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2020 DIGILAW 115 (GAU)

State Of Mizoram v. Lalremsiama

2020-02-03

MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA, NELSON SAILO

body2020
JUDGMENT Michael Zothankhuma, J. - Heard Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor as well as Mr. Joseph L. Renthlei, learned Amicus Curiae. 2. The appeal has been filed by the State against the acquittal of the respondent in terms of the Judgment & Order dated 24.06.2016 passed by the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Aizawl in Session Case No. 54/2014 (Crl. Trial No. 878/2014), arising out of Ngopa P.S. Case No.08/2014 dated 11.05.2014 under section 302 IPC. 3. The prosecution case in brief is that an FIR was received by the Ngopa Police Station on 11.05.2014 at around 8:05 a.m stating that on the morning of 11.05.2014 at around 6:00 a.m., John Horo, the Caretaker of a Coffee garden located near village Hliappui was found with his throat sliced open, which was believed to be done by the accused Remsiama (respondent). John Horo thereafter succumbed to his injury on the way to PHC Kawlkulh. On the basis of the FIR filed, Ngopa P.S. Case No. 8/2014, under section 302 IPC, was registered and investigated into. 4. During the course of investigation, the alleged weapon (dao) which was allegedly used to slice the throat of the deceased John Horo was recovered on the basis of a disclosure statement made by the respondent. As the deceased, prior to his death, and while being taking to the PHC Kawlkulh in the car of PW No.7 had apparently pointed to the house of the respondent, when asked who had sliced his throat, the respondent was arrested as he was suspected to be the perpetrator of the crime. After examining 12 prosecution witnesses and having a post mortem examination done on the body of the deceased, charge sheet was filed against the respondent. Thereafter, charge was framed against the respondent under section 302 IPC on 19.09.2014, wherein the respondent claimed that he was not guilty and claimed trial. 5. After 12 prosecution witnesses were examined and the respondent was examined under section 313 Cr.P.C. on 03.03.2016, the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondent from the charge of section 302 IPC, vide the impugned Judgment & Order dated 24.06.2016, passed in Session Case No. 54/2014 (Crl. Trial No.878/2014). 6. Being aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondent, the State has filed the present appeal. 7. The learned Addl. Trial No.878/2014). 6. Being aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondent, the State has filed the present appeal. 7. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor submits that a perusal of the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses No. 7,8 & 9 clearly shows that the respondent had sliced the throat of the deceased with a dao, as the deceased had pointed to the house of the respondent when asked as to who had committed the said offence. The deceased had pointed to the house of the respondent at the time he was being taken to the Kawlkulh PHC, just prior to his death. Further the alleged weapon used in the crime was recovered from the house of the respondents elder brother, on the basis of the disclosure statement made by the respondent on 11.05.2014 itself. 8. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor also submits that the weapon (dao) had been borrowed by the respondent from PW-4, i,e., one Mr. F. Aitluanga, at around 11:00 P.M on 10.05.2014. The crime was committed at around 5:00 A.M on 11.05.2014 as per the sign language given by the deceased, wherein he showed 5 (five) fingers as the time when the offence took place, when he was found by PW-7, 8 & 9. The respondent was arrested on 11.05.2014 at around 2:20 P.M and it was on the basis of his Disclosure Statement made on 11.05.2014 that the weapon had been recovered from the house of the respondents elder brother. The Addl. Public Prosecutor accordingly submits that the recovery of the weapon on the basis of the information given by respondent was admissible as evidence and the respondent should have been convicted under Section 302 IPC. In this regard, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Raja Alias Rajinder vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2015) 11 SCC 43 . The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor thus prays that the impugned Judgment & Order dated 24.06.2016 passed by the Court of the Addl. Sessions Judge, Aizawl in Sessions Case No. 54/2014 (Criminal Trial No. 878/2014) should be set aside and the respondent should be convicted under Section 302 IPC. 9. Mr. Joseph L. Renthlei, learned Amicus Curiae submits that even if the dao was recovered from the house of the respondents elder brother, there is no evidence linking the dao to the crime. Sessions Judge, Aizawl in Sessions Case No. 54/2014 (Criminal Trial No. 878/2014) should be set aside and the respondent should be convicted under Section 302 IPC. 9. Mr. Joseph L. Renthlei, learned Amicus Curiae submits that even if the dao was recovered from the house of the respondents elder brother, there is no evidence linking the dao to the crime. He also submits that as the dao had not been sent for examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), it cannot be established that the dao was the weapon used in the crime. He also submits that no inference of guilt can be drawn against the respondent as there is no evidence connecting the dao with the crime in question. In this regard, he has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SK. Yusuf vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2011) 11 SCC 754 . He also submits that to prove the guilt of a person by way of circumstantial evidence, there must be a complete chain of evidence, which should conclusively prove the guilt of the perpetrator of the crime. He submits that there should not be any break in the link between the various circumstances relatable to the crime and in the event of the link being broken, no person can be held to be guilty. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq vs. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2011) 13 SCC 621 . 10. The learned Amicus Curiae also submits that the disclosure statement allegedly made by the respondent is not admissible as evidence, inasmuch as, the two civilian witnesses, who had given their signature in the said disclosure statement, in their evidence have stated, that they were not present at the time the disclosure statement was made. He also submits that the entire evidence adduced in the Trial Court at best can have two views. However, in that event, the view that is in favour of the accused would have to be accepted, as held by the Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs Munshi Singh and others, reported in (2009) 14 SCC 170 . However, in that event, the view that is in favour of the accused would have to be accepted, as held by the Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs Munshi Singh and others, reported in (2009) 14 SCC 170 . He accordingly submits that as the acquittal of the respondent has been done by the learned Trial Court, after considering all aspects of the case and as there is no infirmity with the decision of the Trial Court, the same should be upheld. 11. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 12. The evidence of PW-9, i.e., Zosanga alias Maila in his examination-in- chief and cross-examination, which is similar to the evidence adduced by the respondent No. 8, is reproduced below: 'On S/A I know the accused who is present in the court today. On the morning of 11.05.2014 when I got information that Horo sustained injury, I & Zothansiama went to the spot by scooter. Horo was sitting on the road side. Horo could not speak when I asked him about the time of the incident. Horo pointed at his watch showing me his five fingers which I think the incident took place at 5:00am. We brought Horo towards Kawlkulh PHC. On the way to PHC we asked Horo who had injured him. Horo pointed the residence of the accused at Hliapui. Hence, we thought that the accused Remsiama had injured Horo. On the way to Kawlkulh PHC Horo died. Cross examination by the Ld. D/L 1. I am Gorkhali. I got married to a mizo wife Mahriati. With her we have a three years old son. I dont have a scooter. We went to the spot by Hruaias scooter. When we saw Horo, he was sitting on the road side. We found there was a cut injury on his throat. Horo was asking me to supply him water near my residence, but we did not supply him water since we are afraid that he would die. Horo was trying to drink water from side drain, but we did not allow him. We took Horo to PHC Kawlkulh by VCPs car. At the relevant time it was raining heavily. 2. It is a fact that I do not know whether Horo wanted me to get water from the residence of the accused. Horo was trying to drink water from side drain, but we did not allow him. We took Horo to PHC Kawlkulh by VCPs car. At the relevant time it was raining heavily. 2. It is a fact that I do not know whether Horo wanted me to get water from the residence of the accused. It is not a fact that the victim was pointing towards the residence of the accused since he wanted the water. 3. It is a fact that the reason of our opinion that Remsiama injured the victim was merely my suspicion because the victim pointed towards the residence of the accused. 4. It is a fact that I did not see the accused cutting the throat of the victim. 5. I is not a fact that I am deposing falsely.' 13. The accused respondents disclosure statement made to the Investigating Officer (I/O) on 11.05.2014 is to the following effect: 'I, the undersigned on my own free will, before witnesses would like to confess as below. 'I have kept the dao that I used to cut the throat of Horo today i.e. 11.5.2014, caretaker of coffee garden located at the outskirt of Hliappui Village, inside my home at Hliappui above our wash basin on top of the shelf.' On the basis of the disclosure statement, a dao was recovered. In the case of Raja ALIAS RAJINDER v. State of Haryana (supra), the Apex Court has held that a when a discovery is made on the strength of an information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is guarantee that the information supplied is true. The Apex Court in para 17 of the said judgment has stated as follows: '17. In State of Maharashtra v. Damu, while dealing with the fundamental facet of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the Court observed that the basic idea embedded in the said provision is the doctrine of confession by subsequent events, which is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. It further stated that the information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature, but if it results in discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable information and, therefore, the legislature permitted such information to be used as evidence by restricting the admissible portion to the minimum.' 14. On considering the evidence of PW- 8 & 9 and the recovery of the dao on the basis of the disclosure statement, it appears that the accused respondent is the perpetrator of the crime in question. However, on close scrutiny of the evidence of PW-8 & 9, it is seen that though there is a likelihood of the respondent being the perpetrator of the crime, the link between the various circumstances is missing. Though the alleged weapon/dao was allegedly recovered on the basis of the disclosure statement made by the respondent, the said dao was never sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), to be examined by experts, for ascertaining whether the same was the weapon used for the commission of the crime. In the case of S.K. Yusuf v. State of West Bengal (supra), the Apex Court has held that if a recovery of a weapon is made on the basis of a disclosure made by the accused, no inference can be drawn against the accused, if there is no evidence connecting the weapon with the crime alleged to have been committed by the accused. In a case of circumstantial evidence, not sending the weapon used in crime for medical analysis is fatal for the reason that the circumstantial evidence may not lead to the only irresistible conclusion that none else but the accused was the perpetrator of the crime. In this regard, para 34 and 35 of the said judgment is reproduced below: '34. The nature of the admissibility of the facts discovered pursuant to the statement of the accused under Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is very limited. If an accused deposes to the police officer the fact as a result of which the weapon with which the crime is committed is discovered, and as a result of such disclosure, recovery of the weapon is made, no inference can be drawn against the accused, if there is no evidence connecting the weapon with the crime alleged to have been committed by the accused. 35. 35. Be that as it may, the spade had not been sent for chemical analysis as admitted by Digambar Mondal (PW.19), I.O. himself and there was no explanation furnished as for what reason it was not sent. In case of circumstantial evidence, not sending the weapon used in crime for chemical analysis is fatal for the reason that the circumstantial evidence may not lead to the only irresistible conclusion that the appellant was the perpetrator of the crime and none else and that in the absence of any report of Serologist as to the presence of human blood on the weapon may make the conviction of the accused unsustainable.' 15. In the present case, the evidence of PW-4, who had lent the alleged weapon (dao) to the respondent is to the following effect: 'On S/A I know the accused Lalremsiama. His father is my friend but we are not from the same village. I also know the deceased John Horo. On the night of 10.5.2014 the accused came to my house, it was late in the night around 10 PM and I was already sleeping. When I asked his identity he said he is Lalremsiama, son of Ngaihawma from Hliappui. Then I got up and opened the door for him. He came inside my house and asked me to lend him Rs.100 to which I told him that I did not have a single penny. When I asked him the reason he said he is planning to elope with a woman at Rabung (Rabung-ah nupui ru turin ka kal dawn) then he left my house. I locked the door and went back to sleep. Around 11 PM he came back to my house and asked me Rs.50. This time also I told him that I do not have any money with me. Thereafter he asked a knife from me to which I told him that I have only small kitchen knives to which he asked for a dao so I gave him a dao and he said that he will get it sharpen and sent it on the next Monday. Thereafter he left my house I locked my door and went back to sleep. The next day was a Sunday and I came to know about the death of John Horo after the Morning Church Service. Thereafter he left my house I locked my door and went back to sleep. The next day was a Sunday and I came to know about the death of John Horo after the Morning Church Service. I went to Ngopa PS during investigation of this case as I was summoned by the OC of the said PS. At that time I made a similar statement as I did today. At the PS I identified the dao which was known to me by the OC as the one belonging to me. I live alone in my house.' Though PW-4 has identified the alleged weapon as the dao he had lent to the respondent, there is nothing to prove that the said dao was the weapon used for the crime, inasmuch as, the same has not been sent for any expert opinion and examination. In the case of Modh. Arif alias Ashfaq v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), the Apex Court has held at para 187 and 188 as follows: '187. The law on the circumstantial evidence is, by now, settled. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra, this Court drew out the following test for relying upon the circumstantial evidence:- ' 153..(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." The principle of this judgment was thereafter followed in number of decisions, they being Tanviben Pankaj Kumar Divetia Vs. State of Gujarat, State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, Vikram Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, Aftab Ahmad Anasari Vs. State of Uttaranchal etc. 188. It is to be noted that in the last mentioned decision of Aftab Ahmad Anasari Vs. State of Gujarat, State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, Vikram Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, Aftab Ahmad Anasari Vs. State of Uttaranchal etc. 188. It is to be noted that in the last mentioned decision of Aftab Ahmad Anasari Vs. State of Uttaranchal (cited supra), the observation made is to the following effect:- "13. In cases where evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully established. Each fact must be proved individually and only thereafter the Court should consider the total cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each one of which reinforces the conclusion of the guilt. If the combined effect of all the facts taken together is conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction would be justified even though it may be that one or more of these facts, by itself/themselves, is/are not decisive. The circumstances proved should be such as to exclude every hypothesis except the one sought to be proved. But this does not mean that before the prosecution case succeeds in a case of circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and every hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever extravagant and fanciful it might be. 14. There must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused. Where the various links in a chain are in themselves complete, then a false plea or a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court'. 16. PW-2 & 3 are civilian witnesses, who had given their signatures in the disclosure statement, on the basis of which the alleged weapon was recovered. The records show that PW- 2 & 3 had given identical evidence on two different occasions, i.e., on 12.11.2014 and on 01.03.2016. 16. PW-2 & 3 are civilian witnesses, who had given their signatures in the disclosure statement, on the basis of which the alleged weapon was recovered. The records show that PW- 2 & 3 had given identical evidence on two different occasions, i.e., on 12.11.2014 and on 01.03.2016. The evidence of PW-2 given on 12.11.2014 and on 01.03.2016, which is exactly similar to the evidence given by PW-3, on the same dates, is reproduced below: 'Evidence of PW-2 given on 12.11.2014 On S/A Since I and the accused do not belong to the same village, I am not well acquainted with him but I came to know him only when seizure of dao was made. I was present in the house of the accused when seizure of dao was made by the Police from his house on 11.5.2014. After seizure, the seized item i.e. dao was kept in the custody of the Police. I do not have any further knowledge. Ext. P-2 is the Seizure Memo and Ext. P-2(a) is my signature. Ext. M-I containing a dao which his produced in the Court today was seized in my presence. Cross examination by the Ld. D/L : 1. I do not know at what time I got up on 11.5.14 but usually I get up around 5:30 AM. 2. I was asked by the Police at around 6 PM to stand as Seizure Witness. 3. When I reached the house, the Police were in a hurry as the accused was with them and when I saw the dao it was being brought out by the Police though I heard that the same was kept on top of a wardrobe. I did not hear the Police personnel saying that they took the dao from the wardrobe inside the house of the accused. 4. As the dao was wrapped with newspaper when I saw, I do not know whether it was stained with blood or not. 5. It is correct to suggest that as the item seized was wrapped with newspaper I do not know whether it was a dao or some other weapon. 6. I did not measure the length of the seized item which was wrapped with newspaper. 7. I did not see the wrapped item being carried by the accused. It is not a fact that I am deposing falsely in the Court today. 6. I did not measure the length of the seized item which was wrapped with newspaper. 7. I did not see the wrapped item being carried by the accused. It is not a fact that I am deposing falsely in the Court today. Evidence of PW-2 given on 01.03.2016 On S/A On the evening of 11.5.2014, I was present when the accused Lalremsiama made a Disclosure Statement where he kept the seized articles before the Police and I put my signature as witness. Est. P-4 is the Disclosure Statement and Ext. P-4(b) is my signature. Cross examination by the Ld. D/L : 1. It is a fact that since I am a civilian person, I could not be present at the time when the Police interrogated the accused Lalremsiama at the Police Station and at the time when he disclosed the whereabouts of the knife. 2. It is not a fact that I am deposing falsely in the Court today. Re-Examination by the Prosecution : 1. It is a fact that the accused also made a disclosure statement in my presence. Further Cross examination by the Ld. D/L : 1. It is a fact that the accused Lalremsiama simply reiterated while boarding in the vehicle what he had disclosed before the Police at the PS. It is a fact that while giving company to the accused, the accused repeatedly made disclosure statement before us.' 17. A perusal of the evidence given by PW- 2 & 3 in the two different dates, clearly show that there is a major contradiction/inconsistency in their evidence, giving rise to an inference that they are not reliable witnesses. In the evidence given by them on 12.11.2014, they have stated that they were present in the house of the respondent accused when the weapon/dao was seized. They have also stated that they came to know of the respondent accused only when the seizure of the dao was made. They have not made any mention of they being present at the time the disclosure statement (Exhibit- P-4) had been made by the respondent in the Police Station. PW- 2 & 3 were accordingly discharged after they were examined and cross-examined by the Trial Court on 12.11.2014. However, they were recalled by the Court after one year and were made to again give their evidence on 01.03.2016 with respect to the disclosure statement (Exhibit- P-4). PW- 2 & 3 were accordingly discharged after they were examined and cross-examined by the Trial Court on 12.11.2014. However, they were recalled by the Court after one year and were made to again give their evidence on 01.03.2016 with respect to the disclosure statement (Exhibit- P-4). As can be seen from the evidence given on 01.03.2016, they have stated that the disclosure statement was made in their presence. This however is totally inconsistent with the evidence given by them on 12.11.2014. If the disclosure statement had been made in the presence of PW- 2 & 3 as per their evidence given on 01.03.2016, it would not be expected of a normal person to completely overlook the said fact, while giving their evidence one year earlier, i.e., on 12.11.2014. Further, if PW-2 & 3 were present at the time the disclosure statement was made, the evidence given by them on 12.11.2014 that they came to know the accused only when the dao was seized would have to be taken to be a false statement. Besides the above, while PW- 2 & 3 have stated that the dao was seized by the police from the house of the accused, the evidence of the I/O, i.e., PW- 10, Inspector R. Lalzarliana is to the effect that 'Finally, the accused led us to the residence of his elder brother and showed us the dao which he had used for cutting the throat of the victim.' This evidence of the I/O contradicts the statement of the PW - 2 & 3, who have stated that the dao was seized from the house of the accused. There is no evidence led by any of the parties to show that the respondent accused and his elder brother were living in the same house. Accordingly, in the absence of the above, there is a doubt as to the place where the dao was seized, and whether it was the weapon. All the above inconsistencies plant a seed of doubt as to whether the disclosure statement was genuine or fabricated. It is also to be noted that the respondent accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C on 03.03.2016 stated that he did not admit to his guilt voluntarily as the police tried to beat him with a stick. 18. All the above inconsistencies plant a seed of doubt as to whether the disclosure statement was genuine or fabricated. It is also to be noted that the respondent accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C on 03.03.2016 stated that he did not admit to his guilt voluntarily as the police tried to beat him with a stick. 18. In the case of State of Haryana v. Ram Mehar And Others, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 762 , the Apex Court has held at para 29 as follows: 14 '29. In Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell[20] occasion arose to appreciate the principles stated in Mohanlal Shamji Soni (supra). The two- Judge Bench took note of the observations made in the said case which was to the effect that while exercising the power under Section 311 of CrPC, the court shall not use such power 'for filling up the lacuna left by the prosecution'. Explaining the said observation Thomas, J. speaking for the Court observed:- '8. Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case. The advantage of it should normally go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an oversight in the management of the prosecution cannot be treated as irreparable lacuna. No party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors. If proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified. After all, function of the criminal court is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by the parties or to find out and declare who among the parties performed better.' Thus, the recall of PW- 2 & 3 and their subsequent examination again was to prove the disclosure statement (Exhibit - P-4). Though there is nothing wrong with the recalling of the witnesses to rectify their mistake in not proving the disclosure statement in the earlier round of evidence taken on 12.11.2014, the combined reading of the evidence given by PW- 2 & 3 on two different dates only creates a doubt on the prosecution case, as there is inconsistencies in the facts, which will naturally have consequence in the appreciation of evidence. This inconsistency of facts has surfaced due to inconsistent facts being adduced by the witnesses, which has not been clarified by the prosecution. The discrepancy that has emerged are glaring and will have to be weighed in with the other evidence. 19. The other evidence against the accused is due to the fact that the deceased pointed to the residence of the accused, when asked as to who had inflicted the injury upon him, while being taken to Kawlkulh PHC by PW- 7, 8 & 9. This pointing of the finger, to our mind cannot be said to be sufficient proof that the respondent had committed the crime, keeping in mind the fact that the finger was pointed at a house and not against any individual. It is true that the deceased could not speak due to his injury. However, the pointing of a residence by the deceased cannot ipso facto prove the guilt of a person, in the absence of corroborative evidence. The evidence of PW - 2 & 3, juxtaposed with evidence of I.O shows that the dao was seized in 2 different places. The inconsistency could have been reconciled if the respondent and his elder brother were living in the same house. However, there is no evidence to that effect. Assuming the respondent and his elder brother were living in the same house, then the pointing of the finger by the deceased at the house of the respondent in turn could not prove that the respondent was guilty, if his elder brother also resided therein. Even if there is a suspicion that the respondent was the perpetrator of a crime, the same cannot be taken as proof that the respondent was the perpetrator of a crime. Assuming that there were two possible views, one proving the respondent to be guilty and the other innocent, we will have to accept the view favouring the accused respondent. In the case of State of Madhay Pradesh v. Munshi Singh and others (supra), the Apex Court has held that while hearing an appeal against acquittal, if two views on the evidence are possible, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the acquittal, merely because it is of the view that sitting as a Trial Court, a different view could have been taken. 20. 20. In view of the reasons stated above, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment & order. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Send back the LCRs. 21. In appreciation of the assistance provided by the learned Amicus Curiae, his fee is fixed at Rs. 8,500/- (Rupees eight thousand five hundred) only to be paid by the Mizoram State Legal Services Authority. 22. On considering the entire case, we are constrained to make observations with regard to the manner in which the investigation has been conducted by the police and also, the manner in which the prosecution has been conducted. As can be seen from the facts of the case, the police have not diligently investigated into the matter. There has been inconsistencies between the evidence of the witnesses and the I/O. The requirement of sending the weapon to the FSL for examination has not been done. There is nothing to show that the accused respondent and his elder brother are living separately or in the same house. A lot remained to be done by the police and the prosecution during the investigation and in the trial of a case of this nature. The State should ensure that the police and the prosecution get proper training and they sincerely work for the ends of justice in the future. For the reasons stated above, a copy of this order should be sent to the Secretary to the Govt. of Mizoram, Home Department and the Director General of Police, Mizoram for their perusal.