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2020 DIGILAW 1197 (ALL)

Sharada Devi v. Man Singh

2020-10-08

J.J.MUNIR

body2020
JUDGMENT : 1. Smt. Sharada Devi, the first petitioner is Km. Shruti Singh's grandmother (father's mother). Km. Shruti Singh has been arrayed as the second petitioner and profiled as the detenue in this habeas corpus writ petition. 2. Smt. Sharada Devi says that Km. Shruti Singh, her minor grand-daughter and the daughter of her deceased son, Balram Singh is in the unlawful custody of her mother, Smt. Paramsheela, respondent no.3 along with Man Singh, Smt. Ramwati Devi and Sunil Patel, respondent nos.1, 2 and 4, in that order. 3. Smt. Sharada Devi has petitioned this Court praying that a writ, order or direction in the nature of habeas corpus be issued, ordering her minor grand daughter, Km. Shruti Singh to be produced before the Court, and upon production set at liberty in the manner that her custody be delivered to Smt. Sharada Devi. 4. The facts, in the background of which this cause has arisen, shortly put, are these: the late Balram Singh son of Ram Sabad Singh and Smt. Paramsheela were married on 02.02.2011, according to Hindu rites. In due course, the couple were blessed with a child, a baby girl, named Km. Shruti Singh. She was born on 12.12.2012. Smt. Paramsheela lived with her husband, the late Balram Singh in the family home, where Smt. Sharada Devi, Balram Singh's mother, the first petitioner, also lived. It is acknowledged that Smt. Paramsheela discharged all her obligations as Balram Singh's wife. Balram Singh was employed with the Indian Air Force as a Corporal. He had come home on leave. On 21.02.2015, he became the victim of a road accident and passed away. It appears that after Balram Singh's death, Paramsheela, his widow moved back to her father's place along with the parties' minor daughter, Km. Shruti Singh. She appears to have severed relations with her matrimonial home. 5. After her husband's death, Smt. Paramsheela moved on in life and married Sunil Patel son of Ramjeet Patel, a native of Village Harhahua, Post Office Manikpur, District Mau. Sunil Patel is the fourth respondent here. Smt. Paramsheela and Sunil Patel have been blessed with a son on 26.08.2018. There is some grievance made by Smt. Sharada Devi that the Indian Air Force paid all the post retiral benefits of the late Corporal Balram Singh to Smt. Paramsheela, though she had remarried. Sunil Patel is the fourth respondent here. Smt. Paramsheela and Sunil Patel have been blessed with a son on 26.08.2018. There is some grievance made by Smt. Sharada Devi that the Indian Air Force paid all the post retiral benefits of the late Corporal Balram Singh to Smt. Paramsheela, though she had remarried. It is also indicated that Smt. Paramsheela, being paid all the post retiral benefits of her deceased husband, Balram Singh, does not take good care of the minor, Km. Shruti Singh, employing those funds. It is claimed that Smt. Paramsheela, her husband Sunil Patel and their son are a family. She has, thus, become part of a new family, where Km. Shruti Singh has no place. It is urged that respondent nos.1 and 2 are Smt. Paramsheela's father and mother, who stay with her at her matrimonial home. Smt. Paramsheela is short of necessary resources to provide the required nutrition, lodging and education to the minor. Smt. Sharada Devi, being Km. Shruti Singh's grandmother, is entitled to the custody of the minor, after her mother has remarried. 6. It is in the background of these facts and cause of action that the first petitioner, Smt. Sharada Devi has asked this Court to hold the mother's custody for Km. Shruti Singh unlawful and deliver the minor into the first petitioner's custody. 7. Heard Mr. Anand Priya Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Sanjay Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos.3 and 4 and Mr. Jhamman Ram, learned A.G.A. appearing on behalf of respondents nos.5, 6 and 7. 8. This Court issued a rule nisi on 23.09.2020 ordering the minor, Km. Shruti Singh to be produced before the Court on 08.10.2020. In compliance with the rule nisi, the minor, Km. Shruti Singh has been produced, accompanied by her mother, Smt. Paramsheela. This Court interacted with the minor as well as her mother in order to gauge, within the scope of these summary proceedings, if the minor's welfare was best secured in the hands of her mother. The Court will advert to the outcome of that enterprise a little later in this judgment. 9. Mr. Sanjay Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos.3 and 4 and Sri Jhamman Ram, learned A.G.A. raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of this petition. The Court will advert to the outcome of that enterprise a little later in this judgment. 9. Mr. Sanjay Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos.3 and 4 and Sri Jhamman Ram, learned A.G.A. raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of this petition. It was urged by them that the mother being the minor's natural guardian, the minor's custody with her cannot be termed unlawful. Once the custody, where the minor is placed, is not unlawful, a writ of habeas corpus cannot issue. It is the learned Counsel's submission that what this petition discloses is a pure custody dispute, where the grandmother on the paternal side asks for the minor's custody, because she says that the mother has lost that right, owing to her remarriage. A dispute of this kind cannot be remedied by moving this Court through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It is the learned Counsel’s contention that the first petitioner's remedy is to approach the Court of competent jurisdiction under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and establish her right to custody, superior to that of the mother. This petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents, is not maintainable. 10. Mr. Anand Priya Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner on the other hand submits that by now it has come to be well settled that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is maintainable to decide custody disputes, even between parents, if it can be shown that the minor's custody with one party is unlawful on the touchstone of the child’s welfare. 11. The objection raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has engaged the attention of the Supreme Court in Syed Saleemuddin v. Dr. Rukhsana and Ors., (2001) 5 SCC 247 . In Syed Saleemuddin, it has been held: "11. From the principles laid down in the aforementioned cases it is clear that in an application seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus for custody of minor children the principal consideration for the Court is to ascertain whether the custody of the children can be said to be unlawful or illegal and whether the welfare of the children requires that present custody should be changed and the children should be left in care and custody of somebody else. The principle is well settled that in a matter of custody of a child the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration of the Court. Unfortunately, the Judgment of the High Court does not show that the Court has paid any attention to these important and relevant questions. The High Court has not considered whether the custody of the children with their father can, in the facts and circumstances, be said to be unlawful. The Court has also not adverted to the question whether for the welfare of the children they should be taken out of the custody of their father and left in the care of their mother. However, it is not necessary for us to consider this question further in view of the fair concession made by Shri M.N. Rao that the appellant has no objection if the children remain in the custody of the mother with the right of the father to visit them as noted in the judgment of the High Court, till the Family Court disposes of the petition filed by the appellant for custody of his children." 12. The question has also been considered by the Supreme Court in Nithya Anand Raghavan vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, (2017) 8 SCC 454 . In Nithya Anand Raghavan, it was held: “44. The present appeal emanates from a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the production and custody of a minor child. This Court in Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling [Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling, (1973) 2 SCC 674 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 980], has held that habeas corpus was essentially a procedural writ dealing with machinery of justice. The object underlying the writ was to secure the release of a person who is illegally deprived of his liberty. The writ of habeas corpus is a command addressed to the person who is alleged to have another in unlawful custody, requiring him to produce the body of such person before the court. On production of the person before the court, the circumstances in which the custody of the person concerned has been detained can be inquired into by the court and upon due inquiry into the alleged unlawful restraint pass appropriate direction as may be deemed just and proper. On production of the person before the court, the circumstances in which the custody of the person concerned has been detained can be inquired into by the court and upon due inquiry into the alleged unlawful restraint pass appropriate direction as may be deemed just and proper. The High Court in such proceedings conducts an inquiry for immediate determination of the right of the person's freedom and his release when the detention is found to be unlawful. 45. In a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in relation to the custody of a minor child, this Court in Sayed Saleemuddin v. Rukhsana [Sayed Saleemuddin v. Rukhsana, (2001) 5 SCC 247 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 841], has held that the principal duty of the court is to ascertain whether the custody of child is unlawful or illegal and whether the welfare of the child requires that his present custody should be changed and the child be handed over to the care and custody of any other person. While doing so, the paramount consideration must be about the welfare of the child. In Elizabeth [Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw, (1987) 1 SCC 42 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 13], it is held that in such cases the matter must be decided not by reference to the legal rights of the parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interests and welfare of the minor. The role of the High Court in examining the cases of custody of a minor is on the touchstone of principle of parens patriae jurisdiction, as the minor is within the jurisdiction of the Court [see Paul Mohinder Gahun v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Paul Mohinder Gahun v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2004 SCC OnLine Del 699 : (2004) 113 DLT 823] relied upon by the appellant]. It is not necessary to multiply the authorities on this proposition. 46. The High Court while dealing with the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus concerning a minor child, in a given case, may direct return of the child or decline to change the custody of the child keeping in mind all the attending facts and circumstances including the settled legal position referred to above. 46. The High Court while dealing with the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus concerning a minor child, in a given case, may direct return of the child or decline to change the custody of the child keeping in mind all the attending facts and circumstances including the settled legal position referred to above. Once again, we may hasten to add that the decision of the court, in each case, must depend on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case brought before it whilst considering the welfare of the child which is of paramount consideration. The order of the foreign court must yield to the welfare of the child. Further, the remedy of writ of habeas corpus cannot be used for mere enforcement of the directions given by the foreign court against a person within its jurisdiction and convert that jurisdiction into that of an executing court. Indubitably, the writ petitioner can take recourse to such other remedy as may be permissible in law for enforcement of the order passed by the foreign court or to resort to any other proceedings as may be permissible in law before the Indian Court for the custody of the child, if so advised. 47. In a habeas corpus petition as aforesaid, the High Court must examine at the threshold whether the minor is in lawful or unlawful custody of another person (private respondent named in the writ petition). For considering that issue, in a case such as the present one, it is enough to note that the private respondent was none other than the natural guardian of the minor being her biological mother. Once that fact is ascertained, it can be presumed that the custody of the minor with his/her mother is lawful. In such a case, only in exceptionable situation, the custody of the minor (girl child) may be ordered to be taken away from her mother for being given to any other person including the husband (father of the child), in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Instead, the other parent can be asked to resort to a substantive prescribed remedy for getting custody of the child.” 13. Instead, the other parent can be asked to resort to a substantive prescribed remedy for getting custody of the child.” 13. This question about the maintainability of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with a custody dispute as the cause of action, more recently came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Tejaswini Gaud and others vs. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari and others, (2019) 7 SCC 42 . In Tejaswini Gaud, their Lordships examined the question elaborately and held: “19. Habeas corpus proceedings is not to justify or examine the legality of the custody. Habeas corpus proceedings is a medium through which the custody of the child is addressed to the discretion of the Court. Habeas corpus is a prerogative writ which is an extraordinary remedy and the writ is issued where in the circumstances of the particular case, ordinary remedy provided by the law is either not available or is ineffective; otherwise a writ will not be issued. In child custody matters, the power of the High Court in granting the writ is qualified only in cases where the detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody. In view of the pronouncement on the issue in question by the Supreme Court and the High Courts, in our view, in child custody matters, the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable where it is proved that the detention of a minor child by a parent or others was illegal and without any authority of law. 20. In child custody matters, the ordinary remedy only under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act or the Guardians and Wards Act as the case may be. In cases arising out of the proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by whether the minor ordinarily resides within the area on which the court exercises such jurisdiction. There are significant differences between the enquiry under the Guardians and Wards Act and the exercise of powers by a writ court which is summary in nature. What is important is the welfare of the child. In the writ court, rights are determined only on the basis of affidavits. Where the court is of the view that a detailed enquiry is required, the court may decline to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction and direct the parties to approach the civil court. What is important is the welfare of the child. In the writ court, rights are determined only on the basis of affidavits. Where the court is of the view that a detailed enquiry is required, the court may decline to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction and direct the parties to approach the civil court. It is only in exceptional cases, the rights of the parties to the custody of the minor will be determined in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction on a petition for habeas corpus. 21. In the present case, the appellants are the sisters and brother of the mother Zelam who do not have any authority of law to have the custody of the minor child. Whereas as per Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the first respondent father is a natural guardian of the minor child and is having the legal right to claim the custody of the child. The entitlement of father to the custody of child is not disputed and the child being a minor aged 1½ years cannot express its intelligent preferences. Hence, in our considered view, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the father, being the natural guardian, was justified in invoking the extraordinary remedy seeking custody of the child under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 14. Once again, the issue arose before the Supreme Court in Yashita Sahu vs. State of Rajasthan and others, (2020) 3 SCC 67 . It was held in Yashita Sahu: “10. It is too late in the day to urge that a writ of habeas corpus is not maintainable if the child is in the custody of another parent. The law in this regard has developed a lot over a period of time but now it is a settled position that the court can invoke its extraordinary writ jurisdiction for the best interest of the child. This has been done in Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw [Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw, (1987) 1 SCC 42 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 13], Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 8 SCC 454 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 104] and Lahari Sakhamuri v. Sobhan Kodali [Lahari Sakhamuri v. Sobhan Kodali, (2019) 7 SCC 311 : (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 590] among others. In all these cases, the writ petitions were entertained. In all these cases, the writ petitions were entertained. Therefore, we reject the contention of the appellant wife that the writ petition before the High Court of Rajasthan was not maintainable.” 15. The way the law about the maintainability of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to decide custody disputes has evolved, in the opinion of this Court it can no longer be said for a blanket proposition that a custody dispute between natural guardians is beyond the writ’s scope. It is not that, that in every matter where the custody of a minor with a natural guardian is questioned on the basis of a lost entitlement or a superior right founded on better welfare for the minor, the parties are to be asked to approach the Court of competent jurisdiction under the Guardians and the Wards Act. The question about the welfare of the minor can equally be examined by this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus, as by the Court of competent jurisdiction under the Guardians and Wards Act. The only limitation appears to be that where the decision requires fine and intricate questions of fact to be delved into, which in turn would require an elaborate and careful sifting of evidence, the parties may be asked to approach the Civil Court. Also generally, the determination about the entitlement to custody of a minor, made in the exercise of our jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus, carries the status of a tentative determination. Invariably, the parties ought to be left free, irrespective of the determination made here to suit their rights to a minor's custody finally before the Court under the Guardians and Wards Act. 16. This petition in the totality of circumstances and the law applicable is, therefore, held maintainable. 17. The Court may now proceed to consider the merits of the parties' claim. 18. Under Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the mother is the minor's natural guardian after the father. The issue, whether the mother can claim to be the natural guardian, if the father claims custody or can she claim to be the natural guardian in a different context, until the father is dead, need not trouble this Court, as the father is no more. Section 6 of the Act, last mentioned, provides: "6. The issue, whether the mother can claim to be the natural guardian, if the father claims custody or can she claim to be the natural guardian in a different context, until the father is dead, need not trouble this Court, as the father is no more. Section 6 of the Act, last mentioned, provides: "6. Natural guardians of a Hindu minor.-The natural guardians of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minor's person as well as in respect of the minor's property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are- (a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl- the father, and after him, the mother: Provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother; (b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl-the mother, and after her, the father; (c) in the case of a married girl-the husband: Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as the natural guardian of a minor under the provisions of this section- (a) if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or (b) if he has completely and finally renounced the world by becoming a hermit (vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yatiorsanyasi). Explanation.-In this section, the expressions “father” and “mother” do not include a stepfather and a stepmother.” 19. At the same time, Section 13 of the said Act emphasizes ‘welfare’ of the minor to be of paramount consideration. Section 13 is extracted infra: “13. Welfare of minor to be paramount consideration.-(1) In the appointment or declaration of any person as guardian of a Hindu minor by a court, the welfare of the minor shall be the paramount consideration. (2) No person shall be entitled to the guardianship by virtue of the provisions of this Act or of any law relating to guardianship in marriage among Hindus, if the court is of opinion that his or her guardianship will not be for the welfare of the minor.” 20. A conjoint reading of Sections 6(a) and 13 leads to the inevitable conclusion that welfare of the minor is always the paramount consideration. In a given case, the natural guardian may not be found suitable where the welfare of the minor appears to be best secured in some other hands. A conjoint reading of Sections 6(a) and 13 leads to the inevitable conclusion that welfare of the minor is always the paramount consideration. In a given case, the natural guardian may not be found suitable where the welfare of the minor appears to be best secured in some other hands. But that said, the mother is generally the best person to groom the minor into a young and useful citizen. She is also the best person to take care of the minor's needs as he/ she grows up. There is a presumption in favour of the parents that they would secure the welfare of their children best, and it is on the foot of that presumption that both the parents have been acknowledged to be a minor's natural guardian, under Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. There could, of course, be disentitling factors in a case that may work against the mother. This reasoning was adopted to deprive the mother of her right to custody by this Court in Amit Beri and another vs. Smt. Sheetal Beri wife of Amit Beri, AIR 2003 All 78 . In that case, the mother was deprived of the minor's custody because it was found that she regularly attended night clubs and came home late. During that period, the minor was left in some care house. 21. In the present case, there is no positive assertion of any fact or circumstance to indicate that the mother is disentitled to custody. No circumstance of neglect has been cited, from which a conclusion may be drawn that the minor's welfare is not best secured in the mother's hands. There is a general assertion about the fact that the mother has remarried and the first petitioner, the grandmother wants this Court to infer ipso facto that her remarriage and a son born of that marriage would lead to the minor's neglect. There is nothing said for a specific instance against the mother's husband, or for that matter against anyone else in the household that may demonstrate neglect. The grandmother wants this Court to presume or construct neglect upon remarriage by the mother. This Court is afraid that there is no such principle that on a mother's remarriage, neglect of her minor child begotten of her first marriage is to be presumed or inferred on a constructive basis. 22. The grandmother wants this Court to presume or construct neglect upon remarriage by the mother. This Court is afraid that there is no such principle that on a mother's remarriage, neglect of her minor child begotten of her first marriage is to be presumed or inferred on a constructive basis. 22. This Court has spoken to the minor and her mother, a fact earlier recorded in this judgment. The minor, Km. Shruti Singh is a bright child, all of nine years. She told the Court that she reads in class IIIrd at the Geeta's School. She knows her teacher. She conveyed to the Court that she wants to stay with her mother. She referred to Sunil Patel as 'Papa'. That reference to Sunil Patel came with ease and comfort. Upon the Court asking the minor her father's name, she disclosed Sunil’s name. She conveyed to the Court that she was happy to stay with her mother. To a further question by this Court, if she wishes to stay with her mother, she said an unqualified 'Yes'. She also told the Court that she did not know her grandmother and said that she did not want to stay with her. The Court is of opinion that the child is well integrated into her mother's household and is developing a balanced personality. She appears to be receiving fairly good education too. The mother told the Court that she has remarried and stays with her husband, along with his two brothers. She said that her husband (the minor's father) passed away in an accident. The minor had stayed with her since she was born. Her husband, Sunil Patel is a skilled worker, who earns his livelihood by fixing tiles. She said that she had no financial difficulty and could bring up the minor. She could fund and ensure her education. She said that she had a young son, aged a year and a half, begotten of Sunil Patel. 23. This Court does not find that there is the slightest reason to believe that the minor's interest or welfare would in any manner suffer in the hands of her mother while she stays in Sunil’s home, where she has rehabilitated herself after her husband's death. 23. This Court does not find that there is the slightest reason to believe that the minor's interest or welfare would in any manner suffer in the hands of her mother while she stays in Sunil’s home, where she has rehabilitated herself after her husband's death. This Court must note again that the sole reason to doubt the mother's suitability as a good guardian to the minor is the grandmother's apprehension emanating from the mother's remarriage. There are no instances or facts positive cited to infer neglect or compromised welfare for the minor in her mother's home. The question, whether remarriage of the mother disentitles her or can lead to an inference ipso facto that the minor's welfare would not be secure in her hands, fell for consideration of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Sudha vs. State rep. by Superintendent of Police, Nagapattinam District and others, 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 11442. In that case, the paternal grandmother, like the present case, had resisted the mother's claim to custody of the minor, a girl whose father had passed away, on ground that the mother had remarried. It was claimed by the grandmother that on account of the mother's remarriage, the minor's welfare would not be best ensured in the mother's hands. It was held by their Lordships in Subha thus: “15. Admittedly, the petitioner is the mother and natural guardian of the minor, Kaviyasri and the father of the minor child is no more. The 13th respondent is only the paternal grand mother of the child. The only argument advanced by the learned Senior counsel on behalf of the paternal grand mother of the child is that the petitioner, after the death of her husband, father of the detenue, married another person and therefore, giving custody of the child to the mother would not be in the interest and welfare of the minor detenue. 16. After the death of her husband, the petitioner was free, as per law, to decide her second marriage, accordingly, she married the aforesaid Mr. Suseendran. It is the legal right of the petitioner, which cannot be construed as an illegal act. Merely because the petitioner married another person, after the death of her previous husband, she cannot be said incompetent, to be the guardian of minor child and seeking custody of the child. 17. Mr. Suseendran. It is the legal right of the petitioner, which cannot be construed as an illegal act. Merely because the petitioner married another person, after the death of her previous husband, she cannot be said incompetent, to be the guardian of minor child and seeking custody of the child. 17. Mr. C. Suseendran, who married the petitioner has also filed an affidavit stating that he is willing to take care of the minor, Kaviyasri as a dutiful father, if the custody is given to the petitioner, mother of the minor and he assured that he along with the petitioner will take care of the welfare of the minor child and extend all support to the petitioner for the study and growth of the alleged detenue, Kaviyasri. The affidavit filed by the person, who subsequently married the petitioner would also strengthen the case of the petitioner. As Government is also taking a policy to encourage widows remarriage, holding the view that the mother is not entitled to have the custody, merely because she married another persons would be improper and against social justice. 18. In the instant case, the petitioner is admittedly the mother and natural guardian of the minor, Kaviyasri, whose father is no more. Solemnizing second marriage with another person after the death of her earlier husband is not an illegal or improper act. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the view that the claim of the petitioner is legally sustainable, when the claim is made by the mother and natural guardian, seeking custody and that there is no legal embargo for the petitioner in seeking the custody and further, the 13th respondent is not a similarly placed person, seeking custody of the child.” 24. In the present case, this Court has found on a detailed consideration of the matter that the third respondent, the minor's mother, Smt. Paramsheela and her husband, Sunil Patel appear to provide a congenial atmosphere to the minor, where she can be expected to blossom and grow up into a well groomed citizen. This Court has also borne in mind the fact that the mother is closer in her years to the minor than the grandmother, and, therefore, better suited to safeguard her welfare. The minor appears to be comfortable with the mother's husband, Sunil Patel. This Court has also borne in mind the fact that the mother is closer in her years to the minor than the grandmother, and, therefore, better suited to safeguard her welfare. The minor appears to be comfortable with the mother's husband, Sunil Patel. And above all, the mother is the minor's natural guardian, against whom this Court does not find any disentitling facts established by the grandmother. This Court may clarify that the determination about custody made here is summary. It is open to the grandmother, the first petitioner to establish a better right to custody, if so advised, before a Court of competent jurisdiction under the Guardians and Wards Act. If that course is adopted by the first petitioner, nothing said here, will affect the determination of parties' right by that Court in accordance with law, and on the basis of evidence led. 25. In the result, the rule nisi issued in this case, cannot be made absolute. The rule is discharged and this petition is dismissed. 26. The first petitioner is the grandmother of the minor. The minor's grandfather is also there. The minor is their deceased son's child. The grandparents have a right to meet and interact with their grand daughter. For the purpose, the mother shall accompany the minor to the grandparents abode and stay in town for three days, twice a year. During this period, the grandparents shall be freely permitted to interact with the minor. The grandparents in turn shall make suitable arrangement for the minor's mother to stay with them in their house, extending due courtesy to her. These two meetings with the grandparents per year shall take place, as far as possible, during the summer and the winter break for the Schools. Of course, it will be open to the parties to adjust the schedule of these meetings, but not so as to infringe the condition of the meeting between the grandparents and the minor taking place twice for three days each in one calendar year. This arrangement for the mother taking the minor to her grandparents has been made bearing in mind the grandparents' seniority and age.