JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. M.A. Niyazi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner alongwith Mr. Kripa Shankar Nanda, Advocate. 2. Heard Mr. Vishwanath Rai, the learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party-State. 3. The instant criminal revision petition has been filed against the Judgment dated 09.06.2014 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Gumla in Cr. Appeal No. 32 of 2014 whereby and whereunder the learned appellate court upheld and confirmed the Judgment of conviction and the order of sentence of the petitioner passed by the learned trial court and dismissed the appeal. 4. The petitioner has also challenged the Judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 25.03.2014 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Gumla in G.R. Case No. 256 of 2013/T.R. No. 478 of 2014 arising out of Sisai (Bharno) P.S. Case No. 38 of 2013 dated 17.03.2013 registered under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code whereby and whereunder the petitioner was held guilty and convicted for the offence under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in the case of default of payment of fine, the petitioner was directed to further undergo simple imprisonment for four months. The period of detention during trial was directed to be set off from the punishment awarded to the petitioner. Arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has been convicted under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code, but there is no legal evidence to link the petitioner with the alleged occurrence. Learned counsel has also submitted that the informant and the petitioner were known to each other and it has come in evidence that the informant or his wife could not identify voice of the petitioner over phone during the alleged demand of ransom. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the IMEI number of the mobile recovered from the possession of the petitioner is different from the IMEI number in connection with which the call details were procured and exhibited before learned trial court. He further submitted that the last three digits of IMEI number of the recovered mobile was 821 and the call details of IMEI number having last three digits 820 was produced before the learned trial court. He further submitted that the last three digits of IMEI number of the recovered mobile was 821 and the call details of IMEI number having last three digits 820 was produced before the learned trial court. Learned counsel had also submitted that neither the SIM which was used in the alleged offence was registered in the name of the petitioner, nor the said SIM was recovered from the possession of the petitioner and there is nothing on record to connect the petitioner with the alleged offence. However subsequently, the point regarding mismatch of the last digit in connection with IMEI number of the cell phone was given up by the learned counsel for the petitioner by stating that the last digit in IMEI relates to the area and the discrepancy in the last digit of IMEI number may not be of much relevance in the present case. 7. Learned counsel has further submitted that otherwise also the material which has been used against the petitioner i.e. the call details, was the secondary evidence and in view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anvar P.V. -vs- P.K. Basheer reported in (2014) 10 SCC 473 , the same was not admissible in evidence without proper certificate issued by the concerned authority and the authority, who had taken out the call details has also not been examined before the learned court below. The learned counsel had submitted that the petitioner has been convicted on the basis of inadmissible evidence. It was also submitted that the petitioner has already remained in custody for a period from 21.07.2003 to 08.08.2014 i.e. almost 13 months and the petitioner does not have any criminal antecedent and accordingly some sympathetic view may be taken. 8. Upon being pointed out by this Court regarding the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sonu -vs- State of Haryana reported in (2017) 8 SCC 570 , the learned counsel for the parties prayed adjournment to examine this case on the point as to whether the objection regarding admissibility of the electronic evidence adduced before the learned trial court could be taken at subsequent stage as admittedly no such objection was taken by the petitioner at the time when exhibit 2 and 2/1 were marked. 9. On 19.08.2020, the arguments on behalf of the petitioner were advanced by Mr. 9. On 19.08.2020, the arguments on behalf of the petitioner were advanced by Mr. M.A. Niyazi, Advocate who took permission of this Court to argue the case on the point of admissibility of the electronic evidence involved in the present case. It was submitted that the electronic evidence was ex-facie inadmissible in evidence and no prosecution can be sustained on that basis, even if objection to the same has not been taken by the accused in the trial. Learned counsel had also submitted that provision of law has been ultimately settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent judgment dated 14th July, 2020 wherein the view expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Anvar P.V. -vs- P.K. Basheer reported in (2014) 10 SCC 473 has been upheld with slight clarification. Learned counsel also submitted that judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sonu vs. State of Haryana (2017) 8 SCC 570 has to be read alongwith the recent judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court decided on 14th July, 2020 in the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar -vs- Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1 wherein the law has been settled that electronic evidence is inadmissible in absence of the required certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. Arguments of the State 10. The learned A.P.P. appearing for the State had advanced his arguments and submitted that there are concurrent findings of facts recorded by the learned courts below that the mobile phone which was being used by the petitioner was the same mobile which was used for the purpose of calling the informant of the case demanding ransom money. He had further submitted that the scope of revision petition is very limited. He had also submitted that the objection in connection with the admissibility of the evidence i.e. Exhibits- 2 and 2/1 was never taken by the petitioner and such point being subsequently raised by the petitioner cannot be entertained. The Opposite Party-State had submitted that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the judgment passed in the case of Sonu -vs- State of Haryana and the judgment in the present case was passed by the learned trial court prior to the judgment passed in the case of Anvar P.V. -vs-P.K. Basheer reported in (2014) 10 SCC 473 . Findings of this Court: 11. Findings of this Court: 11. In the instant case FIR was registered on 17.03.2013, Trial court judgment was passed on 25.03.2014 and Appellate court judgment was passed on 09.06.2014. The judgment regarding admissibility of electronic evidence under section 65A and 65 B of Evidence Act, 1872 was passed in the case of Anvar P.V. -vs-P.K. Basheer reported in (2014) 10 SCC 473 on 18.09.2014. 12. This Court finds that the prosecution case is based on the written report dated 17.03.2013 submitted by the P.W.-2 before the Officer-in-charge, of the concerned police station alleging that on 06.03.2013 at about 6.40 P.M., a call had come from mobile number 8084935036 to mobile number 9431930522 of the Informant and levy was demanded from him and he was also threatened for taking his life. Initially, he took the said call lightly, but on 08.03.2013 at about 06:40 P.M., he again received call from the said mobile number on his mobile phone and demand of levy was made and he was threatened not to disclose to anyone, otherwise he will lose his life and was also told that in the morning, place will be disclosed as to where he has to give the money. On the next day on 09.03.2013 at 6:30 A.M., he again received a call from the said mobile number, but no conversation took place and thereafter, on 16.03.2013 at about 07:00 P.M., he again received a call on his mobile from the same mobile number. First of all, the caller gave the description about his family members and then told him that on the next day, he has to give Rs. One lakh at Ranchi, otherwise he will lose his life. Further case of the prosecution is that Nokia Mobile with IMEI No. 355508012300821 was recovered from the possession of Jageshwar Lohra (petitioner herein) and as per CDR Report, said IMEI number was used for threatening or demanding ransom. 13. On the basis of written report, the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station registered case under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code against holder of mobile number 8084935036 and Charge-sheet under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code was submitted against the petitioner. Cognizance of the offence was taken on 30.08.2013 and subsequently charge was also framed under the said section. 14. The prosecution examined altogether 09 witnesses. Cognizance of the offence was taken on 30.08.2013 and subsequently charge was also framed under the said section. 14. The prosecution examined altogether 09 witnesses. P.W.-1 is wife of the informant and P.W.-2 is the informant of the case. P.W.-3 Rukmani Devi and P.W.-4 Etwa Lohra were declared hostile by the prosecution. P.W.-5 is the son-in-law of the informant. P.W.-6, is the second Investigating Officer of the case. P.W.-7 is the first Investigating Officer of the case. Apart from the aforesaid, two more witnesses were also examined under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C.. They are P.W.-8 and 9, who are the seizure list witnesses. The following documents were marked as exhibits on behalf of the prosecution, without any objection from the side of the defence: Exhibit-1 Written Report Exhibit 1/1 Forwarding of written report Exhibit-1/2 Registration of written report Exhibit-2 CDR (Call Detail Report) Exhibit 2/1 Call Detail Report of Mob. No. 8084935036 Exhibit-3 Seizure list of mobile recovered from petitioner Exhibit-3/1 Signature of P.W.-8 on Seizure List Exhibit-3/2 Signature of P.W.-9 on Seizure List 15. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the petitioner was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. on 13.03.2014 wherein he denied the incriminating substances put to him and denied recovery of the mobile from his possession and claimed to be innocent. The petitioner did not produce any oral or documentary evidence in his defence and upon his prayer, the defence evidence was closed and the matter was fixed for hearing. 16. The learned trial court recorded that both P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 supported the aforesaid facts mentioned in the first information report. While considering the evidence of P.W.-6, in Paragraph-12 of the trial court judgment it has been recorded that P.W.-6 has stated that after receiving the investigation of the case, he took the call detail report of the mobile involved in the case from the technical branch of S.P. Office, which is in eight pages and from perusal of which, it appeared that call was made to many persons and the same was proved as Exhibit-2. Further from perusal of Exhibit-2/1, it appeared that on 06.03.2013, a call was made from the said mobile number to mobile number 9431930522 at about 18:28:30 and IMEI No. was 35508012300820 and similarly, on 06.03.2013 at about 18:36:18, call was made and IMEI No. was the same. Further from perusal of Exhibit-2/1, it appeared that on 06.03.2013, a call was made from the said mobile number to mobile number 9431930522 at about 18:28:30 and IMEI No. was 35508012300820 and similarly, on 06.03.2013 at about 18:36:18, call was made and IMEI No. was the same. Similarly, on 08.03.2013, call was made from the said mobile number to the Informant’s mobile number at 18:40:25 and again on 16th March, 2013, call was made on 19:20:26. Similarly, on 17.03.2013, call was made at 13:37:00. 17. On the basis of Call Detail Report, a raid was made and the mobile was recovered from the possession of the petitioner with IMEI No. 35508012300821. Further, he deposed that as per the Technical Assistant Mukesh Kumar, last number of IMEI No. of the phone and from the mobile from which call was made, was the same which established that Nokia mobile which was recovered from the possession of the petitioner was used to make call to P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 regarding ransom money and taking of the life. Further this Investigating Officer P.W.-6 also proved the seizure list of the mobile as Exhibit-3. The trial court held that SIM number 7766013444 was issued in the name of the petitioner and he also used his SIM in the mobile of the same IMEI number from which ransom money and threatening was given to P.W.-1 and P.W.-2. It has also been recorded that the SIM was started using in the mobile since 04.06.2013. 18. Learned trial court also considered that Exhibit-2 was Call Details Report of mobile number 7766013444 for the period from 01.03.2013 to 14.07.2013 which was issued in the name of Jageshwar Lohra. It also appeared that the same mobile SIM was used in mobile with IMEI number 35508012300820. The learned trial court also recorded that it appeared from Call Detail Report of Mobile No. 8084935036 that the same SIM was also used in the mobile which was used by the accused. 19. The learned trial court after discussion of the evidence held that the prosecution has well brought the fact that mobile was recovered from the possession of the petitioner from which through SIM No. 8084935036, call was made to informant before the institution of the case. After institution of the case, petitioner started using the said mobile through SIM no. 7766013444. The learned trial court after discussion of the evidence held that the prosecution has well brought the fact that mobile was recovered from the possession of the petitioner from which through SIM No. 8084935036, call was made to informant before the institution of the case. After institution of the case, petitioner started using the said mobile through SIM no. 7766013444. The learned trial court was of the view that the prosecution has shifted the burden upon accused which was not discharged by the accused and ultimately convicted the petitioner under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code. 20. Learned appellate court considered the arguments advanced of the petitioner and rejected each one of them by reasoned judgment and gave concurrent findings. 21. The learned appellate court considered the evidence of CDR and recovery of the mobile from the petitioner and recorded its finding regarding reliability of the CDR (Exhibit-2 and 2/1) in Para- 24 and 25 which reads as under: “24. It may be mentioned that as per first I.O. P.W.-7 Bhola Pandey, he has given details as to obtaining of C.D.R. based on the caller mobile No. 8084935036. In Para-4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16 and 17, he has stated as to the process of obtaining the C.D.R. details by filing application in technical section of S.P. Office and according to him (Para 13, 14) C.D.R. was later received to him from technical section. As per this first I.O. vide (Para 17), he had come to know that the calling SIM No. 8084935036 was held in the name of one Birsu Bhagat. This witness in para-29 also admits of not conducting any voice test. It will appear that this witness had only applied and obtained the C.D.R. and had taken statement of P.W.-1 or P.W.-2, but does not state anything as to how he came to know about the role of the accused/appellant in the present case. He admits that after 4.4.2013, he was transferred and investigation was handed over to P.W. 6 Mahesh Kumar Pandey. 25. If I turn to the evidence of second I.O P.W.-6 Mahesh Kumar Pandey, I find in Para- 2 and 3 that he gives details of C.D.R. (Ext. 2 and Ext. 2/1) as referred to by first I.O. P.W.-7. Although Ext.-2 is related with other call details, but the present connecting C.D.R. is Ext. 25. If I turn to the evidence of second I.O P.W.-6 Mahesh Kumar Pandey, I find in Para- 2 and 3 that he gives details of C.D.R. (Ext. 2 and Ext. 2/1) as referred to by first I.O. P.W.-7. Although Ext.-2 is related with other call details, but the present connecting C.D.R. is Ext. 2/1 related to the present accused. This I.O. in Para 4, 5 and 6 admits that following an application to the technical section of S.P., Gumla, he had received the call details of the caller Mobile No. 8084935036 on the basis of which the caller bearing mobile bearing EMI No. 355508012300820 was located. According to the I.O. P.W.-6 vide Para-6 and 10, the SIM used by the accused Jageshwar Lohra in the above mobile could not be recovered, but based on the C.D.R., the accused was located and further recovery of mobile vide seizure memo Ext.-3 was made from the accused whereafter he was arrested. Thus, summation of evidence of P.W.-6 and P.W.-7 is that the complicity of the present accused was established only when he was found using this mobile through an unknown SIM (not recovered as yet). 22. This Court finds that so far as the evidence of P.W.-8 and P.W.-9 are concerned, the learned appellate court was of the view that even if there was certain distraction on the seizure aspect, but the same cannot be held to be doubtful inter-alia on the ground that defence could have demolish the consistent version of the I.O. of the case. So far as plea of the informant not making Birsu Bhagat as accused in this case who was the registered holder of SIM number 8084935036, it has been recorded that the Investigating Officer found that Birsu Bhagat was not a man of dubious character and SIM was found missing for which a Sanha entry was lodged by him. The learned appellate court was of the considered view that actual holder of the calling SIM number was even found a bonafide person and if the incriminating mobile through which the rangdari call was being made to the informant was recovered from the possession of the petitioner, there was every likelihood that the missing SIM was used by the petitioner in giving rangdari calls to the informant as the mobile was recovered from the possession of the petitioner. Learned appellate court also rejected the plea raised by the defence that the petitioner was carrying a mobile repair work, but the same was rejected as the Investigating Officer P.W.-6 had not seen any repair shop of the petitioner. Although similar statement was made under Section 313, but the petitioner did not establish the same as his defence before the learned trial court. It was also recorded in the impugned judgment passed by the appellate court that in connection with the mobile repair shop, the petitioner had tried to bring the same by way of additional evidence at the appellate stage which was rejected by the learned appellate court vide order dated 23.05.2014 which was not challenged by the petitioner and accordingly, the defence plea of the petitioner being running a mobile running repair shop could not be established by him before the learned trial court. It was also recorded by the learned appellate court in the impugned judgment that the learned trial court had discussed all the circumstances appearing against the petitioner and the learned defence counsel was not able to indicate any specific error or infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned trial court in appreciation of the evidence of the witnesses, particularly informant and his wife P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 as well as Investigating Officers of the case P.W.-6 and P.W.-7. Accordingly, the learned appellate court ultimately upheld the judgment passed by the learned trial court. 23. This Court finds that the arguments before this court mainly revolves around Exhibit-2 and Exhibit 2/1. It is not in dispute that the mobile number 8084935036 was used for making call to the informant of the case and his wife (i.e. P.W.-1 and P.W.-2) demanding levy was issued in the name of Birsu Bhagat who has lodged a Sanha in connection with loss of the SIM. So far as the petitioner is concerned, admittedly, he was the holder of the mobile bearing SIM number 7766013444 and the case of the prosecution is that mobile bearing IMEI number 35508012300820 which was recovered and seized from the possession of the petitioner had used both the SIM i.e. 8084935036 (SIM issued in the name of Birsu Bhagat) and 7766013444 (SIM issued in the name of the petitioner) and this could be established from the CDR reports, Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-2/1. 24. 24. This Court also finds that apart from the aforesaid Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-2/1, there is no other material to link the petitioner with the use of SIM number 8084935036 ,therefore, the case revolves around the point of admissibility and proof of the electronic evidence contained in Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-2/1. Admittedly, no objection whatsoever was raised by the defence before the learned trial court at the time of admission of the said electronic evidence i.e. Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-2/1 and the same were marked without any objection from their side. Admittedly, the required certificate as per Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act is not available and was never obtained by the prosecution from the concerned authority although the Investigating Officer P.W.-7 had given details as to obtaining of CDR based on the caller mobile number 8084935036 and in his evidence he has narrated the process of obtaining CDR details by filing application in Technical Section in S.P. Office and according to him CDR was later on received by him from technical section. 25. So far as P.W.-6 is concerned, who is another Investigating Officer, he has stated in Para-4, 5 and 6 that following an application to the technical section of S.P., Gumla, he had received call details of caller mobile number 8084935036 on the basis of which the caller mobile bearing IMEI number 355508012300820 was located. According to this I.O., although the SIM bearing mobile number 8084935036 was not recovered from the petitioner, but based on the CDR, the petitioner was located and the mobile was seized and recovered which was marked as Exhibit-3. 26. This Court finds that the prosecution case against the petitioner is heavily based on the Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-2/1. In fact, the FIR was instituted by referring to the mobile number and the charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner after investigation when the mobile was recovered from the possession of the petitioner and CDRs as contained in exhibit 2 and 2/1 were obtained from the technical section of the concerned department. 27. In fact, the FIR was instituted by referring to the mobile number and the charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner after investigation when the mobile was recovered from the possession of the petitioner and CDRs as contained in exhibit 2 and 2/1 were obtained from the technical section of the concerned department. 27. In course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner had contended that the call detail report (CDRs) are secondary evidence and in view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anwar P.V. -vs- P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473 , the Call Detail Report which is an electronic evidence is not admissible as evidence in absence of the required certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act issued by the concerned authority and as such, the petitioner has been convicted on the basis of inadmissible evidence. He had further contended that the authority who had taken out the call details has also not been examined before the learned trial court. 28. From perusal of the oral and documentary evidences of the case, particularly, Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-2/1 and also the impugned judgments passed by the learned courts below, this Court finds that both these documents have been exhibited by the prosecution without any objection from the side of the petitioner. The point of inadmissibility of both these exhibits was never taken on behalf of the petitioner during trial. 29. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) -vs- Navjot Sandhu reported in (2005) 11 SCC 600 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court inter-alia held in Para-150 as follows:- “150. According to Section 63, secondary evidence means and includes, among other things, “copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies”. Section 65 enables secondary evidence of the contents of a document to be adduced if the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable. It is not in dispute that the information contained in the call records is stored in huge servers which cannot be easily moved and produced in the court. That is what the High Court has also observed at para 276. It is not in dispute that the information contained in the call records is stored in huge servers which cannot be easily moved and produced in the court. That is what the High Court has also observed at para 276. Hence, printouts taken from the computers/servers by mechanical process and certified by a responsible official of the service-providing company can be led in evidence through a witness who can identify the signatures of the certifying officer or otherwise speak of the facts based on his personal knowledge. Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65-B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in sub-section (4) of Section 65-B is not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned in the relevant provisions, namely, Sections 63 and 65.” 30. The aforesaid statement of law on admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to electronic record was overruled in the case of Anwar P.V. -vs- P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473 vide Para-22 which reads as under: “22. The evidence relating to electronic record, as noted hereinbefore, being a special provision, the general law on secondary evidence under Section 63 read with Section 65 of the Evidence Act shall yield to the same. Generalia specialibus non derogant, special law will always prevail over the general law. It appears, the court omitted to take note of Sections 59 and 65-A dealing with the admissibility of electronic record. Sections 63 and 65 have no application in the case of secondary evidence by way of electronic record; the same is wholly governed by Sections 65-A and 65-B. To that extent, the statement of law on admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to electronic record, as stated by this Court in Navjot Sandhu case, does not lay down the correct legal position. It requires to be overruled and we do so. An electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 65-B are satisfied. It requires to be overruled and we do so. An electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 65-B are satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD, VCD, chip, etc., the same shall be accompanied by the certificate in terms of Section 65-B obtained at the time of taking the document, without which, the secondary evidence pertaining to that electronic record, is inadmissible.” 31. In the case of Sonu -vs- State of Haryana, reported in (2017) 8 SCC 570 , the question which fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was the permissibility of an objection regarding inadmissibility of electronic evidence at that stage. In the said case the investigating officer collected call detail records (CDRs) of the mobile phones that were recovered from the accused from the nodal officers of the mobile companies. An argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the Hon’ble Supreme court as recorded in para 24 that CDRs are not admissible under section 65 B of the evidence Act, 1872, as admittedly they were not certified in accordance with Sub-section (4) thereof. Reliance was placed on the judgment passed in the case of Anwar P.V. -Versus- P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473 . The learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the CDRs were adduced in evidence without objection from the defence and the defence cannot be permitted to raise objection on the point of admissibility at the appellate stage. He placed reliance on a judgment passed by Privi Council reported in AIR 1915 PC 111 (Padman -versus- Hanwanta) to submit that the objection regarding admissibility of a document should be raised in the trial court. It was contended that there are two classes of documents regarding admissibility of documents. The first class is that a document is per-se inadmissible in evidence and the second is where the objection is regarding mode and method of proof of the document. It was argued that the objection of the accused was regarding mode and method of proof as it cannot be said that CDRs are per-se inadmissible in evidence. The first class is that a document is per-se inadmissible in evidence and the second is where the objection is regarding mode and method of proof of the document. It was argued that the objection of the accused was regarding mode and method of proof as it cannot be said that CDRs are per-se inadmissible in evidence. Refuting the submission of the State, it was submitted that the objection raised pertains to inadmissibility of the document and not the mode of proof and that the CDRs are inadmissible without the certificate as held in the case of Anwar P.V. -vs- P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473 and that objection of inadmissibility can be raised even at appellate stage and also that proof required in a criminal case cannot be waived by an accused. 32. The aforesaid contested arguments were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and was decided against the accused-petitioner in Paras-29 and 32 to 35 of Sonu alias Amar -vs- State of Haryana (supra) which are quoted as follows: “29. That an electronic record is not admissible unless it is accompanied by a certificate as contemplated under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act is no more res integra. The question that falls for our consideration in this case is the permissibility of an objection regarding inadmissibility at this stage. Admittedly, no objection was taken when the CDRs were adduced in evidence before the trial court. It does not appear from the record that any such objection was taken even at the appellate stage before the High Court. In Gopal Das v. Thakurji, it was held that: (SCC OnLine PC) “… Where the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof put forward is irregular or insufficient, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. A party cannot lie by until the case comes before a Court of Appeal and then complain for the first time of the mode of proof.” 32. It is nobody's case that CDRs which are a form of electronic record are not inherently admissible in evidence. The objection is that they were marked before the trial court without a certificate as required by Section 65-B(4). It is nobody's case that CDRs which are a form of electronic record are not inherently admissible in evidence. The objection is that they were marked before the trial court without a certificate as required by Section 65-B(4). It is clear from the judgments referred to supra that an objection relating to the mode or method of proof has to be raised at the time of marking of the document as an exhibit and no later. The crucial test, as affirmed by this Court, is whether the defect could have been cured at the stage of making the document. Applying this test to the present case, if an objection was taken to the CDRs being marked without a certificate, the Court could have given the prosecution an opportunity to rectify the deficiency. It is also clear from the above judgments that objections regarding admissibility of documents which are per se inadmissible can be taken even at the appellate stage. Admissibility or a document which is inherently inadmissible is an issue which can be taken up at the appellate stage because it is a fundamental issue. The mode or method of proof is procedural and objections, if not taken at the trial, cannot be permitted at the appellate stage. If the objections to the mode of proof are permitted to be taken at the appellate stage by a party, the other side does not have an opportunity of rectifying the deficiencies. The learned Senior Counsel for the State referred to statements under Section 161 CPC, 1973 as an example of documents falling under the said category of inherently inadmissible evidence, CDRs do not fall in the said category of documents. We are satisfied that an objection that CDRs are unreliable due to violation of the procedure prescribed in Section 65-B(4) cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage as the objection relates to the mode or method of proof. 33. Another point which remains to be considered is whether the accused is competent to waive his right to mode of proof. Mr Luthra’s submission is that such a waiver is permissible in civil cases and not in criminal cases. He relies upon a judgment of the Privy Council in Chainchal Singh case in support of the proposition. The Privy Council held that the accused was not competent to waive his right. Mr Luthra’s submission is that such a waiver is permissible in civil cases and not in criminal cases. He relies upon a judgment of the Privy Council in Chainchal Singh case in support of the proposition. The Privy Council held that the accused was not competent to waive his right. Chainchal Singh case may have no application to the case in hand at all. In that case, the issue was under Section 33 of the Evidence Act, and was whether evidence recorded in an earlier judicial proceeding could be read into, or not. The question was whether the statements made by a witness in an earlier judicial proceeding can be considered relevant for proving the truth or facts stated in a subsequent judicial proceeding. Section 33 of the Evidence Act allows for this inter alia where the witness is incapable of getting evidence in the subsequent proceeding. In Chainchal Singh the accused had not objected to the evidence being read into in the subsequent proceeding. In this context, the Privy Council held that in a civil case, a party can waive proof but in a criminal case, strict proof ought to be given that the witness is incapable of giving evidence. Moreover, the Judge must be satisfied that the witness cannot give evidence. Chainchal Singh also held that: (SCC OnLine PC) “… In a civil case a party can, if he chooses, waive the proof, but in a criminal case strict proof ought to be given that the witness is incapable of giving evidence.” The witness, who had deposed earlier, did not appear in the subsequent proceeding on the ground that he was unable to move from his house because of tuberculosis, as deposed by the process server. There was no medical evidence in this regard. The Court observed that the question of whether or not he was incapable of giving evidence must be proved in this context, and in the proof of such a fact it was a condition that statements given in an earlier proceeding can be taken as proved in a subsequent proceeding. Chainchal Singh case therefore, does not lay down a general proposition that an accused cannot waive an objection of mode of proof in a criminal case. Chainchal Singh case therefore, does not lay down a general proposition that an accused cannot waive an objection of mode of proof in a criminal case. In the present case, there is a clear failure to object to the mode of proof of the CDRs and the case is therefore covered by the test in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder. 34. We proceed to deal with the submission of Mr Luthra that the ratio of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Sk. Farid case is not applicable to the facts of this case. It was held in Sk. Farid case as under: (SCC OnLine Bom paras 5-8) “5. In civil cases mode of proof can be waived by the person against whom it is sought to be used. Admission thereof or failure to raise objection to their tendering in evidence amounts to such waiver. No such waiver from the accused was permissible in criminal cases till the enactment of the present Code of Criminal Procedure in 1973. The accused was supposed to be a silent spectator at the trial, being under no obligation to open his mouth till the occasion to record his statement under Section 342 (present Section 313) of the Code arose. Even then he was not bound to answer and explain the circumstances put to him as being appearing against him. In Chainchal Singh v. King Emperor it was held by the Privy Council that the accused was not competent to waive his right and the obligation of the prosecution to prove the documents on which the prosecution relied. Resultantly, the prosecution was driven to examine witnesses even when the accused was not interested in challenging the facts sought to be proved through them. The inconvenience and the delay was avoidable. 6. Section 294 of the Code is introduced to dispense with this avoidable waste of time and facilitate removal of such obstruction in the speedy trial. The accused is now enabled to waive the said right and save the time. This is a new provision having no corresponding provision in the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure. It requires the prosecutor or the accused, as the case may be, to admit or deny the genuineness of the documents sought to be relied against him at the outset in writing. This is a new provision having no corresponding provision in the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure. It requires the prosecutor or the accused, as the case may be, to admit or deny the genuineness of the documents sought to be relied against him at the outset in writing. On his admitting or indicating no dispute as to the genuineness, the Court is authorised to dispense with its formal proof thereof. In fact after indication of no dispute as to the genuineness, proof of documents is reduced to a sheer empty formality. The section is obviously aimed at undoing the judicial view by legislative process. 7. The preceding Section 293 of the Code also dispenses with the proof of certain documents. It corresponds with Section 510 of the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure. It enumerates the category of documents, proof of which is not necessary unless the Court itself thinks it necessary. Section 294 makes dispensation of formal proof dependent on the accused or the prosecutor, not disputing the genuineness of the documents sought to be used against them. Such contemplated dispensation is not restricted to any class or category of documents as under Section 293, in which ordinarily authenticity is dependent more on the mechanical process involved than on the knowledge, observation or the skill of the author rendering oral evidence just formal. Nor it is made dependent on the relative importance of the document or probative value thereof. The documents being primary or secondary or substantive or corroborative, is not relevant for attracting Section 294 of the Code. Not disputing its genuineness is the only solitary test therefor. 8. Now the post-mortem report is also a document as any other document. Primary evidence of such a document is the report itself. It is a contemporaneous record, prepared in the prescribed form, of what the doctor has noticed in the course of post-mortem of the dead body, while investigating the cause of the death. It being relevant, it can be proved by producing the same. But production is only a step towards proof of it. It can be received in evidence only on the establishment of its authenticity by the mode of its proof as provided under Sections 67 to 71 of the Evidence Act. It being relevant, it can be proved by producing the same. But production is only a step towards proof of it. It can be received in evidence only on the establishment of its authenticity by the mode of its proof as provided under Sections 67 to 71 of the Evidence Act. Section 294(1) of the Code enables the accused also, to waive this mode of proof, by admitting it or raising no dispute as to its genuineness when called upon to do so under sub-section (1). Sub-section (3) enables the Court to read it in evidence without requiring the same to be proved in accordance with the Evidence Act. There is nothing in Section 294 to justify exclusion of it, from the purview of “documents” covered thereby. The mode of proof of it also is liable to be waived as of any other document.” 35. Section 294 CrPC, 1973 provides a procedure for filing documents in a court by the prosecution or the accused. The documents have to be included in a list and the other side shall be given an opportunity to admit or deny the genuineness of each document. In case the genuineness is not disputed, such document shall be read in evidence without formal proof in accordance with the Evidence Act. The judgment in Sk. Farid case is not applicable to the facts of this case and so, is not relevant.” 33. The effect of overrule of the judgment of Navjot Sandhu (supra) by the case of Anwar P.V. (supra) was also considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sonu -vs- State of Haryana, (supra) and the relevant paras for the purposes of the present case are 36, 37 and 40 which are quoted as under: - 36. Electronic records play a crucial role in criminal investigations and prosecutions. The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. Interpreting Section 65-B(4), this Court in Anvar case held that an electronic record is inadmissible in evidence without the certification as provided therein. Navjot Sandhu case which took the opposite view was overruled. 37. The interpretation of Section 65-B(4) by this Court by a judgment dated 4-8-2005 in Navjot Sandhu held the field till it was overruled on 18-9-2014 in Anvar case. Navjot Sandhu case which took the opposite view was overruled. 37. The interpretation of Section 65-B(4) by this Court by a judgment dated 4-8-2005 in Navjot Sandhu held the field till it was overruled on 18-9-2014 in Anvar case. All the criminal courts in this country are bound to follow the law as interpreted by this Court. Because of the interpretation of Section 65-B in Navjot Sandhu, there was no necessity of a certificate for proving electronic records. A large number of trials have been held during the period between 4-8-2005 and 18-9-2014. Electronic records without a certificate might have been adduced in evidence. There is no doubt that the judgment of this Court in Anvar case has to be retrospective in operation unless the judicial tool of “prospective overruling” is applied. However, retrospective application of the judgment is not in the interest of administration of justice as it would necessitate the reopening of a large number of criminal cases. Criminal cases decided on the basis of electronic records adduced in evidence without certification have to be revisited as and when objections are taken by the accused at the appellate stage. Attempts will be made to reopen cases which have become final. 40. This Court did not apply the principle of prospective overruling in Anvar case. The dilemma is whether we should. This Court in K. Madhava Reddy v. State of A.P. held that an earlier judgment would be prospective taking note of the ramifications of its retrospective operation. If the judgment in Anvar is applied retrospectively, it would result in unscrambling past transactions and adversely affecting the administration of justice. As Anvar case was decided by a three-Judge Bench, propriety demands that we refrain from declaring that the judgment would be prospective in operation. We leave it open to be decided in an appropriate case by a three-Judge Bench. In any event, this question is not germane for adjudication of the present dispute in view of the adjudication of the other issues against the accused.” 34. In the case of Tomaso Bruno -vs- State of Uttar Pradesh (2015) 7 SCC 178 , the judgment of Anwar P.V. -Vs- P.K. Basheer (supra) was not referred and the two judges decision of Navjot Sandhu (supra) was followed on the point which was specially overruled in the case of Anwar P.V. -Versus- P.K. Basheer (supra). In the case of Tomaso Bruno -vs- State of Uttar Pradesh (2015) 7 SCC 178 , the judgment of Anwar P.V. -Vs- P.K. Basheer (supra) was not referred and the two judges decision of Navjot Sandhu (supra) was followed on the point which was specially overruled in the case of Anwar P.V. -Versus- P.K. Basheer (supra). The judgment of Anwar P.V. -Versus- P.K. Basheer (supra) was further clarified in the case of Shafhi Mohammad -vs- State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2018) 2 SCC 801 . The Paras- 20, 24 to 26 and 29 are as follows: “20. An apprehension was expressed on the question of applicability of conditions under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act to the effect that if a statement was given in evidence, a certificate was required in terms of the said provision from a person occupying a responsible position in relation to operation of the relevant device or the management of relevant activities. It was submitted that if the electronic evidence was relevant and produced by a person who was not in custody of the device from which the electronic document was generated, requirement of such certificate could not be mandatory. It was submitted that Section 65-B of the Evidence Act was a procedural provision to prove relevant admissible evidence and was intended to supplement the law on the point by declaring that any information in an electronic record, covered by the said provision, was to be deemed to be a document and admissible in any proceedings without further proof of the original. This provision could not be read in derogation of the existing law on admissibility of electronic evidence. 24. We may, however, also refer to the judgment of this Court in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, delivered by a three-Judge Bench. In the said judgment in para 24 it was observed that electronic evidence by way of primary evidence was covered by Section 62 of the Evidence Act to which procedure of Section 65-B of the Evidence Act was not admissible. However, for the secondary evidence, procedure of Section 65-B of the Evidence Act was required to be followed and a contrary view taken in Navjot Sandhu that secondary evidence of electronic record could be covered under Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act, was not correct. However, for the secondary evidence, procedure of Section 65-B of the Evidence Act was required to be followed and a contrary view taken in Navjot Sandhu that secondary evidence of electronic record could be covered under Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act, was not correct. There are, however, observations in para 14 to the effect that electronic record can be proved only as per Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. 25. Though in view of the three-Judge Bench judgments in Tomaso Bruno and Ram Singh, it can be safely held that electronic evidence is admissible and provisions under Sections 65-A and 65-B of the Evidence Act are by way of a clarification and are procedural provisions. If the electronic evidence is authentic and relevant the same can certainly be admitted subject to the Court being satisfied about its authenticity and procedure for its admissibility may depend on fact situation such as whether the person producing such evidence is in a position to furnish certificate under Section 65-B(4). 26. Sections 65-A and 65-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 cannot be held to be a complete code on the subject. In Anvar P.V., this Court in para 24 clarified that primary evidence of electronic record was not covered under Sections 65-A and 65-B of the Evidence Act. Primary evidence is the document produced before the Court and the expression “document” is defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act to mean any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter. 29. The applicability of procedural requirement under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act of furnishing certificate is to be applied only when such electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in a position to produce such certificate being in control of the said device and not of the opposite party. In a case where electronic evidence is produced by a party who is not in possession of a device, applicability of Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be held to be excluded. In such case, procedure under the said sections can certainly be invoked. In a case where electronic evidence is produced by a party who is not in possession of a device, applicability of Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be held to be excluded. In such case, procedure under the said sections can certainly be invoked. If this is not so permitted, it will be denial of justice to the person who is in possession of authentic evidence/witness but on account of manner of proving, such document is kept out of consideration by the court in the absence of certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act, which party producing cannot possibly secure. Thus, requirement of certificate under Section 65-B(4) is not always mandatory.” 35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the order dated 26.07.2019 reported in (2020) 3 SCC 216 Arjun Panditrao Khotkar was of the considered opinion that in view of Anwar P.V. -Versus- P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473 , the pronouncement in the case of Shafhi Mohammad reported in (2018) 2 SCC 801 needs reconsideration and considering the importance of the issue regarding admissibility of electronic evidence, the matter was referred to larger bench with an element of urgency. 36. The reference was ultimately decided vide judgment reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1 (Arjun Panditrao Khotkar -versus- Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal) and the central issue involved was whether the requirement of a certificate could be done away with under Section 65 B (4) of the evidence Act, 1872? 37. The reference was answered as follows:- “73. The reference is thus answered by stating that: 73.1. Anvar P.V. (supra), as clarified by us hereinabove, is the law declared by this Court on Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The judgment in Tomaso Bruno (supra), being per incuriam, does not lay down the law correctly. Also, the judgment in SLP (Crl.) No. 9431 of 2011 reported as Shafhi Mohammad (supra) and the judgment dated 03.04.2018 reported as (2018) 5 SCC 311 , do not lay down the law correctly and are therefore overruled. 73.2. The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under Section 65B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. 73.2. The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under Section 65B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the concerned device, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where the “computer” happens to be a part of a “computer system” or “computer network” and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the Court, then the only means of providing information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65B(4). The last sentence in Anvar P.V. (supra) which reads as “…if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act…” is thus clarified; it is to be read without the words “under Section 62 of the Evidence Act,…” With this clarification, the law stated in paragraph 24 of Anvar P.V. (supra) does not need to be revisited. 73.3. The general directions issued in paragraph 62 (supra) shall hereafter be followed by courts that deal with electronic evidence, to ensure their preservation, and production of certificate at the appropriate stage. These directions shall apply in all proceedings, till rules and directions under Section 67C of the Information Technology Act and data retention conditions are formulated for compliance by telecom and internet service providers. 73.4. Appropriate rules and directions should be framed in exercise of the Information Technology Act, by exercising powers such as in Section 67C, and also framing suitable rules for the retention of data involved in trial of offences, their segregation, rules of chain of custody, stamping and record maintenance, for the entire duration of trials and appeals, and also in regard to preservation of the meta data to avoid corruption. Likewise, appropriate rules for preservation, retrieval and production of electronic record, should be framed as indicated earlier, after considering the report of the Committee constituted by the Chief Justice’s Conference in April, 2016.” 38. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has put a caveat vide para-45 on the ground that when there is a disability that makes it impossible obey the law, the alleged disobedience of law is excused. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has put a caveat vide para-45 on the ground that when there is a disability that makes it impossible obey the law, the alleged disobedience of law is excused. on the facts of the said case, the requirement of furnishing of the certificate under section 65B (4) was dispensed with vide para-49 of the judgment. 39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar -vs- Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1 ) in para 52, 53 and 54 has held as follows: “52. It is pertinent to recollect that the stage of admitting documentary evidence in a criminal trial is the filing of the charge-sheet. When a criminal court summons the accused to stand trial, copies of all documents which are entered in the charge-sheet/final report have to be given to the accused. Section 207 of the CrPC, which reads as follows, is mandatory. Therefore, the electronic evidence, i.e. the computer output, has to be furnished at the latest before the trial begins. The reason is not far to seek; this gives the accused a fair chance to prepare and defend the charges levelled against him during the trial. The general principle in criminal proceedings therefore, is to supply to the accused all documents that the prosecution seeks to rely upon before the commencement of the trial. The requirement of such full disclosure is an extremely valuable right and an essential feature of the right to a fair trial as it enables the accused to prepare for the trial before its commencement. 53. In a criminal trial, it is assumed that the investigation is completed and the prosecution has, as such, concretised its case against an accused before commencement of the trial. It is further settled law that the prosecution ought not to be allowed to fill up any lacunae during a trial. As recognised by this Court in Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai (2002) 5 SCC 82 , the only exception to this general rule is if the prosecution had ‘mistakenly’ not filed a document, the said document can be allowed to be placed on record. The Court held as follows: “7. From the aforesaid sub-sections, it is apparent that normally, the investigating officer is required to produce all the relevant documents at the time of submitting the charge-sheet. The Court held as follows: “7. From the aforesaid sub-sections, it is apparent that normally, the investigating officer is required to produce all the relevant documents at the time of submitting the charge-sheet. At the same time, as there is no specific prohibition, it cannot be held that the additional documents cannot be produced subsequently. If some mistake is committed in not producing the relevant documents at the time of submitting the report or the charge-sheet, it is always open to the investigating officer to produce the same with the permission of the court.” 54. Therefore, in terms of general procedure, the prosecution is obligated to supply all documents upon which reliance may be placed to an accused before commencement of the trial. Thus, the exercise of power by the courts in criminal trials in permitting evidence to be filed at a later stage should not result in serious or irreversible prejudice to the accused. A balancing exercise in respect of the rights of parties has to be carried out by the court, in examining any application by the prosecution under Sections 91 or 311 of the CrPC or Section 165 of the Evidence Act. Depending on the facts of each case, and the Court exercising discretion after seeing that the accused is not prejudiced by want of a fair trial, the Court may in appropriate cases allow the prosecution to produce such certificate at a later point in time. If it is the accused who desires to produce the requisite certificate as part of his defence, this again will depend upon the justice of the case - discretion to be exercised by the Court in accordance with law.” 40. This Court finds that the facts of the present case are similar to that of the case of Sonu -vs- State of Haryana, reported in (2017) 8 SCC 570 . In the said case also, the CDRs were taken into evidence without any objection from the side of the defence. The incident in the said case was of the year 2006, High Court judgment was of the year 2012 and the criminal appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the year 2013 and by the time, the matter was taken up by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the judgment in the case of Anwar P.V. -Versus- P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473 had come. 41. 41. This Court also finds that the judgment passed in the case of Sonu -vs- State of Haryana (2017) 8 SCC 570 as well as the judgment passed in the case of State of Karnataka -vs- M.R. Hiremath (2019) 7 SCC 515 , following the judgment of Sonu -vs- State of Haryana, was also considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while answering the reference in the judgment reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1 (Arjun Panditrao Khotkar -versus- Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal) and the ratio laid down in Sonu -vs- State of Haryana has not been overruled. 42. In the facts of the judgment reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1 (Arjun Panditrao Khotkar -versus- Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has put a caveat and dispensed with the requirement of the certificate under section 65 B (4) of the Evidence Act, 1872 as all attempts were made by the prosecution to procure the certificate, but could not be obtained from third party. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that when there is a disability that makes it impossible to obey the law, the alleged disobedience of law is excused. 43. In view of the aforesaid findings and the binding precedent of the case of Sonu -vs- State of Haryana (2017) 8 SCC 570 read with the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court particularly the judgment reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1 (Arjun Panditrao Khotkar -versus- Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal) and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of the view that the objection regarding admissibility of electronic evidence i.e. CDRs (call details records i.e. Exhibits-2 and 2/1) having not been taken at the stage of trial and permitting them to be adduced in evidence without any objection, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that the said evidence is to be excluded in absence of the certificate under section 65 B (4) of the Evidence Act, 1972. Had the point of inadmissibility of Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-2/1 been raised before the learned trial court at appropriate stage, the prosecution would have got an opportunity to rectify the deficiency. Had the point of inadmissibility of Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-2/1 been raised before the learned trial court at appropriate stage, the prosecution would have got an opportunity to rectify the deficiency. As both these documents have been marked as exhibits without any objection from the side of the petitioner, the point of inadmissibility of Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-2/1 as an evidence being raised subsequently is not permissible in law and hence, the contention of the learned counsel for petitioner with regard to admissibility of Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-2/1 is hereby rejected. 44. This Court finds that both the learned courts below have recorded consistent and concurrent finding of facts and have convicted and sentenced the petitioner after scrutinizing the evidences available on record in detail. 45. In view of the aforesaid discussions and findings and considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in mind the limited scope under revision jurisdiction, this Court finds that the learned courts below have passed well-reasoned judgments considering every aspect of the matter. There being no perversity, illegality or irregularity in the impugned judgments, no interference is called for. 46. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence of the petitioner passed by the learned trial court and confirmed by the learned appellate court is hereby upheld and this criminal revision petition is hereby dismissed. 47. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 48. Bail bond furnished by the petitioner is hereby cancelled. 49. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is also dismissed as not pressed. 50. Let the Lower Court Records be immediately sent back to the court concerned. 51. Let a copy of this Judgment be communicated to the learned court below through ‘e-mail/FAX’. Revision petition dismissed