ORDER : 1. In view of outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, case has been taken up through Video Conferencing. Concerned lawyers have no objection with regard to the proceeding, which has been held through Video Conferencing. They have no complaint in respect to the audio and video clarity and quality. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for direction upon the respondents to grant him all consequential benefits as per Award dated 15.03.2013, passed by learned Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Ref. Case No. 62 of 2009. It has also been prayed for quashing the part portion of settlement dated 19.08.2013 entered between the petitioner and respondent-management by which it was agreed that the petitioner will not claim any back wages for the idle period and the said period will be treated as “Dies-Non” which is against the principle of Section 17A of the I.D. Act. Petitioner has further prayed for a direction upon the respondents to pay full back wages for the period from 01.07.2006 to 20.08.2013. 3. The facts of the case lies in a narrow compass. The petitioner joined the services of the respondent-Management on 31.03.1973. At the time of his joining, his date of birth was recorded in the original Form ‘B’ register as 14.02.1954 and accordingly, he was entitled to remain in service till February, 2014, as per the provisions of Certified Standing Orders of Coal India Ltd. However, to the utter surprise of the petitioner, on 19.01.2006, he received a notice from the respondent No. 1 that the management is going to retire him w.e.f. 27.06.2006. Thereafter, petitioner submitted representation before the respondent- management stating therein that his date of birth recorded in Form ‘B’ register is 14.02.1954 and hence, he is entitled to continue in service till February, 2014 but the respondent-management without considering his representation, had superannuated him from service w.e.f. 26.06.2006. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed W.P. (S) No. 3164 of 2006 before this Court, which was dismissed by the Hon’ble Court vide order dated 11.01.2007, observing that the writ involves disputed question of facts, which cannot be decided by a Writ Court. Hence, the petitioner raised industrial disputes, which was referred to Central Govt. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed W.P. (S) No. 3164 of 2006 before this Court, which was dismissed by the Hon’ble Court vide order dated 11.01.2007, observing that the writ involves disputed question of facts, which cannot be decided by a Writ Court. Hence, the petitioner raised industrial disputes, which was referred to Central Govt. Industrial No. 1, Dhanbad vide notification dated 09.11.2009, by framing the following issue for adjudication of the dispute: “Whether the action of the management of Jogidih Colliery of M/s. BCCL in superannuating Sri. Kali Singh, Attendance Clerk w.e.f. 30.06.2006 when there is discrepancy in his date of various records is legal and justified? To what relief is the workman concerned entitled?” 4. Upon receipt of the notification, the learned Tribunal registered the same as Ref. Case No. 62 of 2009 and issued notices to both the parties. Upon receipt of the notice, both parties appeared before the Tribunal and filed their respective written statements and adduced their evidences in support of their cases. Thereafter, the learned Tribunal, after hearing the parties in detail and perusing the documents and evidences brought on record, by its Award dated 15.03.2013, answered the reference in favour of the petitioner-workman holding therein that the action of the management of Jogidih Colliery of M/s. BCCL in superannuating Sri Kali Singh, Attendance Clerk w.e.f. 30.06.2006 is not legal and justified, hence the workman be reinstated with continuation of service within 10 days after the award is notified in the gazette. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted representation before the respondent No. 2 and requested him to allow the petitioner to resume his duties. It is the further case of the petitioner that on several occasions, he requested the respondent-management to allow him to resume the work but he was not allowed and subsequently, he was forced to enter into settlement with management, in which a condition was inserted that idle period will be treated as “Dies-Non” and petitioner will not be entitled for any back wages for the said period, however, the said period will be treated as continuity in service for the purpose of gratuity. Aggrieved by the said settlement by which petitioner was denied his back wages, petitioner has knocked the door of this Court. 5. Mr. Aggrieved by the said settlement by which petitioner was denied his back wages, petitioner has knocked the door of this Court. 5. Mr. Deepak Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that since the Award itself speak in specific terms that the petitioner be reinstated with continuation of service, he is entitled for all consequential benefits including back wages. The petitioner has rendered a considerable period of service and as his services were wrongfully terminated, he is entitled for full back wages. Learned counsel further submits that after his termination, the petitioner was all along out of employment and the respondent- management had failed to produce any evidence to prove that the petitioner was gainfully employed during the period of idleness. Learned counsel further argues that as the learned Tribunal has held that as the petitioner has wrongly been terminated from service on the basis of forged documents, he is entitled for continuity in service and hence, the petitioner is also entitled for all consequential benefits and the action of the respondents in denying full back wages for period from 01.07.2006 to 20.08.2013 is wholly illegal and unjustified. Learned counsel submits that settlement arrived between the parties is contrary to the Award passed by the learned Tribunal as well as Section 17-A of the I.D. Act and as the petitioner was forced to remain idle, the respondent cannot take benefit of the same treating the period of idleness as “Dies-Non.” 6. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Management vehemently opposes the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the writ petition is wholly misconceived, devoid of any merit and as such, liable to be rejected. Learned counsel submits that if the petitioner was aggrieved by non-compliance of the Award dated 15.03.2013, as has been alleged in the instant writ application, he has an alternative remedy of approaching the learned Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad by filing an application under Section 33(C)(ii) of the I.D. Act and the writ application seeking grant of consequential benefits arising out of an Award passed under I.D. Act is not maintainable. Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad by filing an application under Section 33(C)(ii) of the I.D. Act and the writ application seeking grant of consequential benefits arising out of an Award passed under I.D. Act is not maintainable. Learned counsel further argues that after passing of the Award, a settlement was arrived between the petitioner and the respondent-management and as per Clause-(iii) of the said settlement, the period of idleness shall be treated as dies-non, however, continuity of service shall be maintained for the purpose of gratuity. Accordingly, the petitioner was not paid his back wages as agreed by him and benefit of continuity in service has been extended to him for the purpose of calculation of gratuity. Thereafter, the petitioner joined his service without any demur or protest and as such, claim of consequential benefits including back wages as raised in the instant writ application is wholly misconceived and barred by principles of waiver and estoppel. 7. Before delving into the issue as to whether workman is entitled for back wages in view of reinstatement into service, it would be pertinent to examine as to whether settlement dated 19.08.2013, arrived at in pursuance of Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act, 1947 is binding on the parties or not? 8. Since the settlement arrived at binds both the parties, therefore, the settlement dated 19.08.2013, which contains two fold settlement, first, regarding reinstatement of the writ petitioner and second, forgoing of the right of back wages as also not to make any claim for the period of idleness is binding on both the parties. Since the terms of memorandum binds the parties, therefore, it can comfortably be said that it is not open to the writ petitioner to question the memorandum of settlement which has taken shape of the statutory fervor in terms of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Mahto. vs. Central Coalfield Ltd. and Others, (2007) 8 SCC 549 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the settlement arrived in pursuant to Section 18 is having its binding effect having its statutory fervor. The issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Mahto. vs. Central Coalfield Ltd. and Others, (2007) 8 SCC 549 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the settlement arrived in pursuant to Section 18 is having its binding effect having its statutory fervor. Since the settlement is binding upon the parties, therefore, it is not permissible for the writ petitioner to challenge the same as once he has entered into the settlement, submitted himself to the terms and conditions of the settlement, taken benefit of reinstatement and subsequently, questioned it before Court of Law. Admittedly, the settlement dated 19.08.2013 has got statutory force and hence, it has got its binding effect and further, since in terms of the memorandum of settlement dated 05.11.2011, the petitioner has been reinstated in service treating the period of idleness as ‘Dies-Non’ for which no back wages can be claimed, the settlement cannot be taken into piecemeal and the entire settlement is binding on the parties. In case of R.N. Gosain vs. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683 in Para-10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that “a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage.” [See: Verschures Creameries Ltd. vs. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd. Scrutton, L.J.] According to Halsbury’s order (for example for the payment of costs) a party may be precluded from saying that it is invalid and asking to set it aside.” (Para 1508)” Thus, it is not permissible for the writ petitioner to accept one part of the settlement and decline to accept the other part, which is contrary to the position of law to the effect that it is not allowed to a person to both approbate and reprobate. 9. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that there cannot be settlement after the Award is fully demolished in view of the aforesaid ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 9. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that there cannot be settlement after the Award is fully demolished in view of the aforesaid ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Shobha Ram Raturi vs. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. and Others, (2016) 16 SCC 663 and in case of Sirsilk Ltd. and Another vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and Another, AIR 1964 SC 160 , are not at all attracted in the instant case as in those cases there was no settlement and in the instant case, the writ petitioner has accepted the part of the settlement and has thrown challenge to the second part of the settlement, which is not permissible in the eyes of law. The issue also fell for consideration before this Court in L.P.A. No. 41 of 2018 (Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Others vs. Indrasani Devi) and the similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Court. 10. As a sequel to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, no interference is warranted in the instant writ application and the same is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.