JUDGMENT : 1. The matter has been heard through video conferencing with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. They have no complaint about any audio and visual connectivity. 2. This is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent directed against the order/judgment dated 01.11.2018 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 953 of 1998(R) whereby and whereunder in the peculiar fact of the case the Award passed by the Tribunal to the extent of regularization of the concerned workmen has been declined to be interfered with. 3. The brief facts of the case which require to be enumerated reads as hereunder: The concerned workmen were engaged by the Management of Food Corporation of India (FCI), Food Storage Depot, Chandauti under the District Manager, FCI, Gaya from the month of May, 1989 as casual workers to perform the job of casual employees, however, they were stopped from doing the work from 10.05.1990. The sponsoring Union raised the claim for regularization and back wages of the concerned workmen and when the conciliation failed, the dispute was referred by the appropriate government to the Central Government, Industrial Tribunal No. 2, Dhanbad vide Reference No. 128 of 1996 having the following terms of reference: “Whether the action of the management of Food Corporation of India, Patna retrenching the services of S/Sh. Sashi Shankar and 20 Others (list enclosed) is justified and legal? If not, what relief the concerned workmen are entitled to?” The Tribunal passed the Award dated 18.03.1997 in favour of the concerned workmen and directed the appellant/petitioner to reinstate and regularize them in service in Class-IV post w.e.f. 10.05.1990, i.e. the date of their retrenchment from work with 75% of back wages within two months from the date of publication of the Award. The aforesaid Award has been assailed by the Management by filing a writ petition before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India taking ground therein that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate that there was nothing on record to show the relationship of employer and employee between the appellant/petitioner and the concerned workmen. The concerned workmen were never engaged by the management and there was absolutely no evidence in support of the claim of engagement made by the concerned workmen. The concerned workmen were never engaged by the management and there was absolutely no evidence in support of the claim of engagement made by the concerned workmen. The Tribunal had considered Exhibit W-3, which is an attendance register filed on behalf of the workmen, however, the said document has been said to be forged one and non-existent in the office of the management. The said attendance register brought on record before the Tribunal by the concerned workmen shown to have been endorsed by the depot in-charge who was a Class-III employee and had got no authority to make endorsement on the attendance of any employee or workmen. The signature of the depot in-charge has also not been authenticated and thus has no evidentiary value. According to the management, the said document has been created in collusion with the interested persons only for the purpose of managing back door entry in the employment of the Corporation which is an instrumentality of the Government of India. It has further been contended that the workmen had stated before the Assistant Labour Commissioner about the date of their engagement by the management in the month of December, 1988 and in March, 1989 which contradicts and falsifies the claim of the concerned workmen. The Tribunal ignoring the aforesaid argument of the management had passed an Award of reinstatement with regularization along with payment of 75% of back wages which is not sustainable in the eye of law. The workmen had appeared through his counsel taking the plea inter-alia before the writ Court that the workmen have been retrenched without issuing any notice or without complying the provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1947). There was sufficient evidence including the attendance register, i.e. Exhibit W-3, in support of the claim of the concerned workmen and the admissibility of the said attendance register was never questioned by the management before the Tribunal. Further, the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Patna, Ranchi Bench dismissed the writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 1195 of 1991(R) on 01.07.1991. The finding so made in the Award is final in nature and the writ Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not supposed to act as an Appellate Court so as to interfere with the finding of fact arrived by the Tribunal. The finding so made in the Award is final in nature and the writ Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not supposed to act as an Appellate Court so as to interfere with the finding of fact arrived by the Tribunal. The writ Court considered the rival submission of the parties and placing reliance upon certain judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court as also the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1 came to a finding that before terminating/retrenching, a notice is required to be issued as provided under Section 25-F of the Act, 1947, in case of non-compliance of the same, the workmen would be entitled for reinstatement and not regularization but taking into consideration the fact that the Award has been passed and the concerned workmen have been availing the benefit of Award for more than period of 18 years and if the said decision is changed at this stage, it would cause great hardship to the workmen without having any fault on their part, in view thereof, making the fact of the case as exceptional, even after holding that the Award of the Tribunal particularly to the extent of regularization of the concerned workmen does not appear to be tenable, yet the learned Single Judge refrained from interfering with the impugned Award under the aforesaid exceptional circumstances. The said order is the subject matter of the instant intra-court appeal. 4. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant assisted by Mr. Nipun Bakshi, learned counsel has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eye of law because even though it has been held by recording specific finding that the order of regularization as has been awarded in the impugned Award is not justified but even then merely on sympathy the order of regularization has not been interfered with, therefore, the said Award is not sustainable in the eye of law, further, there is no reference to that effect as would be evident from the terms of the reference since in the reference only the question was to be answered by the Tribunal about the termination of the workmen as to whether the same is justified and if not, what relief they are entitled to. 5. 5. According to the learned counsel, admittedly, the workmen were working in the daily rated capacity, therefore, at best when the Tribunal came to a conscious finding that the retrenchment is contrary to the condition stipulated under the provision of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947, the requirement before the Tribunal was to restore the position of the workmen by passing an order of reinstatement but exceeding the terms of reference had passed an order of regularization which cannot be said to be appropriate on the part of the Tribunal. 6. Learned Single Judge has committed an error by not interfering with the part of the Award whereby and whereunder the order of regularization has been passed merely on the ground that the workmen have been allowed to work for a period of 18 years but the question is that when the said Award is under scrutiny before this Court, the period of rendering the service will not come in the way rather the implementation of Award of regularization or any part thereof will depend upon the outcome of the writ petition pending before the High Court. 7. Mr. Rahul Kumar, learned counsel for the workmen has vehemently defended the Award as also the order passed by the learned Single Judge by making submission that there is no infirmity therein and the learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the fact that the order passed in terms of the provision of Section 17-B of the Act, 1947 since has not been complied with, vacated the interim relief. As a consequence, the Award has been executed and since the date of execution of the Award, the workmen are in service, therefore, at this juncture, if they will be thrown out from service, the same will be hard. Keeping this fact into consideration, the learned Single Judge making the fact of the case as exceptional, had declined to interfere with the same which cannot be said to be unjustified. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, some admitted facts are required to be stated herein. The workmen claimed to have been engaged under the management of FCI in the daily rated capacity. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, some admitted facts are required to be stated herein. The workmen claimed to have been engaged under the management of FCI in the daily rated capacity. They have been retrenched but according to the workmen, the retrenchment was contrary to the procedure laid down under Section 25-F of the Act, 1947, therefore, a demand had been made before the competent authority for conciliation but conciliation failed. The failure report was forwarded to the appropriate Government and thereafter, reference was made as referred hereinabove. The Tribunal proceeded to adjudicate the issue by answering the terms of reference. Admittedly, the reference is for consideration of the decision of the management about termination and the termination if found to be unjustified what relief the workmen were entitled to, was to be answered by the Tribunal. Admitted position herein is that there is no reference to the effect of regularization rather the issue of termination was the terms of reference and if the termination order would be said to be unjustified what relief the workmen were entitled to. The Tribunal in course of adjudication of the issue had considered the document, i.e. the attendance register and other evidences, produced by the workmen in support of their claim that they were working regularly in order to establish their case of coming under the purview of the provision of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947. The aforesaid attendance register has seriously been disputed by the management, however, the Tribunal had passed an Award of reinstatement with regularization along with 75% of the back wages. The question of regularization had been considered by the Tribunal on the ground that several other retrenched employees have already been regularized and the order to that effect has been affirmed by this Court. The management came before this Court by assailing the Award inter-alia on the ground that the order of regularization is bad in the eye of law on the ground of absence of reference about it. The management came before this Court by assailing the Award inter-alia on the ground that the order of regularization is bad in the eye of law on the ground of absence of reference about it. Learned Single Judge has agreed to the said contention of the management and gave a specific finding in the impugned order that there should not be any Award for regularization but taking into consideration the fact that the workmen had been regularized in service and they are working for last 18 years, therefore, at this juncture, if any interference would be made with the Award, the same will lead to unnecessary hardship to the workmen, he did not interfere into the same. 9. It is settled position of law that the Tribunal of the Labour Court is to act as an adjudicator as per the procedure laid down under the provision of the Act, 1947. The workmen, under the provision of the Act, 1947 has been conferred with statutory recourse that in case of any unfair means taken by the management, they will have a remedy under the Act, 1947 to make a demand before the competent authority. The competent authority is supposed to call upon the management for conciliation. If conciliation materializes, the same will bind the parties in view of the provision of Section 18(3) of the Act, 1947 but in case of failure of conciliation, the failure report is to be prepared under the provision of Section 12 of the Act, 1947 which shall be forwarded to the appropriate Government for making a reference for adjudication of the dispute under Section 10 of the Act, 1947. 10. Herein, the workmen had raised the demand before the competent authority. The matter was put for conciliation but conciliation failed. Thereafter, the failure report was prepared which was referred to the appropriate Government for making reference to be adjudicated by the competent adjudicator as per the procedure laid down under the Act, 1947. The terms of reference had been made by the appropriate Government to answer as to whether terminating the service of the workmen is justified? If not, to what relief the workmen were entitled to. The terms of reference had been made by the appropriate Government to answer as to whether terminating the service of the workmen is justified? If not, to what relief the workmen were entitled to. Therefore, the terms of reference is to give a declaration about the justification in terminating the service of workmen and if the Tribunal will find that the termination is not justified then it was to be further adjudicated as to what relief the workmen are entitled to. Admittedly the workmen, in the present case, were in the daily rated capacity and in course, they were terminated. 11. The issue of termination has been questioned on the ground of non-compliance of the provision of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947. The Tribunal came to a conclusion that before retrenching the condition stipulated under the provision of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947 has not been complied with, therefore, the termination has been declared to be unjustified. However, when the termination has been held to be unjustified by the Tribunal by passing an Award, the consequence would be of reinstatement of the workmen. The question of regularization will only be there if the reference to that effect was made. In the absence thereof, it can be safely held that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction by travelling beyond the terms of reference and, while answering the issue of termination, had passed the Award of reinstatement and regularization along with back wage to the extent of 75%. 12. Learned counsel for the management is not assailing the part of the Award whereby direction is for reinstatement and payment of back wages to the extent of 75% rather the management is aggrieved by the Award pertaining to regularization. Further that erroneously, even though the learned Single Judge has found the order of regularization incorrect, merely on the ground that the workmen have been allowed to continue in service and since they have already rendered service for about 18 years, the part of the Award pertaining to regularization has been refused to be interfered with. 13. The settled position of law is that the Tribunal cannot travel beyond the terms of reference because it, being the adjudicator of referred issue, has only to answer the terms of reference. 14. The learned Single Judge also came to a conscious finding that there should not have been an order of regularization. 13. The settled position of law is that the Tribunal cannot travel beyond the terms of reference because it, being the adjudicator of referred issue, has only to answer the terms of reference. 14. The learned Single Judge also came to a conscious finding that there should not have been an order of regularization. However, the question is that can the part of the order whereby and whereunder the regularization has been declined to be interfered with by the learned Single Judge be said to be justified? 15. We, after going through the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge have found therefrom that the order of regularization has not been interfered with only on the ground that the workmen in the meanwhile have rendered their services for about 18 years and if any interference would be shown at this stage, it will be harsh upon the workmen. 16. It is settled position of law that no order can be passed on sympathy. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. vs. U.T. Chandigarh and Others, (2004) 2 SCC 130 , paragraph-36 whereof reads as hereunder: “36. We have no doubt in our mind that sympathy or sentiment by itself cannot be a ground for passing an order in relation whereto the appellants miserably fail to establish a legal right. It is further trite that despite an extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction contained in Article 142 of the Constitution of India, this Court ordinarily would not pass an order which would be in contravention of a statutory provision.” In Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs. vs. State of M.P. (2007) 7 SCC 625 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in paragraph-32 as hereunder: “32. We appreciate the anxiety of the learned counsel for the appellant that if the conviction of the deceased is upheld by this Court, the deceased may not be held entitled to pensionary and other benefits. We are, however, helpless. Once we are satisfied that the acquittal recorded by the trial court was not in consonance with law and the High Court was right in setting aside it and in convicting the accused, it is a mere “consequence” which cannot be helped. We are, however, helpless. Once we are satisfied that the acquittal recorded by the trial court was not in consonance with law and the High Court was right in setting aside it and in convicting the accused, it is a mere “consequence” which cannot be helped. The argument of “sympathy” therefore, does not impress us and cannot carry the case of the appellant-applicant herein further.” It is further settled position of law that once the court comes to the conclusion that a wrong order has been passed, it becomes the solemn duty of the court to rectify the mistake rather than perpetuate the same. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Orissa and Another vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 . 17. We have considered the fact that the workmen have not challenged the order passed by the learned Single Judge against the finding recorded therein that the petitioners are not entitled to be regularized in service since it has specifically been recorded at paragraph 16 that “.......However, if he has been terminated without any notice or compensation in lieu of the same as provided under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, he would be entitled for reinstatement and not regularization.” therefore, the part of the order as observed at paragraph-16 thereof, attained its finality. 18. The question now is that once the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that in case of violation of the provision of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947, the entitlement of reinstatement of the workmen would be there and not regularization but even then the learned Single Judge upheld the Award for regularization merely on the ground that the workmen have been allowed to work for about 18 years. 19. We have considered the fact in the instant case. The order has been passed by this Court under the provision of Section 17-B of the Act, 1947 which stipulates that the last pay drawn is required to be paid to the workmen. 19. We have considered the fact in the instant case. The order has been passed by this Court under the provision of Section 17-B of the Act, 1947 which stipulates that the last pay drawn is required to be paid to the workmen. Admittedly, the last pay drawn has not been paid, therefore, the conditional interim stay of the Award got vacated by the order passed by this Court, and thereafter, the workmen have been allowed to be engaged in service but the fact remains that when the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge about regularization finding it to be illegal, the same having not been assailed by the workmen, has to considered as admitted. Merely on sympathy the order should not have been passed by the learned Single Judge in view of the settled position of law that on sympathy no order can be passed by the court of law. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the part of the order whereby and whereunder the workmen have been allowed to render their service in the capacity of regularized employee is not sustainable in the eye of law as also the part of the Award whereby and whereunder regularization of the workmen has been allowed, even in the absence of reference, thus, being without jurisdiction. It requires to refer herein the settled position of law about the power of judicial review of Award passed by the Tribunal or Lower Court. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 . Paragraph No. 7 of the said judgment is being reproduced herein-below: “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised [vide Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955 (1) SCR 1104 : AIR 1955 SC 233 , Nagendra Nath vs. Commr. of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : AIR 1958 SC 398 and Kaushalya Devi vs. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 ]. In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Others, AIR 1955 SC 233 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as hereunder in paragraph no. 21: “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In Sawarn Singh and Another vs. State of Punjab and Others, (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos. 12 and 13 as hereunder: “12. 12 and 13 as hereunder: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos. 66 and 67 as hereunder: “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. vs. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. vs. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In Thansingh vs. Supdt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships, while discussing the scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference into the finding of the Tribunal, has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para-17 as herein-below: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal vs. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh vs. Amarnath that the.......power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways vs. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose vs. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J. as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 20. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others vs. Giridhari Sahu and Others, (2019) 10 SCC 695 has delved upon the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down that, if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside. 21. We, after applying the principle laid down in the case referred hereinabove while looking into the legality and propriety of the order pertaining to regularization, are of the considered view that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the Award of regularization since there was no reference to the effect of regularization of the workmen. 21. We, after applying the principle laid down in the case referred hereinabove while looking into the legality and propriety of the order pertaining to regularization, are of the considered view that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the Award of regularization since there was no reference to the effect of regularization of the workmen. Further, if the Tribunal came to a finding on the basis of the appreciation of evidence produced before it holding that the order of termination of the workmen was in violation of the provision of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947, the consequence would be to reinstate the workmen in service since they were working prior to the termination in the capacity of daily rated employee and in that view of the matter, there cannot be an order of regularization. 22. We have gone through the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Nagar Mahapalika (Now Municipal Corporation) vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 127 wherein the workmen were directed to be reinstated due to non-compliance of the provision of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (pari materia to the provision as contained under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947). When the direction for reinstatement was not complied with, the workmen approached to the High Court wherein the interim order was passed for implementation of the order of reinstatement passed by the Tribunal and by virtue of that workmen had continued in service for a period of 14 years. The matter went before the Hon’ble Apex Court where the plea was taken to consider the case of the workmen sympathetically on the ground that the workmen had already served for 14 years but the Hon’ble Apex Court has not accepted such submission and held that in the facts of the said case, there should not be an order for reinstatement in service and negating the claim of equity by virtue of rendering service for 14 years, the order of reinstatement was declared illegal, however, the order for compensation of Rs.30,000/- was passed. Therefore, it is settled that if any relief is not permissible under the law, even if granted, the same has to go irrespective of the fact that long service was rendered by such beneficiary. Therefore, it is settled that if any relief is not permissible under the law, even if granted, the same has to go irrespective of the fact that long service was rendered by such beneficiary. In the case in hand, the workmen have continued in service for 18 years but the question is, when there was no term of regularization in the reference, there cannot be an Award for regularization but the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate this aspect of the matter and going on compassion/sympathy, has refused to interfere with the order of regularization. Otherwise also, the order of regularization, since is not legally permissible and the same being wrong, the same has to be quashed and set aside otherwise the illegality will be allowed to be perpetuated. 23. In view of the aforesaid aspect of the matter, since the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction by passing an order of regularization, this Court, by exercising the power of writ of certiorari, is of the view that the part of the Award to the extent of regularization is not sustainable in the eye of law. Accordingly, the same is quashed and set aside. In consequence, the part of the order passed by the learned Single Judge declining to interfere with the order of regularization, based upon compassion, is also not sustainable in the eye of law and, accordingly, the same is also quashed and set aside. 24. The order passed by the learned Single Judge is modified to the extent as indicated hereinabove and the appeal stands disposed of. 25. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of.