JUDGMENT : Dr. S.N. Pathak, J. In view of outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, case was taken up through Video Conferencing and heard at length on various dates, lastly on 24.09.2020 and Judgment was reserved and the same is being pronounced today. Concerned lawyers have no objection with regard to the proceeding which has been held through Video Conferencing and there is no complaint in respect to audio and video clarity and quality and after hearing at length, the matter is being disposed of finally. PRAYER OF THE PETITIONER 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the Award dated 11.05.2009, passed by Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Reference No. 32 of 1996 whereby and whereunder the terms of reference sought to have been answered against the petitioner. CASE OF THE PETITIONER 3. The factual exposition as has been stated in the writ petition is that services of the petitioner was regularized to the post of General Mazdoor, Category-I in or about the year 1973 in Sarubera Colliery. Thereafter, petitioner was promoted to Class-III post. On 13.06.1988, a Charge Sheet was issued against the petitioner under the signature of Colliery Manager of Sarubera Colliery through registered post upon an allegation that he was absenting himself from duty without any permission/ sanctioned leave from the competent authority since 09.05.2008 till that date. On 25.06.1988, petitioner submitted his explanations deying and disputing the allegations contained in the charge sheet issued against him. Thereafter, petitioner was never communicated regarding the progress of enquiry or about the proceeding in respect thereof nor was he provided copy of the proceeding or copy of the enquiry report. Petitioner reported for the duties with medical certificates in support of his sickness and he was allowed to join the duties on 02.02.1989. The medical certificates for the periods from 09.05.1988 to 12.10.1988 was accepted by the Medical board on 21.05.1989. Thus, the allegations of unauthorized absence from the duty either from 09.05.1988 or 19.05.1988 or from any subsequent dates, does not arise. 4. It is further case of the petitioner that he again fell ill and went on leave with effect from 03.02.1989 and after recovery from the illness, he reported to his duties but was not allowed to join. Thus, the allegations of unauthorized absence from the duty either from 09.05.1988 or 19.05.1988 or from any subsequent dates, does not arise. 4. It is further case of the petitioner that he again fell ill and went on leave with effect from 03.02.1989 and after recovery from the illness, he reported to his duties but was not allowed to join. On 18.05.1994, petitioner requested the authority to provide him copy of the relevant documents including enquiry report but no such copy was provided to him. Having left with no option, on 18.09.1994 petitioner raised dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. The said conciliation proceeding ended with a failure report and matter was sent to the appropriate government. Vide Notification dated 26.07.1996, the appropriate government referred the dispute for adjudication before the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad with the following reference: “Whether the action of the management of Sarubera Colliery of M/s. C.C.L. in terminating the services of Sh. Matukdhari Prasad (wrongly typed as Mukutdhari Prasad) w.e.f. 24.03.90 is justified? If not, what relief the concerned workman is entitled to?” The said reference was registered as Reference no. 32 of 1996. 5. Upon notice, petitioner appeared and filed his written statement stating therein that action of the management is illegal, unfair and unjustified and therefore, the order of termination is void ab-initio. Petitioner further contended that no enquiry was held and even no opportunity was provided to the petitioner to defend his case nor he was provided with a copy of the enquiry or even the proceeding. Without considering the fact that due to illness of the petitioner, he could not join the duties, harsh punishment has been imposed against the petitioner and he has been terminated without service of copy of termination order. 6. The respondent also appeared before the Tribunal and filed their written statement on 07.05.1997 denying the allegations made by the petitioner. The said written statement was duly replied by the petitioner vide rejoinder filed by him. On 29.12.1997, petitioner filed an application followed by another application dated 05.11.1999 before the Tribunal with a prayer for a direction upon the respondent to produce copy of the documents mentioned therein. However, no such document was ever produced to him in course of hearing of reference case. On 29.12.1997, petitioner filed an application followed by another application dated 05.11.1999 before the Tribunal with a prayer for a direction upon the respondent to produce copy of the documents mentioned therein. However, no such document was ever produced to him in course of hearing of reference case. On 15.07.1999, petitioner further filed list of documents along with charge sheet, reply of the charge sheet, medical certificate dated 12.10.1988 and medical fitness certificate dated 25.01.1989. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 7. Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner vehemently argued that since the Enquiry Officer took into consideration the alleged absence of the petitioner from duty for the relevant periods after issuance of charge sheet, which was not subject matter of charge sheet, therefore, the enquiry report appears to be perverse and consequently, termination order based upon such perverse enquiry report is also vitiated in law. petitioner did not get any opportunity to explain alleged period of absence which was not subject matter of charge sheet. Petitioner has not been provided with copy of the enquiry report and as such, it has seriously prejudiced his case as he failed to rebut such findings of enquiry officer nor could he file second show cause. Learned counsel further argued that no second show cause was ever issued to him as required under the law. Learned counsel further argued that the enquiry report being perverse, the Tribunal without recording any finding in respect of those points replied the terms of reference in negative and passed the impugned Award, which needs interference by this Court. Learned counsel further argued that the Tribunal did not discuss the materials on record, especially the charge sheet, show cause, alleged enquiry report and other materials in order to answer the reference. Learned counsel further argued that the Tribunal has also erred in not taking into consideration the evidence of MW-1 who categorically admitted that the charge sheet was issued on 13.06.1988 whereas petitioner applied for allowing him to join duty on 17.09.1988; the notice of enquiry was returned unserved; there is no proof of service of notice upon the petitioner; second notice sent to the petitioner is not on record; and the same was also received back undelivered. Learned counsel argued that the petitioner is unemployed person and has never engaged himself for any gainful employment after his termination from the service. Learned counsel argued that the petitioner is unemployed person and has never engaged himself for any gainful employment after his termination from the service. The impugned Award is wholly unlawful and fit to be interfered. Learned counsel further submitted that the Tribunal erred in not considering that even unauthorized absence and misconduct has to be dealt in a properly constituted enquiry committee and the said committee is bound to provide ample opportunity to the petitioner to rebut allegations made against him and the management having failed to observe requirements to be followed by them, has failed to justify their action. Learned counsel further submitted that non service of copy of the alleged enquiry report prior to termination itself vitiated the entire order and as such action of the management should have been held to be unjustified and unfair. Learned counsel further argued that once medical certificates issued by the doctor having been accepted by the concerned authority of the management, petitioner should not have been presumed to be absent unauthorisedly. The impugned award is vitiated on account of absence of finding either on the point of absence or on the point of laches on part of the respondent. The Tribunal has misconstrued the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel further argue that extreme punishment of termination from the service does not commensurate to the nature of misconduct of alleged absence and the same was liable to be set aside in view of powers under Section 11(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such, it is a fit case where the High Court, by exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, may interfere with the Award passed by the Tribunal. The enquiry officer travelled beyond the charge sheet, which itself is bad in law. To buttress his arguments, learned Counsel has heavily placed reliance on the decision passed in the case of (i) Sapan Kumar Pandit Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. Reported in (2001) 6 SCC 222 . (i) Raghubir Singh Vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in (2014) 10 SCC 301 ; ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-MANAGEMENT 8. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent argues that it is a belated reference as the reference has been made after four years. Reported in (2001) 6 SCC 222 . (i) Raghubir Singh Vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in (2014) 10 SCC 301 ; ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-MANAGEMENT 8. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent argues that it is a belated reference as the reference has been made after four years. Petitioner did not bother to join the duties and he raised the industrial dispute in the year 1994 though he was terminated from the service on 24.03.1990. It only shows that petitioner was not interested to do the job. The management had tried to give opportunity to join but he did not join. Learned counsel further argued that petitioner was found fit by the medical officer of the management on 25.01.1989 but he did not join the service. The domestic enquiry was fair and proper and no challenge has been made to the said enquiry. Learned counsel further argued that no industrial dispute existed and the reference itself is bad in the eyes of law. Learned counsel argued that the dispute having been raised after more than four years from the date of termination, does not survive and is hopelessly stale and thus the same is not maintainable. Learned counsel further argues that after more than four years of the date of termination from the service, no industrial dispute survives which has been held in a catena of decisions. Learned counsel relied upon the Judgment reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 [ Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another] and submits that right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. The Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity ‘delay defeats equities’. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel has heavily placed reliance on the decision of a Two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 and submitted that a dispute which is stale cannot be the subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. K.P. Madhavankutty reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 and submitted that a dispute which is stale cannot be the subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel has further relied upon the following Judgments: (i) Reserve Bank of India Vs. Gopinath Sharma and Another reported in (2006) 6 SCC 221 ; (ii) Brahmanand Tiwari Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur reported in 2007 (2) JCR 5 : 2007 (2) LLJ 935 . FINDINGS OF THE COURT 9. Be that as it may, having considered rival submission of the parties across the bar and after examination of documents brought on record, this Court is of the view that admittedly there was unreasonable delay which was unexplained. The dispute was raised after four years of termination. So far as delay in seeking reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned, no formula of universal application can be laid down. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. In the instant case, explanation for unreasonable delay has not been given by the workman. Nothing has been placed on record to show that the industrial dispute was raised within a reasonable time or the workman was not responsible for the delay. 10. From perusal of the documents brought on record and going through findings of the Labour Court and the arguments advanced by both the parties, it appears that the workman was not interested to do the job though ample opportunity was given to join but he did not prefer the same. Plea was taken by the workman that he was suffering from Jaundice but no document or any medical certificate from any government hospital was produced. Though the workman working under the management of Central Coalfields Limited had all the privileges to get himself treated in the Central Hospital of Coal India Limited. It cannot be ruled out that the workman was in the habit of absenting himself from the duty and any employee found guilty of habitual absenteeism, amounts to gross violation of discipline and as such termination from the service on this account cannot be termed to be harsh and interfered by the Labour Court. It is better to weed out the dead wood. Management has not committed any illegality in terminating the workman who was guilty of habitual absenteeism and not interested in doing job. 11. It is better to weed out the dead wood. Management has not committed any illegality in terminating the workman who was guilty of habitual absenteeism and not interested in doing job. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner during course of argument has drawn attention of this Court towards several follies committed by the enquiry officer in the domestic enquiry. Surprisingly the domestic enquiry has been said to be not fair and proper but no challenge has been thrown to the domestic enquiry by the petitioner. No case has been made out regarding violation of principles of natural justice. Petitioner has been provided ample opportunity during the course of enquiry to place his case and, thereafter, the domestic enquiry was found to be fair and proper. In absence of any challenge thrown to the domestic enquiry, the Court abstains from interfering into the same and re-appreciating the evidences as an appellate authority. The Hon’ble Apex Court time and again has warned the High Courts not to act as an appellate authority and reappreciate the evidences thoroughly discussed and relied upon by the Labour Courts or the Tribunals. In the case of Krushna Narayan Wanjari Vs. Jai Bharti Shikshan Sanstha, reported in (2018) 12 SCC 620 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “3. Having regard to the fact that the documents were produced before the High Court, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in refusing to look into the same. After all, the Industrial Court had looked into the entire materials and had awarded the salary for the disputed period. Unless the approach is wholly perverse in the sense that the Tribunal acted on no evidence, the High Court under Articles 226/ 227 is not justified in interfering with the Award. It is not a Court of first appeal to reappreciate the evidence. Therefore, the appeal is allowed and the impugned orders are set aside and the order dated 14.03.2012, passed by the Industrial Court, Nagpur Bench, Maharashtra is restored.” 12. Admittedly reference has been made belatedly and the dispute has been raised after more than four years from the date of termination and thus it can comfortably be held that the dispute does not survive and is hopelessly stale and reference itself is not maintainable. 13. Admittedly reference has been made belatedly and the dispute has been raised after more than four years from the date of termination and thus it can comfortably be held that the dispute does not survive and is hopelessly stale and reference itself is not maintainable. 13. The issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex court in the case of U.P. SRTC v. Babu Ram reported in (2006) 5 SCC 433 and in paragraph-10 of the said Judgment, it has been held as under: “10. It is to be noted that the High Court has very cryptically disposed of the writ petition. The workman has not placed any material to show that he had raised dispute within a reasonable time, and/or that he was not responsible for delayed decision, if any, in the conciliation proceedings. It was for him to show that the dispute was raised within a reasonable time and that he was not responsible for any delay. The High Court, on a hypothetical basis has assumed that the dispute might have been raised promptly but delayed by the State Government and he cannot be penalised for delay in finalising the conciliation proceedings and the reference. But neither the Labour Court nor the High Court has even noted the factual position. The conclusion was based on surmises and conjectures.” 14. The reliance of the workman upon the Judgment passed in the case of Raghubir Singh v. Haryana Roadways (Supra) does not come to his rescue. Said case is distinguished on the ground that assurances were given in the said case to the concerned workman whereas instant case is quite different and the workman was terminated from the service. The case of Raghubir Singh (Supra) or the case of Sapan Kumar Pandit Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 222 are distinguished from the facts and circumstances of the present case. Further, in the case of Raghubir Singh (Supra), there was no proceeding and it was only after conviction, an assurance was given by the Management whereas instant case is totally on different footing where the workman has been terminated from the service. The dispute has to be raised on preponderance of probabilities. Admittedly no straight jacket formula can be available for rejecting the case on the ground of stale claim. The dispute has to be raised on preponderance of probabilities. Admittedly no straight jacket formula can be available for rejecting the case on the ground of stale claim. In the instant case, while reference was made, the State was aware that it is a stale claim and as such reference itself was bad in law. 15. The Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt. reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 is relevant wherein the Judgment passed in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 has also been discussed. Para-25 of the said Judgment reads as under wherein paragraphs-6 to 8 of the Judgment passed in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (Supra) has also been discussed: “25. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty [Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty, (2000) 2 SCC 455 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 283] the Court cautioned that power of reference should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner and not in a mechanical fashion. It was specifically observed that power to make reference cannot be exercised to revive settled matters or to refer stale disputes in spite of absence of statutory limitation period. The Court not only reiterated that the courts had power of judicial review, though to limited extent, but also made the following pertinent observations on delay: (SCC pp. 460-61, paras 6-8) “6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances an industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after a lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become an industrial dispute and the appropriate Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming it as an industrial dispute. The Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose of the Act. The Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court seeking an order to quash the reference in question. 8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a reference has been made under Section 10 of the Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. 8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a reference has been made under Section 10 of the Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a correct proposition to state. An administrative order which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside that is certainly subject to judicial review, limited though it might be. The High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 1 SCC 371 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 264] this Court observed: (SCC p. 393, para 24) ‘24. It will be thus seen that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject-matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference.’” 16. It is further relevant to quote paragraphs 27 of the Judgment passed in the case of Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt. (Supra) which reads as under: “27. In Raghubir Singh v. Haryana Roadways [Raghubir Singh v. Haryana Roadways, (2014) 10 SCC 301 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 23], this Court scanned through most of the available case law on the subject and emphasised that the words “at any time” occurring in Section 10 of the Act would imply that law of limitation did not apply. On facts, the Court held that the State Government had rightly exercised its power and referred the dispute to the Labour Court within reasonable time considering the circumstances in which the appellant therein was placed. In fact, the Court accepted the explanation for delay given by the workman in raising the dispute. On facts, the Court held that the State Government had rightly exercised its power and referred the dispute to the Labour Court within reasonable time considering the circumstances in which the appellant therein was placed. In fact, the Court accepted the explanation for delay given by the workman in raising the dispute. In that case, it was found that there was a criminal case pending against the workman and further the Management had assured him that he would be reinstated on his acquittal. It was also noticed that even despite delay, there was no loss or unavailability of evidence due to the said delay.” In paragraph-29 of the said Judgment, it has been held as under: “29. If one examines the judgments in the aforesaid perspective, it would be easy to reconcile all the judgments. At the same time, in some cases the Court did not hold the reference to be bad in law and the delay on the part of the workman in raising the dispute became the cause for moulding the relief only. On the other hand, in some other decisions, this Court specifically held that if the matter raised is belated or stale that would be a relevant consideration on which the reference should be refused. Which parameters are to be kept in mind while taking one or the other approach needs to be discussed with some elaboration, which would include discussion on certain aspects that would be kept in mind by the courts for taking a particular view. We, thus, intend to embark on the said discussion keeping in mind the central aspect which should be the forefront, namely, whether the dispute existed at the time when the appropriate Government had to decide whether to make a reference or not or the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to decide the same issue coming before it.” 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held in para-17 as under:- “17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons — who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle”. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 18. It is now a well-recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity “delay defeats equities. Thus, in those cases where period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over. Thus, in those cases where period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over. Likewise, in other cases even where no limitation is prescribed, but for a long period the aggrieved party does not approach the machinery provided under the law for redressal of his grievance, it can be presumed that relief can be denied on the ground of unexplained delay and laches and/or on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced into the act of other. As mentioned above, these principles as part of equity are based on principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such a right is non-existent. 19. Admittedly a dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to the Court to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. Hon’ble Apex Court in plethora of decisions has clearly held that reference of dispute at that stage was to be held that bad, both on the ground of delay as well as non-existence of industrial dispute. When the dispute itself was raised after four years, it must be considered that the dispute was non-existing as admittedly there was delay of four years which has not been properly explained and thus it can safely be inferred that the industrial dispute was raised when the said dispute was not in existence. It has clearly been held by the Tribunal that the statements made by the employee have not been substantiated by any materials. As a result, no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition nor in the impugned order. 20. This Court may hasten to clarify that in those cases where the court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. As a result, no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition nor in the impugned order. 20. This Court may hasten to clarify that in those cases where the court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. This Court is of the opinion that the law on this issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the “appropriate Government” to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words “at any time” used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry. 21. On the application of the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the view that the reference at such a belated stage without any justifiable explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had no jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-existing dispute. 22. As a result of the aforesaid rules, guidelines, judicial pronouncements and discussions made hereinabove, it can comfortably be inferred that admittedly the reference at a belated stage is bad in law and as such the Award passed by the Tribunal is not fit for any interference. Although there was no limitation prescribed under the Act for making reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the policy of industrial disputes clarifies that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed unless there is satisfactory explanations for the delay. Although there was no limitation prescribed under the Act for making reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the policy of industrial disputes clarifies that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed unless there is satisfactory explanations for the delay. Since no plausible reason has been given or explained or brought on record, this Court is fully satisfied that the reference itself was bad in law. The Tribunal has clearly held the domestic enquiry to be fair and proper. In absence of any challenge thrown to the domestic enquiry, no interference is warranted. The dispute is hopelessly stale and not maintainable and valid in law. 23. As a result of the aforesaid rules, guidelines, judicial pronouncements and discussions made hereinabove, this writ petition stands dismissed.