ORDER : Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the Judgment/Order dated 05.11.2018 (Annexure-13), passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Dhanbad in M.J. Case No. 37 of 2013, whereby learned Court has been pleased to allow the said case filed by the respondent-Champa Devi and directed the petitioner-BCCL to pay the benefits of monetary compensation to the applicant as provided under Clause-9.5.0 of NCWA. 3. It was the case of the respondent before the learned Labour Court that her husband, late Budhan Bhuiya was a permanent employee of petitioner-BCCL and while discharging his duties, he died in harness on 11.05.2001. After his death, the respondent-Champa Devi applied for employment on compassionate ground on 31.08.2001. The petitioner-management after scrutiny of the application and other relevant documents sent a letter dated 11.09.2001 to the respondent stating therein that there is discrepancy in her age, as in the service records of late Budhan Bhuiya, the age of respondent as on the date of death of her husband comes to 44 years but the documents submitted by the respondent indicates her age to be 40 years on the date of death of her husband. Hence, it was suggested to the respondent to apply for appointment of her son on compassionate ground but she refused to the same. The respondent submitted application for monetary compensation also but no action was taken by the petitioner-management. Thereafter, the respondents preferred several representation but all went into vain. Aggrieved by non-payment of monetary compensation on account of death of her husband, the respondent approached the learned Labour Court by filing M.J. Case No. 37 of 2013 for payment of monetary compensation. Thereafter, notice was issued to the petitioner-BCCL, who appeared before the learned Court and filed its written statements. 4. The learned Labour Court, after hearing the parties and perusing the evidences and documents brought on record, by its Judgment dated 05.11.2018 allowed the said M.J. Case observing therein that: “In the result, it is therefore, ordered that the instant claim petition is hereby allowed in favour of applicant and against OP on contest. 4. The learned Labour Court, after hearing the parties and perusing the evidences and documents brought on record, by its Judgment dated 05.11.2018 allowed the said M.J. Case observing therein that: “In the result, it is therefore, ordered that the instant claim petition is hereby allowed in favour of applicant and against OP on contest. Consequently, O.P. is directed to pay the benefit of monetary compensation to the applicant as provided under Clause 9.5.0 of NCWA from 11.05.2001 till attaining the age of 60 years of the applicant as an arrear within 60 days from passing of this order failing which O.P. will liable to pay the said amount along with simple interest @ 12% per annum from the expiry of said 60 days till the date of actual payment. OP is also liable to pay cost of the litigation to the applicant to the tune of Rs.10,000/-. …………..” Aggrieved by the said judgment, the petitioner-BCCL has knocked the door of this Court. 5. Ms. Pooja Kumari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-BCCL vociferously argues that the petitioner had moved before the learned Labour Court for payment of monetary compensation but it is pertinent to mention here that earlier when the petitioner had offered the said monetary compensation, she refused to accept the same. Learned counsel further argues that the application u/s. 33 (C) of the Industrial Disputes Act was filed in the year 2013 i.e. after lapse of 11 years from the date of death of her husband and as such, it is barred by law of limitation but learned Court below condoned the inordinate delay in filing of the said case and passed final order ignoring the fact that the respondent had waived off the right of monetary compensation. Learned counsel further argues that since there was ambiguity in the age of the respondent, her application for compassionate appointment could not be processed by the petitioner-management. The respondent was also given an option to apply for compassionate appointment of her son but she refused to accept the same. Learned counsel further argues that all of a sudden in the year 2013 i.e. after lapse of 11 years of cause of action, the respondent filed M.J. Case for payment of monetary compensation, which she initially refused and the same application was admitted without taking into consideration the inordinate delay in filing the said case. Learned counsel further argues that all of a sudden in the year 2013 i.e. after lapse of 11 years of cause of action, the respondent filed M.J. Case for payment of monetary compensation, which she initially refused and the same application was admitted without taking into consideration the inordinate delay in filing the said case. Hence, learned counsel submits that the judgment dated 05.11.2018, passed in M.J. Case No. 37 of 2013 is fit to be quashed and set aside by this Court. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and argues that the issue involved in this case is no more res integra and the same cannot be determined u/s 33(C)(2) of the I.D. Act, as the same has already been decided by this Court in W.P.(C). No. 1466 of 2019 (BCCL Vs. Smt. Rukmani Devi). Further, the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in LPA No. 657 of 2018 (Ganga Devi Vs. M/s. BCCL & Ors.) by its order dated 07.07.2020, has allowed the prayer of the appellant for payment of monetary compensation from the date of death of the deceased employee. Learned counsel further argues that save and except copies of Annexure-3 and 11 to the writ application, none of the copies of Annexures-1 to 10 has been served upon the respondent nor the same has been exhibited before the learned Court below and as such, those annexures may not be looked into at this stage. Learned counsel further argues that right to get compensation payable to be female dependent of an deceased employee is an alternative and unconditional remedy and is not dependent on an application being made by the employee and once the application for compassionate employment is turned down by the management, the right to get monetary compensation automatically comes into existence. The monetary compensation is payable to female dependent of employee who dies in harness, from the date of death of the employee and not from the date when application for monetary compensation is submitted as cause of action is cautious, starting from the date of death of the employee. 7. The monetary compensation is payable to female dependent of employee who dies in harness, from the date of death of the employee and not from the date when application for monetary compensation is submitted as cause of action is cautious, starting from the date of death of the employee. 7. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that the main issue to be decided is as to whether the monetary compensation would be paid from the date of death or from the date of making an application. 8. Before delving into the said issue, it would be proper to refer the provisions of National Coal Wage Agreement which was applicable during the time of death of employee, which is reproduced herein below: “9.3.1 Employment would be provided to one dependent of the workers who are disabled permanently and also those who die while in service. 9.3.3 The dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law of the employee may be considered. In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment would be governed by the provisions of Clause 9.5.0. Clause 9.5.0 of N.C.W.A.-V stipulates the following:- (i) In case of death due to mine accident, the female dependant would have the option to either accept the monetary compensation of Rs.3,000/-per month or employment irrespective of age. (ii) In case of death/total permanent disablement due to cause other than mine accident and medical unfitness under clause 9.4.0., if the female dependant is below the age of 45 years she will have the option to accept the monetary compensation of Rs.2,000/-per month or employment. In case the female dependant is above 45 years of age she will be entitled to monetary compensation and not for employment. 9. In case the female dependant is above 45 years of age she will be entitled to monetary compensation and not for employment. 9. This Court after appreciating the provisions of National Coal Wage agreement has found therefrom that it is a bipartite agreement entered in between the authorities of Coal India Limited, to which, the petitioner-B.C.C.L. is one of the subsidiary and the trade unions other than in course of conciliation which means that bipartite agreement will be treated to be an agreement within the meaning of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such, the nature of agreement is having its statutory fervor, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coalfield Ltd. & Ors., reported in (2007) 8 SCC 549 . This Court, therefore, is of the opinion that since bipartite agreement by way of National Coal Wage Agreement is having statutory fervor, therefore, the same is to be followed in its strict sense by the respective parties i.e., its signatories. It is evident from the condition as contained under Clause 9.5.0. of N.C.W.A.-V, wherein it has been agreed to provide immediate relief to the dependent of the bereaved family in case of death of employee in harness, two modes have been provided to extend the said relief, firstly by way of providing employment on compassionate ground if the dependent is found to be eligible and less than 45 years of age and secondly by way of monetary compensation. It is evident from the conditions stipulated in N.C.W.A. as under Clause-9.5.0, wherein a condition of entitlement to receive monetary compensation has been made, meaning thereby, there is no stipulation made therein that the wife of the deceased employee will only be entitled to get the monetary compensation if she files an application for getting such monetary compensation, and if entitlement has been made in the agreement which has got statutory force irrespective of the fact that the application has been submitted or not, the wife of the deceased employee would be entitled to get the monetary compensation. 10. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that when a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. 10. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that when a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and Ors., reported in AIR (1964) SC 358, has held as under : “....its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted....” Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Babu Verghese and Ors. vs.Bar Council of Kerala and Ors., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 422 has held as under: “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under: “[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.” 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law.” The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala & Ors., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 633 , has held that : “..... This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law.” The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala & Ors., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 633 , has held that : “..... it is a normal rule of consideration that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself....” In case of State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ambay Cements & Anr., reported in (2005) 1 SCC 368 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : “....it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed.....” The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. vs. Regional Director ESIC Hyderabad & Ors., reported in (2015) 7 SCC 690 , has under: “14. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, it was held that: (SCC p.378, para 26) 26.... it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way.” 11. It is the settled position of law that a thing is required to be done strictly in pursuance to the provisions of law, if any deviation, then ultimately the provision as contained under the statute will have no effect. Herein also the National Coal Wage Agreement as under Clause-9.5.0, there is no stipulation made about the date of making payment of monetary compensation and as such, the petitioner cannot be allowed to interpret the aforesaid conditions about making payment of monetary compensation from the date of application and not from the date of death. Herein also the National Coal Wage Agreement as under Clause-9.5.0, there is no stipulation made about the date of making payment of monetary compensation and as such, the petitioner cannot be allowed to interpret the aforesaid conditions about making payment of monetary compensation from the date of application and not from the date of death. It is further evident that payment of monetary compensation is to be made on account of death of deceased employee, therefore, the cause of action for disbursement of monetary compensation will be the date of death of employee and hence, the cause of action will be said to accrue from the date of death. In view thereof, the contention which has been agitated by the learned counsel for the petitioner-B.C.C.L. that the monetary compensation has to be paid from the date of application is having no force, for the reason that the authorities of the B.C.C.L. cannot be allowed to insert anything which is not available under the statute as the agreement by way of N.C.W.A. has got statutory force under the provision of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, therefore, the paramount consideration is to be looked into, will be the cause of action to get the amount of compensation. Since the monetary compensation is to be paid in consequence of death of an employee and therefore, the cause of action would be on the date when the death of employee will occur and in that view of the matter, the wife of the deceased employee or the husband as the case may be, will be entitled to get the monetary compensation from the date of death and not from the date of application. 12. This Court on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove and considering the fact that there is no stipulation made in the National Coal Wage Agreement-V that monetary compensation will be paid from the date of application, as has been discussed above, it can safely be construed that the monetary compensation would be paid from the date of cause of action i.e., on the date of death of deceased employee. Further, there cannot be any addition in the National Coal Wage Agreement at the end of the petitioner-authorities making the monetary compensation payable from the date of application. 13. Further, there cannot be any addition in the National Coal Wage Agreement at the end of the petitioner-authorities making the monetary compensation payable from the date of application. 13. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, no interference is warranted in the findings of facts recorded by the learned Court below. 14. Resultantly, the writ petition merits dismissal and the same is hereby dismissed. 15. The petitioner-B.C.C.L. is directed to pay the compensation as per the Judgment dated 05.11.2018, passed in M.J. Case No. 37 of 2013, if not paid till date, within the period of eight weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order.