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2020 DIGILAW 1188 (PNJ)

Sheila Bijlani v. State Of Haryana

2020-05-22

DAYA CHAUDHARY, MEENAKSHI I.MEHTA

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JUDGMENT Meenakshi I. Mehta , J. - By way of instant writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari setting aside the order dated 12.03.2020/ 23.04.2020 whereby the revision petition, as preferred by her against the order of the Appellate Authority, has been dismissed and she has also sought the relief of issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondents no.2 and 3 to hand over the possession of the Industrial Plot No.1260, MIE, Bahadurgarh, Haryana to her and has further prayed to stay the re-allotment/transfer of the said plot during the pendency of this petition. 2. Shorn and short of unnecessary details, the factual matrix, as set forth by the petitioner in the petition in hand, is that she had been allotted the above-said industrial plot by respondents no.2 and 3 vide Memo No.13132 dated 15.11.1978 and its possession was initially offered to her by them vide Memo No.8336 dated 15.07.1981. However, thereafter, these respondents issued a revised Possession-Certificate in her favour and she took over the possession of the said plot vide written undertaking dated 27.07.1983. She deposited the entire sale consideration, in respect of the afore-said plot, with the said respondents and a Deed of Conveyance was also got executed by these respondents in her favour on 29.08.1985. 3. The petitioner has, further, averred that respondents no.2 and 3 failed to provide the basic civic amenities for the development of the industrial area wherein the said plot was located and she had also faced some financial hardships and due to these reasons, she could not raise the construction over the above-said plot which resulted in the resumption thereof by the said respondents vide Letter No.1497 dated 16.03.2006. The appeal, as preferred by her against the afore-said resumption order, was also dismissed by the Administrator, Rohtak vide order dated 09.03.2007. The appeal, as preferred by her against the afore-said resumption order, was also dismissed by the Administrator, Rohtak vide order dated 09.03.2007. Then, she was constrained to file the revision petition to assail the order of the Appellate Authority and vide the impugned order, the same has also been dismissed despite the facts that in CWP No.3378 of 1991, the Hon'ble High Court has held the policy, as floated by the respondents on 12.04.2013 for extension of the time limit for raising construction on the residential and commercial plots beyond the stipulated period of two years, to be applicable to the industrial plots as well and even the Review Petition RA-CW-No. 326 of 2013, as preferred by the respondents in the above-mentioned Civil Writ Petition, was also dismissed by this Court. 4. Respondents no.2 and 3, in their joint written-statement, have contested the claim of the petitioner, inter-alia, on the grounds of breach of terms and conditions of the allotment letter as well as of the Conveyance Deed by her and also on the ground of the resumption order having been passed after following due procedure. On merits, they have asserted that the petitioner failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the allotment letter dated 15.11.1978, wherein condition no.18 specifically required the allottee to complete the construction over the allotted plot within two years of the date of offer of its possession. All the civic amenities were provided in the concerned area but the petitioner never ever applied even for the sanction of the site-plan for raising construction over the said plot and she also failed to do so despite service of several Show-Cause Notices as issued by the respondents to her on 25.08.1992, 16.10.1992, 02.02.1993, 06.01.1995, 10.10.1995, 26.03.1998 and 07.06.2001. She had appeared for personal hearing on 24.11.2004 and submitted the reply requesting therein for grant of one year with an undertaking to complete the construction over the said plot within this period but failed to do so and finally, the said plot was ordered to be resumed. The resumption order and the order passed by the Appellate Authority as well as the impugned order, as handed down by the Revisional Authority, are perfectly legal and hence, this petition deserves dismissal. 5. The resumption order and the order passed by the Appellate Authority as well as the impugned order, as handed down by the Revisional Authority, are perfectly legal and hence, this petition deserves dismissal. 5. In the replication, the petitioner has reiterated her earlier stand, as taken in this writ petition, besides controverting the assertions, as put forth by respondents no.2 and 3 in their written-statement. 6. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties in the present petition and have also perused the file thoroughly. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that due to the lack of civic amenities in the area where the said plot was located and also because of some financial constraints, the petitioner could not raise the construction over the said plot within the stipulated period and therefore, she should be given relaxation in fulfilling condition no.18 of the allotment letter which requires the completion of construction within two years from the date of offer of the possession of the allotted plot. Secondly, he has pointed out that the respondent-Department/the Government floated a policy dated 12.04.2013 (Annexure P-10) granting extension in time limit for raising construction on the residential and commercial plots beyond the stipulated period of two years and he has drawn our attention to Annexure P-9, i.e. the copy of the judgment dated 02.08.2013, as handed down by the Division Bench of this Court in CWP No.3378 of 1991 titled as M/s Vijai Metal Works, Rewari vs. Haryana Urban Development Authority and others, wherein the respondents were directed to consider the case of the petitioner, also an allottee of industrial plot, in the light of the afore-mentioned policy and to regularize the non-construction by him by charging the extension-fee according to the said policy and he has also referred to Annexure P-15, i.e. the copy of the judgment dated 19.03.2014, as passed by this Court in the Review Petition, i.e. RA-CW-No.326 of 2013, in the above-said Civil Writ Petition wherein, while dismissing the same, it has been observed that there was no reason why the afore-said policy should not be made applicable to the industrial plots and he has contended that in view of these observations, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 8. 8. However, learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the civic amenities had been provided in the concerned area before offering the possession of the said plot to the petitioner and the financial constraints, if any, suffered by the petitioner, can be no valid ground to exonerate her from the obligation of complying with the terms and conditions of the allotment letter Annexure R-1. He has further argued that the policy Annexure P-10 specifically provides for extension of the time limit for raising construction over the residential and commercial plots only and the issuing Authority, in its own wisdom, did not include the industrial plots therein and therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any benefit under the said policy. He has also referred to Dalip Singh and others vs. State of Haryana and others, (2018) 4 RCR(Civ) 925 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that "Clause 11 of the terms and conditions of the allotment clearly stipulated that in the event of breach of any of the conditions of transfer, the Estate Officer might resume the land in accordance with the provisions of Section 17 of the HUDA Act, 1977 and since the order of resumption had been passed due to non-construction over the industrial plot, the same was to be upheld as the Court could interfere with revocation of resumption of land only if the Executive had not carried out its duty or had acted in violation of the procedure." 9. We do not find the contentions as raised by learned counsel for the petitioner to be tenable because as regards his first contention regarding lack of civic amenities as well as financial hardships faced by the petitioner, it is pertinent to mention here that the said plot had been allotted to the petitioner on 15.11.1978 vide Annexure R-1 and its clause no.18 required her to complete the construction within two years of the date of offer of its possession. Annexure P-1 is the revised Possession Certificate, as issued on 27.07.1983. There is nothing on the record to show that at the time of taking over possession of the said plot, the petitioner had raised any objection regarding the lack of civic amenities at the spot. Annexure P-1 is the revised Possession Certificate, as issued on 27.07.1983. There is nothing on the record to show that at the time of taking over possession of the said plot, the petitioner had raised any objection regarding the lack of civic amenities at the spot. Rather, she went on to get the conveyance deed (Annexure P-2) executed and registered on 29.08.1985, wherein clause no.5 reiterated the afore-discussed time limit to complete the construction as stipulated in clause no.18 of the allotment letter Annexure R-1. She could have highlighted the alleged lack of the said amenities even at that time but she has not placed any document on the file in this regard. Rather, it was for the first time on 06.12.2013 when she wrote a letter to respondent no.1, i.e. Annexure P-5, mentioning therein that the amenities were non-existent till 2006, meaning thereby that she kept mum over this matter for almost 23 years since taking over the possession of the said plot on 27.07.1983 and highlighted this fact for the first time vide Annexure P-5, i.e. almost after 30 years and that too, when the resumption order as well as the order of the Appellate Authority dismissing her appeal against the resumption order, had already been passed. These facts and circumstances take away the entire sheen and sheath of the afore-discussed contention, as put-forth on behalf of the petitioner. Moreover, financial constraints cannot be a valid ground to bye-pass the obligation, as accepted by the petitioner at the time of allotment of the said plot and also at the time of execution of Conveyance Deed in respect thereof. 10. Moreover, financial constraints cannot be a valid ground to bye-pass the obligation, as accepted by the petitioner at the time of allotment of the said plot and also at the time of execution of Conveyance Deed in respect thereof. 10. So far as the second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the applicability of policy Annexure P-10 is concerned, undisputedly, vide Annexure P-9, this Court had directed the respondents for considering the case of the petitioner therein, in the light of this policy and to regularize the non-construction by him by charging the extension-fee according to this policy and though the Review Petition, as preferred by the respondents against the said judgment, had also been dismissed vide Annexure P-15 but these verdicts are of no avail to the petitioner for substantiating her claim in view of the afore-discussed observations, as made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dalip Singh's case (supra), wherein the allottee had failed to fulfil the condition of raising construction over the industrial plot within the stipulated time and had challenged the order of resumption of the same and rather, Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed in its judgment that :- "13. ..... The allotment of industrial plot was at concessional rate and was subject to terms and conditions and the allottee was bound to comply with the terms and conditions. In such kind of allotment of industrial plots, based on government industrial policy with twin objectives of economic development and generation of adequate employment, sympathy cannot be the ground for considering the case of the appellants as to their non-compliance of the terms and conditions of allotment especially for twenty long years after the allotment." 11. As a sequel to the foregoing discussion, it follows that the present petition, being devoid of any merit, deserves dismissal. We order accordingly.