JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Sudeep Seth, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Pravin Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State respondents, and Sri Abhijeet Raj, learned counsel for respondent no. 5, through video conferencing in view of COVID-19 pandemic. 2. By means of instant writ petition the petitioner has assailed the order dated 24th August, 2020, passed by respondent no.4-Deputy Collector/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer (Panchayat), Lalganj, District-Pratapgarh, whereby he has reviewed his own earlier order dated 25.05.2020, and consequently recorded a contrary finding, declaring that petitioner is not a resident of Village-Ramgarh Raila and further directed that name of the petitioner as well his family members be removed from the electoral list of village-Ramgarh Raila. The brief facts of the case are as under:- (i) The petitioner contested the elections in 2015 for the post of Gram Panchayat-Ramgarh Raila and was elected as Gram Pradhan while respondent no.5 who also contested the said elections lost by a margin of 78 votes. (ii) The respondent No.5 had raised an objection regarding inclusion of the name of the petitioner in the electoral roll of Village Ramgarhia Raila and thereafter after a detailed enquiry by opposite party No.4 by means of order dated 10/11/2015 the name of the petitioner in the electoral role was retained. (iii) Against the order dated 10/11/15 respondent No.5 filed an appeal under Rule 21A of the U.P Panchayati Raj (Registration of Electors) Rules, 1994 which was rejected on 20.11.2015. The order dated 20.11.2015 was challenged before this Court in writ petition No.279 (M/S) of 2015. The said petition was disposed of by this Hon'ble Court vide judgment and order dated 17.12.2019 where the order dated 20.11.2015 was quashed and the matter was remanded back to opposite party No.4 for fresh consideration. (iv) Consequent to the remand of the matter the opposite party No.4, after giving due notice to the parties concerned, decided the matter by means of a detailed and speaking order dated 25/5/2020, thereby the representation of Opposite party no. 5 was rejected. (iv) Consequent to the remand of the matter the opposite party No.4, after giving due notice to the parties concerned, decided the matter by means of a detailed and speaking order dated 25/5/2020, thereby the representation of Opposite party no. 5 was rejected. (v) Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the petitioner apprehended miscarriage of justice at the hands of opposite party No.4, and therefore moved the representation before District Magistrate, Pratapgarh stating that opposite party No.4 was acting in collusion with opposite party No.5 and therefore requested that the matter be transferred to another Sub Divisional Magistrate. The District Magistrate on 18/8/2020 had made an endorsement on the application preferred by the petitioner directing the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Lalganj to do the needful. It has been alleged by the petitioner that opposite party No.4, in the most hurried manner, without fixing any date, allowed the review application moved by opposite party No.5. (vi) It is in light of the aforesaid facts that this Court has been called upon to decide as to whether opposite party No.4 has the jurisdiction to review his own order dated 25.05.2020. 3. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that order dated 24.08.2020, has been passed by the Deputy Collector/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer (Panchayat), Lalganj, District-Pratapgarh on the application for review preferred by respondent no. 5 on 28.01.2020, seeking review of earlier order dated 25.05.2020. 4. It is further submitted on behalf of petitioner that proceedings were initiated by the Deputy Collector/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer on the basis of complaint made by respondent no. 5 with regard to petitioner, alleging that he is not the resident of village-Ramgarh Raila and therefore his name should be struck off from the electoral list of village-Ramgarh Raila. The Deputy Collector/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer in exercise of power under Rule 16 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj (Registration of Electors) Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules, 1994") after issuing notice to the petitioner and taking necessary evidence, rejected the application of respondent no.5 by means of order dated 25.05.2020, holding the petitioner, Brijendra Mani Yadav to be a resident of village-Ramgarh Raila and not resident of any other village as alleged in the complaint. 5. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the impugned order dated 24.08.2020, is beyond jurisdiction, inasmuch as the Deputy Collector/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer having exercised power under Rule 16 of the Rules, 1994 becomes functus officio and said Act of 1947 or the Rules of 1994 does not clothe him with any power of review of his orders, and in absence of any specific provision under the said Act or Rules, the Deputy Collector/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer denuded of exercising power of review and therefore the impugned order is clearly illegal, arbitrary, beyond jurisdiction and deserves to be set aside. 6. Sri Abhijeet Raj, learned counsel has put in appearance on behalf of respondent no. 5. He has raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition. He has submitted that against the impugned order passed by Deputy Collector/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer dated 24.08.2020, the petitioner has efficacious alternative remedy under Rule 21A of the Rules, 1994, of an appeal before the District Magistrate. Learned counsel for respondent no. 5 has vehemently submitted that in the light of the fact that when statutory alternative remedy is available, writ petition should not be entertained in exercise of power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and the petition deserves to be dismissed at the very outset. 7. Counsel for respondent no. 5 further submitted that there is inherent lack of jurisdiction in the order passed by the Deputy Collector/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer and therefore he had moved an application for review. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. The application for review which has been annexed along with the writ petition indicates that the said application was moved with the primary allegation that the petitioner was not residing in village-Ramgarh Raila and further the house which has been shown to be inhabited by the petitioner, belongs to one Daya Ram and in case proper enquiry in this regard is made, it would be evident that petitioner is not resident of village Ramgarh Raila and therefore, the finding of fact arrived at by the Deputy Collector/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer in his earlier order dated 25.05.2020, were erroneous and the order deserves to be reviewed. 10. 10. It has been recorded by the Deputy Collector/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer, in the impugned order, that notices were issued to the petitioner, while the petitioner in his writ petition has stated that notices were never served upon him. The petitioner has submitted that when he came to know about the proceedings pending before the Deputy Collector/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer, he appeared on 17.08.2020 and sought time to file objections and the Deputy Collector/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer granted him three day's time for the said purpose, but he could not file any objection within the said period and subsequently the review application was decided against him. He has further submitted that no date for final hearing was either fixed or communicated to him and therefore he submitted that no order sheet in this regard was prepared. 12. In the present writ petition only ground urged by the petitioner is that the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction inasmuch as the respondent-Sub Divisional Magistrate/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer has reviewed his earlier order dated 25.05.2020 where he has considered the entire facts afresh and re-appreciated the evidence and has come to a contrary finding and has thereby allowed the review application. 13. It has been submitted that the Act, 1947 nor the Rules empower the Sub Divisional Magistrate/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer to exercise power of review on merits and in absence of such power he had no jurisdiction or authority to embark upon the re-appreciation of evidence afresh to record a contrary finding. 14. The entire exercise in entertaining the application for review and embarking upon exercise of reviewing his earlier order is illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 15. With regard to the plea of alternative remedy, this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India usually remits the matter to the appropriate authority or Tribunal where a person has efficacious alternative remedy by way of appeal, review etc., but in appropriate cases where the impugned order has been passed in gross violation of principles of natural justice or where the action of respondents is shown to be wholly without jurisdiction then this Court in such appropriate cases would necessarily interfere and exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. In the case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. 16. In the case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks Mumbai and others, 1998 (8) SCC 1 , this aspect of the matter has been elaborately considered by Hon'ble Apex Court. The position of law as laid down by the Apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation (supra) is quoted herein below :- "14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is primary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose". 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has the discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of such is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where a writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of principles of natural justice or where an order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field." 17. In the light of aforesaid judgment, where the issue raised is solely with regard to jurisdiction of the authority in reviewing his order which goes to the root of the matter, preliminary objection of alternative remedy raised by the respondents is misconceived and is liable to be rejected. 18. In the light of aforesaid judgment, where the issue raised is solely with regard to jurisdiction of the authority in reviewing his order which goes to the root of the matter, preliminary objection of alternative remedy raised by the respondents is misconceived and is liable to be rejected. 18. The moot question for consideration before this Court is whether the Sub Divisional Magistrate/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer had jurisdiction to review his order dated 25.05.2020, who after hearing all the parties and considering all the relevant facts, had recorded definite finding of fact whether the petitioner was in fact resident of Village-Ramgarh Raila or not in favour of petitioner. 19. The Panchayati Raj Act, 1947 or the Rules framed thereunder do not ascribe any power of review with the Sub Divisional Magistrate/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer. 20. Learned counsel for the respondents also could not point out any such power vested in the Act or Rules for exercise of such power of review by the Sub Divisional Magistrate/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer. 21. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Urmila Jaiswal Vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2013 (4) ADJ 205 , while considering the matter pertaining to allotment of Fair Price Shop where appeal was dismissed and subsequently the review application was allowed, and the issue raised before the said Division Bench was as to whether the Commissioner could have reviewed his earlier order, the Division Bench of this Court after considering the catena of cases while allowing the writ petition, held as under :- "15. Now the question which is to be answered as to whether the Appellate Authority can review its order since the respondent no.4 has filed the review application dated 01.06.2012 taking various grounds of review and one of the ground was that the Government Order issued on 17th August 2002 was not attracted on the respondent no.4. The Commissioner heard the review on merits and had passed an order allowing the review application and setting aside the earlier order of cancellation. The Order 2004 does not contain any provision empowering the Appellate Authority to review its order. There is no dispute that the Appellate Authority has exercised the quasi-judicial power. The Full Bench relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Smt. Shivraji (Supra) has laid down following proposition of law. Para 35 of the said judgment is quoted below: 35. There is no dispute that the Appellate Authority has exercised the quasi-judicial power. The Full Bench relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Smt. Shivraji (Supra) has laid down following proposition of law. Para 35 of the said judgment is quoted below: 35. Any tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power, which is not vested with power of review under the statute expressly or by necessary implication, has an inherent power of review of its previous order in any circumstances. In our view the decisions only lay down the proposition that a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power has the inherent power to correct a clerical mistake or arithmetical error in its order and has the power to review an order which has been obtained by practicing fraud on the Court, provided that injustice has been perpetrated on a party by such order. Therefore, these decisions should not be construed as laying down any proposition of law contrary to the well settled principle of law that any order delivered and signed by a judicial or quasi judicial authority attains finality subject to appeal or revision as provided under the Act and if the authority passing the order is not specifically vested with power of review under the statute, it cannot reopen the proceeding and review/revise its previous order. 16. The Full Bench held that any Tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power, which is not vested with power of review under the Statute expressly or by necessary implication, has no power of review except an inherent power to correct the clerical mistake or to correct the order, which has been obtained by practising the fraud on the Court. 17. A Division Bench judgment in Sudha Sharma (supra) as well as Syed Madadgar Husain Rizvi (supra) lays down the same principles. The Division Bench has held that a quasi judicial authority is not permitted to review its order unless it is so expressly conferred by the Statute itself. 18. The Apex Court in 1987(4) SCC 525 Dr (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta Vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyayla, Sitapur (U.P.) & Others had occasion to consider the issue as to whether the Vice-Chancellor of a University under the provisions of U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 has power of review. The Vice-Chancellor had passed an order on 24.01.1987 disapproving the order of dismissal of the appellant. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyayla, Sitapur (U.P.) & Others had occasion to consider the issue as to whether the Vice-Chancellor of a University under the provisions of U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 has power of review. The Vice-Chancellor had passed an order on 24.01.1987 disapproving the order of dismissal of the appellant. Subsequently, the Vice-Chancellor had review the said order on 07.03.1987. While considering the aforesaid case, following was laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraph 11: "It is now well established that a quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. The Vice-Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order or dismissal of the Principal, acts as a quasi-judicial authority. It is not disputed that the provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not confer any power on the Vice-Chancellor. In the circumstances, it must be held that the Vice-Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction in reviewing her order dated January 24, 1987 by her order dated March 7, 1987. The said order of the Vice-Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 was a nullity." 19. The Apex Court in 2005 (13) SCC 777 , Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union Vs. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and another had again considered the power of review. The Tribunal had reviewed its earlier award dated 12.06.1987. The matter was taken to the High Court, which held that in absence of an express provision in the Industrial Disputes Act, Tribunal could not review its earlier award. The matter was taken to the Apex Court, where one of the submission raised was that even in the absence of an express power of review, the Tribunal had the power to review its order if some illegality was pointed out. Rejecting the submissions following was laid down in paragraph 17 and 18: "17. The question still remains whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to recall its earlier "Award dated June 12, 1987. The High Court was of the view that in the absence of an express provision in the Act conferring upon the Tribunal the power of review the Tribunal could not review its earlier Award. The High Court has relied upon the judgments of this Court in Dr. The High Court was of the view that in the absence of an express provision in the Act conferring upon the Tribunal the power of review the Tribunal could not review its earlier Award. The High Court has relied upon the judgments of this Court in Dr. (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and Ors. and Patel Narshi Thakershi and Ors. v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsingji : AIR 1970 SC 1273 wherein this Court has clearly held that the power of review is not an inherent power and must be conferred by law either expressly or by necessary implication. The appellant sought to get over this legal hurdle by relying upon the judgment of this Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors. (supra). In that case the Tribunal made an ex-parte Award. Respondents applied for setting aside the ex-parte Award on the ground that they were prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the reference was called on for hearing. The Tribunal set aside the ex-parte Award on being satisfied that there was sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and accordingly set aside the ex-parte Award. That order was upheld by the High Court and thereafter in appeal by this Court. 18. It was, therefore, submitted before us relying upon Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors. (supra) that even in the absence of an express power of review, the Tribunal had the power to review its order if some illegality was pointed out. The submission must be rejected as misconceived. The submission does not take notice of the difference between a procedural review and a review on merits. This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors. (supra) clearly highlighted this distinction when it observed :- "Furthermore, different considerations arise on review. The expression 'review' is used in the two distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a mis-apprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the court in Patel Narshi Thakershi case held that no review lies on merits unless a statute specifically provides for it. Obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debit a justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every court or Tribunal". 20. Again in (2010) 9 SCC 437 , Kalabharti Advertising Vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and Others, the power of review in the absence of statutory provisions was considered by the Apex Court. Following proposition was laid in paragraph nos. 12, 13 and 14: "12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed is ultra-vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (vide: Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and Anr. : AIR 1965 SC 1457 and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh and Ors. : AIR 1966 SC 641 ). 13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and Ors. v. Shri Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji : AIR 1970 SC 1273 ; Maj. Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan and Ors. : AIR 1978 SC 1814 ; Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidhyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and Ors. : AIR 1987 SC 2186 ; State of Orissa and Ors. v. Commissioner of Land Records and Settlement, Cuttack and Ors. : (1998) 7 SCC 162 and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain and Ors : (2008) 2 SCC 705 , this Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication and in absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in absence of any statutory provision for the same is nullity being without jurisdiction. 14. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in absence of any statutory provision for the same is nullity being without jurisdiction. 14. Therefore, in view of the above, the law on the point can be summarised to the effect that in absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review or under the garb of clarification/modification/correction is not permissible." 21. From the proposition of law as laid down in the above cases, it is well established that unless the Statute/Rule permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi judicial orders. In Order 2004, no power of review has been expressly provided nor such power can be read by implication. The Commissioner after dismissing the appeal filed under Clause 28 of Order 2004 has entertained the review application on merits and had allowed the review on merits." 22. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Naresh Kumar and Others Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) and one more connected case, reported in (2019) 9 SCC 416 , while considering the same proposition held as under :- "13. It is settled law that the power of review can be exercised only when the statute provides for the same. In the absence of any such provision in the statute concerned, such power of review cannot be exercised by the authority concerned. This Court in Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, has held as under : "......12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh) 13. In Patel Narsi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji, Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan, Kuntesh Gupta v. Hindu Kanya Kahavidyalaya, State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records & Settlement and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain this Court held that the power to "review is not an inherent power. In Patel Narsi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji, Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan, Kuntesh Gupta v. Hindu Kanya Kahavidyalaya, State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records & Settlement and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain this Court held that the power to "review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication" and in the absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in the absence of any statutory provision for the same is a nullity, being without jurisdiction. 14. Therefore, in view of the above, the law on the point can be summarised to the effect that in the absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review or under the grab of clarification/modification/correction is not permissible."" 23. In the present case the exercise of power by the Sub Divisional Magistrate/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer in entertaining the application of respondent no. 5 and thereby reviewing his own earlier order dated 25.05.2020, was clearly without jurisdiction in the light of the fact that there is no provision in the Act of 1947or Rules of 1994 enabling the Sub Divisional Magistrate/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer to do the same. 24. In case respondent no. 5 was not satisfied with the findings of fact recorded by the Sub Divisional Magistrate/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer, it was open for him to file an appeal under Section 21A of the Rules, 1994. 25. In the light of above, the impugned order dated 24.08.2020, being without jurisdiction, is hereby quashed. 26. The writ petition is allowed.