ORDER : 1. This case is taken up through video conferencing. 2. The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of direction upon the respondent nos. 1 to 3 to show cause as to for what reason the bid submitted by the petitioner in connection with Tender Notice No. JRDA/VA/IFB-06/2018-19 has been held to be not qualified for opening of Part-II bid and consequently the tender has been rejected in course of technical evaluation. Further prayer has been made for issuance of direction upon the respondent nos. 1 to 3 to show cause as to how and under what authority the respondent nos. 4 and 5 have been awarded the work in connection with the said tender notice. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing the communication as contained in e-mail dated 19.06.2019 by which the petitioner has been informed that its technical bid has been rejected and upon quashing the communication dated 19.06.2019, the respondent nos. 1 to 3 be directed to award the work in favour of the petitioner after opening of Part-II i.e. the financial bid. The petitioner has further prayed for issuance of direction upon the respondent nos. 1 to 3 to show cause as to how the respondent no.4 has been declared to be technically qualified and has consequently been awarded part of the work and if no cause or insufficient cause is shown, then to hold and declare that the respondent no.4 was not technically qualified and its bid ought to have been rejected. The petitioner has also sought a declaration that the award of work in connection with Tender Notice No. JRDA/VA/IFB-06/2018-19 to the respondent nos.4 and 5 is wholly illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional and consequently to direct the respondent nos.1 to 3 to recall/rescind any letter of authority issued and/or agreement executed in their favour. 3. The factual matrix of the case, as stated in the writ petition, is that the respondent no.1 issued Tender Notice No. JRDA/VA/IFB-06/2018-19 (hereinafter to be referred as the ‘said Tender’) dated 8th March, 2019, inviting bids to participate in a nationwide competitive bidding for construction of 4000 units (G+3) four storied “Visthapit Awas” at Phase-VIII, Mouja Belgoria, District Dhanbad. The estimated cost of the project was Rs.209,73,86,142/- and the completion period of the said work was fixed as 36 months. The estimated cost of the project was Rs.209,73,86,142/- and the completion period of the said work was fixed as 36 months. The procurement notice and the complete bidding documents were uploaded on the official website of the respondent no.1 on 11th March, 2019. The petitioner as a joint venture consortium of M/s. Rishabh Construction Private Limited and M/s. Swadeshi Civil Infrastructure Private Limited, participated in the said tender through M/s. Rishabh Construction Private Limited being the lead partner and submitted its e-tender. Altogether five bidders participated in the said tender process including the petitioner. The bids were opened on 3rd May, 2019 and, thereafter, the petitioner was communicated vide e-mail dated 19th June, 2019 that its bid was rejected during technical evaluation by stating “not qualified for Part-II opening”. The petitioner came to know that out of five bidders, three bidders including the petitioner were declared technically disqualified. The tender committee in its meeting dated 20th June, 2019 found the amount quoted by the respondent nos.4 and 5 to be the lowest and consequently decided to award the work in two equal halves with reduced completion time of 24 months to both the said bidders at their quoted rate of 10% below estimated cost of work i.e. Rs.1,88,76,47,527.40. The petitioner sent several e-mails, requesting the Tender Inviting Authority to intimate the shortcomings on the basis of which its tender was rejected, however, the same were not responded and the respondent no.2 issued Letter of Acceptance in favour of the respondent nos.4 and 5 vide letter nos.236 and 237, both, dated 21st June, 2019. Hence, the present writ petition. 4. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner’s technical bid was rejected by the respondent JRDA only on the ground that the solvency certificates submitted by the members of the petitioner’s joint venture were not as per the prescribed format and hence the same were treated to be conditional bank certificates. The requirement of solvency certificate is mandated by clause 4.3(g) of Part A of the bid document which is applicable in this case as the employer had not undertaken prequalification of potential bidders and the said clause does not mention that the certificate must be in a particular format. The requirement of solvency certificate is mandated by clause 4.3(g) of Part A of the bid document which is applicable in this case as the employer had not undertaken prequalification of potential bidders and the said clause does not mention that the certificate must be in a particular format. The qualification information as set out in section 2 of the Bid Document provides for the information to be filled by the bidder in the pages mentioned in that section to be used for the purpose of post qualification as provided in Clause 4 of the Instruction to Bidders (IBD) but it has been clarified that the said information will not be incorporated in the contract. Further, Paragraph 1.9 of section 2 mentions that the bidder must list and attach supporting documents showing evidence of access to financial resources to meet qualification requirement i.e. cash in hand, lines of credit etc. No format has been mentioned in the above paragraph. Though, a sample format is attached with the tender documents, but in the entire bid document it has nowhere been mentioned that the solvency certificate must be submitted in a prescribed format. Even otherwise, if the sample format for evidence of access to or availability of credit facilities is taken into consideration, the deviation if any in the Bank Certificate submitted by the petitioner is not of such nature which would make it conditional, rather the sample format merely stipulates that the bank must certify that the bidder is a reputed company with good financial standing and if the work is awarded, the bank shall be able to provide overdraft/credit facilities to the extent of the amount required to meet the working capital for executing the work during the contract period. The said two requirements have duly been satisfied by the concerned banks in the certificate issued in favour of the members of the petitioner-Joint Venture. It is further submitted that in terms of the bid document, a JV bidder had to show its financial capability by furnishing credit lines/letter of credit/certificates issued by the Banks for meeting the funds requirements etc to the extent of Rs. 21 Crore (approximately). It is further submitted that in terms of the bid document, a JV bidder had to show its financial capability by furnishing credit lines/letter of credit/certificates issued by the Banks for meeting the funds requirements etc to the extent of Rs. 21 Crore (approximately). The requirement of solvency had to be met by the members of the petitioner JV by showing that they had the capacity or were supported by the banks to the extent of approximately 21 crores in the manner that lead partner i.e M/s Rishabh Constructions Pvt. Ltd. had to furnish solvency certificate to the extent of Rs.15.75 crores and the other member namely M/s Swadeshi Civil Infrastructure Private Limited to the extent of Rs.5.25 crores. The lead partner had submitted the solvency certificate to the tune of Rs. 72.50 crores and the other partner to the tune of Rs.21 crores which was more than the required amount. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the respondent no.4 has suppressed the material facts in its bid documents and as a matter of fact has submitted a false affidavit and declaration, the format of which has been provided at page nos.35 and 37 of the bid documents so far as the same relates to the assertion that any contract awarded to the respondent no.4 was not rescinded during last five years and that it was not banned and delisted by any State Government. In fact, the respondent no.4 had been awarded three or more contracts by the Department of Water Resources, Government of Bihar and due to breach committed by the respondent no.4, the said department did not only terminate the contracts but also blacklisted the respondent no.4. The petitioner also came to know that the Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar had uploaded the extracts of its order relating to blacklisting of contractors on its website vide order no.1240 dated 24th March, 2014, letter no.412 dated 6th February, 2018 and letter no.2480 dated 4th July, 2018. The respondent no.4 has also suppressed true facts relating to an ongoing project with the respondent no.1, as the Executive Engineer of the respondent no.1 vide letter dated 5th April, 2019 had informed the respondent no.4 about its slow progress of Phase-IV work and had consequently directed it to speed up the progress. The respondent no.4 has also suppressed true facts relating to an ongoing project with the respondent no.1, as the Executive Engineer of the respondent no.1 vide letter dated 5th April, 2019 had informed the respondent no.4 about its slow progress of Phase-IV work and had consequently directed it to speed up the progress. Thus, the respondent no.4 has not only suppressed the facts but has also committed fraud and thereby has obtained the present work by making misrepresentation. It is also submitted that the Central Public Works Department, Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India had withdrawn the part of the work relating to construction of Super Speciality Block in S.S. Hospital, IMS, BHU Varanasi to meet timeline and had floated a tender for completion of the part of the work not done by the respondent no.4. Since such withdrawal in effect amounts to abandonment of work/rescission of the part of the work, the respondent no.4 has given false declaration in its affidavit. It is further submitted that admittedly the respondent no. 4 did not disclose about letter no 352 dated 14.03.2019 issued by the Government of Bihar by which its contract was rescinded and filing of a writ petition being CWJC No. 6949 of 2019 before the Patna High Court. Though the Patna High Court passed interim order for maintaining status quo, the same did not amount to stay of the order rescinding the contract and thus the respondent no.4 committed fraud by consciously concealing the relevant facts. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the respondent authorities (respondent nos.1, 2 and 3) have not conducted proper verification of the information supplied and the documents furnished by the respondent no.4, rather proceeded to award the work in question in haste. Even with respect to the earlier work relating to Phase-IV, similar circumstances were overlooked and, therefore, it appears that the respondent no.4 is being favoured for an oblique motive. The respondent authorities, while taking decision to award the work in two equal halves to the respondent nos.4 and 5, have acted contrary to the tender notice and without any authority. The tender notice never contemplated for awarding the work in two equal halves to two bidders. The respondent authorities, while taking decision to award the work in two equal halves to the respondent nos.4 and 5, have acted contrary to the tender notice and without any authority. The tender notice never contemplated for awarding the work in two equal halves to two bidders. Part-F, Section 1 of the bid document, which relates to awarding of work, does not lay down any such procedure which would authorize the Tender Committee of the respondent no.1 to divide the work into two equal works and to award the same to purported qualified bidders. The CPWD Work Manual or any other CPWD norm does not provide for awarding work to more than one bidder even if two or more bidders are found to be the lowest. It is a settled law that where a power is required to be exercised by an authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. It is also submitted that the completion period, which was fixed as 36 months in the bid document, has, in fact, been increased by reasons of division of work between two bidders as compared to the alleged deduction of completion time. If two bidders are granted 24 months’ time each to complete the work, the same would come up to 48 months instead of 36 months. Moreover, the tender authorities were also bound by the terms and conditions of the tender notice and the same could not have been altered except in accordance with the provisions already stipulated in the tender document i.e. by issuing corrigendum notice. However, in the present case, no such corrigendum was issued by the respondent authorities before bifurcating the said work and awarding the same to the respondent nos.4 and 5. The rejection of the petitioner’s bid without assigning any reason is illegal and arbitrary and awarding of the said work in favour of the respondent nos.4 and 5 in such a manner does not satisfy the test of fairness and reasonableness. It is further submitted that the solvency certificate is issued with regard to financial capacity of a person and the same is issued without any guarantee or responsibility of the bank or its officer(s). The certifying officer does not take undertaking on behalf of a person in whose favour solvency certificate is issued. It is further submitted that the solvency certificate is issued with regard to financial capacity of a person and the same is issued without any guarantee or responsibility of the bank or its officer(s). The certifying officer does not take undertaking on behalf of a person in whose favour solvency certificate is issued. Thus, the objection of the respondent authorities raised with respect to the condition of solvency certificate submitted by the petitioner is not tenable in law. 7. Mr. Navaniti Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent no.4 submits that the respondent no.4 neither suppressed nor provided any false certificate and declaration while submitting its bid document. Three debarment orders against the respondent no.4, as alleged by the petitioner-company, has either been withdrawn or set aside. The respondent no.4 had, in fact, provided complete information with regard to its litigation history and the status of the case(s), as was required in the bid documents. It is further submitted that so far as the work of construction of Centenary Super Speciality Block in S. S. Hospital, IMS, BHU, Varanasi under PMSSY [SH: C/O Hospital Building (G+6)], service building along with other services is concerned, the respondent no.4 was neither debarred nor blacklisted nor the said contract was rescinded, rather it completed the said work within a reasonable period. Before awarding the work in question, an enquiry was made by JRDA, Dhanbad in this regard at the time of awarding the work by the said authority. It would be apparent from the communication made between JRDA, Dhanbad and the office of the Executive Engineer, BHU, Project Division-II, CPWD, Varanasi and also from the certificate issued by the said office that the contract was not rescinded and the respondent no.4 was also not blacklisted/debarred. Thus, non-disclosure of the said work having neither been rescinded nor having any litigation history cannot be alleged as concealment of any material fact. Learned senior counsel for the respondent no.4 also submits that so far as non-disclosure of pendency of the aforesaid writ petition (CWJC No.6949 of 2019) before the Patna High Court is concerned, in the said case, the concerned respondent authorities have been directed to maintain status quo till final disposal of the said writ petition, which is still pending, and, therefore, non-disclosure of the said case can also not be said as concealment of material facts. 8. 8. Learned senior counsel for the respondent no.4 further submits that the petitioner has neither pleaded in specific term nor has adduced any prima facie material to contend that if the work could not have been awarded to the respondent no.4, the petitioner was entitled to be awarded the said work and as such the challenge to the award of the part work in favour of the respondent no.4 may not be entertained by this court. In support of the said submission, the learned senior counsel for the respondent no.4 puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Bharat Singh and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, reported in (1988) 4 SCC 534 . 9. It is also submitted by the learned senior counsel for the respondent no.4 that an appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned Division Bench of this Court rendered in the case of Balaji Enterprises Vs. The State of Jharkhand [L.P.A. No.730 of 2018 with L.P.A. No.734 of 2018] before the Hon’ble Supreme Court being Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).1091 of 2020 which is still pending and in the meantime the said judgment of the High Court has been stayed and as such the observation made by the High Court in the said case would not help the case of the petitioner in any manner. 10. Mr. Rohit Roy, learned counsel for the respondent no.5 submits that the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, seeking enforcement of private rights and with an object to give effect to contractual rights and obligation, which cannot be entertained by a writ Court in its extra ordinary writ jurisdiction. The petitioner has miserably failed to comply mandatory requirement of Instructions to Bidders (ITB), as it failed to furnish the bank certificate in accordance with the terms and conditions of the ITB. It is completely incorrect to say that the petitioner had qualified as a bidder and had satisfied the essential criteria of the SBD. The bid of the petitioner was duly considered taking into account each and every document submitted by the petitioner and on verification of the same, it was found that the bank certificate submitted by the petitioner was not in terms with the ITB, making it ineligible in the said tender. The bid of the petitioner was duly considered taking into account each and every document submitted by the petitioner and on verification of the same, it was found that the bank certificate submitted by the petitioner was not in terms with the ITB, making it ineligible in the said tender. On contrary, the respondent no.5 had complied all the requirements and its bid was found to be most responsive, as a result of which a portion of the work was awarded to it, though it was entitled to be awarded the entire work. The respondent authorities were required to keep information regarding the decision making process confidential in terms with the stipulations made in the ITB and as such they have acted within the four corners of the same. The respondent no.5 was otherwise eligible for award of the entire work, however, the respondent authorities in their wisdom split up the said work and awarded the same to the respondent nos.4 and 5 in equal parts. The period for completion of the said work was reduced to 24 months, which would run parallel to each other. Any state instrumentality in its discretion is duly empowered to declare a bidder successful, keeping in mind the larger public interest involved in such project. The respondent no.5, after award of the work, immediately deployed its men and machineries and started executing the work, which is running in good pace and at present more than 75% of the physical progress in the said work has been achieved. As such, any interference in the work in question will prove detrimental to the larger public interest and will spoil the overall pace and rhythm of the project. 11. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned Advocate General, State of Jharkhand, appearing on behalf of the respondent authorities submits that for the purpose of evaluation of the technical bid in any tender, three aspects are primarily taken into consideration i.e. turnover of the bidder, experience of the bidder in executing the work of similar nature and financial soundness of the bidder. In order to ascertain the financial soundness, the Tender Evaluation Committee has taken into consideration the earnest money deposit submitted and the credit certificate provided by the bank. Clause 4 of the ITB provides the qualification of the bidders. In order to ascertain the financial soundness, the Tender Evaluation Committee has taken into consideration the earnest money deposit submitted and the credit certificate provided by the bank. Clause 4 of the ITB provides the qualification of the bidders. Clause 4.2(i) requires the bidders to furnish the evidence of access to line(s) of credit and availability of other financial resources facilities (10% of the contract value) certified by the bankers. The sample for the bank format was specifically provided with the Invitation For Bids (IFB). In course of evaluation of the technical bid of the petitioner, it was found that the bank certificate attached by it with the tender document was a conditional one and as the financial soundness of the petitioner could not be ascertained, its bid was rejected. On the contrary, the bank certificate provided by the respondent nos.4 and 5 duly complied the requirement of the terms and conditions of the tender. The respondent authorities were not bound to disclose the reasons of rejection to the bidders, as the entire bid evaluation process was confidential in nature in view of Clause 24 of the ITB. Further, in view of Clause 32.1 of the ITB, the employer has a right to accept or reject any bid without incurring any obligation to inform the grounds of employer’s action to the affected bidders. It is further submitted that on the basis of the documents submitted by the respondent no.4 and on verification of the same, the Tender Committee found that the respondent no.4 was technically qualified to proceed for further round of the tender evaluation. Three orders of blacklisting appended by the petitioner in the writ petition have, in fact, been quashed/ set aside. The respondent no.4 had provided litigation history and based upon all the documents furnished by it, the tender was duly awarded to it along with respondent no.5 after evaluating their bids as per the terms of the ITB. Moreover, no complaint was received against the respondent no.4 with respect to the work in Phase-IV. Rule 163(d) of the Jharkhand Public Works Department Code, 2012 stipulates that in the case of “Externally Aided Projects” (EAP), the guidelines of the Government of India/ Donor Agency as applicable will be followed. Moreover, no complaint was received against the respondent no.4 with respect to the work in Phase-IV. Rule 163(d) of the Jharkhand Public Works Department Code, 2012 stipulates that in the case of “Externally Aided Projects” (EAP), the guidelines of the Government of India/ Donor Agency as applicable will be followed. It is also submitted that Clause 4.19.2 of the Manual for Civil Engineering Works, Coal India Limited clearly provides that if there are more than one lowest bidder and splitting up of the work is not considered necessary/feasible, the final L-1 may be decided by calling all the L-1 bidders to submit the reduced price online on the basis of revised/reduced price or through ‘reverse auction’ amongst the L-1 bidders and since in the present case the splitting up of the work was feasible, the same was done after taking due consent of both the successful bidders. It is a standard practice which has been adopted by the respondent authorities for allotment of the work in other similar tenders. The completion period of the work allotted to the respondent nos.4 and 5 has been fixed as 24 months which will run parallel and by taking said step, the completion period of the project has, in fact, been reduced from 36 months to 24 months. 12. Before appreciating the rival contentions of the parties, it would be relevant to go through the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for the parties wherein the guidelines to be followed by the writ Court while exercising the power of judicial review in contract matters have been laid down.. 13. In the case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Others Vs. AMR Dev Prabha and Others, reported in 2020 SCC Online SC 335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- (I) Maintainability of Writ Petition 29. The scope of judicial review in tenders has been explored in-depth in a catena of cases. It is settled that constitutional courts are concerned only with lawfulness of a decision, and not its soundness. Phrased differently, Courts ought not to sit in appeal over decisions of executive authorities or instrumentalities. Plausible decisions need not be overturned, and latitude ought to be granted to the State in exercise of executive power so that the constitutional separation of powers is not encroached upon. Phrased differently, Courts ought not to sit in appeal over decisions of executive authorities or instrumentalities. Plausible decisions need not be overturned, and latitude ought to be granted to the State in exercise of executive power so that the constitutional separation of powers is not encroached upon. However, allegations of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety would be enough grounds for courts to assume jurisdiction and remedy such ills. This is especially true given our unique domestic circumstances, which have demonstrated the need for judicial intervention numerous times. Hence, it would only be the decision-making process which would be the subject of judicial enquiry, and not the end result (save as may be necessary to guide determination of the former). 30. This position of law has been succinctly summed up in Tata Cellular v. Union of India (supra), where it was famously opined that: “77. … Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under : (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness, (iii) Procedural impropriety.” 31. But merely because the accusations made are against the State or its instrumentalities doesn't mean that an aggrieved person can bypass established civil adjudicatory processes and directly seek writ relief. In determining whether to exercise their discretion, writ courts ought not only confine themselves to the identity of the opposite party but also to the nature of the dispute and of the relief prayed for. Thus, although every wrong has a remedy, depending upon the nature of the wrong there would be different forums for redress. 32. In cases where a constitutional right is infringed, writs would ordinarily be the appropriate remedy. Thus, although every wrong has a remedy, depending upon the nature of the wrong there would be different forums for redress. 32. In cases where a constitutional right is infringed, writs would ordinarily be the appropriate remedy. In tender matters, such can be either when a party seeks to hold the State to its duty of treating all persons equally or prohibit it from acting arbitrarily; or when executive actions or legislative instruments are challenged for being in contravention to the freedom of carrying on trade and commerce. However, writs are impermissible when the allegation is solely with regard to violation of a contractual right or duty. Hence, the persons seeking writ relief must also actively satisfy the Court that the right it is seeking is one in public law, and not merely contractual. In doing so, a balance is maintained between the need for commercial freedom and the very real possibility of collusion, illegality and squandering of public resources. 33. Such a proposition has been noticed by this Court even earlier in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa in the following words: “22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made “lawfully” and not to check whether choice or decision is “sound”. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold.” (emphasis supplied) 34. Such conscious restraint is also necessary because judicial intervention by itself has effects of time and money, which if unchecked would have problematic ramifications on the State's ability to enter into contracts and trade with private entities. Further, it is not desirable or practicable for courts to review the thousands of contracts entered into by executive authorities every day. Courts also must be cognizant that often-a-times the private interest of a few can clash with public interest of the masses, and hence a requirement to demonstrate effect on ‘public interest’ has been evolved by this Court. 14. In the case of Afcons Infrastructure Limited Vs. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Limited and Another, reported in (2016) 16 SCC 818 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 13. In other words, a mere disagreement with the decision-making process or the decision of the administrative authority is no reason for a constitutional court to interfere. The threshold of mala fides, intention to favour someone or arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity must be met before the constitutional court interferes with the decision-making process or the decision. 15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. The constitutional courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the tender documents, unless there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the tender conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer of a project may give an interpretation to the tender documents that is not acceptable to the constitutional courts but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation given. 15. In the case of Municipal Corporation, Ujjain and Another Vs. It is possible that the owner or employer of a project may give an interpretation to the tender documents that is not acceptable to the constitutional courts but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation given. 15. In the case of Municipal Corporation, Ujjain and Another Vs. BVG India Limited, reported in (2018) 5 SCC 462 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 16. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have a public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise them only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should interfere. (See the judgment in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. [Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 617 ] 27. Thus, only when a decision-making process is so arbitrary or irrational that no responsible authority proceeding reasonably or lawfully could have arrived at such decisions, power of judicial review can be exercised. However, if it is bona fide and in public interest, the court will not interfere in the exercise of power of judicial review even if there is a procedural lacuna. The principles of equity and natural justice do not operate in the field of commercial transactions. Wherever a decision has been taken appropriately in public interest, the court ordinarily should exercise judicial restraint. When a decision is taken by the authority concerned upon due consideration of the tender document submitted by all tenderers on their own merits and it is ultimately found that the successful bidder had in fact substantially complied with the purpose and object for which the essential conditions were laid down, the same may not ordinarily be interfered with. 16. In the case of Jagdish Mandal Vs. State of Orissa &Ors., reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring to various earlier judgments has held at para 22 as under:- “22. 16. In the case of Jagdish Mandal Vs. State of Orissa &Ors., reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring to various earlier judgments has held at para 22 as under:- “22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made “lawfully” and not to check whether choice or decision is “sound”. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; Or Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached”; (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action. 17. In the case of Montecarlo Limited Vs. National Thermal Power Corporation Limited, reported in (2016) 15 SCC 272 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “19. In [Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M&N Publications Ltd., (1993) 1 SCC 445 ], the Court has held that under some special circumstances a discretion has to be conceded to the authorities who have to enter into contract giving them liberty to assess the overall situation for purpose of taking a decision as to whom the contract be awarded and at what terms. It has also been observed that by way of judicial review the Court cannot examine the details of the terms of the contract which have been entered into by the public bodies or the State. Courts have inherent limitations on the scope of any such enquiry. 20. In [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 ] a three-Judge Bench after referring to earlier decisions culled out certain principles, namely, (a) the modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action, (b) the Court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made, (c) the Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible, and (d) the Government must have freedom of contract and that permits a fair play in the joints as a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. Hence, the Court has laid down that the decision must not only be tested by the application of the Wednesbury principle [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.” 18. In the case of Central Coalfields Limited and Another Vs. In the case of Central Coalfields Limited and Another Vs. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) and Others, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 622 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held thus:- “32. The core issue in these appeals is not of judicial review of the administrative action of CCL in adhering to the terms of NIT and the GTC prescribed by it while dealing with bids furnished by participants in the bidding process. The core issue is whether CCL acted perversely enough in rejecting the bank guarantee of JVC on the ground that it was not in the prescribed format, thereby calling for judicial review by a constitutional court and interfering with CCL's decision. 37. For JVC to say that its bank guarantee was in terms stricter than the prescribed format is neither here nor there. It is not for the employer or this Court to scrutinise every bank guarantee to determine whether it is stricter than the prescribed format or less rigorous. The fact is that a format was prescribed and there was no reason not to adhere to it. The goalposts cannot be rearranged or asked to be rearranged during the bidding process to affect the right of some or deny a privilege to some. 47. The result of this discussion is that the issue of the acceptance or rejection of a bid or a bidder should be looked at not only from the point of view of the unsuccessful party but also from the point of view of the employer. As held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 ] the terms of NIT cannot be ignored as being redundant or superfluous. They must be given a meaning and the necessary significance. As pointed out in [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 ] there must be judicial restraint in interfering with administrative action. Ordinarily, the soundness of the decision taken by the employer ought not to be questioned but the decision-making process can certainly be subject to judicial review. As pointed out in [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 ] there must be judicial restraint in interfering with administrative action. Ordinarily, the soundness of the decision taken by the employer ought not to be questioned but the decision-making process can certainly be subject to judicial review. The soundness of the decision may be questioned if it is irrational or mala fide or intended to favour someone or a decision “that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached” as held in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517 followed in Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216 .” 19. It is a trite law that the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review is not expected to act as a court of appeal while examining an administrative decision and to record a finding as to whether any different decision could have been taken in the facts and circumstances of the case. A writ court, by way of judicial review should ordinarily refrain from examining the details of the terms of the contract, which have been entered into by the public bodies of the State. A writ court has its inherent limitation on the scope of such enquiry. Even if some defect is found in the decision making process, the court while exercising the power under Article 226 should always keep in mind the larger public interest. The writ court nevertheless can certainly examine as to whether “decision making process” is perverse, irrational, arbitrary, malafide and intended to favour someone. In BVG India Ltd. (Supra.), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has gone to the extent of observing that only when a decision making process is so arbitrary or irrational that no responsible authority proceeding reasonably or lawfully could have arrived at such decision, power of judicial review should be exercised. However any bonafide action in the public interest should not be interfered with. 20. In view of the aforesaid judicial principle, the issue before this Court is as to whether there is any arbitrariness, unreasonableness, mala fide and biasness in the decision making process of the respondent authorities so as to make any interference with the tender process. 21. Reverting back to the present case. 20. In view of the aforesaid judicial principle, the issue before this Court is as to whether there is any arbitrariness, unreasonableness, mala fide and biasness in the decision making process of the respondent authorities so as to make any interference with the tender process. 21. Reverting back to the present case. Both the parties have referred some clauses of the bid document and as such the same are being quoted hereinbelow for better appreciation of the matter. Qualification of the Bidder 4.1. All bidders shall provide in Section 2, Forms of Bid and Qualification Information, a preliminary description of the proposed work method and schedule, including drawings and charts, as necessary. The proposed methodology should include programme of construction backed with equipment planning and deployment duly supported with broad calculations and quality assurance procedures proposed to be adopted justifying their capability of execution and completion of work as per technical specifications, within stipulated period of completion. 4.2 In the event that pre-qualification of potential bidders has been undertaken, only bids from pre qualified bidders will be considered for award of contract. These qualified bidders should submit with their bids any information updating their original prequalification application or alternatively, confirm in their bids that the originally submitted prequalification information remains essentially correct as of date of bid submission. The update of confirmation should be provided in section 2. A copy of the original prequalification application and the letter of prequalification should also be furnished. With the update information, the bidder must notinue to be qualified in accordance with the criteria laid down in the prequalification document. All bidders shall also furnish the following information in section 2 : (i) evidence of access to line(s) of credit and availability of other financial resources facilities (10% of contract value), certified by the Bankers ii. undertaking that the bidder wilt be able to invest a minimum cash upto 25% of contract value of work, during implementation of work. (iii) proposals for subcontracting components of the works amounting to more than 10 percent of the Bid Price (iv) Power of attorney. 4.3 If the Employer has not undertaken prequalification of potential bidders. undertaking that the bidder wilt be able to invest a minimum cash upto 25% of contract value of work, during implementation of work. (iii) proposals for subcontracting components of the works amounting to more than 10 percent of the Bid Price (iv) Power of attorney. 4.3 If the Employer has not undertaken prequalification of potential bidders. all bidders shall include the following information and documents with their bids in Section 2: ---- (g) evidence of access to line (s) of credit and availability of other financial resources facilities W (10% of contract value), certified by the Bankers(not more than 3 months old)(original copy will be submitted along with other financial instruments) Information regarding any litigation, current or during the last five years, in which the Bidder is involved, the parties concerned, and disputed arount; 12.1 the bidder as Volume V of the bid document (refer Clause 8.1.) shall be in two separate parts Part I shall be named Technical Covers and shall comprise (i) Bid security in the form specified in Section 8. (ii) Qualification information and supporting documents as specified in Section 2. (iii) Certificates, undertaking, affidavits as specified in Section 2.1 ------- 22. Out of five bidders, the technical bids of three bidders including the petitioner were rejected. It appears that the technical bid of the petitioner was rejected on the ground that the bank certificate issued by the banker of one of the consortium partners of the petitioner was not found in conformity with the format given in the ITB. On bare perusal of the format of the bank certificate to be issued to a bidder, it would appear that the concerned bank by way of issuing the said certificate was required to give an unconditional undertaking for providing overdraft facilities to meet the working capital requirement of the bidder. 23. Learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent authorities has explained the requirement of such unconditional undertaking to be given by the bank to the bidder so as to satisfy the financial viability of the contractor to execute the work. It has been submitted that the bank certificate issued to the one of the consortium partners of the petitioner does not fulfil the purpose of financial viability of the petitioner to execute the work and as such the tender committee has rightly rejected its bid. It has been submitted that the bank certificate issued to the one of the consortium partners of the petitioner does not fulfil the purpose of financial viability of the petitioner to execute the work and as such the tender committee has rightly rejected its bid. On the contrary, the bank certificates issued by the bankers of the respondent nos.4 and 5 were exactly in the same format as has been provided in the tender document. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Clause 4.3(g) of part A of the bid document does not mention that the certificate must be in a particular format. However a sample format was attached with the tender documents but in the entire bid document it has, however, been mentioned that the solvency certificate must be furnished in the said format. Mr. Sinha has tried to convince this court that the sample format attached to the document was not the performa and as such the same was not required to be strictly adhered to by the bidders and even if there was a slightest deviation in the Certificate furnished by the petitioner, the same by itself was not such a strong ground so as to reject the bid of the petitioner. 25. To counter the argument of Mr. Sinha, the learned Advocate General while inviting the attention of this court to Clause 4.2, 4.3 and 12.1 to the bid document has submitted that it was specifically mentioned these clauses that the bidders were required to submit the information and documents in section 2 and the format for submitting bank certificate was also under said section and as such the petitioner was required to strictly follow the said condition, however, the petitioner admittedly violated the said condition and as such its bid was rightly rejected. 26. I find force in the submission of the learned Advocate General. In Clause 4.2 of the instructions to bidders (I.T.B.) itself, it was specified that the bidders were required to furnish information and documents in section 2. Moreover, Clause 12.1(iii) of the I.T.B. also specified that the bid document must comprise the certificates, undertaking, affidavits as specified in section 2. The format for furnishing Bank Guarantee was given in section 2. In Clause 4.2 of the instructions to bidders (I.T.B.) itself, it was specified that the bidders were required to furnish information and documents in section 2. Moreover, Clause 12.1(iii) of the I.T.B. also specified that the bid document must comprise the certificates, undertaking, affidavits as specified in section 2. The format for furnishing Bank Guarantee was given in section 2. Since it was specifically stipulated that the information and documents were to be submitted in section 2, the term ‘format’ written in the required form did not permit the bidders to deviate from it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Coalfields Limited (Supra.) has held that if any bidder has confusion with regard to any term of the bid document, it may ask the authority for its clarification. Thus, I do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 27. The next limb of argument of Mr. Sinha is that even if it is accepted that the sample format for bank certificate provided in Section 2 (Qualification Information) was applicable under Clause 4.3(g) of the I.T.B., the Bank Certificates of the concerned banks of both the partners of the petitioner-consortium was satisfying the requirement of the respondent authority. As per the bid document, the lead partner was required to provide overdraft/credit facilities to the extent of Rs.15.75 crores and the other partner was required to provide the overdraft facilities to the extent of Rs.5.25 crores. The certificate furnished by the other partner would suggest that it was availing the credit facility of 10 crores which was more than the required credit facility in the present tender. In the Bank Certificate issued in favour of Swadeshi Civil Infrastructure Private Limited, the mention of “company comply the terms that provide STDR for the same” is a formal line and by no stretch of imagination makes it a conditional bank certificate as it implies that for availing the facility of overdraft/credit facilities a company has to comply with the special term deposit requirements. It is submitted that so far as the bank certificate issued in favour of Rishabh Constructions Private Limited is concerned, it was enjoying credit facility to the tune of Rs.72.50 crore which was more than the required limit of Rs.15.75 crores. It is submitted that so far as the bank certificate issued in favour of Rishabh Constructions Private Limited is concerned, it was enjoying credit facility to the tune of Rs.72.50 crore which was more than the required limit of Rs.15.75 crores. So far as the last paragraph is concerned, the bank merely clarified that the information provided in the said certificate was without any risk and responsibility on the part of the bank in any respect whatsoever, more particularly either as a guarantee or otherwise. It is, thus, submitted that the format of insolvency certificate issued by the banks generally contains certain conditions. While issuing solvency certificate, the banks do not undertake any liability either direct or vicarious on behalf of any person or agency. In support of the said contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has put reliance on paragraph nos.13 and 14 of the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Mandeepa Enterprises Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. [W.P.(C) No.986 of 2018 with W.P.(C) No.888 of 2018]. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the view taken by this Court in the said case has been affirmed by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Balaji Enterprises Vs. The State of Jharkhand [L.P.A. No.730 of 2018 with L.P.A. No.734 of 2018]. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited the attention of this Court to the format of the solvency certificate, which was required to be filed by the bidder while submitting its bid. The said format is reproduced as under:- “Solvency Certificate This is to certify that to the best of our knowledge and information that ____ a customer of our bank is respectable and can be treated as good for any engagement upon a limit of Rs.----------. It is certified that this information is furnished without any risk and responsibility on our part in any respect whatsoever more particularly either as guarantor or otherwise. This certificate is issued at the specific request of the customer.” 29. It is certified that this information is furnished without any risk and responsibility on our part in any respect whatsoever more particularly either as guarantor or otherwise. This certificate is issued at the specific request of the customer.” 29. To appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, I have also gone through the sample format of the bank certificate as was required to be filled by the bidders in the tender in question, which is reproduced as under: “Sample Format for evidence of Access To or availability of Credit Facilities (Clause 4.2 (i) of ITB) Bank Certificate This is to certify that M/s -----------------------------------is a reputed Company with a good financial standing. If the contract for the work, namely _______________ is awarded to the above firm, we shall be able to provide overdraft/credit facilities to the extent of Rs. __________ to meet their working capital requirement for executing the above contract during the contract period.” The Bank Certificate as submitted by the members/partners of the petitioner-consortium is quoted as under:- “Bank Certificate This is to certify that M/s Swadeshi Civil Infrastructure Private Limited is a reputed Company with a good financial standing and enjoying OD facility of Rs. 10.00 Crores (Rupees Ten Crores Only) as on date 24th April 2019 with our Branch. This certificate is issued on written request of company for applying the contract for the work, namely E-Tender Reference No. JRDA/VA/IFB-06/2018-19 Dt. 08.03.2019, Name of Work:- Construction of 4000 units (G+3) four storey Visthapit Awas at Phase-VIII Mouza Belgoria, Dhanbad, We shall be able to provide further overdraft/credit facilities to the extent of Rs. 21,00,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty One Crores Only) if the work is awarded and company comply the terms that provide STDR for the same to meet their working capital requirements for executing the above contract during the contract period. Banker’s Certificate This is to certify that to the best of our knowledge and information M/s Rishabh Construction Pvt. Ltd. having marginally noted address OKAY PLUS TOWER, NEAR GOVT. HOSTEL CROSSING, AJMER ROAD, JAIPUR-302006, is a reputed company with a good financial standing. If the contract for work, namely Construction of 4000 units (G+3) four storey Visthapit Awas at Phase-VIII, Mouza Belgoria, Dhanbad is awarded to the above company, we shall be able to provide overdraft/credit facilities to the extent of Rs. 72.50 crores (Fund Based facilities of Rs. HOSTEL CROSSING, AJMER ROAD, JAIPUR-302006, is a reputed company with a good financial standing. If the contract for work, namely Construction of 4000 units (G+3) four storey Visthapit Awas at Phase-VIII, Mouza Belgoria, Dhanbad is awarded to the above company, we shall be able to provide overdraft/credit facilities to the extent of Rs. 72.50 crores (Fund Based facilities of Rs. 7.50 crores and Non fund based facilities of Rs. 65.00 crores, which are already sanctioned to the aforesaid company) to meet their working capital requirements for executing the above contract during the contract period. It is clarified that this information is furnished without any risk and responsibility on our part in any respect whatsoever more particularly either as guarantor or otherwise. This certificate is issued at the specific request of the customer.” 30. It would be evident from the format of solvency certificate and the bank certificate as were required by the respondent no.1 from the bidders that both the said certificates are different from each other. On the one hand, the solvency certificate is issued by the bank to its customer for a particular amount having taken into consideration the reputation and transaction of the tenderer which proves the financial stability of an individual or entity. While issuing the solvency certificate, the bank does not take any guarantee in relation to such certificate. However, so far as the present case is concerned, the respondent no.1 has required an unconditional undertaking from the bank of the partners of the petitioner for providing it overdraft/credit facilities for a particular amount to meet its working capital requirement for executing the work. The said certificate was demanded from the bidders in view of Clause 4.2(i) of ITB which specifically provides that the bidders will have to furnish the evidence of access of line of credit and availability of other financial resource facilities certified by the bankers. Thus, the Bank Certificate required from the bidders was to ensure financial viability of the bidders to execute the work which cannot be equated with the solvency certificate which is furnished only to show the financial stability of any bidder. 31. I am, thus, of the view that learned counsel for the petitioner has misconstrued the bank certificate required as per the IFB as against solvency certificate. Hence, the proposition laid down in the case of Mandeepa Enterprises (Supra.) is not applicable in the present case. 32. 31. I am, thus, of the view that learned counsel for the petitioner has misconstrued the bank certificate required as per the IFB as against solvency certificate. Hence, the proposition laid down in the case of Mandeepa Enterprises (Supra.) is not applicable in the present case. 32. Now this court has to see as to whether the respondent authorities have committed any infirmity in rejecting the bid of the petitioner as the Bank Certificate submitted by its members/partners were not found in conformity with the format prescribed for the same. 33. The bank of M/s Swadeshi Civil Infrastructure Private Limited while issuing the certificate put condition “if the work is awarded and the company comply the terms that provide STDR for the same”. The bank of Rishabh Construction Private Limited while issuing bank certificate also stated that they were not taking any risk and responsibility either as guarantor or otherwise. Thus admittedly there were deviations in the Bank Certificates submitted by the members of the petitioner. It has, however, been contended that such deviation was not of such a nature which would make those conditional. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India & Others, reported in (1979) 3 SCC 489 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the rule of interpretation is applicable to the documents alike the statutes and thus save for compelling necessity, the Court should not be prompt to ascribe superfluity to the language of a document “and should be rather at the outset inclined to suppose every word intended to have some effect or be of some use”. To reject words as insensible should be the last resort of judicial interpretation, for it is an elementary rule based on common sense that no author of a formal document intended to be acted upon by the others should be presumed to use words without a meaning. The court must, as far as possible, avoid a construction which would render the words used by the author of the document meaningless and futile or reduce to silence any part of the document and make it altogether inapplicable.It is a settled law that the terms of NIT cannot be ignored as being redundant or superfluous. They must be given a meaning and the necessary significance. They must be given a meaning and the necessary significance. Whether term of NIT is essential or not, is decided by the authority, provided, the decision is uniformly applied to all the bidders. The author of the tender document is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirement and interpret its documents.It is not the case of the petitioner that the respondent authorities have discriminated amongst the bidders standing on the equal footing. A contract is a commercial transaction and the party inviting the tender has a right to put any condition to be fulfilled by a bidder and also has a right to strictly adhered to. An unsuccessful bidder may not be allowed to interpret it contrary to the intention of the tender inviting authority. The court will not exercise its power of judicial review even if some procedural error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer is made out to certain extent unless a case of gross discrimination vis-a-vis others is made out. 34. I find substance in the argument of learned senior counsel for the respondent no.4 that the language of the sample format of the Bank Certificate explicitly reveals that the same was contract specific and the bank of the bidder was required to issue certificate for the particular work, however the bank of one of the consortium partners of the petitioner- M/s Swadeshi has mentioned in the certificate that it is already availing the credit facility of 10 crores stating that further overdraft/credit facility to the extent of 21 crores will be provided if it complies the term of STDR. The bank of the lead partner- M/s Rishabh Construction has though agreed to provide overdraft/credit facility to the extent of Rs.72.50 crores, however has clarified that the said certificate has been issued without any risk and responsibility. The purpose for which the Bank Certificate was demanded by the respondent authorities was not fulfilled and thus the respondent authorities rightly rejected the technical bid of the petitioner. On the other hand, the bank certificates submitted by the respondent nos.4 and 5 were found in conformity with the format provided in the SBD. The petitioner neither challenged the said condition of the tender document nor complied the same. 35. On the other hand, the bank certificates submitted by the respondent nos.4 and 5 were found in conformity with the format provided in the SBD. The petitioner neither challenged the said condition of the tender document nor complied the same. 35. The other limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent no.4 has suppressed the material facts and has committed fraud in obtaining the work order, which was required to be verified by the respondent authorities while awarding the half of the work in question to it. On the contrary, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent authorities as well as learned senior counsel for the respondent no.4 have submitted that the litigation history was duly provided by the respondent no.4 at the time of submitting its tender document and was duly verified by the respondent authorities while awarding the said work to it. Learned senior counsel for the respondent no.4 has also submitted that order No.1240 dated 24.03.2014 blacklisting the respondent no.4 was recalled by the Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna vide letter no.11 dated 31.03.2014. Further, order no.412 dated 6.2.2018 blacklisting the respondent no.4 was quashed by the learned Division Bench of the Patna High Court vide order dated 5.4.2018 passed in L.P.A. No.453 of 2018. Order no.2480 dated 4.7.2018 blacklisting the respondent no.4 was kept in abeyance by the Patna High Court vide order dated 30.11.2018 passed in C.W.J.C. No.13292 of 2018. 36. It has already been discussed hereinabove that the writ Court while entertaining the matter with regard awarding of contract is required to see as to whether the decision making process adopted by the state authorities/functionaries suffers from the vice of arbitrariness, unreasonableness, mala fide and biasness. Ordinarily, the soundness of the decision taken by the tendering authority cannot be questioned, however, the decision making process can certainly be subject to the judicial review by the writ Court. In the present case, the respondent authorities have proceeded in the tender process having taken into consideration the litigation history submitted by the respondent no.4 with its tender document and, thus, I do not find any infirmity in the decision making process while awarding part of the said work to the respondent no.4. In the present case, the respondent authorities have proceeded in the tender process having taken into consideration the litigation history submitted by the respondent no.4 with its tender document and, thus, I do not find any infirmity in the decision making process while awarding part of the said work to the respondent no.4. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Mandal (Supra.) has held that an attempt by unsuccessful tenderer with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self and to persuade the Court to interfere while exercising power of judicial review should be resisted. 37. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the respondent no.4 did not disclose or suppress material facts regarding blacklisting/debarment/rescission of contract during last five years which was the mandatory requirements to be followed by the bidders. In course of argument, learned counsel has put emphasis on one instance that the respondent no.4 suppressed the filing of the writ petition being CWJC No.6949 of 2019 before the Patna High Court, which, according to him, would have revealed that its contract was terminated and the order of status quo granted by the Patna High Court did not have the effect of staying such order at that point of time. The said concealment was an active concealment of fact and was intended to deceive the concerned authorities and hence amounted to practising fraud. Learned counsel for the petitioner has put reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Nidhi Kaim Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 1 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the trivialest act of wrongdoing based on a singular act of fraud cannot be countenanced in the name of justice. Even if the said argument is accepted for a while and the respondent no.4 is said to have suppressed the pendency of CWJC No.6949 of 2019, the same by itself does not vitiate the tender process undertaken by the respondent authorities since there is no such infirmity found in the decision making process. Even if the said argument is accepted for a while and the respondent no.4 is said to have suppressed the pendency of CWJC No.6949 of 2019, the same by itself does not vitiate the tender process undertaken by the respondent authorities since there is no such infirmity found in the decision making process. The petitioner has not been able to show any cogent evidence that the said fact of pendency of CWJC No.6949 of 2019 was within the knowledge of the respondent authorities which was ignored by them so as to give benefit to the respondent no.4 which might have proved the malafide or favouritism on the part of the respondent authorities. Although the petitioner has pleaded the malafide against the respondent authorities while awarding the contract in favour of the respondent nos.4 and 5, it has failed to prove the same by bringing on record sufficient evidence in support of the same. 38. That apart, learned counsel for the petitioner has not made any allegation against the respondent no.5, who, according to its assertion, has completed more than 75% of the physical work in question and, therefore, at the said advanced stage of the work, any interference by this Court would certainly be detrimental to the interest of the respondent no.5 as well as would affect the pace of the work being carried on for public purpose. 39. The judgment of learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s N.R. Constructions Private Limited through its Managing Director Vs. The State of Jharkhand and Others, reported in (2004) 2 JLJR 706 , has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner to contend that merely the work being in advance stage by itself does not come in way of the writ court in interfering with any award of work which is found to be illegal. In the said case the learned Division Bench found that the respondent State by deviating from the essential term of contract awarded the work to the respondent no.4 and thus held that once the award of the work to the respondent no.4 of that case was found to be illegal, it was not possible to uphold the plea based on equity. The said judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is, however, not applicable in the facts and circumstance of the present case. The said judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is, however, not applicable in the facts and circumstance of the present case. The petitioner has failed to show any arbitrariness and malafide in the decision making process of the respondent authorities in awarding the work in question in favour of the respondent no.4 and 5. 40. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also assiduously contended that by splitting the work between the respondent nos.4 and 5 and granting them 24 months’ time each for completion of the same has, in fact, increased the period of completion of work to 48 months instead of 36 months, as was stipulated in the tender document. 41. I do not find any substance in the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner as it would be evident that the completion time of the work was fixed as 36 months for the entire work, which has now been reduced to 24 months after splitting of the work between the respondent nos.4 and 5. The said period of completion would run parallel and both the respondent nos.4 and 5 are under obligation to complete the same within the said period. The said reduction of the period in completing the work would certainly expedite the pace of the work and, thus, can be said to be in the interest of public at large. It is a settled law that a tendering authority is permitted to make any modification in the tender condition, the ultimate object of which is the interest of public and such modification is not to be interfered in the writ jurisdiction. The court is not supposed to exercise the power of judicial review to protect private interest at the cost of public interest. 42. So far as the action of the respondent authorities while splitting the work in two halves for awarding the same to the respondent nos.4 and 5 is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the said decision has been taken arbitrarily since the CPWD Works Manual or any other CPWD norm does not provide for splitting of work for awarding the same to two or more bidders, who are found to be the lowest. In response to the said argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel for the respondent authorities has invited the attention of this Court to Rule 163(d) of the Jharkhand Public works Department Code, 2012 and Manual For Civil Engineering Works, Coal India Limited. 43. I have gone through the Rule 163(d) of the Jharkhand Public Works Department Code, 2012, which stipulates that in case of Externally Aided Projects (EAP), the guidelines of the Government of India/Donor Agency as applicable are to be followed and in the present case the projects are funded by the Coal India Limited. Clause 4.19.2 of the Manual for Civil Engineering Works, Coal India Limited clearly provides that if there are more than one lowest bidder and splitting up of the work is not considered necessary/feasible, the final L-1 may be decided by calling all the L-1 bidders to submit the reduced price online on the basis of revised/reduced price or through ‘reverse auction’ amongst the L-1 bidders. The specific case of the respondent authorities is that such practice has been adopted by them in most of the cases of similar nature. 44. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, I find no infirmity in the decision making process undertaken by the respondent authorities in rejecting the technical bid of the petitioner as well as in splitting the work in two halves and awarding the same to the respondent nos.4 and 5. 45. The writ petition being devoid of merit is, accordingly, dismissed. 46. I.A. No.10593 of 2019 is also dismissed.