JUDGMENT : V.K. Jadhav, J. 1. These writ petitions have been placed before us pursuant to the reference order of the Division Bench of this Court (Coram: T.V. Nalawade and Mangesh S. Patil, JJ.) dated 12.3.2019 in criminal writ petition No. 273 of 2019 with other connected writ petitions. In all these writ petitions, the petitioners original convicts have claimed the benefit of the State remission for three months, in terms of the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017. The reference has been occasioned as the learned counsel for the petitioners, in those writ petitions placed reliance on the decision given by the Division Bench of this Court (Coram: R.M. Borde and Mangesh S. Patil, JJ.) in criminal writ petition No. 1254 of 2018 (Vitthal Ganpat Parekar (C-93) vs. the State of Maharashtra and another) dated 21.09.2018 in criminal writ petition No. 1123 of 2018 (Laxman Keshav Mali (C-6205) vs. State of Maharashtra and another) dated 7.9.2018. In the aforesaid writ petitions, the Division Bench, by referring the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017 which provides remission to the extent of three months on account of 125th Birth Anniversary of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, held that except the prisoners who squarely falls in the categories as mentioned in the said Government Resolution, rest of the prisoners are entitled to the benefit of remission under the Government Resolution. The Division Bench also held that the opinion expressed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in ignorance of or by overlooking the Government Resolution is faulty and needs to be corrected. 2. The Division Bench headed by Justice T.V. Nalawade in Criminal writ petition No. 273 of 2019 and other connected criminal writ petitions in the order dated 12.3.2019 not agreeing with the observations made in earlier two writ petitions, as stated above, referred the following questions to the Larger Bench:- “i) Whether it is necessary to obtain the opinion of the Presiding Officer mentioned in Section 432(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of convicts mentioned in Government Resolution dated 3rd June, 2017 to whom the benefit of remission is to be given. ii) Whether the application given by the convicts, who fall under the excepted categories, can be rejected straightway by the authority. ii) Whether the application given by the convicts, who fall under the excepted categories, can be rejected straightway by the authority. iii) Whether the opinion given by the Presiding Officer mentioned in Section 432(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also the record of trial, need to be considered by the authority created for grant or refusal of remission as relevant circumstances or whether the opinion is binding on the authority. iv) Whether under such policy without any scrutiny as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure the benefit, remission must be given.” 3. In all the aforesaid writ petitions, the petitioners, who have been convicted for life imprisonment, claim entitlement of the State remission for three months on account of 125th Birth Anniversary of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar and they have been denied the remission as the concerned Sessions Judge/Presiding Judge of the court has given his opinion in negative. The Sessions Judge/Presiding Judge of the court has given his opinion that the remission as claimed by the petitioners should be refused. 4. Mr. Nagargoje and Ms. Sharda P. Chate, learned counsel for the petitioners in criminal writ petition Nos. 273 of 2019, 274 of 2019, 275 of 2019 and 276 of 2019 would submit that the provisions of section 432 (2) of Cr.P.C. are not mandatory in nature. In terms of provision of sub-section (2) of Section 432 of Cr.P.C. whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government for suspension or remission of sentence, the appropriate Government may require the Presiding Judge of the court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion whether the application should granted or refused, together with the reasons for such opinion. Learned counsel submit that it is not mandatory and binding on the appropriate Government to seek the opinion of the presiding Judge for exercising the powers to grant remission in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 432 of Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the application, if any, submitted by the convict for grant of remission in terms of Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017, cannot be rejected outrightly for the reason that the said convict fall under the exceptional categories as detailed in the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017. In terms of provisions of Section 432 of Cr.P.C., it is necessary for the appropriate Government to pass necessary orders. In terms of provisions of Section 432 of Cr.P.C., it is necessary for the appropriate Government to pass necessary orders. It is further submitted that such an opinion given by the Presiding Judge in terms of the provisions of Section 432(2) of Cr.P.C. is not binding on the appropriate Government. It is submitted that in terms of Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017 without any further scrutiny, as provided in the Cr.P.C., the appropriate Government is required to grant remission. Learned counsel submit that the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017 specify the procedure as well as the eligibility criteria to avail the benefits of the State remission on account of 125th Birth Anniversary of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar. It is submitted that since the year 1981, the State Government on many occasions of National or State importance granted remissions to the prisoners by passing the Government Resolutions, for example (a) on 27.04.1984 on account of Maharashtra Day six months, (b) on 04.11.1988, on account of 40th year of Independence of India, three months and (c) on 15.04.1991 on account of Centenary of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar for three months. It is submitted that in the aforesaid Government Resolution when the remission was granted, there was no condition to call upon the report of the Presiding Judge of the court and those remissions came to be granted as per the eligibility criteria as contemplated in the said Government Resolutions. It is further submitted that only in the present Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017, the State Government has inserted the clause in respect of opinion of the Presiding Judge by taking recourse to the provisions of section 432 of Cr.P.C. The State Government has exercised the powers sou motu and granted special State remission to the prisoners and the said remission is not granted on the application submitted by the prisoners in terms of the provisions of section 432 (2) of Cr.P.C. It is therefore, not necessary to seek the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the court for granting remission in terms of the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017. It is thus submitted that the provisions of section 432 (2) of Cr.P.C. are inapplicable for grant of remission in terms of the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017 on account of certain events of National or State importance. Learned counsel for the petitioners in writ petition Nos. It is thus submitted that the provisions of section 432 (2) of Cr.P.C. are inapplicable for grant of remission in terms of the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017 on account of certain events of National or State importance. Learned counsel for the petitioners in writ petition Nos. 273 of 2019, 274 of 2019, 275 of 2019 and 276 of 2019, in order to substantiate their contentions, place reliance on the following judgments:- i) State of M.P. vs. Ratan Singh and others, reported in 1976 AIR (SC) 1552, ii) State of Haryana vs. Nauratta Singh, reported in 2000 AIR (SC) 1179, iii) Union of India vs. V. Sriharan @ Murugan, reported in (SCC) 2014 11 1, iv) State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Vallabhapuram Ravi, reported in (SCC) 1984 4 410 v) Sangeet and another vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 2 SCC 452 . 5. Mr. N. N Gawankar alongwith Mr. Rupesh Jaiswal, learned counsel for the petitioners in writ petition Nos. 373 of 2019, 423 of 2019, 718 of 2019 and 719 of 2019 would submit that in terms of the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017 the convicts, who do not fall in any excepted category of the prisoners, are entitled for the remission of three months on account of 125th Birth Anniversary of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar. In terms of the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017 as provided under Section 432 (1) of Cr.P.C. the prisoners, who are undergoing the life imprisonment, would get three months State remission. Learned counsel submit that the petitioners undergoing the sentence of life imprisonment, do not fall into any of the excepted categories as detailed in the Government Resolution and as such, the report by the Sessions Judge/Presiding Judge of the Court overlooking these aspects is contrary to the provisions of law. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submit that Section 59 of the Prisons Act 1894 empowers the State Government to make Rules consistent with the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, the State Government has framed Rules viz. Maharashtra Prisons (Remission System) Rules 1962. In terms of Rule 4, the remission is of four kinds i.e. (a) ordinary remission, (b) annual good conduct remission, (c) special remission and (d) State remission. Accordingly, the State Government has framed Rules viz. Maharashtra Prisons (Remission System) Rules 1962. In terms of Rule 4, the remission is of four kinds i.e. (a) ordinary remission, (b) annual good conduct remission, (c) special remission and (d) State remission. Learned counsel submit that in terms of Rule 18 of the Rules of 1962, the State Government may, on such occasion of national importance or public rejoining as the State Government may determine grant remission to such prisoners for such number of days as the State Government may by order specify in this behalf. It is submitted that the Prisons Act 1894 is substantive Act itself and the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (5) of Section 59 of the Prisons Act 1894, framed the Rules. It is submitted that in terms of the provisions of Rule 18 for granting remission to the prisoners or class of prisoners for such number of days on account of national importance or public rejoining would be at the discretion of the State Government and in addition to the same, the State Government may grant the remission in terms of Section 432 of Cr.P.C. It is submitted that for grant of State remission in terms Rule 18 of the Rules of 1962, it is not mandatory to follow the procedure as prescribed under Section 432(2) of Cr.P.C. It is submitted that in the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017 the requirement of the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the court is contemplated, however, in terms of the provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of 1962, the said opinion may not be relevant circumstance or such an opinion is not binding on the Government. Mr. Gawankar with Mr. Jaiswal, the learned counsel for the petitioners in writ petition Nos. 373 of 2019, 423 of 2019, 718 of 2019 and 719 of 2019, in order to substantiate their submissions, placed reliance on the following cases:- i) Rambhau Pandurang Wankhede vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2000 ALL MR (Cri.) 68 ii) Sangeet and another vs. State of Haryana, reported in 2013 ALL SCR 534. 7. 373 of 2019, 423 of 2019, 718 of 2019 and 719 of 2019, in order to substantiate their submissions, placed reliance on the following cases:- i) Rambhau Pandurang Wankhede vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2000 ALL MR (Cri.) 68 ii) Sangeet and another vs. State of Haryana, reported in 2013 ALL SCR 534. 7. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that in terms of Section 3(5) of the Prisons Act, 1894, The “Remission system” means Rules for the time being in force regulating the award of marks to, and the consequent shortening of sentence of the prisoners in jail in accordance with the Rules. In exercise of the powers under clause (5) of Section 59 of the Prisons Act 1894, the Maharashtra Prisons (Remission System) Rules 1962 came into existence in the month of April, 1962. These Rules are quite exhaustive. Rule 18 of the said Rules, specifically deals with State remission and in terms of it, the State Government may, on such occasion of national importance or public rejoining as the State Government may determine grant remission to such prisoners for such number of days as the State Government may by order specify in this behalf. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that in terms of the provisions of these Rules, the State Government has issued Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017 on the occasion of 125th Birth Anniversary of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar. Learned public prosecutor submits that however, to prevent its arbitrary exercise, the Legislature has built in some procedural and substantive checks in the statute. In terms of the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017 the remission can be granted under Section 432 of Cr.P.C. in the case of a definite term of sentence. The power under section 432 of Cr.P.C. is available only for granting “additional” remission i.e. for a period over and above the remission granted or awarded to a convict under the Jail Manual or other statutory Rules. 8. The power under section 432 of Cr.P.C. is available only for granting “additional” remission i.e. for a period over and above the remission granted or awarded to a convict under the Jail Manual or other statutory Rules. 8. Learned public prosecutor submits that in terms of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sangeet and another vs. State of Haryana, reported in 2013 ALL SCR 534, before actually exercising the powers of remission under section 432 of Cr.P.C., the appropriate Government is required to obtain opinion of the Presiding Judge and remission can be given only “case to case basis and not in a wholesale manner.” Learned Public Prosecutor submits that in the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017, initially in para 4, the convicts under the Central Act are excluded from the entitlement of remission. However, a corrigendum has been issued on 19.11.2018 and it is to be read as “convict under section 435 of Cr.P.C.” instead of “convict under Central Act”. It is submitted that as per the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017, the convicts falling in specified categories are excepted from the Government Resolution. As it is seen from the last para of the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017, it has become binding on each District Superintendent of Jail to obtain opinion from the concerned Presiding Judge of the court about each convict and the same is required to be registered in the remission Register. The said record and calculation of remission is required to be maintained after obtaining the opinion from the Presiding Judge of the court. 9. Learned Public Prosecutor, on question No. (i) of the reference, submits that it is necessary to obtain opinion of the Presiding Judge of the court in terms of provisions of Section 432 (2) of Cr.P.C. Learned A.P.P. on question No. (ii) of the reference submits that if the convict files an application to avail remission in terms of Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017 and if he falls in the excepted category, his application is required to be rejected straightway by the authority. So far as question No. (iii) of the reference is concerned, learned Public Prosecutor submits that the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the court is relevant circumstance but the same is not binding on the authority. So far as question No. (iii) of the reference is concerned, learned Public Prosecutor submits that the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the court is relevant circumstance but the same is not binding on the authority. Learned Public prosecutor however made an addition that the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the court is always respected while dealing with the remission application by the jail authorities. However, learned Public Prosecutor, on instructions, made it clear that the record of the trial court is never sent to the jail authorities alongwith the opinion. So far as question No. (iv) of the reference is concerned, learned Public Prosecutor submits that remission is not the right of the convict and it is a concession which is to be granted by applying mind after following due procedure as prescribed in the Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017 read with the provisions of Section 432 of Cr.P.C. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that such remission cannot be granted without any scrutiny as provided in the Cr.P.C. 10. Learned Public Prosecutor, in order to substantiate his contentions, placed his reliance on the following cases:- i) Sangeet and another vs. State of Haryana, reported in 2013 ALL SCR 534 ii) Judgment dated 28.11.2019 delivered by the Division Bench of this court at Principal Seat Bombay in criminal writ petition No. 1979 of 2018, iii) Vitthal Rayaji Gadekar vs. State of Maharashtra and another, reported in 2018 ALL MR (Cri.) 4736 11. In this context, we take up the following three questions i.e. question Nos. (i), (ii) and (iv), together for discussion:- “i) Whether it is necessary to obtain the opinion of the Presiding Officer mentioned in Section 432(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of convicts mentioned in Government Resolution dated 3rd June, 2017 to whom the benefit of remission is to be given. ii) Whether the application given by the convicts, who fall under the excepted categories, can be rejected straightway by the authority. iv) Whether under such policy without any scrutiny as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure the benefit, remission must be given.” 12. ii) Whether the application given by the convicts, who fall under the excepted categories, can be rejected straightway by the authority. iv) Whether under such policy without any scrutiny as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure the benefit, remission must be given.” 12. In the case of Union of India vs. V. Sriharan @ Murugan and others, reported in (2014) 11 SCC 1 , the petitioner therein had challenged the letter dated 19.2.2014 issued by the State Government of Tamilnadu to the Central Government wherein the State Government proposed to remit the sentence of life imprisonment and to release respondent Nos. 1 to 7 in the writ petition, who were convicted in Rajiv Gandhi assassination case [Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253 ] which case right from the inception had been investigated by the CBI and which thereafter carried prosecution right up to the Supreme Court and at no stage the State Government had any role to play. Originally, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were sentenced to death but in the case of V. Sriharan @ Murugan and others vs. Union of India (2014) 4 SCC 242 , the sentence of death was commuted. Immediately, thereafter, the letter impugned therein came to be issued by the State Government which gave rise to the filing of writ petition by the Union of India, raising questions interalia, whether such further remission was possible at all and whether the State Government had the remission power as “appropriate Government” in such circumstances where the case had been investigated entirely by the CBI and matter had national ramifications. While dealing with the said writ petition, the three Judge Bench in the case of Union of India vs. V. Sriharan @ Murugan and others (2014) 11 SCC 1 , thought it fit to refer seven questions for consideration by a Constitution Bench. Accordingly, the said writ petition was placed before the Constitution Bench and the following questions have been reformulated by the Constitution Bench in para 8 of the case i.e. Union of India vs. V. Sriharan @ Murugan and others, reported in (2016) 7 SCC 1 . “52.1 (8.1) (i) As to whether the imprisonment for life means till the end of convict’s life with or without any scope for remission? “52.1 (8.1) (i) As to whether the imprisonment for life means till the end of convict’s life with or without any scope for remission? 52.2 (8.2) (ii) Whether a special category of sentence instead of death for a term exceeding 14 years can be made by putting that category beyond grant of remission? 52.3 (8.3) (iii) Whether the power under Sections 432 and 433 Code of Criminal Procedure by Appropriate Government would be available even after the Constitutional power under Articles 72 and 161 by the President and the Governor is exercised as well as the power exercised by this Court under Article 32? 52.4 (8.4) (iv) Whether State or the Central Government have the primacy under Section 432(7) of Criminal Procedure Code? 52.5 (8.5) (v) Whether there can be two Appropriate Governments under Section 432(7)? 52.6 (8.6) (vi) Whether power under Section 432(1) can be exercised suo motu without following the procedure prescribed under section 432(2)? 52.7 (8.7) (vii) Whether the expression ‘‘Consultation’’ stipulated in 435(1) really means ‘‘Concurrence’’?” “52.1 Whether imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the Penal Code meant imprisonment for rest of the life of the prisoner or a convict undergoing life imprisonment has a right to claim remission and whether as per the principles enunciated in paras 91 to 93 of Swamy Shraddananda (2), a special category of sentence may be made for the very few cases where the death penalty might be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term in excess of fourteen years and to put that category beyond application of remission? (as formulated by the Referral Bench.) 13. In the context of the issue raised in the reference, the question 8.6 as formulated by the Constitution Bench corresponds to 52.6 as formulated by the referral Bench, is relevant, which read as under:- “8.6 (vi) Whether power under Section 432(1) can be exercised suo motu without following the procedure prescribed under section 432(2)? 52.6. Whether suo motu exercise of power of remission under Section 432(1) is permissible in the scheme of the section, if yes, whether the procedure prescribed in sub-section (2) of the same section is mandatory or not? (As formulated by the Referral Bench)” 14. 52.6. Whether suo motu exercise of power of remission under Section 432(1) is permissible in the scheme of the section, if yes, whether the procedure prescribed in sub-section (2) of the same section is mandatory or not? (As formulated by the Referral Bench)” 14. Hon’ble F.M. Ibrahaim Kalifulla, J. delivered the leading opinion of the court on behalf of Hon’ble Dattu, the Chief Justice, himself and Hon’ble Ghos J. while Hon’ble Lalit J. for Hon’ble Sapre J. and himself delivered an opinion concurring therewith on all issues except on validity of the special category sentence. 15. Hon’ble F.M. Ibrahaim Kalifulla, J., who has delivered the leading opinion of the court on behalf of Hon’ble Dattu, the Chief Justice, himself and Hon’ble Ghos J. in para 181 of the judgment recorded the answer to question No. 8.6 (52.6 reformulated by Referral Bench), which reads as under:- “181. No suo motu power of remission is exercisable under Section 432(1) of Criminal Procedure Code. It can only be initiated based on an application of the person convicted as provided under Section 432 (2) and that ultimate order of suspension or remission should be guided by the opinion to be rendered by the Presiding Officer of the court concerned.” 16. At this stage, we may refer Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. which reads as under:- “432. Power to suspend or remit sentences. (1) When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced. (2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the appropriate Government may require the presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion as to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists. (3) If any condition on which a sentence has been suspended or remitted is, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, not fulfilled, the appropriate Government may cancel the suspension or remission, and thereupon the person in whose favour the sentence has been suspended or remitted may, if at large, be arrested by any police officer, without warrant and remanded to undergo the unexpired portion of the sentence. (4) The condition on which a sentence is suspended or remitted under this section may be one to be fulfilled by the person in whose favour the sentence is suspended or remitted, or one independent of his will. (5) The appropriate Government may, by general rules or special orders give directions as to the suspension of sentences and the conditions on which petitions should be presented and dealt with: Provided that in the case of any sentence (other than a sentence of fine) passed on a male person above the age of eighteen years, no such petition by the person sentenced or by any other person on his behalf shall be entertained, unless the person sentenced is in jail, and- (a) where such petition is made by the person sentenced, it is presented through the officer in charge of the jail; or (b) where such petition is made by any other person, it contains a declaration that the person sentenced is in jail. (6) The provisions of the above sub- sections shall also apply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under any section of this Code or of any other law which restricts the liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him or his property. (7) In this section and in section 433, the expression "appropriate Government" means,- (a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in sub- section (6) is passed under, any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government; (b) in other cases, the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced or the said order is passed.” 17. Broadly speaking, the remissions are of two kinds. Broadly speaking, the remissions are of two kinds. The first category is of remission as detailed in Rules 4 (a), (b) and (c) of the Maharashtra Prisons (Remission System) Rules, 1962, depending upon the good conduct or behavior of the convict while undergoing the sentence awarded to him. These are generally referred to as “earned remissions” and are not referable to Section 432 of Cr.P.C. This aspect was explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Swamy Shraddananda (2) vs. the State of Karnataka, reported in (2008) 13 SCC 767 . The Supreme court in para 80 of the said judgment has made the following observations:- “80. From the Prisons Acts and the Rules it appears that for good conduct and for doing certain duties, etc. inside the jail the prisoners are given some days’ remission on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis. The days of remission so earned by a prisoner are added to the period of his actual imprisonment (including the period undergone as an undertrial) to make up the term of sentence awarded by the Court. This being the position, the first question that arises in mind is how remission can be applied to imprisonment for life. The way in which remission is allowed, it can only apply to a fixed term and life imprisonment, being for the rest of life, is by nature indeterminate.” 18. The exercise of power in terms of the provisions of Section 432 of Cr.P.C. was explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Maru Ram vs Union of India, reported in (1981) 1 SCC 107 . In para 24 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has made the following observations:- “24. ….. ‘4. … In the first place, an order of remission does not wipe out the offence; it also does not wipe out the conviction. All that it does is to have an effect on the execution of the sentence; though ordinarily a convicted person would have to serve out the full sentence imposed by a court, he need not do so with respect to that part of the sentence which has been ordered to be remitted. All that it does is to have an effect on the execution of the sentence; though ordinarily a convicted person would have to serve out the full sentence imposed by a court, he need not do so with respect to that part of the sentence which has been ordered to be remitted. An order of remission thus does not in any way interfere with the order of the court; it affects only the execution of the sentence passed by the court and frees the convicted person from his liability to undergo the full term of imprisonment inflicted by the court, though the order of conviction and sentence passed by the court still stands as it was. The power to grant remission is executive power and cannot have the effect which the order of an appellate or revisional court would have of reducing the sentence passed by the trial court and substituting in its place the reduced sentence adjudged by the appellate or revisional court. ... Though, therefore, the effect of an order of remission is to wipe out that part of the sentence of imprisonment which has not been served out and thus in practice to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone, in law the order of remission merely means that the rest of the sentence need not be undergone, leaving the order of conviction by the court and the sentence passed by it untouched.” 19. Hon’ble Uday Lalit, J. for Sapre J. and himself, concur with the leading opinion given by Hon’ble F.M. Ibrahaim Kalifulla, J. and in para 226 of the judgment made the following observations:- “226. The difference between earned remissions “for good behaviour” and the remission of sentence under Section 432 is clear. The first depends upon the Jail Manual or the Policy in question and normally accrues and accumulates to the credit of the prisoner without there being any specific order by the appropriate Government in an individual case while the one under Section 432 requires specific assessment in an individual matter and is case specific. Could such exercise be undertaken under Section 432 by the appropriate Government on its own, without there being any application by or on behalf of the prisoner? Hon’ble Justice Lalit has referred the cases wherein this issue has already been dealt with. 20. Could such exercise be undertaken under Section 432 by the appropriate Government on its own, without there being any application by or on behalf of the prisoner? Hon’ble Justice Lalit has referred the cases wherein this issue has already been dealt with. 20. In the case of Sangeet vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 2 SCC 452 in paras 59, 61 and 62, the Supreme Court has made the following observations:- “59. There does not seem to be any decision of this Court detailing the procedure to be followed for the exercise of power under Section 432 Cr.P.C. But it does appear to us that sub-section (2) to sub-section (5) of Section 432 Cr.P.C. lay down the basic procedure, which is making an application to the appropriate Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, either by the convict or someone on his behalf. In fact, this is what was suggested in Samjuben Gordhanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat when it was observed that since remission can only be granted by the executive authorities, the appellant therein would be free to seek redress from the appropriate Government by making a representation in terms of Section 432 Cr.P.C. 60. …. 61. It appears to us that an exercise of power by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 432 Cr.P.C. cannot be suo motu for the simple reason that this sub-section is only an enabling provision. The appropriate Government is enabled to ‘override’ a judicially pronounced sentence, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. Those conditions are found either in the Jail Manual or in statutory rules. Sub-section (1) of Section 432 Cr.P.C. cannot be read to enable the appropriate Government to ‘further override’ the judicial pronouncement over and above what is permitted by the Jail Manual or the statutory rules. The process of granting ‘additional’ remission under this section is set into motion in a case only through an application for remission by the convict or on his behalf. On such an application being made, the appropriate Government is required to approach the Presiding Judge of the court before or by which the conviction was made or confirmed to opine (with reasons) whether the application should be granted or refused. Thereafter, the appropriate Government may take a decision on the remission application and pass orders granting remission subject to some conditions, or refusing remission. Thereafter, the appropriate Government may take a decision on the remission application and pass orders granting remission subject to some conditions, or refusing remission. Apart from anything else, this statutory procedure seems quite reasonable inasmuch as there is an application of mind to the issue of grant of remission. It also eliminates ‘discretionary’ or en masse release of convicts on ‘festive’ occasions since each release requires a case-by-case basis scrutiny. 62. It must be remembered in this context that it was held in State of Haryana v. Mohinder Singh that the power of remission cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The decision to grant remission has to be well informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned. The statutory procedure laid down in Section 432 Cr.P.C does provide this check on the possible misuse of power by the appropriate Government.” 21. In the case of Mohinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 294 in para 27, the Supreme court has made the following observations:- “27. In order to check all arbitrary remissions, the Code itself provides several conditions. Sub-sections (2) to (5) of Section 432 of the Code lay down basic procedure for making an application to the appropriate Government for suspension or remission of sentence either by the convict or someone on his behalf. We are of the view that exercise of power by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 432 of the Code cannot be suo motu for the simple reason that this is only an enabling provision and the same would be possible subject to fulfilment of certain conditions. Those conditions are mentioned either in the Jail Manual or in statutory rules. This Court in various decisions has held that the power of remission cannot be exercised arbitrarily. In other words, the decision to grant remission has to be well informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned. The statutory procedure laid down in Section 432 of the Code itself provides this check on the possible misuse of power by the appropriate Government. As rightly observed by this Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana, there is a misconception that a prisoner serving life sentence has an indefeasible right to release on completion of either 14 years’ or 20 years’ imprisonment. As rightly observed by this Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana, there is a misconception that a prisoner serving life sentence has an indefeasible right to release on completion of either 14 years’ or 20 years’ imprisonment. A convict undergoing life imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of his life, subject to any remission granted by the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Code which in turn is subject to the procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and further substantive check in Section 433-A of the Code.” 22. In the case of Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2013) 13 SCC 1 in paras 921 and 922 the Supreme Court has made the following observations:- “921. In order to check all arbitrary remissions, the Code itself provides several conditions. Sub-sections (2) to (5) of Section 432 of the Code lay down basic procedure for making an application to the appropriate Government for suspension or remission of sentence either by the convict or someone on his behalf. We are of the view that exercise of power by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 432 of the Code cannot be automatic or claimed as a right for the simple reason, that this is only an enabling provision and the same would be possible subject to fulfilment of certain conditions. Those conditions are mentioned either in the Jail Manual or in statutory rules. This Court, in various decisions, has held that the power of remission cannot be exercised arbitrarily. In other words, the decision to grant remission has to be well informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned. The statutory procedure laid down in Section 432 of the Code itself provides this check on the possible misuse of power by the appropriate Government. 922. As rightly observed by this Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana, there is misconception that a prisoner serving life sentence has an indefeasible right to be released on completion of either 14 years or 20 years’ imprisonment. A convict undergoing life imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of his life, subject to any remission granted by the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Code, which in turn is subject to the procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and to further substantive check in Section 433-A of the Code.” 23. A convict undergoing life imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of his life, subject to any remission granted by the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Code, which in turn is subject to the procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and to further substantive check in Section 433-A of the Code.” 23. The Hon’ble Justice Lalit for Sapre, J. and himself, by referring all the aforesaid cases, in para 228 of the judgment, has made the following observations: “228. We find force in the submission of the learned Solicitor General. By exercise of power of remission, the appropriate Government is enabled to wipe out that part of the sentence which has not been served out and over- ride a judicially pronounced sentence. The decision to grant remission must, therefore, be well informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned. The procedure prescribed in Section 432(2) is designed to achieve this purpose. The power exercisable under Section 432(1) is an enabling provision and must be in accord with the procedure under Section 432(2). Our answer to question posed in para 52.6 of the Referral Order Question 52.6. Whether suo motu exercise of power of remission under Section 432(1) is permissible in the scheme of the section, if yes, whether the procedure prescribed in sub-section (2) of the same section is mandatory or not? ANSWER In para 229 answered the question No. 8.6 (52.6 as formulated by the referral Bench), which reads as under:- “229. That suo motu exercise of power of remission under Section 432(1) is not permissible and exercise of power under Section 432(1) must be in accordance with the procedure under Section 432(2) of Cr.P.C.” 24. In the case of Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in AIR 1961 SC 600 the Supreme Court had an occasion to discuss the scope of Rules made under Section 59 of the Prisons Act. In paras 7 and 8, the Supreme Court has made the following observations:- “7. It is common case that the said rules were made under the Prisons Act, 1894 and that they have statutory force. But the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority a power to commute or remit sentences; it provides only for the regulation of prisons and for the treatment of prisoners confined therein. It is common case that the said rules were made under the Prisons Act, 1894 and that they have statutory force. But the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority a power to commute or remit sentences; it provides only for the regulation of prisons and for the treatment of prisoners confined therein. Section 59 of the Prisons Act confers a power on the State Government to make rules, inter alia, for rewards for good conduct. Therefore, the rules made under the Act should be construed within the scope of the ambit of the Act. The rules, inter alia, provide for three types of remissions by way of rewards for good conduct, namely, (i) ordinary, (ii) special and (iii) State. For the working out of the said remissions, under rule 1419 (c), transportation for life is ordinarily to be taken as 15 years' actual imprisonment. The rule cannot be construed as a statutory equation of 15 years' actual imprisonment for transportation for life. The equation is only for a particular purpose, namely, for the purpose of "remission system'' and not for all purposes. The word "ordinarily'' in the rule also supports the said construction. The non obstante clause in sub rule (2) of rule 1447 reiterates that notwithstanding anything contained in rule 1419 no prisoner who has been sentenced to transportation for life shall be released on completion of his term unless orders of Government have been received on a report submitted to it. This also indicates that the period of 15 years' actual imprisonment specified in the rule is only for the purpose of calculating the remission and that the completion of the term on that basis does not ipso facto confer any right upon the prisoner to release. The order of Government contemplated in rule 1447 in the case of a prisoner sentenced to transportation for life can only be an order under S. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for in the case of a sentence of transportation for life the release of the prisoner can legally be effected only by remitting the entire balance of the sentence. Rules 934 and 937 (c) provide for that contingency. Under the said rules the orders of an appropriate Government under S. 401, Criminal Procedure Code, are a pre-requisite for a release. Rules 934 and 937 (c) provide for that contingency. Under the said rules the orders of an appropriate Government under S. 401, Criminal Procedure Code, are a pre-requisite for a release. No other rule has been brought to our notice which confers an indefeasible right on a prisoner sentenced to transportation for life to an unconditional release on the expiry of a particular term including remissions. The rules under the Prisons Act do not substitute a lesser sentence for a sentence of transportation for life. 8. Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act XXVI of 1955 a sentence of transportation for life could be undergone by a prisoner by way of rigorous imprisonment for life in a designated prison in India. After the said Act, such a convict shall be dealt with in the same manner as one sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the same term. Unless the said sentence is commuted or remitted by appropriate authority under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law to serve the life term in prison. The rules framed under the Prisons Act enable such a prisoner to earn remissions - ordinary, special and State – and the said remissions will be given credit towards his term of imprisonment. For the purpose of working out the remissions the sentence of transportation for life is ordinarily equated with a definite period, but it is only for that particular purpose and not for any other purpose. As the sentence of transportation for life or its prison equivalent, the life imprisonment, is one of indefinite duration, the remissions so earned do not in practice help such a convict as it is not possible to predicate the time of his death. That is why the rules provide for a procedure to enable the appropriate Government to remit the sentence under S. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on a consideration of the relevant factors, including the period of remissions earned. The question of remission is exclusively within the province of the appropriate Government; and in this case it is admitted that, though the appropriate Government made certain remissions under S. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not remit the entire sentence. The question of remission is exclusively within the province of the appropriate Government; and in this case it is admitted that, though the appropriate Government made certain remissions under S. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not remit the entire sentence. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner has not yet acquired any right to release.” [Section 432 correspondence to Section 401 of Code of 1898] (emphasis supplied). 25. It is thus clear that, in terms of the provisions of Prisons Act, 1894 and the Rules made thereunder, for good conduct and for doing certain duties etc. inside the jail, the prisoners are given some days’ remission on monthly, quarterly or annual basis. The days of remissions so earned by the prisoner are added to the period of his actual imprisonment (including the period undergone as under trial) to make up the term of sentence awarded by the court. The difference between earned remission “for good behavior” and the remission of sentence under Section 432 is clear. Section 432 of Cr.P.C. requires specific assessment in an individual matter and is case specific. It appears that an exercise of power by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 432 of Cr.P.C. cannot be suo motu for the simple reason that this subsection (1) is only an enabling provision. The process of granting ‘additional’ remission under Section 432 of Cr.P.C. is set into motion in a case only through an application for remission by the convict or on his behalf. On such an application being made, the appropriate Government is required to approach the Presiding Judge of the court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed to opine (with reasons) whether the application should be granted or refused. Thereafter, the appropriate Government may take decision on the remission application and pass orders granting remission subject to some condition, or refusing remission. Thus, there is an application of mind to the issue of grant of remission. It also eliminates ‘discretionary’ or en masse release of convicts on ‘festive’ occasions since each release requires the case-by-case basis scrutiny. The Supreme Court in various decisions has held that the power of remission as contemplated under Section 432 of Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised arbitrarily. In other words, the decision to grant remission has to be well informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned. The Supreme Court in various decisions has held that the power of remission as contemplated under Section 432 of Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised arbitrarily. In other words, the decision to grant remission has to be well informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned. The procedure as laid down under Section 432 of Cr.P.C. does provide this check on the possible misuse of the power by the appropriate Government. The procedure prescribed in section 432 (2) of Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve this purpose. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. V. Sriharan (supra) has unequivocally held that the power exercisable under section 432(1) is an enabling provision and must be in accordance with the procedure under section 432 (2) of Cr.P.C. 26. On careful perusal of Government Resolution dated 3.6.2017, we find that the Government has issued the said Resolution by exercising the powers under Section 432 (1) of Cr.P.C. Furthermore, certain prisoners falling in categories 1 to 6 are excluded from granting benefit of remission in terms of the said Resolution. In view of the same, if any application is submitted by the prisoner, who falls under the said exceptional categories, the same is liable to be rejected straightway by the authority. 27. The question No.(iv) formulated by the Referral Division Bench is part of question No.(i) and thus needs no separate discussion. We accordingly answer the question Nos. (i), (ii) and (iv) as follows:- Question No. (i): Whether it is necessary to obtain the opinion of the Presiding Officer mentioned in Section 432(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of convicts mentioned in Government Resolution dated 3rd June, 2017 to whom the benefit of remission is to be given. Answer: In view of the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court, in the case of Union of India vs. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Others (supra) this question is no more res-integra. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme court in the said case has recorded the answer to the question formulated in para 52.6 by the Referral Bench and recorded that suo motu exercise of power of remission under Section 432(1) is not permissible and exercise of power under Section 432(1) must be in accordance with the procedure under Section 432(2) of Cr.P.C. In the instant case, we answer the referral question No.(i) accordingly. Question No. (ii): Whether the application given by the convicts, who fall under the excepted categories, can be rejected straightway by the authority. Answer: In view of the discussion above, we record our answer to question No.(ii) in the affirmative. Question No. (iv): Whether under such policy without any scrutiny as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure the benefit, remission must be given. Answer: In view of the discussion above, we record our answer to question No.(iv) in negative. 28. The question No.(iii) needs to be answered particularly in the backdrop of answers recorded to the aforesaid questions i.e. (i), (ii) and (iv). Question No.(iii) reads as under:- iii) Whether the opinion given by the Presiding Officer mentioned in Section 432(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also the record of trial, need to be considered by the authority created for grant or refusal of remission as relevant circumstances or whether the opinion is binding on the authority. 29. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Others (supra) has answered referral questions pertaining to the provisions of Section 432(2) of Cr.P.C. and held that ultimate order of suspension or remission should be guided by the opinion to be rendered by the Presiding Judge of the court concerned and exercise of the powers under Section 432 (1) of Cr.P.C. must be in accordance with the procedure as enumerated under Section 432 (2) of Cr.P.C. In view of the same, to our mind, seeking opinion of the Presiding Judge of the court or by which conviction was had or confirmed as to whether the application filed under Section 432(1) of Cr.P.C. should be granted or refused, as not an empty formality. It is true that if we read Section 432 (2) of Cr.P.C. the word “may” is used. If we consider the said exercise of calling opinion of the Presiding Judge of the court as merely relevant circumstance, the object of the said provision will be defeated. It is well settled that in construing the provisions of the statute, the court should be slow to adopt the construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective. It is well settled that in construing the provisions of the statute, the court should be slow to adopt the construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective. If we read sub-section (2) of Section 432 of Cr.P.C. as a whole, it appears that the requirement of seeking opinion of the Presiding Judge of the Court as to whether the application filed in terms of Section 432(1) of Cr.P.C. should be granted or refused. In the language of sub-section (2) of section 432 of Cr.P.C. it is also incumbent upon such Presiding Judge of the Court to state his opinion together with his reasons for such opinion. 30. In the instant case, the State Government has issued a Resolution dated 3.6.2017 granting remission to the prisoners excepting certain categories of prisoners on account of 125th day of Birth Anniversary of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar. In terms of the said Government Resolution, even if the accepted categories of prisoners are to be accorded benefit of remission on account of 125th Birth Anniversary of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, the same cannot be granted en masse and blindly without looking into the nature of the offence, aggravated circumstance, brutality while commission of offence etc. For this reason, in our considered opinion, the Presiding Judge of the court is best equipped and likely to be more correct in his view for achieving the purpose and performing the task satisfactorily. He is an expert in the field and as such a greater weight to his opinion is required to be attached. It would be a fallacy to grant remission to the hardened criminal, who has committed the offence with extreme brutality etc., by treating the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the Court as a relevant circumstance without having any binding effect. We afraid that if the answer to the referral question No.(iii) is recorded as “relevant circumstances” that would open floodgates to the authorities to treat it as “irrelevant circumstances” and grant benefit of remission to the unscrupulous prisoners. 31. We afraid that if the answer to the referral question No.(iii) is recorded as “relevant circumstances” that would open floodgates to the authorities to treat it as “irrelevant circumstances” and grant benefit of remission to the unscrupulous prisoners. 31. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Others (supra) has held that the decision to grant remission in terms of the provisions of Section 432(1) of Cr.P.C. must be well informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned and the procedure prescribed in Section 432(2) is designed to achieve this purpose. The power exercisable under Section 432(1) is an enabling provision and must be in accordance with the procedure under Section 432(2) of Cr.P.C. 32. We are fortified by the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-On Record Association and others vs. Union of India, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 441 . In the said case, the Supreme Court has dealt with the debate on primacy is intended to determine, who amongst the constitutional functionaries involved in the integrated process of appointments is best equipped to discharge the greater burden attached to the role of primacy, of making the proper choice. This question arose for the purpose of appointment of the Judges of Supreme Court in accordance with Article 124(2), and in the High Courts in accordance with Article 217(1); and transfer of a Judge/Chief Justice from on High Court to another in accordance with Article 222 of the Constitution. Though the issue was different, however, in para 441 the Supreme court has made following observations, which is relevant for the purpose of deciding question No.(iii) herein:- “441. For this reason, it must be seen who is best equipped and likely to be more correct in his view for achieving the purpose and performing the task satisfactorily. In other words, primacy should be in him who qualifies to be treated as the 'expert' in the field. Comparatively greater weight to his opinion may then be attached.” 33. In the case of State of Gujarat vs. R.A. Mehta, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 1 in para 32, the Supreme Court has made the following observations:- “32. In other words, primacy should be in him who qualifies to be treated as the 'expert' in the field. Comparatively greater weight to his opinion may then be attached.” 33. In the case of State of Gujarat vs. R.A. Mehta, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 1 in para 32, the Supreme Court has made the following observations:- “32. Thus, in view of the above, the meaning of ‘consultation’ varies from case to case, depending upon its fact situation and the context of the statute as well as the object it seeks to achieve. Thus, no straitjacket formula can be laid down in this regard. Ordinarily, ‘consultation’ means a free and fair discussion on a particular subject, revealing all material that the parties possess in relation to each other and then arriving at a decision. However, in a situation where one of the consultees has primacy of opinion under the statute, either specifically contained in a statutory provision, or by way of implication, “consultation” may mean concurrence. The court must examine the fact situation in a given case to determine whether the process of “consultation” as required under the particular situation did in fact stand complete.” (emphasis supplies) 34. In the case of Indian Administrative Service (S.C.S.) Association, U. P. and others vs. Union of India and others, reported in (1993) Suppl. (1) SCC 730, the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with the meaning of word “consultation”. In para 26 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has made following observations:- “26. The result of the above discussion leads to the following conclusions: (1) Consultation is a process which requires meeting of minds between the parties involved in the process of consultation on the material facts and points involved to evolve a correct or at least satisfactory solution. There should be meeting of minds between the proposer and the persons to be consulted on the subject of consultation. There must be definite facts which constitute the foundation and source for final decision. The object of the consultation is to render consultation meaningful to serve the intended purpose. Prior consultation in that behalf is mandatory. (2) When the offending action affects fundamental rights or to effectuate built-in insulation, as fair procedure, consultation is mandatory and non-consultation renders the action ultra vires or invalid or void. The object of the consultation is to render consultation meaningful to serve the intended purpose. Prior consultation in that behalf is mandatory. (2) When the offending action affects fundamental rights or to effectuate built-in insulation, as fair procedure, consultation is mandatory and non-consultation renders the action ultra vires or invalid or void. (3) When the opinion or advice binds the proposer, consultation is mandatory and its infraction renders the action or order illegal. (4) When the opinion or advice or view does not bind the person or authority, any action or decision taken contrary to the advice is not illegal, nor becomes void. (5) When the object of the consultation is only to apprise of the proposed action and when the opinion or advice is not binding on the authorities or person and is not bound to be accepted, the prior consultation is only directory. The authority proposing to take action should make known the general scheme or outlines of the actions proposed to be taken be put to notice of the authority or the persons to be consulted; have the views or objections, take them into consideration, and thereafter, the authority or person would be entitled or has/have authority to pass appropriate orders or take decision thereon. In such circumstances it amounts to an action “after consultation”. (6) No hard and fast rule could be laid, no useful purpose would be served by formulating words or definitions nor would it be appropriate to lay down the manner in which consultation must take place. It is for the Court to determine in each case in the light of its facts and circumstances whether the action is “after consultation”; “was in fact consulted” or was it a “sufficient consultation”. (7) Where any action is legislative in character, the consultation envisages like one under Section 3(1) of the Act, that the Central Government is to intimate to the State Governments concerned of the proposed action in general outlines and on receiving the objections or suggestions, the Central Government or Legislature is free to evolve its policy decision, make appropriate legislation with necessary additions or modification or omit the proposed one in draft bill or rules. The revised draft bill or rules, amendments or additions in the altered or modified form need not again be communicated to all the concerned State Governments nor have prior fresh consultation. The revised draft bill or rules, amendments or additions in the altered or modified form need not again be communicated to all the concerned State Governments nor have prior fresh consultation. Rules or Regulations being legislative in character, would tacitly receive the approval of the State Governments through the people’s representatives when laid on the floor of each House of Parliament. The Act or the Rule made at the final shape is not rendered void or ultra vires or invalid for non-consultation. 35. In the case of State of U. P. and others vs. Bapu Ram Upadhya, reported in AIR 1961 SC 751 , the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the statute whether mandatory or directory. In para 29, the Supreme Court has made the following observations:- “29. The relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly stated thus: When a statute uses the word “shall”, prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the noncompliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered.” 36. In the case of Siraj-ul-Haq-Khan and others vs. The Sunni Central Board of Wakf, Utter Pradesh and others, reported in AIR 1959 SC 198 , the Supreme Court, while referring the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, has held that where the literal meaning of the words used in a statutory provision would manifestly defeat its object by making a part of it meaningless and ineffective, it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provision and to make the whole of it effective and operative. 37. 37. In the case of Hameedia Hardware Stores vs. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1060 , the Supreme court held that the court while construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the Court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. 38. In the case of Bhikraj Jaipuria vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1962 SC 113 , in para 17, the Supreme court has made the following observations:- “17. The question still remains whether the purchase orders executed by the Divisional Superintendent but which were not expressed to be made by the Governor-General and were not executed on behalf of the Governor-General, were binding on the Government of India. Section 175(3) plainly requires that contracts on behalf of the Government of India shall be executed in the form prescribed thereby; the section however does not set out the consequences of non-compliance. Where a statute requires that a thing shall be done in the prescribed manner or form but does not set out the consequences of noncompliance, the question whether the provision was mandatory or directory has to be adjudged in the light of the intention of the legislature as disclosed by the object, purpose and scope of the statute. If the statute is mandatory, the thing done not in the manner or form prescribed can have no effect or validity: if it is directory, penalty may be incurred for noncompliance, but the act or thing done is regarded as good. As observed in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 10th Edition p. 376: "It has been said that no, rule can be laid down for determining whether the command is to be considered as a mere direction or instruction involving no invalidating consequences in its disregard, or as imperative, with an implied nullification for disobedience, beyond the fundamental one that it depends on the scope and object of the enactment. It may perhaps be found generally correct to say that nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience, but the question is, in the main governed by considerations of convenience and justice, and when that result would involve general inconvenience or injustice to innocent persons or advantage to those guilty of the neglect, without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment, such an intention is not to be attributed to the legislature. The whole scope and purpose of the statute under consideration must be regarded." Lord Campbell in Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner (1860) 30 L.J. CH 379 observed: "No universal rule 'can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Court of justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed." 39. In the instant case, though the provisions of Section 432 (2) does not set out the consequences after receipt of report of Presiding Judge of the Court, however, if it is held that the said report would have no binding force, then entire exercise of granting remission in terms of Section 432 (1) of Cr.P.C. would get frustrated and meaningless. 40. In terms of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 432 of Cr.P.C. Presiding Judge of the Court is required to state his opinion as to whether the application under Section 432(1) of Cr.P.C. filed for grant of remission should be granted or refused, in the context in which provision appears to make it harmonious and meaningful, it would be necessary to pronounce that the said opinion given by the presiding Judge of the court would bind the authorities while deciding the application for grant of remission in terms of provisions of Section 432(1) of Cr.P.C. 41. Considering the above discussion, we answer the question No. (iii) as follows:- Question No.(iii) : Whether the opinion given by the Presiding Officer mentioned in Section 432(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also the record of trial, need to be considered by the authority created for grant or refusal of remission as relevant circumstances or whether the opinion is binding on the authority. Answer: The opinion given by the Presiding Judge of the court in terms of provisions of Section 432(2) of the Cr.P.C. is binding on the authority. 42. In view of the discussion made herein above and the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in various authorities as cited above, as referred in the foregoing paragraphs, we answer the question Nos.(i) to (iv) as follows:- Question No. (i): Whether it is necessary to obtain the opinion of the Presiding Officer mentioned in Section 432(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of convicts mentioned in Government Resolution dated 3rd June, 2017 to whom the benefit of remission is to be given. Answer: In view of the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court, in the case of Union of India vs. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Others (supra) this question is no more res-integra. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme court in the said case has recorded the answer to the question formulated in para 52.6 by the Referral Bench and recorded that suo motu exercise of power of remission under Section 432(1) is not permissible and exercise of power under Section 432(1) must be in accordance with the procedure under Section 432(2) of Cr.P.C. Question No. (ii): Whether the application given by the convicts, who fall under the excepted categories, can be rejected straightway by the authority. Answer: In view of the discussion above, we record our answer to question No.(ii) in the affirmative. Question No.(iii) : Whether the opinion given by the Presiding Officer mentioned in Section 432(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also the record of trial, need to be considered by the authority created for grant or refusal of remission as relevant circumstances or whether the opinion is binding on the authority. Answer: The opinion given by the Presiding Judge of the court in terms of provisions of Section 432(2) of the Cr.P.C. is binding on the authority. Question No. (iv): Whether under such policy without any scrutiny as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the benefit, remission must be given. Answer: In view of the discussion above, we record our answer to question No.(iv) in negative. 43. The reference of the aforesaid questions are answered in the above manner and we direct the writ petitions be placed before the appropriate Bench for disposal.