, the Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand, did not comply the direction dated 05.03.2019 though the status of the said land is not clear as would be evident from the conflicting reports of Additional Collector, Chatra, opinion of learned Advocate General, Jharkhand and the Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand. It is further submitted that in view of the order dated 05.03.2019, the site inspection was required to be done by the Standing Site Inspection Committee comprising of the representatives of (i) State Forest Department (ii) Regional office of MoEF, Government of India (iii) one non-official member having expertise in forestry to ascertain the status of forest, based on which a certificate in this regard was required to be issued in accordance with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s order dated 06.07.2011 passed in the matter of Lafarge Umiam Mining Private Limited (supra). The Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand which is only a member of Standing Site Inspection Committee constituted in accordance with the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, should have advised to get the said land inspected and verified by the said Committee before arriving at such a decision, however it failed to discharge its statutory duty. The State Forest Department cannot impose its decision upon other members of the Committee by declaring it as forest land and thereby pre-empting the Committee to express its independent view after inspection and verification. The Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand despite being the owner and custodian of all Gair Majarua land in the State also did not apply its own mind and simply forwarded the note sheet of State Forest Department, Government of Jharkhand to the respondent no.5 and thus the Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand did not form its own opinion as to whether the said land is forest or non-forest in nature. The preparation of record of rights and conducting the survey and settlement process in the District of Chatra is governed by the provisions of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 which contemplate that a land which has been recorded as forest, can subsequently be changed to a non-forest “Korkar” land and therefore the recent entry in the revenue records which establishes that the land is not a forest/Jungle Jhari land, cannot be ignored, rather it has to be given effect to. The nature of any land is not permanent and with passage of time and change in usage by the raiyat/tenant, it may so happen that a forest/deemed forest land would stand degraded, denude or cleared. The petitioners have deposited security deposits for getting mining leases and as such by issuance of impugned letters, they have suffered irreparable loss and injury. The petitioners have made huge investment for establishing of crusher units and other machineries, moreover many persons have been engaged in the mining activities and as such the interest of the petitioners as well as their employees has been adversely affected by the impugned letters of cancellation of their mining leases. It is further submitted that once a particular mining lease is granted, it is the solemn duty of the State Government to ensure smooth and proper extraction of the minerals as specified in the lease agreement. The impugned letters are in complete abrogation of the right of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The moment, the mining leases were granted and necessary clearances were obtained, the right to mine on the piece of land as specified in the deed and other statutory clearances, squarely falls within the meaning of occupation, trade or business as enshrined under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The Divisional Forest Officer, Chatra had already issued no objection certificate regarding the said land treating these as non-forest land. Moreover, current status of the land was also examined and certified by the Additional Collector, Chatra along with Circle Officer, Huntergunj who verified the spot as well as revenue records and reported that the raiyati entry in Register-II has been continuing since 1962-63 and the current status of the land is “Tand”. Moreover, current status of the land was also examined and certified by the Additional Collector, Chatra along with Circle Officer, Huntergunj who verified the spot as well as revenue records and reported that the raiyati entry in Register-II has been continuing since 1962-63 and the current status of the land is “Tand”. Section 24-A of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (in short “the Act, 1957”) provides for the rights and liabilities of a holder of a mining lease as well as confers a statutory right to enter the land over which the mining lease has been granted. This statutory right of the license so provided by the Act, 1957 casts a liability upon the State to protect and uphold it as a natural corollary. 5. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondent-State, submits that the Joint Secretary, Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand while enclosing the note-sheet of the Forest, Environment and Climate Change, vide letter no.2281 dated 24.06.2019, has mentioned that as per the advice of the Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand, such plot having entry as “Jungle-Jhari” in the ‘khatiyan’ prepared in the last survey prior to 25.10.1980, would be treated as forest land. The Revenue Department advised the respondent no.5 to take suitable action as per Act/Rules/Guidelines in coordination with the Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand. Thereafter, the respondents took decision on the opinion of the Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change and cancelled the mining leases of the petitioners by the respective impugned letters. It is further submitted that the impugned letters of cancellation of mining leases are just, legal and proper as those were granted to the petitioners treating the said land as non-forest which eventually turned out as forest land and as such no notice was required to be issued to the petitioners for premature termination of the mining leases. The Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand has also advised that khatiyan will prevail over the other government records such as register-II and registered sale deeds. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioners herein are aggrieved by the decision of the respondent no. The Department of Forest, Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand has also advised that khatiyan will prevail over the other government records such as register-II and registered sale deeds. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioners herein are aggrieved by the decision of the respondent no. 5 whereby the respective stone mining leases of the petitioners have been prematurely cancelled alleging that the said mining activities were going on over the plots which are recorded in the record of rights as ‘Gairmajurwa Jungle Jhari’. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently submitted that before issuing the impugned letters, the petitioners were not afforded any opportunity of hearing by the respondent authorities and thus the impugned letters suffer from violation of the principles of natural justice. 8. To appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, I have perused the records of the cases. It would reveal from aforesaid facts that the petitioners were served individual show cause notices by the respondent no.6 for premature termination of their stone mining leases which were replied by them and thereafter respondent no. 5 sought legal opinion of the learned Advocate General and subsequently permitted them to resume their mining operations. However, the respondent no.5 after getting the opinion of the Revenue Department did not seek explanation from the petitioners and the impugned letters were issued by the respondent no.6. 9. In the case of Kesar Enterprises Ltd. Vs. State of U.P.& Others, reported in (2011) 13 SCC 733 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “26. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [ (1981) 1 SCC 664 ] R.S. Sarkaria, J., speaking for the majority in a three-Judge Bench, lucidly explained the meaning and scope of the concept of “natural justice”. Referring to a catena of decisions, His Lordship observed thus: (SCC p. 666) “Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. But there are two fundamental maxims of natural justice viz. (i) audi alteram partem, and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule has many facets, two of them being (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. But there are two fundamental maxims of natural justice viz. (i) audi alteram partem, and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule has many facets, two of them being (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity. The general principle—as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application—seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise.” (emphasis added) 27. In Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy [ (2005) 6 SCC 321 ] the concept, scope, history of development and significance of principles of natural justice have been discussed in extenso, with reference to earlier cases on the subject. Inter alia, observing that the principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights, the Court said: (SCC p. 331, para 14) “14. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held.” 29. A Bench of three Judges, speaking through one of us (D.K. Jain, J.), explaining the concept of “natural justice” and the principles governing its application, summed up the legal position as under: (Sahara India case [ (2008) 14 SCC 151 ], SCC p. 163, paras 19-20) “19. Thus, it is trite that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences for the party affected. The principle will hold good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial. 20. We may, however, hasten to add that no general rule of universal application can be laid down as to the applicability of the principle audi alteram partem, in addition to the language of the provision. Undoubtedly, there can be exceptions to the said doctrine. Therefore, we refrain from giving an exhaustive catalogue of the cases where the said principle should be applied. The question whether the principle has to be applied or not is to be considered bearing in mind the express language and the basic scheme of the provision conferring the power; the nature of the power conferred and the purpose for which the power is conferred and the final effect of the exercise of that power. It is only upon a consideration of all these matters that the question of application of the said principle can be properly determined.” 31. It is only upon a consideration of all these matters that the question of application of the said principle can be properly determined.” 31. Undoubtedly, action under the said Rule is a quasi-judicial function which involves due application of mind to the facts as well as to the requirements of law. Therefore, it is plain that before raising any demand and initiating any step to recover from the executant of the bond any amount by way of penalty, there has to be an adjudication as regards the breach of condition(s) of the bond or the failure to produce the discharge certificate within the time mentioned in the bond on the basis of the explanation as also the material which may be adduced by the person concerned denying the liability to pay such penalty. Moreover, the penalty amount has also to be quantified before proceedings for recovery of the amount so determined are taken. 10. In the case of Voltas Ltd. Vs. Tahsildar, Thane & Others reported in (2012) 13 SCC 165 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that no penal order can be passed without giving any notice and hearing to the affected person. 11. In the case of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. Vs. CCE reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “35. From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basic requirement in the court proceeding. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus, observed in A.K. Kraipak case [ (1969) 2 SCC 262 ] that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [ (1978) 1 SCC 248 ] also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corpn. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [ (1978) 1 SCC 248 ] also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corpn. v. Suvarna Board Mills [ (1994) 5 SCC 566 ], this aspect was explained in the following manner: (SCC p. 568, para 3) “3. It has been contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straitjacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law. All will depend on facts and circumstances of the case.” 12. It is well established that the principles of natural justice are quite flexible. These cannot be applied in any straitjacket formula. It all depends upon the kinds of function performed and the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. State authorities, while exercising the powers vested to them, are required to observe the principles of natural justice. It is incumbent upon the quasi-judicial authority to issue a notice to the persons concerned disclosing the circumstances under which proceedings are sought to be initiated against them, failing which the conclusion would be drawn that the principles of natural justice have been violated. This is imperative especially if the actions are going to have adverse civil consequences for the affected parties. An order passed by a State authority, particularly by reasons of which a citizen is to be visited with civil consequences, must meet the test of principles of natural justice. 13. This is imperative especially if the actions are going to have adverse civil consequences for the affected parties. An order passed by a State authority, particularly by reasons of which a citizen is to be visited with civil consequences, must meet the test of principles of natural justice. 13. In the present case, I find substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned letters suffer from the violation of principles of nature justice since after receiving the letter of the Revenue Department along with the opinion of the Forest Department, the respondent no. 5 did not issue any show cause notice to the petitioners. It is further evident from the letter issued by the Revenue Department to the respondent no.5 vide memo no. 2281 dated 24.06.2019 that the respondent no.5 was requested to co-ordinate with the Forest Department and after getting its suggestion, to take action as per the provisions of law. The respondent no. 5 was never asked to straightway issue the orders/letters of termination of the mining leases to the petitioners. The respondents have failed to show any reasoned order passed by the respondent no.5 applying his independent mind taking into consideration the relevant provisions to the effect of cancellation of the mining leases of the petitioners. The impugned letters issued by the respondent no.6 suggest that the same were issued on the basis of the orders dated 28.06.2019 passed by the respondent no.5. To verify the said fact, this Court vide order dated 05.10.2020 directed the respondents to file a supplementary counter affidavit bringing on record the order dated 28.06.2019 passed by the respondent no. 5 as has been referred by the respondent no. 6 in his letter nos. 1010-1014 dated 28.06.2019. Pursuant to the order of this Court, the respondent nos. 5 and 6 filed counter affidavit dated 22.10.2020 bringing on record a note-sheet prepared by the respondent no. 6 and placed before the respondent no. 5 which was subsequently approved by him by writing “As proposed” and putting his signature. Thus, I find substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that no order has been passed by the respondent no.5, rather the said respondent just approved the proposal of the respondent no. 6 placed by way of a note-sheet, which is in clear violation of rule 27(2) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004. Thus, I find substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that no order has been passed by the respondent no.5, rather the said respondent just approved the proposal of the respondent no. 6 placed by way of a note-sheet, which is in clear violation of rule 27(2) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004. I have perused the said provision which specifically provides that the Collector may terminate mining lease if the licensee has violated the terms and conditions of the lease deed. In the present case the respondent no.5 was exercising the power of the Collector and as such he was obliged to provide opportunity of hearing to the petitioners before issuance of the impugned letters terminating the respective mining leases of the petitioners. I am of the considered view that once the respondents allowed the petitioners to resume the mining operation, before taking any decision affecting the right of the petitioners; they were again required to serve show cause notices so as to enable them to sufficiently explain the allegations and thereafter the respondent no.5 was required to pass reasoned order in accordance with law after taking into consideration the relevant provisions as well as the factual materials laid before him. 14. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, the impugned letters issued by the respondent no.6 to the petitioners whereby the stone mining leases of the petitioners have been prematurely terminated, are quashed having been issued in violation of principles of natural justice and without entering into the merit of the case, the present batch of the writ petitions are disposed of with a direction to the respondent no.5 to issue fresh show cause notices to the petitioners specifically mentioning the allegations levelled against them and on receipt of their respective reply, to pass appropriate informed orders in accordance with law taking into consideration the available materials. The said exercise shall be completed by the respondent no. 5 within four months from the date of the present order. 15. The writ petitions are disposed of with the aforesaid observations and directions.