ORDER 1. This case was taken up for hearing on 22.10.2020 and was heard at length on admission and as well as final disposal. 2. However, hearing could not be concluded as time was sought by Shri Raghvendra Dixit, learned counsel for respondents-Corporation on the ground that he has filed certain relevant documents which had not come on record. 2.1 Since enough time was consumed yesterday for hearing arguments of rival parties and matter could have been decided but this Court in the interest of justice on the request of counsel for respondents-Corporation directed to list this matter on 23.10.2020. 2.2 When the matter is taken up today, even in second round no one appeared for respondents-Corporation and therefore after hearing learned counsel for petitioner this Court proceeded to pass final order. Another reason which persuaded this Court is the consensus arrived at between counsel for rival parties to decide this case on the sole point of interpretation of rule 41 of Madhya Pradesh Rajya Audyogik Bhumi Evam Bhawan Prabandhan Niyam, 2015 (for brevity 2015 Rules) without entering into merits of the impugned order. 3. Challenge in this petition is to Annexure-P/1 dated 3.9.2016 passed by appellate authority Joint Director, Bhopal dismissing the appeal preferred by petitioner u/R. 41 of the 2015 Rules against an order dated 8.9.2015, P/9 passed by Managing Director Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation, Gwalior (IIDC in short) raising demand of Rs. 1,82,546/- as on 1.4.2015 under various heads as mentioned therein. 3.1 The appellate authority by the impugned order P/1 declined to entertain appeal on merits and dismissed the same as not maintainable for not having been filed against cancellation of lease which is the only subject matter according to appellate authority against which an appeal lies, u/R. 41(ii)(2) of 2015 Rules. 3.2 Thus short question which begs for an answer is as to whether R. 41 of 2015 Rules provides for remedy of appeal/review merely against cancellation of lease or even against orders of other nature. 3.2 Thus short question which begs for an answer is as to whether R. 41 of 2015 Rules provides for remedy of appeal/review merely against cancellation of lease or even against orders of other nature. 3.3 For ready reference and convenience, Rule 41 of 2015 Rules is reproduced below in toto:- ¼41½ vihy ,oa iqufoZyksdu %& ¼1½ bu fu;eksa ds vUrxZr vkcaVu vf/kdkjh }kjk ikfjr ewy vkns'k ls vlarq"V iV~Vsnkj@i{kdkj }kjk ,slk vkns'k ikfjr gksus ls 30 fnol dh vof/k esa dafMdk 41¼2½ esa of.kZr {ks=kf/kdkj vuqlkj l{ke izkf/kdkjh ds le{k vihy fuEu vihy 'kqYd lfgr izLrqr dh tk ldsxh%& y?kq m|ksxksa gsrq :- 2]000@& e/;e m|ksxksa gsrq :- 5]000@& o`gr m|ksxksa gsrq :- 10]000@& vihy 'kqYd vihyh; vf/kdkjh dks ns; gksxk] tks okilh ;ksX; ugha gksxkA ¼2½ vihy ds laca/k esa {ks=kf/kdkj fuEukuqlkj gksxk & 1 vfodflr Hkwfe ds izdj.kksa esa m|ksx vk;qDr }kjk ikfjr fujLrhdj.k ewy vkns'k ds fo:) izFke vihyh; vf/kdkjh izeq[k lfpo e/;izns'k 'kklu okf.kT; ,oa m|ksx foHkkx ds le{k vihy izLrqr dh tkosxh rFkk izeq[k lfpo e/;izns'k 'kklu okf.kT; ,oa m|ksx foHkkx ds vkns'k ds fo:) iqujh{k.k gsrq ekuuh; ea=h] e/;izns'k 'kklu okf.kT; ,oa m|ksx foHkkx ds le{k vkosnu izLrqr fd;k tk ldsxkA 2 fodflr Hkwfe@'ksM ds izdj.kksa esa vkS|ksfxd dsUnz fodkl fuxe ds }kjk ikfjr fujLrhdj.k vkns'k ds fo:) izca/k lapkyd] VªkbQsd] izFke vihyh; vf/kdkjh gksxk izFke vihyh; vf/kdkjh ds ikfjr fu.kZ; ds fo:) leh{kk dh vf/kdkfjrk v/;{k VªkbQsd dks gksxhA egkizca/kd ftyk O;kikj ,oa m|ksx dsUnz }kjk ikfjr fujLrhdj.k vkns'k ds fo:) ifj{ks= ds la;qDr Lkapkyd m|ksx izFke vihyh; vf/kdkjh gksxk rFkk izFke vihyh; vf/kdkjh ds ikfjr fu.kZ; ds fo:) iqujh{k.k dh vfèkdkfjrk m|ksx vk;qDr dks gksxhA ¼3½ vihy@iqujh{k.k fujkdj.k dh izfØ;k & vihyh; vf/kdkjh }kjk vihy izkIr gksus ds 15 fnol ds vanj lquokbZ gsrq frfFk fu;r dj vihydrkZ bdkbZ dks lwfpr fd;k tkosxk rFkk 60 fnol ds vanj vf/kdre 3 lquokbZ dk volj nsdj vihy dk fujkdj.k fd;k tkosxkA vihy iqujh{k.k esa ewy vkns'k dks ;Fkkor j[kk tk ldrk gS vFkok fujLr fd;k tk ldrk gS vFkok ewy vkns'k esa vkaf'kd la'kksèku Hkh fd;k tk ldrk gSA 3.4 A bare scrutiny of the terminology used in rule 41(i) of 2015 rules reveals that in introductory and principle part of the provision remedy of appeal is available against any basic order passed by the allotment officer, as per jurisdiction defined in rule 41(ii) of rules 2015. 3.5 Whereas rule 41(ii) 1 provides first appellate authority for undeveloped plot while other sub-clause 2 to rule 41(ii) provides appellate authority for developed land/shed. 3.6 The present matter pertains to developed land/shed and thus falls within rule 41(ii) 2 which stipulates that against cancellation order passed by Audyogik Kendra appeal lies to the Managing Director (TAIFAC) who is designated as first authority against whose order second appeal lies to the Chairman of M.P. Trade and Investment Facilitation Corporation Limited (TAIFAC) whereas against order of cancellation passed by General Manager District Trade & Industrial Centre, appeal lies to the Joint Director (Industry) who is first appellate authority against whose decision review lies to the Commissioner (Industry). 3.7 rule 41(i) makes available remedy of appeal to an aggrieved lessee against any “basic order”. The term basic order has not been defined to restrict its meaning to an order of cancellation of lease. 3.8 However, the nature, ambit, scope and sweep of jurisdiction to be exercised by the appellate/revisional authority emanates from R 41(ii) of 2015 rules. The relevant R. 41(ii) 2 further does not speak about cancellation order being only of lease cancellation but merely stipulates that first appeal would lie against basic cancellation order passed either by Managing Director (TAIFAC) or Managing Director District Trade and Industrial Centre. 3.9 From the aforesaid textual and contextual reading of the provision, it becomes crystal clear that remedy of appeal/review stipulated in rule 41 is available not merely against an order of cancellation of lease but is available against any basic order passed against the interest of lessee and the source of which can be traced in 2015 rules. 3.10 More so, if a close scrutiny of rule 41 is undertaken it is seen that the said 2015 rules pertain to Prabhandan (Management) of land and building earmarked for industrial purpose. The said rules 2015 relates to various subject matters which are allotment of land, allotment of industrial land/building, premium, development charges/rent etc relating to the said land and building, lease/sub-lease/ transfer/registration of the land, division of industrial plot, cancellation of lease etc. 3.11 Among the said various subjects governed by the said 2015 rules “cancellation of lease” is only one of the subjects in regard to which rule 41 can be invoked. 3.11 Among the said various subjects governed by the said 2015 rules “cancellation of lease” is only one of the subjects in regard to which rule 41 can be invoked. 3.12 On the anvil of above analysis of the relevant rule, if we test the legality and validity of the impugned appellate order dated 3/9/2016, P/1 it is clear as daylight that appellate authority Joint Director failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it under rule 41 of 2015 rules to consider and decide the merits of the appeal preferred by petitioner against order dated 8.9.2015, P/9. The basic order dated 8.9.2015 has been passed by the Managing Director IIDC against which appeal lies to the Joint Director (Industry) under rule 41(ii)2 of 2015 rules. 4. In view of above, this Court has no hesitation to allow this petition in following terms:- (1) The impugned order Annexure-P/1 dated 3.9.2016 passed by appellate authority Joint Director, Bhopal is quashed. (2) The appellate authority is directed to consider appeal of petitioner against order dated 8.9.2015 P/9 on merits by passing a speaking order within an outer limit of 30 (Thirty) days from the date of communication of this order passed today. (3) It is expected of Managing Director, IIDC Gwalior not to implement the basic order dated 8.9.2015 P/9 till decision is taken by appellate authority on appeal preferred by petitioner.