JUDGMENT Ravindra V. Ghuge, J. - The appellant Anil Shrawan More seeks to challenge the Judgment and Order dated 06.06.2013 delivered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dhule in Sessions Case No. 109 of 2012, vide which, he has been convicted for having committed the offence of murdering his wife. The order of conviction and awarding of sentence reads thus: "ORDER 1] Accused is convicted for the offence p/u/s 302 of I.P.C. 2] Accused is sentenced to suffer rigorous life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs. 5000/- i/d to suffer R.I. for three months. 3] Muddemal property being worthless be destroyed, after the appeal period is over. 4] Accused is given set off for his custody period. 5] Dictated and pronounced in open Court. Date: 06-06-2013. Dhule. Addl. Sessions Judge, Dhule." 2. We have extensively heard the learned Advocate appointed to represent appellant - Anil who is in Jail and the learned APP, on 14.10.2020 and 15.10.2020. With their assistance, we have gone through the record and proceedings and testimonies of the witnesses, threadbare. 3. The appellant has relied upon the following Judgments:- i] Smt. Gargi vs State of Haryana, (2019) 12 Scale 617 ii] Sahadevan & Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) AIR SC 2435 iii] Navaneethakrishnan v. State by Inspector of Police, (2018) AIR SC 2027 iv] Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhara Pradesh, (1990) AIR SC 79 v] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh and others, (1964) AIR SC 358 4. The learned APP has relied upon the following Judgments:- i] Dayanand Changdeo Zende and others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 1 MhLJ(Cri) 74 ii] Shivdas @ Betu s/o. Narayan Boddewar Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) AllMR(Cri) 3165 iii] Swamy Shraddananda (2)* ALIAS Murali Manohar Mishra Versus State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 iv] Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (2011) AIRSCW 372 v] Kashinath Krishna Jadhav vs State of Maharashtra, (1973) AIR SC 1219 vi] Mahadeo Ganpati Sutar and Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) AllMR(Cri) 2274 vii] Mohammad Ismail Noormohammad vs. The State of Maharashtra decided by the Division Bench of the Principal Seat of this Court vide Judgment dtd. 23.01.2020. 5. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) AllMR(Cri) 2274 vii] Mohammad Ismail Noormohammad vs. The State of Maharashtra decided by the Division Bench of the Principal Seat of this Court vide Judgment dtd. 23.01.2020. 5. The prosecution has succeeded in acquiring conviction of the appellant- Anil on the basis of its case as follows: a] The informant Bhalchandra Jayram Pagare, Police Patil at village Shenpur, lodged a complaint on 13.03.2012 at 09:15 a.m., stating therein that Prakash Shrawan More, real elder brother of the appellant Anil, was working as a Saldar with a farm owner by name Ashok Govind Kakuste. His wife and his children reside together in one of the agricultural fields of Ashok. Anil had come to the house of Prakash in search of work and stayed with him along with his wife, a son and a daughter. He was given employment by Ashok in an adjacent field and Anil started residing in a small hut in the said field along with his wife and children. It was a one room hut which did not have a door. b] On 13.03.2012, at about 07:00 a.m., when Bhalchandra reached the Gram Panchayat Office, Prakash and Ujjwal s/o Ashok Kakuste came on a motorcycle. Ujjwal informed Bhalchandra that Anil had killed his wife in between 01:00 to 01:30 a.m., on 13.03.2012. Bhalchandra therefore went to the spot of the incident along with Suresh Maharu Kakuste and Rajendra Babulal Kakuste. Prakash and Ujjwal were along with him. c] At the spot of the incident, Bhalchandra found Anil seated outside his house on the otta (platform). Bhalchandra himself entered the house and saw the wife of the Anil, namely Suvarna, lying on the ground in a naked condition. She was dead. She had two to three injuries on her head and a few injuries on her body. She had bled from these injuries. d] Bhalchandra inquired with Anil and Anil told him that he killed his wife because she was indulging in 'faltukpana' (local language indicating an inappropriate/improper /immoral act). He assaulted her with a sickle and a wooden stick and killed her. Anil told Bhalchandra that he had sent his children to the house of brother Prakash. Bhalchandra therefore reached the Police Station and lodged the complaint registered as C.R. No. 45/2012. e] The API - Mr. Abdul Khalik Abdul Mannan Pathan (Investigating Officer) carried out the investigation. He assaulted her with a sickle and a wooden stick and killed her. Anil told Bhalchandra that he had sent his children to the house of brother Prakash. Bhalchandra therefore reached the Police Station and lodged the complaint registered as C.R. No. 45/2012. e] The API - Mr. Abdul Khalik Abdul Mannan Pathan (Investigating Officer) carried out the investigation. He visited the spot on 13.03.2012 and prepared an inquest panchanama and a spot panchanama in the presence of panch witnesses. He seized the blood stained clothes, wooden stick, blood stained sickle, blood stained sand and simple sand, etc. A panchanama was prepared for about 13 articles. He arrested the accused and prepared the arrest panchanama. He also seized the clothes of the accused which had blood stains. f] As a part of investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded the statements of 15 persons (inclusive of five panch witnesses) during the course of investigation. Anil was sent for medical examination. On 15.03.2012, the Investigating Officer issued a letter to the Medical Officer for conducting the medical examination of the accused. He also issued a letter to the Circle Officer for preparation of a map. Muddemal property was sent to the Chemical Analyst at Nashik along with a letter. The body of Suvarna was sent to the Rural Hospital, Sakri for post-mortem. g] The prosecution examined five witnesses as under: i) PW1- Informant- Bhalchandra Jayram Pagare at Exh.17. ii) PW2- Prakash Shrawan More at Exh. 19. iii) PW3- Yogesh Jaywant Pagare at Exh. 20. iv) PW4- I.O. - Abdul K.A.M. Pathan at Exh. 23. v) PW5- Dr. Kalpana Govindrao Chaudhari at Exh. 30. h] The accused did not lead any evidence and did not examine himself. In his statement u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C., his answer to the first question was that he had heard and understood the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses. From question no. 2 till question no. 21, his identical answer was "it is false". In fact, he answered in the negative even to the fact that he was in employment of Ashok and his wife was found dead in a naked condition. Similar answers were given when confronted that he was residing at the farm of Ashok and his two children were sent to the house of his brother Prakash. In fact, he answered in the negative even to the fact that he was in employment of Ashok and his wife was found dead in a naked condition. Similar answers were given when confronted that he was residing at the farm of Ashok and his two children were sent to the house of his brother Prakash. He also answered in the negative that the house did not have a door, that the I.O. was investigating the case, that clothes were seized from his house, that the dead body of Suvarna was taken to the Rural Hospital, Sakri and that he has one son and one daughter. i] After appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the appellant was held to have committed an offence of murdering his wife and was convicted. 6. The submissions of the learned Advocate for the appellant can be summarized as under : - a] The room provided by the landlord was without any door. b] Anil has admitted the spot panchanama and the map. c] The accused has admitted the inquest panchanama dtd. 13.03.2012, Exh. 12. The landlord Ashok can be treated as being a custodian of the whole family of Anil. d] Ujjwal, son of the landlord was not examined as a prosecution witness though his name was referred to by PW1 as well as PW2. e] The seven years old son of Anil, was also not examined as a witness. f] Ashok, the landlord was also not examined. g] The evidence of the informant Bhalchandra shows a very weak motive for commission of the offence since the word 'faltukpana' has been said to have been uttered by Anil. h] No independent witness supports the testimony of the informant PW1. i] The statement of Bhalchandra is based on hearsay information. j] The entire case rests upon circumstantial evidence and there are many missing links. k] The overlapping time in the spot panchanama Exh. 21, inquest panchanama Exh. 12 and the postmortem report Exh. 31 indicate that the evidence produced by the prosecution, is doubtful. l] Neither the blood group of the deceased nor of the accused Anil, has been determined and the test on the blood sample of the deceased was shown to be inconclusive. m] The C.A. report as regards the articles is not conclusive and does not connect Anil with the murder of his wife. l] Neither the blood group of the deceased nor of the accused Anil, has been determined and the test on the blood sample of the deceased was shown to be inconclusive. m] The C.A. report as regards the articles is not conclusive and does not connect Anil with the murder of his wife. n] The purported extra-judicial confession of Anil said to have been made before Bhalchandra and Prakash, was not voluntary and the fact that the accused Anil appeared before the Magistrate and declined to make a confessional statement indicates that he had never admitted of murdering his wife. o] There is an improvement in the FIR at the behest of Bhalchandra on the point of the extra-judicial confession. p] PW2 Prakash does not disclose the use of weapons which is contrary to the statement of PW1 Bhalchandra. q] PW2 Prakash does not support the testimony of PW1 Bhalchandra on the point of her character. r] The word 'faltukpana' does not mean that the wife of Anil was characterless or was of an easy virtue. s] The failure on the part of the prosecution in examining the son of the accused is fatal to the case of the prosecution. t] Discrepancy is visible with regard to the testimony of PW1, PW2 and PW4 in connection with the presence of the children at the spot of the crime. u] The conduct of Anil pursuant to the demise of his wife would indicate that he did not attempt to run away, he guarded the dead body by sitting at the entrance of the hut throughout the night. He did not hide the weapons found in the hut. There was no marital discord or strained relations between Anil and Suvarna. 7. The learned APP has contended that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses is unshaken. There are no suggestions in the cross examination of either PW1 Bhalchandra or PW2 Prakash for impeaching their version of extra-judicial confession. Prakash is the real elder brother of Anil and it was on account of the efforts of Prakash that Anil had come in search of work and was successful in getting employment at the same farm owned by Ashok. Prakash is not on inimical terms with Anil. Any other person in place of Prakash, could have suppressed the fact of the extra-judicial confession. Prakash is not on inimical terms with Anil. Any other person in place of Prakash, could have suppressed the fact of the extra-judicial confession. Prakash has stated on oath that Anil had confessed that he had killed his wife. 8. The learned APP further submitted that Anil had actually approached a Magistrate by following the due process of law to make a confessional statement. The concerned Judicial Officer followed the due procedure and eventually, there was a change of mind on the part of Prakash and he finally informed the learned Magistrate that he does not wish to make any statement. This would indicate that Anil had the desire of making a confessional statement in the form of a judicial confession. However, it appears that he developed cold feet and he declined to make a confessional statement before the concerned Judicial Officer. 9. He then submits that a clear motive has emerged. Considering the local language, describing the conduct of a wife as being 'faltukpana' would indicate that the husband was aggrieved by the immoral acts of the wife and Anil therefore appears to have formed a view that Suvarna had a loose character and hence he has killed her. 10. He further adds that the defence Advocate should have made suggestions to the prosecution witnesses so as to build up his case that an unknown person may have killed her. No such suggestions are made and the only stand taken by the accused is that the case of the prosecution is false. 11. He then submits that Section 106 of the Evidence Act would play a role in this matter. In the middle of the night, Suvarna being inside a hut and Anil having been found with her, would indicate that Suvarna died while being in the natural custody of husband Anil. 12. In the light of the submissions of the learned counsel, we have perused the record in order to appreciate the sequence of events. PW2 Prakash has stated categorically that both the children of Anil were residing at his house which is at a distance of about 1.5 kms., from the house of Anil, when the incident had occurred. The Investigating Officer PW4 has stated that he came to know that Anil had left his children after the incident had occurred. PW2 Prakash has stated categorically that both the children of Anil were residing at his house which is at a distance of about 1.5 kms., from the house of Anil, when the incident had occurred. The Investigating Officer PW4 has stated that he came to know that Anil had left his children after the incident had occurred. Anil has purportedly told Prakash that he had killed his wife and that Prakash should inform the employer Ashok. Prakash had gone to the employer Ashok in the early morning. He met Ujjwal, son of Ashok and, therefore, told him that Anil had told him (Prakash) that Anil had killed his wife. WHETHER THE DEATH OF SUVARNA CAN BE SAID TO BE HOMICIDAL? 13. The prosecution has relied upon the testimony of PW5 who is Dr. Kalpana Chaudhari. She has deposed the factual details about the dead body of Suvarna, which was received for the purpose of conducting a post-mortem. The post-mortem commenced at 10:05 am and concluded at 11:30 am. Dr. Kalpana noticed the following injuries on the dead body: - "bruise on left shoulder, left arm left elbow, left gluteal region, left thigh, perineal region. CLW frontal region of skull, left side of forehead, right cheek just below right ear, just above upper lip, abrasion on left shoulder, arm, forearm, linear abrasion mammary region, left mammary liernical I have mentioned size of all those injuries in column No.17 and 19 of postmortem report. I had noticed fracture on the body as follows. Fracture right wrist, frontal region of skull, right 2nd, 4th and 5th rib, left 5th rib, left elbow. I found following internal injuries: - Haematoma in the scalp 10 to 12 CM x 8 to 10 CM Fracture frontal bone of skull 3 CM X 2 CM X 1 CM Fracture frontal bone of skull 3 CM X 2 CM X 1 CM Fracture 2nd, 4th, 5th Rib on right side fracture 5th rib on left side right lung contused wound at anterior surface 1CM X 1CM X 0.5CM Heart right chamber full with blood and left chamber empty bruise at left side of upper abdomen 4CM x 2CM x 0.5CM Stomach 100 to 150 ML of serrous reddish fluid I had collected blood for grouping and vaginal swab for CA, stomach content. In my opinion cause of death is cardiorespi arrest, due to haemorrhagic shock, due to head injury and grievous injury to vital organ with multiple fracture. The injuries mentioned in column Nos. 17 to 21 are possible due to assault by assault by sickle, and wooden rod and wooden stick. Injuries mentioned in column No. 17 as CLW frontal region of skull and CLW forehead are corresponding to injury mentioned in column No. 19 at serial No. 1 and 2. All those injuries are possible due to assault is done forcefully with the weapon. I prepared postmortem report in my own handwriting. Postmortem report now shown to me is the same. Postmortem report is at Exh. 31." 14. Dr. Kalpana has then perused the muddemal property and by looking at the sickle, sr. no. 5 and wooden sticks, sr. no. 9, has stated that the injuries mentioned in the PM report can be inflicted by such a sickle and sticks. 15. We have perused the testimony of PW1 Bhalchandra, PW2 Prakash & PW3 Yogesh which would indicate that they have seen the dead body of Suvarna lying on the floor in a naked condition. The injuries caused on her body were also viewed. The sickle and two wooden sticks, randha (a wedge like tool with a cutting blade used by a carpenter for chiselling wood), one saree, one blouse and one petticoat, were all blood stained. All these items including blood stained bunch of hair, blood stained sand and all the above mentioned articles were sent to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory at Nashik. It's report dated 17.08.2012 indicates that the wooden handle, hair and hair found on the two wooden sticks, rendered an inconclusive blood grouping. However, all other articles indicate blood group 'B'. 16. In the light of the above, we are convinced that Suvarna has suffered a homicidal death. IS THE ACCUSED ANIL, THE MURDERER OF HIS WIFE? 17. We have referred to the testimony of PW1 Bhalchandra who is the informant. What we find from his testimony is that Prakash had told him that Anil had informed his real elder brother Prakash about the murder of his wife at his hands. The body was in a naked condition and the injuries exhibited have been referred to herein above. To this extent, Bhalchandra has relied upon hearsay. What we find from his testimony is that Prakash had told him that Anil had informed his real elder brother Prakash about the murder of his wife at his hands. The body was in a naked condition and the injuries exhibited have been referred to herein above. To this extent, Bhalchandra has relied upon hearsay. However, pursuant to this version heard by him, he himself visited the hut and witnessed the dead body. The various articles like the sickle and wooden sticks have also been found at the spot of the crime. When he confronted Anil after reaching his house, Anil told Bhalchandra that he suspected the character of his wife and has, hence, murdered her by striking her with a sickle and sticks. In his cross-examination, he has specifically stated that Anil was residing at a distance of about 1.5 kms., from the house of Prakash. When he reached the hut in which Anil resided, he noticed that Anil was in a frightened condition and few articles in the house were scattered. He had then gone to the police station to file a complaint and when he returned with the Police party, Anil was still seated at the same place and he did not try to run away. In his lengthy cross-examination, his testimony could not be shaken. 18. Pw2 Prakash has stated that Anil was his younger brother and at the time of the incident of murder, both the children of Anil were residing in the house of Prakash. Anil had walked up to the house of Prakash on the fateful night and had told him that he had killed his wife and Prakash should inform this to Ashok. In the early morning, Prakash met the employer Ashok and his son Ujjwal. He narrated to Ujjwal that Anil told him that Anil had killed his wife. Thereafter, Prakash, Ujjwal and Bhalchandra - the Police Patil reached the residence of Anil with two to three persons. They noticed that Anil was still in the house and Suvarna was lying on the ground in a naked condition. Her injuries were noticed by these persons. Bhalchandra then inquired with Anil about the incident in the presence of Prakash (PW2) and Anil told Bhalchandra (PW1) that he had killed his wife and he regretted doing so. 19. In the cross-examination of PW2, he has reiterated his statements in the examination. Her injuries were noticed by these persons. Bhalchandra then inquired with Anil about the incident in the presence of Prakash (PW2) and Anil told Bhalchandra (PW1) that he had killed his wife and he regretted doing so. 19. In the cross-examination of PW2, he has reiterated his statements in the examination. He has denied the suggestion that Anil used to supply water to the onion and sugarcane crop during the night time. The sugarcane crop was at a distance of only 15 to 20 feet from the house of Anil. The onion crop was adjacent to the sugarcane crop and there was no other Saldar working at the said farm where Anil was working. Prakash reiterated in the cross-examination that two days prior to the murder of Suvarna, Anil and Suvarna had sent their son Suresh to the house of Prakash. He further reiterated that the daughter of Anil was not in their (Anil) house when Suvarna was murdered. Prakash has confessed that he did not accompany Anil to his house after Anil informed him about murdering his wife, as Prakash had become very much frightened. Prakash then denied the suggestion that Anil told him that he had gone to supply water to the onion crop and that he heard shouts from his house and when rushed back, he found that an unknown person had killed his wife. He denied the suggestion that Anil had never told Prakash and the Police Patil that he had killed his wife. 20. We have then perused the testimony of PW3 Yogesh who is a panch for the spot panchanama. On the day of the incident he had met the accused for the first time. He identified the 15 articles seized from the spot. There is nothing more to this in the testimony of PW3. 21. In the testimony of PW4 Investigating Officer, he has specifically explained the manner in which he had reached the spot of the crime, the spot and inquest panchanama made in the presence of the panchas, the blood stained articles seized, the muddemal property being sealed and labelled with the signatures of the two panchas, the preparation of the arrest panchanama and the panchanama of the seized clothes of the accused. His testimony as regards the recording of statements of six witnesses and the body of Suvarna being sent for postmortem, are set out. 22. His testimony as regards the recording of statements of six witnesses and the body of Suvarna being sent for postmortem, are set out. 22. In his cross-examination, he stated that Anil was residing in a single room hut. Articles in the room were scattered. There were no blood stains on the walls. There were blood stains on the articles and the clothes. On coming to know that the accused had one son and one daughter, he has stated in cross-examination on the basis of the information given by the accused that Anil had left his children, seven year old son and four year old daughter, with the family of Prakash after the incident. The learned Advocate for the appellant has highlighted this statement, which does not convince us that the children were witness to the murder because the two children were already in the house of PW2 Prakash as per his statement made before the police and is also set out in his testimony. It was the accused who probably misdirected the Investigating Officer by stating that the two children were dropped at the residence of the Prakash after the death of Suvarna. The Investigating Officer further states that he tried to record the statements of the two kids, but did not succeed because their grandparents had taken them to their village at Tambaswadi, Tq. Niphad, Dist. Nashik. He denied the suggestion that he did not record the statements of the children so as to avoid bringing the facts on record. He also denied the suggestion that the accused did not tell him that he had committed the murder of his wife. 23. We have already referred to the testimony of Dr. Kalpana herein above. She has supported her version in her cross-examination. She clearly stated that there was no sign of a sexual attack on Suvarna notwithstanding that her body was found in a naked condition. She has then stated that the wounds inflicted on Suvarna were possible with the use of sickle and wooden sticks. She has however stated that the injuries mentioned in column no. 17 are possible by the use of a sharp weapon other than a sickle. 24. She has then stated that the wounds inflicted on Suvarna were possible with the use of sickle and wooden sticks. She has however stated that the injuries mentioned in column no. 17 are possible by the use of a sharp weapon other than a sickle. 24. While analyzing the testimony of these witnesses in the light of this case resting purely on extra-judicial confession and circumstantial evidence, it would be advantageous to refer to the judgments cited by the learned APP on the aspect of extra-judicial confession. In Sansar Chand (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has concluded in paragraph 33 and 34 as under:- 33. There is no absolute rule that an extra judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction, although ordinarily an extra judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material vide Thimma vs. The State of Mysore, (1971) AIR SC 1871 , Mulk Raj vs. The State of U.P., (1959) AIR SC 902 , Sivakumar vs. State by Inspector of Police,206 AIR SC 563 (para 41 & 42), Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) AIR SC 1692 , Mohd. Azad vs. State of West Bengal, (2009) AIR SC 1307 . In the present case, the extra judicial confession by Balwan has been referred to in the judgments of the learned Magistrate and the Special Judge, and it has been corroborated by the other material on record. We are satisfied that the confession was voluntary and was not the result of inducement, threat or promise as contemplated by Section 24 of the Evidence Act. 34. The learned Magistrate and the Special Judge have discussed in great detail the prosecution evidence, oral as well as documentary and have found the appellant guilty. The High Court has affirmed that verdict and we see no reason to take a different view. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. [Emphasis supplied.] 25. In Kashinath Jadhav (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in paragraph nos. 13, 14 and 15 as under. 13. In order to show that it was the accused who caused injuries to Anusuya as a result of which she died, the prosecution has relied upon the extra judicial confession made by the accused to Radhabai (PW 2), Pand-urong (PW 5) and Shankar (PW 6). 13, 14 and 15 as under. 13. In order to show that it was the accused who caused injuries to Anusuya as a result of which she died, the prosecution has relied upon the extra judicial confession made by the accused to Radhabai (PW 2), Pand-urong (PW 5) and Shankar (PW 6). The evidence of these witnesses was accepted by the High Court and we see no cogent ground to take a view different from that of the High Court. Radhabai lives very close to the place of occurrence, while the other two witnesses work in the factory which is located in one of the rooms of the chawl wherein the occurrence took place. According to these witnesses, the accused with a knife in his hand came and enquired regarding the whereabouts of Ganpat. The accused also told them that he had murdered that woman. There is nothing unnatural or improbable in the above statement of the accused which was made immediately after the murder of the deceased. The three witnesses had no particular animus against the accused and after having been taken through their evidence, we find a ring of truth in it. 14. In addition to the evidence of the above mentioned three witnesses we have the statement of Ganpat PW that the accused came armed with a knife to the witness. The witness on seeing the accused in a threatening mood ran away. The fact that the accused after arming himself with a knife ran after Ganpat is also admitted by the accused. This circumstance lands further assurance to the testimony of Radhabai, Pandurang and Shankar. 15. Apart from the above, we find that the clothes of the accused, who was arrested by the police soon after the occurrence, were found to be stained with blood. The accused was also soon after the occurrence seen sitting in front of the room in which the dead body of the deceased was lying with a blood-stained knife in his hand. These facts, which are not disputed by the accused, furnish additional corroboration to the evidence relating to the extra judicial confession made by the accused. The explanation furnished by the accused regarding the blood stains on his clothes and the blood-stained knife in his hand is not at all convincing and has been rightly rejected by the High Court. [Emphasis supplied.] 26. The explanation furnished by the accused regarding the blood stains on his clothes and the blood-stained knife in his hand is not at all convincing and has been rightly rejected by the High Court. [Emphasis supplied.] 26. We find that the facts in Kashinath Jadhav (supra) are almost identical to the case in hand. Anil had reached the house of brother Prakash (PW2) immediately after the death of Suvarna. He confessed to PW2 that he killed her. Then he went back to his hut and sat near her body till Bhalchandra (PW1) came. He continued to sit there till PW1 came with the Police. His blood stained clothes and the blood stained weapons were also near the body. 27. In Mahadeo Sutar (supra), it was held by this Court in paragraph nos. 14 and 15 as under:- 14. P.W. 5 Sunanda Sutar's evidence is important in as much as Sunanda happens to be the aunt of accused No. 1. Admittedly, accused No. 2 Sakhubai is the cousin sister of Sunanda. She has deposed that on the day of the incident at about 11.00 a.m. accused No. 1 came to her house. He was looking very frightened. He told her that when Suman had gone to bring cowdung, he called her towards Ghorpade's well and that when Suman came there he assaulted her, pressed her neck and killed her. P.W. 5 Sunanda further deposed that accused No. 1 told her that thereafter he threw her body in Ghorpade's well. P.W. 5 further deposed that she told accused No. 1 that he had not done proper and that in case he did not approve of her he ought to have sent her to her parents place. 15. Thus the evidence of P.W. 5 nails accused No. 1 completely. Being a very close relative of both the accused, she would not have nailed them unless the incident was true. Thus there is no reason to disbelieve the extra judicial confession made by accused No. 1 to his own aunt on the very day of the incident. It is pertinent to note that there is no dent in the deposition of this witness also in the cross-examination. [Emphasis supplied.] In the case in hand, Anil had confessed to his real elder brother Prakash (PW2). 28. It is pertinent to note that there is no dent in the deposition of this witness also in the cross-examination. [Emphasis supplied.] In the case in hand, Anil had confessed to his real elder brother Prakash (PW2). 28. In a recent judgment delivered by this Court on 12.02.2020 in the matter of Mohammad Ismail Noormohammad (supra), this Court has dealt with the issue of extra-judicial confession and the relevant observations are found in paragraph no. 8, 12 to 17, 21 and 26 as under:- 8. The prosecution has relied on the following circumstances:- (i) Homicidal death of deceased Zuber. (ii) Extra-judicial confession of appellant/accused. (iii) The appellant/accused was in possession of factory premises of place of incident. (iv) The appellant/accused had called deceased Zuber to his factory premises. (v) Dead-body was pointed out by the appellant/accused. (vi) Subsequent conduct of the appellant. 12. Extra-judicial confession of appellant/accused :- Admittedly, the extra judicial confession is weak piece of evidence. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused has relied on the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Vijay Shankar vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 12 SCC 644 and Kala Alias Chandrakal vs. State Through Inspector of Police, (2006) 9 SCC 337 . In the above cited cases, the Apex Court has held that the extra judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material on record and it is weak piece of evidence. In view of the ratio laid down in the cited supra, one has to appreciate the evidence laid on record. 13. To establish the extra judicial confession, the prosecution has heavily relied on the evidence of Mohd. Ismail Madar Shah (PW-3). Admittedly, Mohd. Shah (PW-3) is father-in-law of the appellant/accused. He deposed that he is resident of Squarters colony. He has a business of imitation jewelery. His daughter Nikatbanu got married with the appellant/ accused about one year prior to the incident in question. The appellant/accused was residing with his daughter at Squarters Colony, Chincholi gate. The parents of the appellant/accused were residing along with him. The above evidence is not at all denied by the appellant/accused. 14. Mohd. Ismail Madar Shah (PW-3) further deposed that on 07.02.2011 at about 9.15 a.m. the appellant/accused called him on his cellphone. The appellant/accused was frightened at that time and was weeping, hence, he called the appellant/accused to his house. The above evidence is not at all denied by the appellant/accused. 14. Mohd. Ismail Madar Shah (PW-3) further deposed that on 07.02.2011 at about 9.15 a.m. the appellant/accused called him on his cellphone. The appellant/accused was frightened at that time and was weeping, hence, he called the appellant/accused to his house. He further deposed that the appellant/accused reached his house within 15 to 20 minutes. The appellant/accused was frightened, hence, he asked him as to what had happened. The appellant/accused disclosed him that after drinking liquor, he had quarreled with deceased Zuber in the evening on 06.02.2011. He gave fist blows to deceased Zuber and due to his beating, Zuber expired. The appellant/accused has also disclosed that incident had taken place in his factory at Ambapada. 15. Mohd. Ismail Madar Shah (PW-3) further deposed that he called the informant Makbul Malang Shah (PW-1). He further deposed that on arrival of the informant, the informant made enquiry with the appellant/accused as to what had happened. The appellant/accused disclosed that he had beaten the deceased Zuber and killed him. The appellant/accused further disclosed that he and Zuber had quarreled after drinking liquor. PW-3/ Mohd. Ismail Madar Shah further deposed that the appellant/accused was taken to police station by Yunus and Abdul Kadar. His statement was recorded by the police. 16. In his cross examination, he admitted that he had no license for his imitation jewelery, but he carried on the said business for couple of years. He has also admitted that he has no reason as to why he has not obtained license for his business. He further admitted that his daughter has good relations with the appellant/accused. He also admitted that he had not accompanied the appellant/accused to the police station. It is suggested that the appellant/accused never made any disclosure of his acts of killing Zuber to him. But he denied the suggestion. So except denial, nothing had brought on record to assail the extra judicial confession made by the appellant/accused to witness PW-3/Mohd. Ismail Madar Shah. 17. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant/accused also made extra judicial confession before the informant when he had been to the house of PW-3/ Mohd. Ismail Madar Shah along with PW-4/Mohamed Latif Malang Shah. The informant/PW-1 deposed that deceased Zuber was his brother-in-law. The appellant/accused is son of his sister Jamila. Ismail Madar Shah. 17. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant/accused also made extra judicial confession before the informant when he had been to the house of PW-3/ Mohd. Ismail Madar Shah along with PW-4/Mohamed Latif Malang Shah. The informant/PW-1 deposed that deceased Zuber was his brother-in-law. The appellant/accused is son of his sister Jamila. In the year 2011, he had a business of imitation jewelery. The appellant/accused was also doing the same work. The factory of the appellant/accused was at Pathanwadi. Deceased Zuber was residing in Flyover Society near Link Road in February, 2011. The above evidence is not at all challenged by the appellant/accused, so it can be said that the appellant/accused and deceased are closed relative of the informant Makbul Shah. 21. In the present case, the appellant/accused called his father-in-law on hearing the voice of the appellant/accused, father-in-law felt that the appellant/accused was in great difculty. Hence, he called him. On arrival in the house of PW-3/Mohd. Ismail Madar Shah, the appellant/accused disclosed that he had a quarrel with the deceased Zuber in earlier night. Both of them had consumed liquor and thereafter he assaulted Zuber and killed him. In order to express himself, the appellant/accused disclosed the incident occurred in earlier night before his father-in-law. Similarly, the appellant/accused also disclosed the said incident to the informant and PW-4/Mohamed Latif Malang Shah to gain sympathy. Therefore, it can be said that the extra judicial confession of the appellant/accused was voluntary without any coercion obtained under undue infuence. 26. Subsequent conduct of accused :- It is established from the extra judicial confession of the appellant/accused that he had consumed liquor along with deceased Zuber in his factory premises and thereafter there was quarrel which ended into the death of the Zuber. In the next day morning, the appellant/ accused gave call to his father-in-law and disclosed the incident. Thereafter, he disclosed the incident to the informant and other persons and showed his willingness to point out the place where the dead body was lying. Accordingly, he took informant, other witness and police party to his factory premises and pointed out the dead body, which was lying on the mezzanine foor of the factory. 29. Thereafter, he disclosed the incident to the informant and other persons and showed his willingness to point out the place where the dead body was lying. Accordingly, he took informant, other witness and police party to his factory premises and pointed out the dead body, which was lying on the mezzanine foor of the factory. 29. The learned Advocate for the appellant has relied upon Gargi (supra), in support of her contention that the five golden principles with regard to circumstantial evidence set out in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobde Vs. The State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , would constitute the panchshil of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence. 30. The learned Advocate for the appellant has relied upon Smt. Gargi (supra) to support her contention that Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of its primary burden as has been held in Sawal Das v. State of Bihar, (1974) 4 SCC 193 . She has then relied upon paragraph 12 to 21 of Sahdevan (supra) to support her contention that extra-judicial confession should inspire confidence, which read as under. 12. There is no doubt that in the present case, there is no eye-witness. It is a case based upon circumstantial evidence. In case of circumstantial evidence, the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove the complete chain of events which shall undoubtedly point towards the guilt of the accused. Furthermore, in case of circumstantial evidence, where the prosecution relies upon an extra-judicial confession, the court has to examine the same with a greater degree of care and caution. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the Court, upon due appreciation of the entire prosecution evidence, intends to base a conviction on an extra- judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If, however, the extra- judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent as per the prosecution version, it may be difficult for the court to base a conviction on such a confession. In such circumstances, the court would be fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration. 13. Now, we may examine some judgments of this Court dealing with this aspect. 14. In such circumstances, the court would be fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration. 13. Now, we may examine some judgments of this Court dealing with this aspect. 14. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) Supp4 SCC 259 , this Court stated the principle that an extra-judicial confession, by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. Where an extrajudicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance. 15. In Pakkirisamy v. State of T.N., (1997) 8 SCC 158 , the Court held that it is well settled that it is a rule of caution where the court would generally look for an independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon such extra-judicial confession. 16. Again in Kavita v. State of T.N., (1998) 6 SCC 108 , the Court stated the dictum that there is no doubt that conviction can be based on extrajudicial confession, but it is well settled that in the very nature of things, it is a weak piece of evidence. It is to be proved just like any other fact and the value thereof depends upon veracity of the witnesses to whom it is made. 17. While explaining the dimensions of the principles governing the admissibility and evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession, this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 stated the principle that an extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. The Court, further expressed the view that such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused. 18. 18. In the case of Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of W.B., (2007) 12 SCC 230 , the Court, while holding the placing of reliance on extra-judicial confession by the lower courts in absence of other corroborating material, as unjustified, observed: "87. Confession ordinarily is admissible in evidence. It is a relevant fact. It can be acted upon. Confession may under certain circumstances and subject to law laid down by the superior judiciary from time to time form the basis for conviction. It is, however, trite that for the said purpose the court has to satisfy itself in regard to: (i) voluntariness of the confession; (ii) truthfulness of the confession; (iii) corroboration. 89. A detailed confession which would otherwise be within the special knowledge of the accused may itself be not sufficient to raise a presumption that confession is a truthful one. Main features of a confession are required to be verified. If it is not done, no conviction can be based only on the sole basis thereof." 19. Accepting the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession, the Court in the case of Sansar Chand v. State o Rajasthan, (2010) 10 SCC 604 held that :- "29. There is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction, although ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material. [Vide Thimma and Thimma Raju v. State of Mysore, Mulk Raj v. State of U.P., Sivakumar v. State (SCC paras 40 and 41 : AIR paras 41 & 42, Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari v. State of Maharashtra and Mohd. Azad v. State of W.B. 30. In the present case, the extra-judicial confession by Balwan has been referred to in the judgments of the learned Magistrate and the Special Judge, and it has been corroborated by the other material on record. We are satisfied that the confession was voluntary and was not the result of inducement, threat or promise as contemplated by Section 24 of the Evidence Act, 1872." 20. Dealing with the situation of retraction from the extra-judicial confession made by an accused, the Court in the case of Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 5 SCC 740 , held as under : "It appears therefore, that the appellant has retracted his confession. Dealing with the situation of retraction from the extra-judicial confession made by an accused, the Court in the case of Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 5 SCC 740 , held as under : "It appears therefore, that the appellant has retracted his confession. When an extra-judicial confession is retracted by an accused, there is no inflexible rule that the court must invariably accept the retraction. But at the same time it is unsafe for the court to rely on the retracted confession, unless, the court on a consideration of the entire evidence comes to a definite conclusion that the retracted confession is true." 21. Extra-judicial confession must be established to be true and made voluntarily and in a fit state of mind. The words of the witnesses must be clear, unambiguous and should clearly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of conviction, if it passes the test of credibility. The extra-judicial confession should inspire confidence and the court should find out whether there are other cogent circumstances on record to support it. [Ref. Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B., (2011) 11 SCC 754 and Pancho v. State of Haryana, (2011) 10 SCC 165 ]. 31. The law on circumstantial evidence has been crystallized from the judgment delivered as early as in 1952 in the matter of Hanuman Govind Nargundkar and anr. vs. State of M.P., (1952) AIR SC 343 . The said law was highlighted once again in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Versus State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 and in the cases of Gagan Kanojia & Anr. Versus. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516 and Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430 . 32. It would be apposite to reproduce paragraph 10 of the judgment in Hanuman Nargundkar (supra) as under:- "10. Assuming that the accused Nargundkar had taken the tenders to his house, the prosecution, in order to bring the guilt home to the accused, has yet to prove the other facts referred to above. No direct evidence was adduced in proof of those facts. Reliance was placed by the prosecution and by the courts below on certain circumstances, and intrinsic evidence contained in the impugned document, Ex.P-3A. No direct evidence was adduced in proof of those facts. Reliance was placed by the prosecution and by the courts below on certain circumstances, and intrinsic evidence contained in the impugned document, Ex.P-3A. In dealing with circumstantial evidence the rules specially applicable to such evidence must be borne in mind. In such cases there is always the danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof and therefore it is right to recall the warning addressed by Baron Alderson, to the jury in Reg. v. Hodge,1838 2 Lewil 227, where he said :- "The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting circumstances to one another, and even in straining them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts of one connected whole; and the more ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely was it, considering such matters to overreach and mislead, itself to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete." It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. In spite of the forceful arguments addressed to us by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the State we have not been able to discover any such evidence either intrinsic within Ex. P-3A or outside and we are constrained to observe that the courts below have just fallen into the error against which, warning was uttered by Baron Alderson in the above mentioned case." 33. P-3A or outside and we are constrained to observe that the courts below have just fallen into the error against which, warning was uttered by Baron Alderson in the above mentioned case." 33. In Gagan Kanojia (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with a case of kidnapping and murder of two children for ransom, based purely on circumstantial evidence. While concluding on the point of appreciation of circumstantial evidence, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed in paragraph no. 9 and 10 as under:- "9. The prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence. Indisputably, charges can be proved on the basis of the circumstantial evidence, when direct evidence is not available. It is well-settled that in a case based on a circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove that within all human probabilities, the act must have been done by the accused. It is, however, necessary for the courts to remember that there is a long gap between 'may be true' and 'must be true'. Prosecution case is required to be covered by leading cogent, believable and credible evidence. Whereas the court must raise a presumption that the accused is innocent and in the event two views are possible, one indicating to his guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the defence available to the accused should be accepted, but at the same time, the court must not reject the evidence of the prosecution, proceeding on the basis that they are false, not trustworthy, unreliable and made on flimsy grounds or only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. The prosecution case, thus, must be judged in its entirety having regard to the totality of the circumstances. The approach of the court should be an integrated one and not truncated or isolated. The court should use the yardstick of probability and appreciate the intrinsic value of the evidence brought on records and analyze and assess the same objectively. 10. We would proceed on the well-known principles in regard to appreciation of the circumstantial evidence which were noticed by the High Court in the following terms : "1) There must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 2) Circumstantial evidence can be reasonably made the basis of an accused person's conviction if it is of such character that it is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and is consistent only with his guilt. 3) There should be no missing links but it is not that everyone of the links must appear on the surface of the evidence, since some of these links may only be inferred from the proven facts. 4) On the availability of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. 5) It cannot be said that prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forwarded by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful it might be. Nor does it mean that prosecution evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise." 34. The Hon'ble Apex Court had an occasion to deal with yet another case of Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430 , in which the issue of conviction on circumstantial evidence was considered. After appreciating the evidence of the witnesses and the medical record, it was observed in paragraph 15, 16, 17 and 18 as under:- "15. Before adverting to the above stated arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, we shall at the threshold point out that in the present case there is no direct evidence to connect the accused with the commission of the offences and the prosecution case entirely rests on circumstantial evidence. Before adverting to the above stated arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, we shall at the threshold point out that in the present case there is no direct evidence to connect the accused with the commission of the offences and the prosecution case entirely rests on circumstantial evidence. This Court in a series of decisions has consistently held that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:- (i) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (ii) those circumstances should be of definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (iii) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (iv) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. [See Gambhir v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 2 SCC 351 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 431 : AIR 1982 SC 1157 . See also Rama Nand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1981) 1 SCC 511 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 197) : AIR 1981 SC 738 , Prem Thakur v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 462 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 88 : AIR 1983 SC 61 , Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 SCC 330 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 447 : AIR 1983 SC 446 , Gian Singh v. State of Punjab,1986 Supp SCC 676 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 223 : AIR 1987 SC 1921 and Balvinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1987) 1 SCC 1 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 27 : AIR 1987 SC 350 . 16. As far back as in 1952 in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P., (1952) AIR SC 343 , it was observed thus: (AIR pp. 345-46, para 10) "10. 16. As far back as in 1952 in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P., (1952) AIR SC 343 , it was observed thus: (AIR pp. 345-46, para 10) "10. ....It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 17. A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487 : AIR 1984 SC 1622 . Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity or lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are (SCC p. 185, para 153) : (i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established; (ii) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (iv) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (v) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 18. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1205, wherein it has been observed thus: (SCC pp. 206-07, para 21) "21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence." In Sashi Jena v. Khadal Swain, (2004) 4 SCC 236 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1077, this Court again reiterated the well-settled principle of law on circumstantial evidence. 35. It is apparent that though Anil intended to make a confessional statement before the Magistrate and he embarked upon the process for doing so, he resiled from his intention when he again reached the office of the Judicial Magistrate after having been granted 24 hours for rethinking/reflection. He has thus refused to make a judicial confession. However, the law on judicial confessions, does not neutralize or dilute an extra-judicial confession given by an accused. 36. We are of the view that if Anil had desired to retract his extra-judicial confession or to render them as being baseless or a false evidence on the part of Prakash, Bhalchandra and the Investigating Officer, he had an opportunity of stepping into the witness box pursuant to his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. Neither has he done so, nor did he make any statement when the trial Court had asked him as to whether he desired to say anything more u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C. In this backdrop, the extra-judicial confessions to PW1, PW2 and PW4 cannot be rendered to disutility or purposeless merely because the accused has consistently answered the questions u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C. by saying "it is false". Considering the law as is pronounced in Sansar Chand, Kashinath Jadhav, Mahadeo Sutar and Mohammad Ismail (supra), the trial Court has rightly analyzed and appreciated the extra-judicial confessions and we do not find any reason to discard the same. 37. Considering the law as is pronounced in Sansar Chand, Kashinath Jadhav, Mahadeo Sutar and Mohammad Ismail (supra), the trial Court has rightly analyzed and appreciated the extra-judicial confessions and we do not find any reason to discard the same. 37. The learned Advocate for the appellant has vehemently contended that as the son of Anil was not examined and Ujjwal son of the land owner Ashok was not examined, the case of the prosecution is demolished. Taking into account the cumulative effect of the testimonies of PW1-Bhalchandra, PW2-Prakash, real brother of Anil and PW4 the Investigating Officer, the extra-judicial confessions are proved beyond any doubt. The testimony of Ujjwal could have only increased the quantity of the evidence and not its quality because Anil had expressed his confessional statement in the presence of PW2 Prakash when Yogesh was not present and he had also made his confession before the PW4 Investigating Officer when Prakash, PW1 Bhalchandra as well as Yogesh were present. PW1, PW2 and PW4 have been examined. As held by this Court in Mahadeo Sutar (supra), the evidence of a close relative of the accused would nail the accused completely. There are no circumstances or evidence before us which would indicate that Prakash desired to settle an old score or grind an axe against Anil due to which he had a motive and an object to implicate him. In fact, Anil had secured his employment with the landlord Ashok due to the recommendation of the real elder brother Prakash which establishes family bonds between Anil and Prakash thereby eliminating any chance of Prakash attempting to get rid of Anil by tendering a false testimony so as to implicate Anil. SECTION 106, EVIDENCE ACT 38. In view of our conclusions arrived at in the foregoing paragraphs, it is crystal clear that Suvarna was in the custody of Anil being wife and husband. The unsubstantiated version of Anil that he had gone to the farm which is 10 to 15 ft. away from his hut to water the sugarcane crop, and on returning to his home found Suvarna dead, indicates by his own version that he had been with Suvarna in the house in that night. This establishes that both were together in their single room house and, therefore, Section 106 of the Evidence Act stands attracted. 39. away from his hut to water the sugarcane crop, and on returning to his home found Suvarna dead, indicates by his own version that he had been with Suvarna in the house in that night. This establishes that both were together in their single room house and, therefore, Section 106 of the Evidence Act stands attracted. 39. In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bihar and Raj Pal Sharma v. State of Bihar, (1994) AIR SC 2420 , is a complete answer to this issue. The reliance placed upon Dayanand (supra) and Swami Shraddhanand (supra), by the learned APP with regard to the applicability of Section 106, is well placed. 40. In Suresh Chandra Bahri (supra), the Apex Court has held as under:- 21. At the very outset we may mention that sometimes motive plays an important role and becomes a compelling force to commit a crime and therefore motive behind the crime is a relevant factor for which evidence may be adduced. A motive is something which prompts a person to form an opinion or intention to do certain illegal act or even a legal act but with illegal means with a view to achieve that intention. In a case where there is clear proof of motive for the commission of the crime it affords added support to the finding of the court that the accused was guilty for the offence charged with. But it has to be remembered that the absence of proof of motive does not render the evidence bearing on the guilt of the accused nonetheless untrustworthy or unreliable because most often it is only the perpetrator of the crime alone who knows as to what circumstances prompted him to a certain course of action leading to the commission of the crime. In the present case before us the prosecution has adduced evidence that the appellant Suresh Bahri had a strong motive to eliminate his wife and two children from his way which evidence has been accepted by both the courts below. In the present case before us the prosecution has adduced evidence that the appellant Suresh Bahri had a strong motive to eliminate his wife and two children from his way which evidence has been accepted by both the courts below. We shall, therefore, have a look to the said evidence to see whether the two courts are justified or not in taking the view that the appellant Suresh Bahri had a strong motive to hatch a conspiracy with the assistance of the other two appellants, namely, Raj Pal Sharma and Gurbachan Singh to commit the murder of his wife and the two children. 41. In the light of the above, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The same is therefore dismissed. 42. This Court had appointed Smt. Ranjana D. Reddy to represent the appellant in this case and we find that the learned Advocate as well as the learned APP have exerted in this matter to render assistance to the court. We are therefore quantifying the fees of the learned Advocate for the appellant at Rs. 15,000/- to be paid to her through the High Court Legal Services Authority, Sub-Committee, Aurangabad.