JUDGMENT : (Prayer: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records relating to the impugned proceedings of the first respondent dated 19.08.2013 in T.P.No.A4/38/2013 and quash the same.) The prayer sought for herein is for a Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records relating to the impugned proceedings of the first respondent, dated 19.08.2013 in T.P.No.A4/38/2013 and quash the same. 2. The petitioner joined in Tamil Nadu Uniform Service as Grade-II Police Constable in 1984. Thereafter, he was promoted as Sub-Inspector of Police in the year 2007. While he was working as such, a criminal case in Crime No.868 of 2010 was registered on the file of the Kottar Police Station against the petitioner and some others for the alleged offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341 and 294(b) and 302 IPC and under Section 3 (1) of TNPPDL Act. After completion of investigation, charge sheet has been filed by the Police concerned, where the petitioner has been shown as the fourth accused, against whom, charges were framed for the alleged offences punishable under Section 302 IPC r/w 120 (b). 3. Simultaneously, the respondent department initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Accordingly, he was placed under suspension, by an order dated 27.04.2013 and thereafter, on 19.08.2013, charge memo has been issued, where, two charges have been framed against the petitioner. 4. To have a easy reference, the relevant charges framed against the petitioner are extracted herein: “TAMIL” 5. However, the petitioner, on the ground that, since on similar set of charges, a criminal case has already been filed and it is pending, where charge sheet has also been filed, the departmental proceedings on the same set of charges cannot be proceeded, therefore, accordingly, he approached this Court by filing W.P(MD).No.19138 of 2013, where, he sought for a prayer of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records relating to the impugned proceedings that means, the charge memo, dated 19.08.2013 and quash the same. The Writ Court, after hearing the petitioner and the respondents therein, has passed the following order: '............. 6. I have considered the above submissions. The Writ Court, after hearing the petitioner and the respondents therein, has passed the following order: '............. 6. I have considered the above submissions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Paul Anthony's case, that in the event the allegations in the criminal case as well as in the departmental proceedings are more or less same and in the event it is found that the witnesses are also almost common, allowing the disciplinary proceedings to be concluded first will surely cause prejudice in the trial of the criminal case. Therefore, according to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the disciplinary proceedings should be kept in abeyance. Applying the said principle to the facts and circumstances of the present case, if we look into the case, it is crystal clear that so far as the first charge is concerned, the allegations are similar in the departmental proceedings also. Witnesses in both the cases are almost common. In view of the same, I am of the first view that in the event disciplinary proceedings is conducted first, it will cause serious prejudice to the defence of the petitioner in the criminal case. A fair trial, which is a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, should be preserved and the same should be guaranteed. In view of the above, I am inclined to issue a direction to the respondents to keep the disciplinary proceeding pending until the conclusion of the criminal case.' 6. Thus, the departmental proceedings initiated by issuance of charge memo against the petitioner has been stalled, on the own voluntarily action on the part of the petitioner by filing the aforesaid writ petition, therefore, the departmental proceedings could not be progressed. 7. Subsequently, the trial has been completed in the criminal case and ultimately, by a judgment dated 12.02.2020, the concerned Criminal Court i.e., Principal District and Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli, in S.C.No.600 of 2017 has acquitted the petitioner from the said charges i.e., charges for the punishable offences under Sections 120(b) and 302 IPC. 8. 7. Subsequently, the trial has been completed in the criminal case and ultimately, by a judgment dated 12.02.2020, the concerned Criminal Court i.e., Principal District and Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli, in S.C.No.600 of 2017 has acquitted the petitioner from the said charges i.e., charges for the punishable offences under Sections 120(b) and 302 IPC. 8. Since the petitioner has been acquitted from the criminal case, he seems to have approached the respondents to drop the proceedings initiated departmentally, as in respect of the same set of charges since the petitioner has been acquitted, after full fledged trial by the competent Criminal Court, in respect of the very same set of charges in the departmental proceedings, nothing could be made out and therefore, the departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner by issuance of charge memo, dated 19.08.2013, can be dropped. 9. However, the said request of the petitioner seems to have not been accepted by the respondents and they proceeded to conduct the departmental proceedings, pursuant to the said charge memo, dated 19.08.2013. Therefore, the petitioner has once again sought for indulgence of this Court to quash the charge memo, dated 19.08.2013 and accordingly, this writ petition has been filed with aforesaid prayer. 10. At the outset, this Court wants to clarify that, what attempt has been made by the petitioner in the first round of litigation by filing W.P(MD).No.19138 of 2013 to quash the said charge memo, dated 19.08.2013, since partly accepted as the Writ Court, at that time only directed to keep the departmental proceedings pending till the outcome of the decision in the criminal case, exactly, now the same attempt has been made once again challenging the very same charge memo, dated 19.08.2013. 11. Eventhough changing circumstances between these two writ petitions, according to the petitioner is that, in the criminal case, the petitioner has been acquitted, whether that changing circumstances will preclude the respondent department from proceed against the petitioner in the departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner by issuance of charge memo, which is impugned herein. 12. 11. Eventhough changing circumstances between these two writ petitions, according to the petitioner is that, in the criminal case, the petitioner has been acquitted, whether that changing circumstances will preclude the respondent department from proceed against the petitioner in the departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner by issuance of charge memo, which is impugned herein. 12. In this context, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that, since the charges are one and the same both in the departmental proceedings as well as in the criminal case and in the criminal case, after having examined number of witnesses, the Criminal Court has come to the conclusion that, the petitioner is not found guilty in respect of the charges framed against him on both Sections punishable for the offences under Sections 302 and 120 (b) IPC and such an acquittal is honourable acquittal insofar as the petitioner is concerned, therefore, no further evidence could be gathered by the department against the petitioner to prove the very same set of charges in the departmental proceedings. He would also submit that, under Clause 67 of Police Standing Order i.e., PSO 67, what shall be the procedure to be adopted after acquittal in a registered criminal case in respect of a member of the Police service, who are governed under the Police Standing Order is concerned, has been explained. By relying upon the said PSO.No.67, the learned counsel would submit that, if at all, the department decides to proceed further departmentally against the erring person, where, similar set of charges have already been tried in Criminal Court and acquitted, in such circumstances, the specific reasons for proceeding against the erring employee departmentally, has to be identified and recorded. In this regard, he also submits that, under Clause 67(4) of PSO, such a nod should be obtained from the Government, without which, the disciplinary authority cannot proceed against the erring employee. In order to appreciate the same, the relevant portion of PSO 67 is extracted hereunder: 'PSO 67.Procedure after acquittal. The Government have issued the following orders in the matter of reinstatement of a Government servant kept under suspension pending a criminal proceeding against him and of holding a departmental enquiry into the conduct of an officer who has already been tried in a Criminal Court on the facts which formed the basis of the charge against him. The Government have issued the following orders in the matter of reinstatement of a Government servant kept under suspension pending a criminal proceeding against him and of holding a departmental enquiry into the conduct of an officer who has already been tried in a Criminal Court on the facts which formed the basis of the charge against him. (G.O.Ms.No.186, Judl.21st January, 1884) (1) When a Police Officer has been tried and acquitted by a Criminal Court or has had his conviction quashed on appeal he should ordinarily be reinstated. (2) (a) If on a full consideration of the same facts, a criminal Court has arrived at a definite decision which is neither reversed nor modified, it is not expedient that the department should proceed on the basis that proceedings in the criminal Court were misconceived or that the judgment were erroneous, but (b) If certain facts affecting the charge were not placed before a criminal Court or a definite aspect of the case was not considered by it, or if the acquittal was on purely technical grounds like lack of sanction, some technical defect in procedure etc., or the facts found proved by the Court were held insufficient to make out a criminal offence but may make out a departmental irregularity, it is open to the departmental authorities to institute departmental proceedings into the connected matters. (G.O.Ms.No.841, Home, dated 13th March, 1967) (3) The Government do not wish it to be understood that the departmental authorities are not entitled, on grounds of legitimate suspicion, to order a departmental enquiry in all such cases. They do, however, wish to emphasize that in enquiries of this kind, the departmental authorities should not dissent from the conclusions arrived at by the Court of Law, unless fresh circumstances have brought to light lacunae or defects in the evidence before, or in the procedure of such Court. (4) In every such case where the departmental authority is of opinion that departmental proceedings are called for against the Government servant who is acquitted in Court, the facts of the case shall within one month from the date of judgment (exclusive of the period required for obtaining copy), be reported to the Government for orders. Every case so reported shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment in the criminal case. ' 13. Every case so reported shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment in the criminal case. ' 13. By making all these submissions, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that, the departmental proceedings cannot be proceeded, if at all the respondent wants to proceed against the petitioner without a specific reason to be recorded in this regard, that too, after getting the nod from the Government. Therefore, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that, the impugned charge memo, which is nothing but replica of the charge sheet filed in the criminal case for same set of charges, since have already been tried, where the petitioner has been acquitted, cannot be proceeded further, therefore, it is liable to be quashed. 14. However, the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents would submit that, law is well settled in this regard, where, eventhough a Government employee is acquitted in a criminal case and in the same set of charges, if departmental proceeding is already initiated, the same can be proceeded unmindful of the acquittal recorded by the criminal Court. He further submits that, moreover, in the impugned charge memo, two charges were framed against the petitioner, insofar as the first charge is concerned, it relates to the criminal charge, which was tried, where, the petitioner was acquitted, however, the second charge in the impugned charge memo is concerned, it is altogether a different charge, which had not been tried by the Criminal Court. Therefore, in respect of the second charge, even that reason of acquittal in criminal case cannot be applied. 15. The learned Additional Government Pleader would further submit that, for the long pendency of the departmental proceedings from 2013 reasons cannot be attributed to the respondents, since the petitioner admittedly approached this Court and got an order sometime in 2013, where the departmental proceedings were directed to be kept in abeyance, hence the departmental proceedings was delayed. However, it is the duty of the respondents to complete the departmental proceedings at the earliest and in this regard, the learned Additional Government Pleader also, on instructions, would submit that, within a period of four months, the respondents would complete the disciplinary proceedings. 16. However, it is the duty of the respondents to complete the departmental proceedings at the earliest and in this regard, the learned Additional Government Pleader also, on instructions, would submit that, within a period of four months, the respondents would complete the disciplinary proceedings. 16. I have considered the said submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents and have perused the materials placed before this Court. 17. Two grounds were urged by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in the first ground, he submitted that, similar set of charges were tried in a Criminal Court, where, the petitioner has been given clear acquittal, therefore, the same set of charges cannot be proceeded further in the departmental proceedings. The said ground cannot be sustained on the face of it, because, as has been rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Government Pleader, the law is well settled in this regard. Insofar as the second ground, relying upon PSO.No.67, is concerned, it is the vehement contention on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner that, in a case, where, same set of charges were tried by the Criminal Court and clear acquittal is given to the employee, whether departmental proceedings can be progressed or not, can only be decided at the Government level and in this regard, he very much relied upon Clause 67(4) of PSO. 18. Clause 67(4) of PSO merely says that, in every case, where the departmental authority is of the opinion that, departmental proceedings are called for against the Government servant, who is acquitted in the Court, the facts of the case shall within one month from the date of judgment be reported to the Government for orders. The import of Clause 67(4) of PSO cannot be expected to be applied negatively to drop the departmental proceedings. Only after reporting the acquittal in the criminal case to the Government and after getting nod from the Government alone, the department can proceed against the employee, is a far stretch interpretation of Clause 67(4) of PSO and this Court is not subscribing to such interpretation sought to be given by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Only after reporting the acquittal in the criminal case to the Government and after getting nod from the Government alone, the department can proceed against the employee, is a far stretch interpretation of Clause 67(4) of PSO and this Court is not subscribing to such interpretation sought to be given by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Moreover, in this case, the disciplinary authority has decided to proceed against the petitioner pursuant to the impugned charge memo, as the departmental proceedings has been pending for all these years, because of the orders obtained by the petitioner from this Court. Once the disciplinary authority decided to proceed, this Court does not feel to direct the disciplinary authority to get a nod from the Government, by citing Clause 67(4) of PSO, as this Court is of the considered view that, Clause 67(4) of PSO cannot be interpreted to adopt such kind of procedure. 19. Further, on perusal of the impugned charge memo, where two charges were framed against the petitioner, the first charge, which relates to alleged offence said to have been committed by the petitioner punishable under Sections 120(b) and 302 of IPC, in this context, it can be noted that, in respect of the first charge, ultimately, the charge sheet seems to have been filed only in respect of charges punishable under Section 302 r/w 120 (b) IPC, where, the petitioner have got a clear acquittal. Assuming that the petitioner got a clear acquittal for the said two charges from the criminal case, that will not ipso facto preclude the department to proceed independently. 20. That apart, insofar as the second charge in the impugned charge memo is concerned, it is altogether a different issue, where the charge is, the petitioner allegedly conducted a chit business at his home and also, he had been involving in administration of six temples in that locality, where, he was part of the administrative committee of that temples and these activities on the part of the petitioner, according to the respondents, are without knowledge and nod or permission from the employer, therefore, those activities on the part of the petitioner, can be construed as an violation of Conduct Rules, 1964. 21. 21. If any of the action of the Government employee makes it to be unbecoming of a Government servant within the meaning of a Service Regulation and Code of Conduct, which governs the Government servant, certainly, against such activities on the part of the Government employee, disciplinary proceedings can be initiated departmentally. Therefore, there are enough reasons to come to the conclusion that, second charge in the impugned charge memo is purely independent and has not been dealt with or answered by the criminal Court in the judgment, where the petitioner was acquitted. 22. Therefore, looking it from any angle, this Court feels that, there is absolutely no reason or ground to interfere with the impugned charge memo, in the absence of any acceptable reasons such as the charge memo was issued without jurisdiction, without any basic facts of accusation and the charge memo was issued against any statutory provisions. In the absence of any of such grounds, this Court is of the considered view that, the impugned charge memo cannot be found to be a defective one and pursuant to the impugned charge memo, the petitioner can be proceeded further in the disciplinary proceedings. 23. Moreover, because of the long delay in concluding the departmental proceedings, as all these years the same has been kept pending only because of the orders obtained by the petitioner from this Court, as referred to above, the learned Additional Government Pleader has assured before this Court, on instructions, that, within four months period the departmental proceedings would be concluded. When that being the position, absolutely there is no reason to quash the impugned charge memo, accordingly, the prayer sought for in this writ petition, in the considered opinion of this Court is liable to be rejected. 24. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed with the following observations: '(i) that the impugned charge memo can very well be proceeded further by way of disciplinary proceedings by the respondents. In this regard, the respondents shall give reasonable opportunity of being heard in any departmental proceedings, where a major punishment charge is enquired, and after giving all reasonable opportunity available to the petitioner in the relevant Service Regulations, the respondent shall conclude the proceedings and pass final order within a period of four (4) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (ii) The time limit prescribed herein should be strictly adhered to by both parties, therefore, it is needless to mention that, the petitioner shall give his fullest cooperation to the respondents to complete the departmental proceedings within the time stipulated above.' No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.