JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Sankalp Narain, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ashish Kumar Nagar, learned Standing Counsel for the State. 2. Petitioners’ learned counsel has raise an issue that petitioners, who are working on the post of constable, were subjected to the recruitment process prior to the cut off date i.e. 01.04.2005, when new pension Rules came into vogue. Petitioners contention is that admittedly appointment order to the petitioners were issued after the cut-off date, but that was due to the fact that similar litigation was pending in the High Court which was initiated at the instance of unsuccessful candidates and on account of stay granted by the High Court, appointment orders could not be issued in favour of the petitioners. 3. Therefore, the whole controversy is to be addressed within the narrow compass i.e. whether petitioners who were appointed after the cut off date i.e. 31.03.2005, are entitled to benefit of old pension Rules which were in vogue up to 31.03.2005 or will be governed by new pension Rule. 4. These three petitions since raise common legal issues and the factual back drop under which this legal issue has been raised being same, all the three petitions are being disposed of simultaneously. 5. The brief facts as extracted from writ petition no.6711 of 2020 are that on 06.01.2005, 4364 (Four thousand three hundred and sixty four) posts of Constable in Civil Police and PAC were advertised by the State of Uttar Pradesh. 6. Petitioners were since eligible, had applied for the post of Constable. In the advertisement, it is mentioned that eligible candidates may appear in the office of the Senior Superintendent of Police/Superintendent of Police between 10.01.2005 and 10.02.2005 on any working day between 10.00 a.m. and 5.00 p.m. where applications be examined and physical measurements will be carried out. It is mentioned that no application shall be entertained after the cut-off date. It is also mentioned that persons who qualify the preliminary eligibility parameters during scrutiny of their candidature and subject to fulfilment of physical parameters, alone shall be eligible for other stages of selection. It is also mentioned in the advertisement that physical efficiency test will commence on 17.02.2005 at 8.00 a.m. and a candidate will be required to appear on the same centre where he had deposited his application form. 7. It is also mentioned in the advertisement that physical efficiency test will commence on 17.02.2005 at 8.00 a.m. and a candidate will be required to appear on the same centre where he had deposited his application form. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that since petitioners’ recruitment was initiated before coming into force of notification dated 28.03.2005 and 07.04.2005 so also before coming into force of the Uttar Pradesh Retirement Benefits (Amendment) Rules, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as Rules, 2005) whereby it is provided that Uttar Pradesh Retirement Benefits Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as Rules, 1961) and General Provident Fund (Uttar Pradesh) Rules, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as Rules, 1985) will not apply to employees entering in service on or after 01.04.2005, these Rules will not be applicable from a retrospective date. 8. Petitioners’ submission is that at the time of initiation of the recruitment when advertisement dated 06.01.2005 was issued, provisions of the Rules, 1961 were invogue and therefore, there was a legitimate expectation that their service conditions will be governed by Rules, 1961 and they will be getting remuneration on the post of constable in terms of the Rules, 1961. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submits that the advertisement did not disclose the fact that petitioners will be subjected to new contributory pension system, which was introduced for the first time vide notification dated 28.03.2005 followed by subsequent amendment in the Rules notified on 07.04.2005 made effective from 01.04.2005. 10. Petitioners’ contention is that ex-servicemen, who have been recruited, have been excluded from the ambit of new pension scheme and they are being governed in accordance with earlier rules, which is violative of Article 16 and 14 of the Constitution of India. In this back drop, a prayer has been made in the petition to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent authorities to enforce the provisions of the earlier pension scheme and not to enforce the new pension scheme upon the petitioners which was notified vide notification dated 28.03.2005. 11. In this back drop, a prayer has been made in the petition to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent authorities to enforce the provisions of the earlier pension scheme and not to enforce the new pension scheme upon the petitioners which was notified vide notification dated 28.03.2005. 11. Learned counsel for petitioners submits that their case is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court passed in case of Mahesh Narayan and others vs. State of U.P. and others as reported in 2020 (2) ALJ 518 wherein the co-ordinate Bench of this Court partly allowed the writ petition and under the facts and circumstances of the case held that petitioners in that case are excluded from the effect and operation of notifications dated 28.03.2005 and 07.04.2005 holding it to be in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as also the law laid down by different High Courts. Consequently, respondents were directed to include the petitioners in that case under old pension scheme as provided in Rules, 1961 before amendment and be given all other consequential benefits. 12. Learned counsel for the State in his turn submits that this petition is highly belated. Admittedly, petitioners were appointed in May/June, 2005 and this petition has been filed after 15 years claiming a relief after being a member of new contributory pension scheme for about 15 years and therefore, if their plea is to be accepted then it is barred by the principle of estopple so also that of acquiescence. 13. It is also submitted that petitioners have an alternative remedy of approaching the Uttar Pradesh Public Services Tribunal, established under the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 and therefore, in view of alternative statutory remedy, petition is not maintainable. It is also submitted that petitioners’ recruitment process was initiated on 06.01.2005 and as per the terms and conditions of the advertisement after formal scrutiny of the documents and physical parameters, physical efficiency test, consisting of throw ball, long jump, chinning up, sit ups followed by running etc., was to be conducted and those candidates who would have cleared the eligibility criteria were required to appear in a written test, consisting of 50 marks in which questions relating to general knowledge, mental aptitude and Hindi essay were to be attempted. It was mandatory to obtain 33% marks in the written examination which was followed by interview of 20 marks and thereafter selected candidates were to be sent for training. 14. It is also submitted that petitioners cannot claim parity with the ex-servicemen for which there is a separate quota and in any case petitioners have not enclosed any documentary evidence to substantiate that ex-servicemen Satish Kumar was also appointed along with them and therefore, case of Satish Kumar is similar to that of petitioners. It is also submitted that plea of pendency of litigation is also not made out from record inasmuch as petitioners have neither given any case number nor enclosed copy of any order from the Court to show that procedure of selection was delayed. It is submitted, in any case that too will not have any bearing as benefits are admissible as are permissible under law on the date of appointment. He submits that the petition is bereft of merits and deserves to be dismissed. 15. After hearing learned counsel for petitioners and going through the records, it is necessary to first refer to the notifications and the amendment in the Rules, 1961, language of which reads that :- “from 01.04.2005, the new defined contribution pension system would mandatorily apply to all new recruits to the service of the State Government and of all State controlled autonomous/State aided private educational institutions referred to above”. 16. It provides for two accounts viz., pension Tier-I account in which employee is required to make a monthly contribution equal to 10% of the salary and Dearness Allowance. A matching contribution is to be made by the employer. No withdrawal is allowed from this account during the service period. There is a provision of voluntary Tier-II account, keeping in mind the fact that new recruits would not be able to subscribe to G.P.F. and this is in addition to the pension Tier-I account. In Tier-II account, employer would not make any contribution. However, employee has been given a liberty of withdrawal in part or all of the proceeds from Tier-II account. Thus it is apparent that Tier-I account is with a view to protect post-retiral interests of the employee whereas Tier-II account is like G.P.F. providing flexibility to an employee to withdraw sums out of his own savings as per the exigencies of life. 17. Thus it is apparent that Tier-I account is with a view to protect post-retiral interests of the employee whereas Tier-II account is like G.P.F. providing flexibility to an employee to withdraw sums out of his own savings as per the exigencies of life. 17. Thus, submission of the petitioners that this scheme is flawed is not made out. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to demonstrate any arbitrariness in the scheme and moreover petitioners have not challenged the validity of the scheme or of notification dated 28.03.2005 or of the Rules of 2005. Therefore, in absence of any challenge to the said provisions, this Court is not required to advert to and address them. 19. As far as the decision in case of Mahesh Narayan (supra) is concerned, before appreciating the applicability of the said judgment and the principles of law applied, it is necessary to appreciate the facts of that case. 20. In case of Mahesh Narayan and others (supra), requisition for appointment to 954 posts of Junior Engineer (Civil) in the irrigation department of State of U.P. was sent on 20.10.1999 to the U.P. Public Service Commission. In the notification itself it was clearly mentioned that posts are pensionable and after receiving requisition, Commission issued an advertisement no. A-3/E-1/2000 dated 22.12.2000. The last date of submission of form was 27.01.2001. Originally the scheme as was advertised provided for a preliminary screening test, followed by a written test but subsequently preliminary screening test was done away and all applicants were permitted to appear straightway in the mains written examination which was held on 22.12.2001. 21. It is mentioned in para 2 of the judgment itself that prior to holding of written examination writ petition no.7062 (S/S) of 2001 was filed by some candidates possessing degree in Civil Engineering to claim permission to participate in the said examination. In the said petition, stay was granted by learned single judge restraining the holding of examination vide order dated 18.12.2001. Against this, Special Appeal was filed by the Commission and vide order dated 19.12.2001 interim order was modified, that persons challenging the exam were permitted to appear in the said examination. However, Commission was directed not to declare the results of such candidates, who were allowed to appear on the strength of the intervention of the Court. Against this, Special Appeal was filed by the Commission and vide order dated 19.12.2001 interim order was modified, that persons challenging the exam were permitted to appear in the said examination. However, Commission was directed not to declare the results of such candidates, who were allowed to appear on the strength of the intervention of the Court. It is mentioned that there was no restrain order with regard to declaration of result of remaining candidates but there was only observation that declaration of result of remaining candidates shall be provisional, subject to final decision of writ petition. In this back drop, result of the said examination was not declared. Subsequently, vide order dated 05.07.2005, writ petition no.7062 (S/S) of 2001 and connected petitions were dismissed. After dismissal of these petitions, result of written examination was declared on 05.10.2005. Reasons shown as having qualified were called for interview. Interviews were held between November, 2005 and January, 2006 and thereafter vide office order dated 14.06.2006, appointment was granted. Consequent to such appointment, joining was given to different candidates in June and July, 2006. 22. In the above back drop, petitioners raised their grievance in regard to their exclusion from the benefit of pension payable under the provisions of U.P. Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961 and from Provident Fund under the Rules, 1985. The notifications dated 28.03.2005 and 07.04.2005 so also the amended Rules, 2005 were assailed by the petitioners on the ground that in the notification dated 20.10.1999, it was clearly mentioned that posts are pensionable and due to certain litigations if selection process could not be finalised then petitioners cannot be put to a disadvantage. 23. In case of Mahesh Narayan and others (supra) co-ordinate Bench of this Court has placed reliance on the judgment in case of Ashutosh Joshi & others Vs. State of Uttrakhand and others in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 1170 of 2010 wherein the facts were that against the same advertisement, appointments were made creating two categories i.e., one for female candidates who were given appointment prior to cut-off date from which “new pension scheme” was implemented whereas the male candidates were given appointment after the cut-off date. Therefore, this act of the employer was held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 24. Another judgment relied on is that of Balwant Singh and Others. Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Others. Therefore, this act of the employer was held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 24. Another judgment relied on is that of Balwant Singh and Others. Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Others. Writ Petition Nos.16 and 944 of 2011 (S/S). Against the very same advertisement, there was two sets of selected candidates one submitting their joining prior to the cut-off date and the other after the cut-off date. These petitions were allowed. Special Appeal nos.330 of 2013 and 520 of 2013 filed by the State of Uttrakhand were dismissed by the Division Bench of Uttrakhand High Court vide order dated 26.06.2014. 25. The ratio of the judgment of the Division Bench in Special Appeal is that service conditions prevailing on the date of recruitment process commenced cannot be permitted to be altered to disadvantage of the recruitees. Further observed that the Government order dated 25.10.2005 is prospective in nature and cannot be made applicable retrospectively for the persons who had applied for the post prior to 25.10.2005. 26. Co-ordinate Bench in case of Mahesh Narayan & others (supra) also placed reliance on the judgment of Delhi High Court in the matter of Inspector Rajendra Singh and others vs. Union of India as reported in 2017 SCC Online Del 7879 where facts of the case are that petitioners were declared medically unfit. Thereafter, petitioners got themselves medically examined in other reputed medical institutions, where they were declared medically fit. Thereafter the petitioners applied for medical re-examination by a Review Medical Board. In the meanwhile, appointment orders in relation to other candidates who participated in the same recruitment process were issued and they all joined the respective forces on or before 31.12.2003 but due to delay in the review medical examination, petitioners who were eventually found successful, joined subsequent to the cut-off date and in this back drop the Delhi High Court held that :- “it would be grossly unjust and arbitrary to deny the petitioners, the benefit of old pension scheme, applicable at the time when the posts were advertised, only because of the fortuitous considerations of their joining service after the enforcement of the new pension scheme for reasons not attributable to them.” 27. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of Delhi High Court in case of Parmanand Yadav and Others Vs. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of Delhi High Court in case of Parmanand Yadav and Others Vs. Union of India and others {WP(C) No.3834/2013} decided on 12.02.2015 wherein the appointment letters were delayed by three months, the fact which was admitted by the Director General of BSF in his counter affidavit and thus for the reasons of parity, relief was granted to Paramanand Yadav treating his case to be at par with Navin Kumar Jha and Avinash Singh. 28. In case of Naveen Kumar Jha vs. Union of India and others, as reported in 2012 SCC Online Delhi 5606 wherein noting a fact that Staff Selection Commission had invited applications to fill up posts of Sub-Inspector in Central Para Military Force. They were declared unfit by the medical board which conducted medical examination on 04.02.2002. Petitioner had applied for reexamination before a Review Medical Board as per the scheme of the recruitment within 30 days of unfitness being intimated but Review Medical Board was not convened and in the meanwhile by March, 2003 others who were successful were allowed to join the respective Para Military Force to which their allocation was made. Petitioner was called for interview in July, 2003 and after clearing the same, was offered appointment in April, 2004. Thus finding that the delay in conducting the Review Medical Board being a fortuitous circumstance, petitioner was allowed to be a member of pension scheme which remained in vogue till 31.12.2003. Thus apparently case of Naveen Kumar Jha and Avinash Singh is on the same footing as that of Inspector Rajendra Singh (supra). 29. Co-ordinate Bench also relied on the judgment of Amrendra Kumar vs. UOI & Others., passed by High Court of Delhi in {WP(C) No.10028 of 2009} decided on 02.08.2010 which is again on the same lines as that of Inspector Rajendra Singh (supra), similarly, case of Shoorvir Singh Negi Vs. Union of India and others again originating from the High Court of Delhi in {WP(C) No.5830 of 2015} decided on 17.09.2015 has been relied facts of which are similar to that of Naveen Kumar Jha. 30. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of Delhi High Court passed in case of Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi & others. etc. Vs. Ajay Kumar & others etc. so also other connected matters where the facts were similar to Naveen Kumar Jha. 30. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of Delhi High Court passed in case of Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi & others. etc. Vs. Ajay Kumar & others etc. so also other connected matters where the facts were similar to Naveen Kumar Jha. It is noted that this judgment of Delhi High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court by filing Diary No.15658 of 2019 which has been dismissed by Supreme Court vide order dated 10.07.2019. In fact a perusal of order on the website of Supreme Court reveals that delay was condoned and matter dismissed. 31. Similarly, there is mention of judgment of Allahabad High Court in case of Satyesh Kumar Mishra and others vs. State of U.P. and others, as reported in 2016(6) ADJ 808 (LB) where Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court referring to the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Sudhir Kumar Kansal Vs. Allahabad Bank as reported in 2011 (2) ESC 243 and also on case of Smt. Rakhi Ray and others Vs. High Court of Delhi and others as reported in 2010 (2) SCC 637 so also on case of Vijoy Kumar Pandey Vs. Arvind Kumar Rai and others as reported in 2013 (11) SCC 611 dismissed the petition filed by Satyesh Kumar Mishra and others wherein petitioners had sought direction to respondents to make necessary deduction towards G.P.F. etc. in view of old pension scheme, which was in existence at the time of notification dated 27.09.2002 issued by Secondary Education Service Selection Board, oblivious of the fact that petitioners had entered into service on 16.04.2005 after coming in effect of the new pension scheme. 32. Hon’ble Co-ordinate Bench recorded a finding in case of Sudhir Kumar Kansal (supra), to the effect that :- “in a society governed by rule of law, sympathies cannot override the rules and regulations”. 33. Similarly, in case of Rakhi Ray and others (supra) the Supreme Court in para 24 observed that :- “a person whose name appears in the select list does not acquire any indefeasible right of appointment. Empanelment at the best is a condition of eligibility for the purpose of appointment and by itself does not amount to selection or create a vested right to be appointed.” 34. Empanelment at the best is a condition of eligibility for the purpose of appointment and by itself does not amount to selection or create a vested right to be appointed.” 34. In case of Vijoy Kumar Pandey (supra), the Supreme Court held that :- “preparation of select list or panel does not by itself entitle the candidate whose name figures in such a list/panel to seek appointment or claim mandamus” 35. Learned Co-ordinate Bench in case of Mahesh Narayan and others (supra) placing reliance on the judgment of Allahabad High Court in case of Firangi Prasad Vs. State of U.P. & Others as reported in 2010 (10) ADJ 1659 wherein facts of the case are that in a matter of consideration of scheme of regularisation of ad-hoc appointees, cut-off date of 06.08.1993 was prescribed whereas Firangi Prasad who was selected for appointment as Assistant Teacher on 05.01.1993 by the District Inspector of Schools was not given appointment by the management of the school and ultimately management after initially refusing to perform the ministerial act of issuing the letter of appointment to appellant issued appointment letter on 25.08.1993. In this back drop, it is held that the appointment of the petitioner shall relate back to the date of the letter of the District Inspector of Schools, communicating the order of selection to the management and therefore, appellant will be entitled to benefit of Section 33 (c) of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 certain provisions of which were amended w.e.f. 20.04.1998. 36. In the above back drop, petition in case of Mahesh Narayan was allowed and relief has been granted. 37. Now the fact of the matter is that there exists two judgments of two different Benches of equal strength of the same High Court viz., one in case of Mahesh Narayan and others vs. State of U.P. and others and another in case of Satyesh Kumar Mishra and others and therefore, matter should be referred to a larger Bench for its decision. 38. 38. The fact of the matter is that another Co-ordinate Bench in case of Ashok Kumar Singh and another vs. UPPCL and three others passed in Writ–A No.50301 of 2014 delivered on 03.03.2020 has dealt with similar issue and in the light of the decision in case of Firangi Prasad, it held that since petitioners were not at fault, and placing reliance on the judgment of Kamlesh Kumar Sonkar vs. State of U.P. and others rendered in Writ-A No.55607 of 2008 dealing with recruitment of Junior Engineer (Civil), Irrigation Department pursuant to an advertisement published in 2002 allowed the petition. However, fact of the matter in the present case are distinguishable. 39. Admittedly, advertisement was issued on 06.01.2005. There is no condition in the advertisement that the posts are pensionable unlike in case of Mahesh Narayan and others (supra), therefore, in the light of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mills as reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111 wherein in para 59, the Supreme Court observed :- “It is also well-settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.” 40. So, also in the light of the judgment of Supreme Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., and another vs N.R. Vairamani And Another as reported in AIR 2004 SC 778 that a decision cannot by relied on without considering the factual situation. The Supreme Court observed : “Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.” 41. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.” 41. Similarly, in case of P.S. Rao vs. State as reported in JT 2002 (SC) 1, the Supreme Court held as under :- "There is always a peril in treating the words of judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in setting of the facts of a particular case. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases.” 42. In case of Rafiq vs. State, as reported in 1980 SCC (CRL) 946 it is observed as under :- “The ratio of one case cannot be mechanically applied to another case without having regard to the fact situation and circumstances obtaining in two cases.” 43. In the light of decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court starting from Rafiq (supra), P.S. Rao (supra) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., (supra) and Bhavnagar University (supra), I find myself sufficiently equipped to hold that under the facts and circumstances of the case, since facts of the present case are different from that of Mahesh Narayan (supra), Firangi Prasad (supra) and Ashok Kumar Singh and another (supra), this Court is of the opinion that in the light of law laid down by Supreme Court in case of Rakhee Ray and others (supra), Vijoy Kumar Pandey (supra) and Sudhir Kumar Kansal (supra) the facts of the judgments referred to in case of Ashutosh Joshi and others, Balwant Singh and others, Inspector Rajendra Singh, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, and also that from the cases of Naveen Kumar Jha, Paramanand Yadav, Avinash Singh, Amrendra Kumar, Shoorvir Singh Negi are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the present case, as has been discussed above, recruitment was initiated on 06.01.2005, results were declared on 23.04.2005 followed by the medical examination and document verification from 24.04.2005 and therefore, definitely appointment orders were issued after 24.04.2005 whereas the Rules of 2005 had become effective w.e.f. 01.04.2005 i.e., much before the date of declaration of even the results of the petitioner and therefore, there being no parity in case of the petitioners and also in the light of the settled law laid down in case of Roshan Lal Tandon vs. Union of India and others as reported in AIR 1967 SC 1889 wherein it has been held that while exercising the authority under Articles 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution of India, the terms of service can be altered unilaterally by Government, there is no vested contractual right for the servant. 44. Similarly, in case of Tagin Litin vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh and others as reported in (1996) 5 SCC 83 it has been held that appointment order will become effective from the date of communication. Un-communicated order of appointment is held to be ineffective. 45. In case of Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club and another vs. Chander Hass and another as reported in (2008) 1 SCC 683 the Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of separation of powers and the limits of powers of judiciary, it has deprecated the attempt on the part of judges to perform executive or legislative functions. 46. In case of Ashwani Kumar Singh vs. U.P. Public Service Commission and others as reported in (2003) 11 SCC 584 it is held that policy decision of the employer to appoint a particular number of candidates cannot be interfered with unless it is irrational or mala fide. It has also been held that judgments are not to be construed as statutes. Blind reliance on judgment without considering the fact situation has been held to be improper. 47. In case of Official Liquidity vs. Dayanand and others as reported in (2008) 10 SCC 1 it has been held that :- “in the matter of different employment, scope of judicial review of power of employer to create or abolish posts or cadres or to prescribe source or mode of recruitment etc. 47. In case of Official Liquidity vs. Dayanand and others as reported in (2008) 10 SCC 1 it has been held that :- “in the matter of different employment, scope of judicial review of power of employer to create or abolish posts or cadres or to prescribe source or mode of recruitment etc. is not immune from judicial review, but power of judicial review can be exercised in such matters only if it is shown that the action of the employer is contrary to any constitutional or statutory provision or patently arbitrary or is vitiated by mala fides.” 48. In case of Government of Odisha through Secretary, Commerce and Transport Department, Bhubaneswar vs. Hare Prasad Das and other as ported in (1998) 1 SCC 487 it has been held that recruitment process of preparation of a panel does not confer any right on the candidates included therein. Where Government decides for a valid reason not to make further appointments, such decision cannot be termed arbitrary. Meaning thereby that there is no vested right to be appointed in a service merely with the commencement of the recruitment process or declaration of a panel. 49. In case of General Manager Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan vs. Laxmi Devi and others as reported in (2009) 7 SCC 205 Supreme Court held that :- “an employee can claim status as government servant only if his appointment has been made in terms of recruitment rules and he fulfils criteria for appointment.” 50. In view of such facts and the law on the subject, I am of the opinion that petitioners have failed to make out a case either of parity with that of Mahesh Narayan or Firangi Prasad or the judgments cited therein, neither have been able to establish any mala fide, arbitrariness or deliberate delay in the process of recruitment. Petitioners have failed to make out the case that the legislative and executive action has failed to satisfy the twin test of reasonable classification and the rational principal co-related to the object sought to be achieved. In absence of such pleadings and submissions even on this ground petition is not maintainable. 51. Petitioners contention that due to pendency of similar litigation delay has been caused in issuance of appointment order is not made out from record. No proof in regard to this averment has been furnished by the petitioners. 52. In absence of such pleadings and submissions even on this ground petition is not maintainable. 51. Petitioners contention that due to pendency of similar litigation delay has been caused in issuance of appointment order is not made out from record. No proof in regard to this averment has been furnished by the petitioners. 52. Issue of prospectivity of the Rules is also discussed above. It is settled principle of law that a person attains rights in the matter of service from the date of appointment and not from the date of initiation of the recruitment process. Therefore, this arguments of the petitioners that recruitment was initiated prior to coming into force of the amended Pension Rules has no force. 53. As far as plea of the Co-ordinate Bench in regard to dismissal of SLP is concerned, the impact of such dismissal has been discussed by Hon’ble Supreme Court. It does not mean that issue has been settled. 54. Supreme Court in the case of Kunhayammed & Others vs State of Kerala & Another as reported in 2000 (6) SCC 359 , has dealt with the issue of effect of ‘in limine’ dismissal of Special Leave Petition (SLP) by the Supreme Court and has held that :- “....as to when a decision of the Court in a SLP would be binding and when not. The Supreme Court observed that there are two distinct stages: (a) Granting of special leave to appeal; and (b) Hearing the appeal. If the SLP is dismissed at the stage of special leave without a speaking or reasoned order, there is no res judicata, no merger of the lower order and the petitioner retains the statutory right, if available of seeking relief in review jurisdiction of the High Court. If the SLP is dismissed at the first stage by speaking a reasoned order, there is still no merger but rule of judicial discipline and declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution will apply. The order of Supreme Court would mean that it has declared the law and in that light the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. Once leave is granted but SLP converted into appeal is dismissed with or without reasons, merger results and law is declared. The order of Supreme Court would mean that it has declared the law and in that light the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. Once leave is granted but SLP converted into appeal is dismissed with or without reasons, merger results and law is declared. It is no longer permissible to move the High Court by review and no Court, Tribunal or Authority can express any opinion contrary to the view taken by Supreme Court. Order appealed against can be reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction at the second stage only and not at the discretionary first stage of special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.” 55. Thus dismissal of SLP does not mean that the judgment of High Court has attained a binding nature with the seal of approval of the Supreme Court. 56. Therefore, the judgment of Mahesh Narayan being distinguishable on facts and petitioners have failed to make out a case of parity or on its own merits, petitions are liable to be dismissed and are dismissed. 57. Parties bear their own costs.